Issue 10803: 'state of affairs' is an individual concept, not a thing (sbvr-ftf) Source: NIST (Mr. Edward J. Barkmeyer, edbark(at)nist.gov) Nature: Uncategorized Issue Severity: Summary: Name: 'state of affairs' is an individual concept, not a thing Doc: dtc/06-08-05 Date: August 2006 Version: Interim Convenience Document Chapter: 8.6 Description: The diagram in 8.6 says that a state of affairs is (intended to be) a thing, and 'actuality' is a state of affairs that occurs in the reference world. Both of these statements are incorrect. An actuality is indeed a 'thing'. A 'state of affairs' cannot be. The definition of fact type says that all its instances must be actualities. This implies that a possible state of affairs that is not an actuality does not correspond to any fact type. And that is correct, because a (possible) state of affairs is intrinsically conceptual. If one replaces the roles in a fact type with specific things, one gets a proposition, which, according to 8.6, 'corresponds to' a (potential) state of affairs. But that proposition must be a concept: it has an instance that is a state of affairs, and a state of affairs is a 'thing'. If it is impossible, that state of affairs is an instance of the proposition, but if it is actual, it is also an instance of the fact type. This makes no sense. The problem lies in trying to distinguish states of affairs from propositions and fact types. If one replaces the roles in a fact type with specific things, one gets a *specialization* of the fact type -- an individual concept. Therefore, a proposition must be an individual concept. That individual concept *is* a potential state of affairs, and an actuality is the thing it corresponds to, if any. Therefore, a 'state of affairs' is not a 'thing', it is an individual concept, and it is a synonym for 'proposition'. And an actuality is not a subtype of 'state of affairs'; it is rather the instance it corresponds to. Resolution: Deferred to second SBVR Revision Task Force because there were more foundational issues that had to be resolved first, and it was very important SBVR v1.1 out as soon as they were done. Disposition: Deferred Revised Text: Actions taken: March 5, 2007: received issue Discussion: End of Annotations:===== te: Mon, 05 Mar 2007 15:42:05 -0500 From: Ed Barkmeyer Reply-To: edbark@nist.gov Organization: NIST User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.7.2) Gecko/20040804 Netscape/7.2 (ax) X-Accept-Language: en, fr, de, pdf, it, nl, sv, es, ru To: issues@omg.org Subject: SBVR Issue - 'state of affairs' is an individual concept, not a thing X-MailScanner-Information: Please contact postmaster@mel.nist.gov for more information X-MailScanner: Found to be clean X-MailScanner-SpamCheck: X-MailScanner-From: edbark@nist.gov X-Spam-Status: No X-Virus-Scanned: by amavisd-new-20030616-p10 (Debian) at omg.org Name: 'state of affairs' is an individual concept, not a thing Doc: dtc/06-08-05 Date: August 2006 Version: Interim Convenience Document Chapter: 8.6 Description: The diagram in 8.6 says that a state of affairs is (intended to be) a thing, and 'actuality' is a state of affairs that occurs in the reference world. Both of these statements are incorrect. An actuality is indeed a 'thing'. A 'state of affairs' cannot be. The definition of fact type says that all its instances must be actualities. This implies that a possible state of affairs that is not an actuality does not correspond to any fact type. And that is correct, because a (possible) state of affairs is intrinsically conceptual. If one replaces the roles in a fact type with specific things, one gets a proposition, which, according to 8.6, 'corresponds to' a (potential) state of affairs. But that proposition must be a concept: it has an instance that is a state of affairs, and a state of affairs is a 'thing'. If it is impossible, that state of affairs is an instance of the proposition, but if it is actual, it is also an instance of the fact type. This makes no sense. The problem lies in trying to distinguish states of affairs from propositions and fact types. If one replaces the roles in a fact type with specific things, one gets a *specialization* of the fact type -- an individual concept. Therefore, a proposition must be an individual concept. That individual concept *is* a potential state of affairs, and an actuality is the thing it corresponds to, if any. Therefore, a 'state of affairs' is not a 'thing', it is an individual concept, and it is a synonym for 'proposition'. And an actuality is not a subtype of 'state of affairs'; it is rather the instance it corresponds to. -- Edward J. Barkmeyer Email: edbark@nist.gov National Institute of Standards & Technology Manufacturing Systems Integration Division 100 Bureau Drive, Stop 8263 Tel: +1 301-975-3528 Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8263 FAX: +1 301-975-4482 Date: Wed, 07 Mar 2007 18:34:56 -0500 From: Ed Barkmeyer Reply-To: edbark@nist.gov Organization: NIST User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.7.2) Gecko/20040804 Netscape/7.2 (ax) X-Accept-Language: en, fr, de, pdf, it, nl, sv, es, ru To: sbvr-ftf@omg.org Subject: Re: issue 10803 -- state of affairs X-MailScanner-Information: Please contact postmaster@mel.nist.gov for more information X-MailScanner: Found to be clean X-MailScanner-SpamCheck: X-MailScanner-From: edbark@nist.gov X-Spam-Status: No X-Virus-Scanned: by amavisd-new-20030616-p10 (Debian) at omg.org As of the end of today's telecon, I now realize that in SBVR every 'concept' is a 'thing'. This, and some other things I wrote in Issue 10803, are wrong. But 10803 is still correct that 'state of affairs' is a concept! An 'actuality' is an "event, activity, situation or circumstance". A state of affairs is a *concept of* an "event, activity, situation or circumstance". The instance of a 'state of affairs' (if there is one) is an 'actuality'. 8.6 says a 'state of affairs' can be actual, possible or impossible. That statement makes it a 'meaning'. An actuality is not a meaning, so it cannot be a specialization of a state of affairs. To clean up the Issue: The diagram in 8.6 says that a state of affairs is (intended to be) a thing, and 'actuality' is a state of affairs that occurs in the reference world. Both of these statements are incorrect. An actuality is indeed a 'thing'. A 'state of affairs' cannot be. A state of affairs is a thing, only because all concepts are things. The important aspect here is that: 1) an actuality is a thing that is NOT a concept. 2) a state of affairs is a concept. 3) an actuality is not a kind of state of affairs; it is an instance of one. The definition of fact type says that all its instances must be actualities. This implies that a possible state of affairs that is not an actuality does not correspond to any fact type. And that is correct, because a (possible) state of affairs is intrinsically conceptual. In view of Issue 10801 and our late discussion today, a state of affairs characterizes an actuality in which roles are apparently not distinguished. That makes it a noun concept. And it may be related to a fact type, viz.: If one replaces the roles in a fact type with specific things, one gets a proposition, which, according to 8.6, 'corresponds to' a (potential) state of affairs. One actually gets both a proposition and a (conceptual) state of affairs. But their relationship not 'meaning corresponds to thing'. 'Proposition' and 'state of affairs' are both conceptualizations of actualities. In logic, a 'proposition' differs by being a 'sentential form', while the state of affairs is just a noun phrase. And I think that is the SBVR intent as well. But that proposition must be a concept: it has an instance that is a state of affairs, and a state of affairs is a 'thing'. If it is impossible, that state of affairs is an instance of the proposition, but if it is actual, it is also an instance of the fact type. This makes no sense. The problem lies in trying to distinguish states of affairs from propositions and fact types. Actually the problem lies in my being confused. In SBVR, every 'meaning' can have instances. Thus a given actuality can simultaneously be an instance of - a proposition - a fact type - a noun concept, e.g. a state of affairs If one replaces the roles in a fact type with specific things, one gets a *specialization* of the fact type -- an individual concept. Therefore, a proposition must be an individual concept. This is a cute idea, but it is wrong. It assumes that the relationship between fact types and propositions must be of the type/instance or type/subtype variety. In fact, the relationship between a proposition and a fact type is "closure". A fact type is a sentential form that has "unbound" roles (variables). A proposition is a sentential form in which all the roles are bound to things. The SBVR distinction between proposition and concept captures the essence of the sentential form: a proposition is either true or false; a concept is never either of those. That individual concept *is* a potential state of affairs, and an actuality is the thing it corresponds to, if any. Close. The proposition is not an individual concept; the state of affairs is the individual concept, since it can have at most one corresponding actuality in a given world. The state of affairs is the noun concept that "mirrors" the proposition. (We don't have a fact type for this relationship, and we have already used 'corresponds to' and 'nominalizes' for other transforms.) Therefore, a 'state of affairs' is not a 'thing', it is an individual concept, and it is a synonym for 'proposition'. From the above, a 'state of affairs' is an individual concept. All the rest of this sentence is wrong. And an actuality is not a subtype of 'state of affairs'; it is rather the instance it corresponds to. This sentence is correct. -Ed P.S. Note also that the fact type as "a sentential form that has unbound roles" is what distinguishes it from noun concepts (issue 10801). Actually, I would have said that sentential forms are not concepts -- a sentential form is not a "unit of knowledge that embodies a set of characteristics". But that is not really relevant to this issue. -- Edward J. Barkmeyer Email: edbark@nist.gov National Institute of Standards & Technology Manufacturing Systems Integration Division 100 Bureau Drive, Stop 8263 Tel: +1 301-975-3528 Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8263 FAX: +1 301-975-4694 "The opinions expressed above do not reflect consensus of NIST, and have not been reviewed by any Government authority." Date: Thu, 25 Jun 2009 18:49:59 -0400 From: Ed Barkmeyer Reply-To: edbark@nist.gov Organization: NIST User-Agent: Thunderbird 2.0.0.21 (Windows/20090302) To: SBVR RTF Subject: Issue 10803 -- and John Hall's issue X-MailScanner-Information: Please contact postmaster@mel.nist.gov for more information X-NISTMEL-MailScanner-ID: n5PMo7TS003939 X-MailScanner: Found to be clean X-MailScanner-SpamCheck: X-MailScanner-From: edbark@nist.gov X-MailScanner-Watermark: 1246575009.06481@wP0qjhHFyktBbaqMlRxXVw X-Spam-Status: No I see that in today's conference call, I repeated myself. My thanks to Donald for putting Issue 10803 on the agenda. It does seem to be relevant to John Hall's issue. What is not mentioned below is what I added today. That Terry introduced 'state of affairs' to mean the "objectification" of a proposition as a thing in the Universe of Discourse, so that the state of affairs, whether it is actual or not, can be classified by noun concepts and can play various roles in other verb concepts. This has nothing to do with real or imaginary; it has only to do with our ability to use it as a Thing, an instance of some concept in a universe of discourse. (And I think that in that universe of discourse relationship to a World is a specific fact-type. That is, in that UoD, "there exists x" has nothing to with actuality. In that UoD, actuality is not a subtype of state of affairs, either. There is some fact type that relates a state of affairs to an actuality in a given world.) So I take Donald's point that we are conflating two ideas: existence in the UoD, and existence/actuality in a given World. Whether there is a Santa Claus or not depends on which of those you are talking about. Business people don't usually conflate these -- operations people don't talk about imaginary things, and planning people distinguish the concerns. But as I said, this is philosophically messy. If we want to get a consistent omelette, we are going to break some eggs. -Ed -------- Original Message -------- Subject: issue 10803 -- SBVR FTF issue Date: Wed, 07 Mar 2007 16:07:17 -0500 From: Juergen Boldt To: issues@omg.org, sbvr-ftf@omg.org Date: Mon, 05 Mar 2007 15:42:05 -0500 From: Ed Barkmeyer Reply-To: edbark@nist.gov Organization: NIST Name: 'state of affairs' is an individual concept, not a thing Doc: dtc/06-08-05 Date: August 2006 Version: Interim Convenience Document Chapter: 8.6 Description: The diagram in 8.6 says that a state of affairs is (intended to be) a thing, and 'actuality' is a state of affairs that occurs in the reference world. Both of these statements are incorrect. An actuality is indeed a 'thing'. A 'state of affairs' cannot be. The definition of fact type says that all its instances must be actualities. This implies that a possible state of affairs that is not an actuality does not correspond to any fact type. And that is correct, because a (possible) state of affairs is intrinsically conceptual. If one replaces the roles in a fact type with specific things, one gets a proposition, which, according to 8.6, 'corresponds to' a (potential) state of affairs. But that proposition must be a concept: it has an instance that is a state of affairs, and a state of affairs is a 'thing'. If it is impossible, that state of affairs is an instance of the proposition, but if it is actual, it is also an instance of the fact type. This makes no sense. The problem lies in trying to distinguish states of affairs from propositions and fact types. If one replaces the roles in a fact type with specific things, one gets a *specialization* of the fact type -- an individual concept. Therefore, a proposition must be an individual concept. That individual concept *is* a potential state of affairs, and an actuality is the thing it corresponds to, if any. Therefore, a 'state of affairs' is not a 'thing', it is an individual concept, and it is a synonym for 'proposition'. And an actuality is not a subtype of 'state of affairs'; it is rather the instance it corresponds to. -- Edward J. Barkmeyer Email: edbark@nist.gov National Institute of Standards & Technology Manufacturing Systems Integration Division 100 Bureau Drive, Stop 8263 Tel: +1 301-975-3528 Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8263 FAX: +1 301-975-4482 Juergen Boldt Director, Member Services Object Management Group 140 Kendrick St Building A Suite 300 Needham, MA 02494 USA tel: +1 781 444 0404 x 132 fax: +1 781 444 0320 email: juergen@omg.org X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10432:5.7.7855,1.0.260,0.0.0000 definitions=2012-08-07_03:2012-08-07,2012-08-07,1970-01-01 signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=notspam policy=default score=0 spamscore=0 ipscore=0 suspectscore=0 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=6.0.2-1203120001 definitions=main-1208070151 From: keri Subject: SBVR Issue 10803 Date: Tue, 07 Aug 2012 08:51:48 -0700 Cc: sbvr-rtf@omg.org, Donald Chapin To: Ed Barkmeyer X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.1084) Hi, Ed, I'm trying to locate the latest Issue document for 10803. The only one I've found (attached) is dated June 25 2009. Have you sent out an update? It is so old that any email threads about it appear to have rolled off my local email client. Does the write-up still reflect the issue as you see it today? Thanks! ~ Keri Hi, Ed, I'm trying to locate the latest Issue document for 10803. The only one I've found (attached) is dated June 25 2009. Have you sent out an update? It is so old that any email threads about it appear to have rolled off my local email client. Does the write-up still reflect the issue as you see it today? Thanks! ~ Keri Issue10803.doc Disposition: Resolved OMG Issue No: 10803 Title: 'state of affairs' is an individual concept, not a thing Source: Ed Barkmeyer, NIST Summary: The diagram in 8.6 says that a state of affairs is (intended to be) a thing, and 'actuality' is a state of affairs that occurs in the reference world. Both of these statements are incorrect. An actuality is indeed a 'thing'. A 'state of affairs' cannot be. The definition of fact type says that all its instances must be actualities. This implies that a possible state of affairs that is not an actuality does not correspond to any fact type. And that is correct, because a (possible) state of affairs is intrinsically conceptual. If one replaces the roles in a fact type with specific things, one gets a proposition, which, according to 8.6, 'corresponds to' a (potential) state of affairs. But that proposition must be a concept: it has an instance that is a state of affairs, and a state of affairs is a 'thing'. If it is impossible, that state of affairs is an instance of the proposition, but if it is actual, it is also an instance of the fact type. This makes no sense. The problem lies in trying to distinguish states of affairs from propositions and fact types. If one replaces the roles in a fact type with specific things, one gets a *specialization* of the fact type -- an individual concept. Therefore, a proposition must be an individual concept. That individual concept *is* a potential state of affairs, and an actuality is the thing it corresponds to, if any. Therefore, a 'state of affairs' is not a 'thing', it is an individual concept, and it is a synonym for 'proposition'. And an actuality is not a subtype of 'state of affairs'; it is rather the instance it corresponds to. Resolution: Xxx Disposition: Resolved From: "Donald Chapin" To: Subject: RE: issue 10803 -- SBVR FTF issue Date: Wed, 8 Aug 2012 15:01:14 +0100 X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook 14.0 Thread-Index: Acdg/L6njas9mQ0LROKasJyQ0rU/lowo4aWA X-Mirapoint-IP-Reputation: reputation=Fair-1, source=Queried, refid=tid=0001.0A0B0302.5022712C.005C, actions=tag X-Junkmail-Premium-Raw: score=7/50, refid=2.7.2:2012.8.8.133332:17:7.944, ip=81.149.51.65, rules=__HAS_FROM, __TO_MALFORMED_2, __TO_NO_NAME, __BOUNCE_CHALLENGE_SUBJ, __BOUNCE_NDR_SUBJ_EXEMPT, __SUBJ_ALPHA_END, __HAS_MSGID, __SANE_MSGID, __MIME_VERSION, __CT, __CTYPE_HAS_BOUNDARY, __CTYPE_MULTIPART, __CTYPE_MULTIPART_MIXED, __HAS_X_MAILER, __OUTLOOK_MUA_1, __USER_AGENT_MS_GENERIC, __ANY_URI, __FRAUD_CONTACT_NUM, __STOCK_PHRASE_24, __FRAUD_CONTACT_NAME, __CP_URI_IN_BODY, __C230066_P5, __HTML_MSWORD, __HTML_FONT_BLUE, __HAS_HTML, BODY_SIZE_10000_PLUS, BODYTEXTH_SIZE_10000_LESS, __MIME_HTML, __TAG_EXISTS_HTML, __STYLE_RATWARE_2, RDNS_GENERIC_POOLED, HTML_50_70, RDNS_SUSP_GENERIC, __OUTLOOK_MUA, RDNS_SUSP, FORGED_MUA_OUTLOOK X-Junkmail-Status: score=10/50, host=c2beaomr09.btconnect.com X-Junkmail-Signature-Raw: score=unknown, refid=str=0001.0A0B020A.50227138.0047,ss=1,re=0.000,fgs=0, ip=0.0.0.0, so=2011-07-25 19:15:43, dmn=2011-05-27 18:58:46, mode=multiengine X-Junkmail-IWF: false All . Attached is a draft resolution for Issue 10803 that is part of the package of five that addresses the .state of affairs. question. Donald From: Juergen Boldt [mailto:juergen@omg.org] Sent: 07 March 2007 21:07 To: issues@omg.org; sbvr-ftf@omg.org Subject: issue 10803 -- SBVR FTF issue Date: Mon, 05 Mar 2007 15:42:05 -0500 From: Ed Barkmeyer Reply-To: edbark@nist.gov Organization: NIST User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.7.2) Gecko/20040804 Netscape/7.2 (ax) X-Accept-Language: en, fr, de, pdf, it, nl, sv, es, ru To: issues@omg.org Subject: SBVR Issue - 'state of affairs' is an individual concept, not a thing X-MailScanner-Information: Please contact postmaster@mel.nist.gov for more information X-MailScanner: Found to be clean X-MailScanner-SpamCheck: X-MailScanner-From: edbark@nist.gov X-Spam-Status: No X-Virus-Scanned: by amavisd-new-20030616-p10 (Debian) at omg.org Name: 'state of affairs' is an individual concept, not a thing Doc: dtc/06-08-05 Date: August 2006 Version: Interim Convenience Document Chapter: 8.6 Description: The diagram in 8.6 says that a state of affairs is (intended to be) a thing, and 'actuality' is a state of affairs that occurs in the reference world. Both of these statements are incorrect. An actuality is indeed a 'thing'. A 'state of affairs' cannot be. The definition of fact type says that all its instances must be actualities. This implies that a possible state of affairs that is not an actuality does not correspond to any fact type. And that is correct, because a (possible) state of affairs is intrinsically conceptual. If one replaces the roles in a fact type with specific things, one gets a proposition, which, according to 8.6, 'corresponds to' a (potential) state of affairs. But that proposition must be a concept: it has an instance that is a state of affairs, and a state of affairs is a 'thing'. If it is impossible, that state of affairs is an instance of the proposition, but if it is actual, it is also an instance of the fact type. This makes no sense. The problem lies in trying to distinguish states of affairs from propositions and fact types. If one replaces the roles in a fact type with specific things, one gets a *specialization* of the fact type -- an individual concept. Therefore, a proposition must be an individual concept. That individual concept *is* a potential state of affairs, and an actuality is the thing it corresponds to, if any. Therefore, a 'state of affairs' is not a 'thing', it is an individual concept, and it is a synonym for 'proposition'. And an actuality is not a subtype of 'state of affairs'; it is rather the instance it corresponds to. -- Edward J. Barkmeyer Email: edbark@nist.gov National Institute of Standards & Technology Manufacturing Systems Integration Division 100 Bureau Drive, Stop 8263 Tel: +1 301-975-3528 Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8263 FAX: +1 301-975-4482 Juergen Boldt Director, Member Services Object Management Group 140 Kendrick St Building A Suite 300 Needham, MA 02494 USA tel: +1 781 444 0404 x 132 fax: +1 781 444 0320 email: juergen@omg.org www.omg.org SBVR Issues 10803 Draft Resolution (2012-08-08).docx Disposition: Resolved OMG Issue No: 10803 Title: 'state of affairs' is an individual concept, not a thing Source: Ed Barkmeyer, edbark@nist.gov Summary: The diagram in 8.6 says that a state of affairs is (intended to be) a thing, and 'actuality' is a state of affairs that occurs in the reference world. Both of these statements are incorrect. An actuality is indeed a 'thing'. A 'state of affairs' cannot be. The definition of fact type says that all its instances must be actualities. This implies that a possible state of affairs that is not an actuality does not correspond to any fact type. And that is correct, because a (possible) state of affairs is intrinsically conceptual. If one replaces the roles in a fact type with specific things, one gets a proposition, which, according to 8.6, 'corresponds to' a (potential) state of affairs. But that proposition must be a concept: it has an instance that is a state of affairs, and a state of affairs is a 'thing'. If it is impossible, that state of affairs is an instance of the proposition, but if it is actual, it is also an instance of the fact type. This makes no sense. The problem lies in trying to distinguish states of affairs from propositions and fact types. If one replaces the roles in a fact type with specific things, one gets a *specialization* of the fact type -- an individual concept. Therefore, a proposition must be an individual concept. That individual concept *is* a potential state of affairs, and an actuality is the thing it corresponds to, if any. Therefore, a 'state of affairs' is not a 'thing', it is an individual concept, and it is a synonym for 'proposition'. And an actuality is not a subtype of 'state of affairs'; it is rather the instance it corresponds to. Resolution: The definition of .state of affairs. does not say that each state of affairs is a concept of an event, activity, situation, or circumstance; it says that it is an event, activity, situation, or circumstance. It is implied that the event, activity, situation, or circumstance is in the universe of discourse; i.e., the world of the organization that owns the vocabulary in question. Whatever else .states of affairs. may mean in other contexts, in SBVR .states of affairs. are defined to be things in the universe of discourse and not individual concepts in an SBVR vocabulary. 1. Clarify .state of affairs by adding two Notes to the .state of affairs entry and providing a Dictionary Basis for the four terms in its extensional definition, and Dictionary Basis and Note for event, activity, situation and circumstance. 2. Bring the Necessity regarding the relationship of proposition and state of affairs in line with the new definition of proposition in SBVR v1.1. 3. Define the implicit and often referenced verb concept .proposition corresponds to state of affairs. that is a subset of the verb concept .meaning corresponds to thing. to make it clear that the state of affairs is .the event, activity, situation, or circumstance in the universe of discourse which is talked about by the statement that expresses the proposition that corresponds to the state of affairs.. 4. Replace all uses of the word .exist. with respect to .state of affairs. except in Clause 8 with .can be talked about by a statement expressed by the proposition that corresponds to it.. 5. Change the definition of .verb concept. to specialize the concept .state of affairs. to make it possible to structure propositions that are not know to correspond to actualities without having to use objectifications. This also resolves Issue 14849 which is merged into this Issue. 6. Add a Note to explain how states of affairs that are not actual can be referred to by using objectifications (Clause 9). 7. Add .state of affairs concept. as a synonym for .verb concept objectification. and make it the preferred term. 8. Add the three .objectification. approach verb concepts missing from the Date-Time Vocabulary as shown in this .Objectification vs. Nominalization Approach. table. Support for Objectification for State of Affairs SBVR Objectification Approach DTV Nominalization Approach state of affairs is actual (already part of SBVR) situation model is realized state of affairs occurs or is thought of as occurring for time interval situation model occurs for time interval state of affairs occurs or is thought of as occurring throughout time interval situation model occurs throughout time interval state of affairs occurs or is thought of as occurring within time interval situation model occurs within time interval Revised Text: Replace the .state of affairs. entry in Clause 8.5 on printed page 40: state of affairs FL Definition: event, activity, situation, or circumstance Reference Scheme: a proposition that corresponds to the state of affairs Note: A state of affairs can be possible or impossible. Some of the possible ones are actualities. A proposition corresponds to a state of affairs. A state of affairs either occurs or does not occur, whereas a proposition is either true or false. A state of affairs is not a meaning. It is a thing that exists and can be an instance of a concept, even if it does not happen. Example: EU-Rent owning 10,000 rental cars is a state of affairs to which the proposition .EU-Rent owns 10,000 rental cars., corresponds. Example: It being obligatory that each rental have at most three additional drivers is a state of affairs to which the rule, .Each rental must have at most three additional drivers., corresponds. WITH state of affairs FL Definition: res that is an event, activity, situation or circumstance Definition: A possibility, actuality or impossibility of the kind expressed by a nominalization of a declarative sentence. Example: This die comes up six. may be nominalized by .that this die comes up six. or .this die.s coming up six.. The resulting nominalizations might be interpreted as naming corresponding propositions or states of affairs respectively. Source: CDP: state of affairs Reference Scheme: a proposition that corresponds to the state of affairs Note: Propositions have two references: .a closed logical formulation that means the proposition.; and .a statement of the proposition.. In SBVR reference schemes work transitively, so either reference scheme for proposition also serves as a reference scheme for .state of affairs.. Note: Event is understood in the definition of .state of affairs in its common English meaning: happening or thought of as happening [SOED] Note: Activity is understood in the definition of .state of affairs in its common English meaning : thing that a person or group does or has done; actions by a group in order to achieve their aims [NODE] Activity. is that which is done, independent of any given doing or occurrence in time or location in space. Activities can also be done by animals or machines Note: situation is understood in the definition of .state of affairs in its common English meaning: relative position or combination of circumstances at a certain moment [MWU] .Situation. is the set of circumstances, independent of whether or not this set of circumstances are actual and independent of any occurrence in time or location in space. Note: circumstance is understood in the definition of .state of affairs in its common English meaning: a condition connected with or relevant to an event or action [NODE] .Circumstance. is a condition, independent of whether or not the condition is actual, and independent of any occurrence in time or location in space. Note: A state of affairs can be possible or impossible. Some of the possible ones are actualities. A proposition corresponds to a state of affairs. A state of affairs either occurs or does not occur, whereas a proposition is either true or false. A state of affairs is not a meaning. It is a thing that exists and can be an instance of a concept, even if it does not happen. Note: SBVR defines .thing. as anything perceivable or conceivable. A conceivable situation might be actual or not. It might have been actual in the past, not actual in the present and actual again in the future. It might be wanted, whether actual or not. It might occur intermittently. It might be obligated. State of affairs that are not actual are involved in actualities. E.g., each instance of the verb concept (from SBVR 12.4.1) .element of guidance obligates state of affairs. is an actuality, regardless of whether that element of guidance is an operative rule that is being violated. If the rule is violated, the obligated state of affairs is not an actuality. But that state of affairs, despite failing to be actual, fills the .state of affairs. verb concept role in the instances of the verb concept .element of guidance obligates state of affairs., and those instances is an actuality. Note: There is an important difference between a conceived thing and the concept that corresponds to that thing. For example, a possible world is a conceived thing. It is also a state of affairs. But a possible world is not a concept. It is an instance of the concept .possible world. and also an instance of the more general concept .state of affairs.. Example: EU-Rent.s owning 10,000 rental cars is a state of affairs to which the proposition .EU-Rent owns 10,000 rental cars., corresponds. Example: Its being obligatory that each rental has at most three additional drivers is a state of affairs to which the rule, .Each rental must have at most three additional drivers., corresponds. REMOVE the entire entry for .state of affair. in Clause 10.1.2 on printed page 119 because it.s been incorporated into the Clause 8 .state of affairs. entry as a synonymous definition Add the following verb concept after the .state of affairs. entry in Clause 8.5 on printed page 40: statement denotes state of affairs Definition: the statement indicates the state of affairs that is corresponded to by the proposition that is expressed by the statement REPLACE this Necessity in Clause 8.5.2 on printed page 42: Each proposition corresponds to at most one state of affairs WITH Each proposition corresponds to exactly one state of affairs ADD this Necessity in Clause 8.5.2 on printed page 42 immediately after . Each proposition corresponds to at most one state of affairs.: Each state of affairs corresponds to exactly one proposition ADD the following concept entries immediately after the .state of affairs. entry in Clause 8.5 on printed page no. 40: proposition corresponds to state of affairs General Concept: .meaning corresponds to thing. Definition: the state of affairs is a 1:1 correspondence to a proposition and makes the proposition true if actual and false if not actual Note: The following principles govern the relationship of propositions and their statements to possible worlds and their states of affairs: . Every clause in an English sentence has one verb which has a time that is determined by the tense and aspects of the verb with all combinations relative to a present time. . The present time that each verb is related to is an indexical and is not a specific time. . Each possible world in SBVR has at most one present time; i.e. some possible worlds take no interest in time e.g. mathematics . Each possible world can have many past times and future times but all are with reference to its present time. . The present time for each verb in each clause in the English sentence becomes specific when you relate the sentence to a possible world to ask if is it true or false in that possible world. The present time in the sentence becomes specific to the .present time. of the possible world being considered to determine the truth-value. . Different possible worlds can give different truth-values to the same proposition (i.e. the meaning) based on what the present time of a given possible world is , plus other factors. ADD a Note after the existing Note in the entry for .state of affairs is actual. in Clause 8.5 on printed page no. 41: Note: If a state of affairs is perceivable (real) in a possible world, it is actual. If it is only conceivable (planned, talked about) and not perceivable in a possible world, it is not actual. Note: Whether or not a state of affairs is actual does not depend on .how many times there are in a possible world.. Per any reasonable concept system usable by a business, a possible world does not have more than one present. In SBVR, in keeping with linguistics, for each possible world there is at most one present time, and as many past times and future times as are perceived or conceived. Past and future states should not be confused with possible worlds, even though there are similarities. A possible world can include many states, including the state of something having happened at a certain past time and the state that something will or might happen at a particular future time. Each different present time is a potential different possible world. Once a proposition is related to a given possible and its present time, the state of affairs that corresponds to that proposition can be determined tobe actual or not actual by examining the possible world. See the note on .principles that govern the relationship of propositions and their statements to possible worlds and their states of affairs. under the entry for .proposition corresponds to state of affairs.. REPLACE the last sentence in the Note in the entry for .possible world. in Clause 10.1.2 on printed page 117: Thus, in the context of a static constraint declared for a given business domain, a .possible world. would correspond to (but not be identical to) a state of the domain.s fact model that could exist at some point in time. WITH: Given that its context is organizations and their business, SBVR considers a given .possible world. linguistically such that it has one present time, whatever that may be, and as many past times and future times as are perceived or conceived in relation to the present time. REPLACE the word .exists in the Note under the entry for .state of affairs. in Clause 8.5 on printed page 40 WITH the phrase .is talked about by a statement of the proposition that corresponds to it. In the Note under the entry for .state of affairs is actual. in Clause 8.5 on printed page 40: . REPLACE the word .exists. WITH the phrase .being talked about by a statement of the proposition that corresponds to it. . REPLACE the phrase .can exist. WITH the phrase .can be talked about by a statement of the proposition that corresponds to it. In the Example under the entry for .state of affairs is actual. in Clause 8.5 on printed page 41: . REPLACE both occurrences of word .exists. WITH the phrase .can be talked about by a statement of the proposition that corresponds to it. In the Note under the entry for .actuality. in Clause 8.5 on printed page 41: . REPLACE the word .exists. WITH the phrase .can be talked about by a statement of the proposition that corresponds to it. Replace the current entry for .verb concept. in in Clause 8.1.1 on printed page 21: verb concept Definition: concept that specializes the concept .actuality. and that is the meaning of a verb phrase that involves one or more roles Note: Each instance of a verb concept is an actuality. For each instance, each role of the verb concept is one point of involvement of something in that actuality. Note: Two verb concept definitions define the same verb concept if they reveal the same incorporated characteristics and the same verb concept roles. Concept Type: concept type Necessity: Each verb concept has at least one role. Necessity: Each verb concept is a concept that specializes the concept .actuality.. Reference Scheme: a verb concept wording of the verb concept Reference Scheme: a closed projection that defines the verb concept WITH: verb concept Definition: concept that specializes the concept .state of affairs. and that is the meaning of a verb phrase that involves one or more roles Definition: string of symbols from the alphabet of the formal language that conforms to the grammar of the formal language of predicate logic with at least one free variable. Note: A propositional function becomes a proposition when it is closed; it is closed either by generalization or instantiation, that is, either by binding free variables or replacing them with constants. Synonym: [logic] propositional function Source: [SubeGFOL]: Propositional function, Wff Note: Each instance of a verb concept is a state of affairs. For each instance, each role of the verb concept is one point of involvement of something in that state of affairs. Note: Two verb concept definitions define the same verb concept if they reveal the same incorporated characteristics and the same verb concept roles. Concept Type: concept type Necessity: Each verb concept has at least one role. Necessity: Each verb concept is a concept that specializes the concept .state of affairs.. Necessity: The definition that represents the verb concept is consistent with and defines exactly the complete set of propositions that can be created by quantifying each verb concept role of the verb concept Reference Scheme: a verb concept wording of the verb concept Reference Scheme: a closed projection that defines the verb concept ADD two synonyms at the end of the entry for concept .verb concept objectification. in Clause 11.1.5.3. on printed page no. 155: Synonym: objectifying noun concept Synonym: state of affairs concept ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- The entries below would normally go in the Date-Time Vocabulary, but are needed in SBVR to support SBVR semantics as a supplement the Date-Time Vocabulary until the DTV RTF includes them in the Date-Time Vocabulary specification: Add the following concepts: state of affairs occurs within time interval Definition: the state of affairs occurs or is thought of as occurring within the time interval Necessity: It is necessary that each statement of the proposition that corresponds to the state of affairs does not already include occurring at a time interval or a point in time Possibility: It is possible that a state of affairs does not occur and is not thought of as occurring within any time interval Possibility: It is possible that a state of affairs that qualifies to play the role in this verb concept occurs or is thought of as occurring within many time intervals Synonymous Form: state of affairs within time interval Synonymous Form: state of affairs in time interval Synonymous Form: state of affairs at time interval Synonymous Form: state of affairs during time interval Example: The state of affairs "soldiers are engaged in battle. occurred within the time interval that has the time coordinate "14 October 1066". Example: "Flight 70 landed in Minneapolis at 9:12 on May 13, 2011." point in time Definition: specific instant of time with no duration state of affairs occurs at point in time Definition: the state of affairs occurs or is thought of as occurring at the point in time Necessity: It is necessary that each statement of the proposition that corresponds to the state of affairs does not already include occurring at a time interval or a point in time Possibility: It is possible that a state of affairs does not occur and is not thought of as occurring at any point in time Possibility: It is possible that a state of affairs that qualifies to play the role in this verb concept occurs or is thought of as occurring at many points in time Note: The proposition corresponding to the state of affairs and the point in time may uniquely identify an instantaneous event. location Definition: particular place or position in three-dimensional space state of affairs occurs at location Definition: the state of affairs occurs or is thought of as occurring at the location Necessity: It is necessary that each statement of the proposition that corresponds to the state of affairs does not already include occurring at location Possibility: It is possible that a state of affairs does not occur and is not thought of as occurring at any location Possibility: It is possible that a state of affairs that qualifies to play the role in this verb concept occurs or is thought of as occurring at many locations event with duration concept Definition: general concept that objectifies a given verb concept that has an extension that includes only things that are occurrence or thought of as occurring of a state of affairs that occurs or is thought of as occurring within exactly one time interval and/or exactly one location Concept Type: concept type Dictionary Basis: event: happening or thought of as happening [SOED] Note: state of affairs plays the role of WHAT happens or is thought of as happening in state of affairs occurs or is thought of as occurring within exactly one time interval. and/or exactly one location instantaneous event concept Definition: general concept that objectifies a given verb concept that has an extension that includes only things that are occurrence or thought of as occurring of a state of affairs that occurs or is thought of as occurring at exactly one point in time and/or exactly one location General Concept: Concept Type: concept type Dictionary Basis: event: happening or thought of as happening [SOED] Note: state of affairs plays the role of WHAT happens or is thought of as happening in state of affairs occurs or is thought of as occurring at exactly one point in time. and/or exactly one location Note: An .instantaneous event. is an event that is thought of and dealt with as happening at a single point in time. Example: Like event in BPMN 2.0 Example: Like TimeEvent [13.3.27] in UML Superstructure 2.4.1 activity concept Definition: general concept that objectifies a given verb concept that has an extension that includes only things that are activities Concept Type: concept type Dictionary Basis: activity: thing that a person or group does or has done; actions taken by a group in order to achieve their aims [NODE] Note: .Activity. is that which is done, independent of any given doing or time interval or location in space. situation concept Definition: general concept that objectifies a given verb concept that has an extension that includes only things that are situations Concept Type: concept type Dictionary Basis: situation: relative position or combination of circumstances at a certain moment [MWU] Note: .Situation. is the set of circumstances, independent of whether or not this set of circumstances are actual and independent of any time interval or location in space. Disposition: Resolved Date: Wed, 8 Aug 2012 13:01:05 -0400 From: Ed Barkmeyer Reply-To: Organization: NIST User-Agent: Thunderbird 2.0.0.23 (Windows/20090812) To: Donald Chapin CC: "sbvr-ftf@omg.org" Subject: Re: issue 10803 -- SBVR FTF issue X-NISTMEL-MailScanner-Information: Please contact postmaster@mel.nist.gov for more information X-NISTMEL-MailScanner-ID: q78H1B2v022812 X-NISTMEL-MailScanner: Found to be clean X-NISTMEL-MailScanner-SpamCheck: X-NISTMEL-MailScanner-From: edbark@nist.gov X-NISTMEL-MailScanner-Watermark: 1345050080.41799@9X/epDWv9mLos/wx/tOWVQ X-Spam-Status: No Donald Chapin wrote: All . Attached is a draft resolution for Issue 10803 that is part of the package of five that addresses the .state of affairs. question. Donald The proposed definitions of state of affairs are mutually contradictory: Definition: res that is an event, activity, situation or circumstance Definition: A possibility, actuality or impossibility of the kind expressed by a nominalization of a declarative sentence. No event, activity or situation that exists as a res in a given possible world is impossible. By definition, an impossible situation cannot exist in (i.e, be part of) a possible world. A kind of event, and a kind of situation, can be impossible, in exactly the same way that some concepts cannot ever be instantiated. So, if you mean 'kind of situation' instead of 'situation', say that. The nominalization of a declarative sentence makes the sentence or its meaning (pick one) a thing that exists in the domain of discourse, i.e., a thing that exists in the possible world. Every sentence or meaning can logically exist in any domain of discourse the moment that it is uttered or conceived. Nominalization just treats the sentence as a representation of the meaning/proposition thing rather than as a reference to its truth value or to anything else it may be said to correspond to, such as an 'actuality'. So the foundation of the house of cards that is this would-be issue resolution is two contradictory definitions: A state of affairs is a thing that is not a meaning; a state of affairs is a meaning treated as a thing. After 5 years, SBVR still conflates two concepts -- 'situation' and 'kind of situation' ('res' and 'description of res'). And each revision begets more meaningless text and terminology that doesn't end the conflation. The text of this resolution demonstrates that an SBVR state of affairs is in fact EITHER a meaning or a res. The term 'state of affairs' refers to the union. There are many technical approaches to making the distinction, but no 'situation' is ever a 'kind of situation' and no 'kind of situation' is ever a 'situation'. As used in SBVR, 'state of affairs' is the union of 'situation' ('actuality') and 'kind of situation' (possible situation, impossible situation, etc.). And that union has no useful properties. Its sole property is that it is whatever can be represented by a sentence -- the concept and the instance. The model in DTV (and Davidson and Zalta and Sowa, and BPMN and ISO PSL and UML) makes the distinction and that distinction enables a viable formal basis. SBVR 'state of affairs' can continue to be the union of 'situation concept' and 'occurrence', and SBVR can say whatever it pleases about it, but it will be ignored by anyone who needs a formal logical basis for situations as things. If you don't intend to make the distinction, then don't write any more meaningless or contradictory text. NIST will vote No on any resolution that does not make the distinction between situations and kinds of situations. -Ed -- Edward J. Barkmeyer Email: edbark@nist.gov National Institute of Standards & Technology Manufacturing Systems Integration Division 100 Bureau Drive, Stop 8263 Tel: +1 301-975-3528 Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8263 Cel: +1 240-672-5800 "The opinions expressed above do not reflect consensus of NIST, and have not been reviewed by any Government authority." To: date-time-ftf@omg.org Subject: RE: issue 10803 -- SBVR FTF issue X-KeepSent: 117B66B0:4BDE7FC9-85257A54:006B5206; type=4; name=$KeepSent X-Mailer: Lotus Notes Release 8.5.3 September 15, 2011 From: Mark H Linehan Date: Wed, 8 Aug 2012 15:51:31 -0400 X-MIMETrack: Serialize by Router on D01MC604/01/M/IBM(Release 8.5.3 ZX853HP5|January 12, 2012) at 08/08/2012 15:51:32, Serialize complete at 08/08/2012 15:51:32 X-Content-Scanned: Fidelis XPS MAILER x-cbid: 12080819-5806-0000-0000-0000182CDC36 The last part of this proposed resolution contains a set of concepts that are in the scope of the Date-Time Vocabulary, not SBVR. They should be struck from the issue. The concept 'point in time' (as defined in this proposed resolution) is explicitly rejected in the Date-Time Vocabulary. Date-Time Vocabulary says that every 'time interval' has a duration, however small. The proposed 'state of affairs occurs within time interval' is defined in terms of itself. More importantly, a definition that includes '... or is thought of as occurring ..." gets SBVR even further into the philosophical issue of whether concepts are in the mind or are in the real world. And if I think a particular state of affairs is thought of as occurring within some time interval and you don't think of it, then does the relationship exist or not? There is no reason given for defining concepts such as "event with duration', 'instantaneous event concept', 'activity concept', and 'situation concept'. If there is a reason for these concepts, then it would be better to start by formally defining each of 'event', 'situation', 'circumstance', or 'activity'. -------------------------------- Mark H. Linehan STSM, IBM Research From: "Donald Chapin" To: , Date: 08/08/2012 10:07 AM Subject: RE: issue 10803 -- SBVR FTF issue -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- All . Attached is a draft resolution for Issue 10803 that is part of the package of five that addresses the âstate of affairsâ question. Donald From: Juergen Boldt [mailto:juergen@omg.org] Sent: 07 March 2007 21:07 To: issues@omg.org; sbvr-ftf@omg.org Subject: issue 10803 -- SBVR FTF issue Date: Mon, 05 Mar 2007 15:42:05 -0500 From: Ed Barkmeyer Reply-To: edbark@nist.gov Organization: NIST User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.7.2) Gecko/20040804 Netscape/7.2 (ax) X-Accept-Language: en, fr, de, pdf, it, nl, sv, es, ru To: issues@omg.org Subject: SBVR Issue - 'state of affairs' is an individual concept, not a thing X-MailScanner-Information: Please contact postmaster@mel.nist.gov for more information X-MailScanner: Found to be clean X-MailScanner-SpamCheck: X-MailScanner-From: edbark@nist.gov X-Spam-Status: No X-Virus-Scanned: by amavisd-new-20030616-p10 (Debian) at omg.org Name: 'state of affairs' is an individual concept, not a thing Doc: dtc/06-08-05 Date: August 2006 Version: Interim Convenience Document Chapter: 8.6 Description: The diagram in 8.6 says that a state of affairs is (intended to be) a thing, and 'actuality' is a state of affairs that occurs in the reference world. Both of these statements are incorrect. An actuality is indeed a 'thing'. A 'state of affairs' cannot be. The definition of fact type says that all its instances must be actualities. This implies that a possible state of affairs that is not an actuality does not correspond to any fact type. And that is correct, because a (possible) state of affairs is intrinsically conceptual. If one replaces the roles in a fact type with specific things, one gets a proposition, which, according to 8.6, 'corresponds to' a (potential) state of affairs. But that proposition must be a concept: it has an instance that is a state of affairs, and a state of affairs is a 'thing'. If it is impossible, that state of affairs is an instance of the proposition, but if it is actual, it is also an instance of the fact type. This makes no sense. The problem lies in trying to distinguish states of affairs from propositions and fact types. If one replaces the roles in a fact type with specific things, one gets a *specialization* of the fact type -- an individual concept. Therefore, a proposition must be an individual concept. That individual concept *is* a potential state of affairs, and an actuality is the thing it corresponds to, if any. Therefore, a 'state of affairs' is not a 'thing', it is an individual concept, and it is a synonym for 'proposition'. And an actuality is not a subtype of 'state of affairs'; it is rather the instance it corresponds to. -- Edward J. Barkmeyer Email: edbark@nist.gov National Institute of Standards & Technology Manufacturing Systems Integration Division 100 Bureau Drive, Stop 8263 Tel: +1 301-975-3528 Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8263 FAX: +1 301-975-4482 Juergen Boldt Director, Member Services Object Management Group 140 Kendrick St Building A Suite 300 Needham, MA 02494 USA tel: +1 781 444 0404 x 132 fax: +1 781 444 0320 email: juergen@omg.org www.omg.org[attachment "SBVR Issues 10803 Draft Resolution (2012-08-08).docx" deleted by Mark H Linehan/Watson/IBM] Date: Fri, 10 Aug 2012 11:27:11 -0400 From: Ed Barkmeyer Reply-To: Organization: NIST User-Agent: Thunderbird 2.0.0.23 (Windows/20090812) To: SBVR RTF Subject: SBVR: Draft resolution of Issue 10803 X-NISTMEL-MailScanner-Information: Please contact postmaster@mel.nist.gov for more information X-NISTMEL-MailScanner-ID: q7AFRHJ5028615 X-NISTMEL-MailScanner: Found to be clean X-NISTMEL-MailScanner-SpamCheck: X-NISTMEL-MailScanner-From: edbark@nist.gov X-NISTMEL-MailScanner-Watermark: 1345217239.93512@o8FDdAHpbYJbMmOO7fs4UA X-Spam-Status: No The draft resolution includes the following excerpt from the Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy: state of affairs Definition: A possibility, actuality or impossibility of the kind expressed by a nominalization of a declarative sentence. This says that the 'nominalization of a declarative sentence' is a 'kind of thing', i.e., an SBVR:concept, and the things it SBVR:'corresponds to' are what is meant by 'state of affairs'. So there is some derivative of a proposition (the "meaning of a declarative sentence") that is a concept. That was Mark's original point. There is a concept that is derived from a proposition, and the instances of such a concept are states of affairs. Believe it or not, if we can all agree to that, we will have made a major step forward in resolving the DTV/SBVR problems. Further, the CDP definition says that 'state of affairs' has three specializations: actuality, possibility, impossibility, and that every state of affairs is one of those. SBVR only mentions 'actuality'. I suggest that in resolving Issue 10803 it might be wise to add 'possibility' and 'impossibility', especially if we plan to use propositions to refer to things that are not actualities. One aspect of the issue is 'what else is there?' (Note: SBVR defines 'possibility' and 'impossibility' to be something other than subtypes of 'state of affairs'. This suggests, as Mark pointed out, that SBVR uses multiple and conflicting terminologies for its logical basis. Similarly, SBVR introduces the notion 'possible world', which must somehow be related to 'possiblities' that exist in the actual world. So this is another aspect of SBVR semantics that needs to be resolved.) Nothing in the CDP definition suggests that "the kind expressed by a nominalization of a declarative sentence" is uniquely satisfied in each domain of discourse. That is, the CDP does not say or imply that a SBVR:proposition (the nominalization of a declarative sentence?) must correspond to only one thing of the "kind" in a given possible world. Where does that idea come from? Can the same 'kind' correspond to more than one 'state of affairs'? The example 'This die comes up 6' seems to correspond to a 'possibility' in every world, and to correspond to an 'actuality' in some worlds. So, the 'kind' "that this die comes up 6" can correspond to two states of affairs in the same world -- a possibility and an actuality. Or perhaps a single 'state of affairs thing' can be both a 'possibility' and an 'actuality', so that 'actuality' is necessarily a specialization of 'possibility'? Further, if the possible world has time, then the kind "that this die comes up 6" can correspond to distinguishable events in that world. Is each such event an 'actuality'? or is the corresponding actuality something that is none of the individual events? or is there no corresponding 'actuality'? That is, if the die also comes up 2 and 5 at other times in the actual world, is the corresponding 'state of affairs' only a 'possibility', because some events confirm it and others contradict it? None of these questions are addressed in the dozen proposed Notes to 'state of affairs'. And the proposed resolution proposes the bald Necessity that 'each proposition corresponds to exactly one state of affairs' in each possible world, without any supporting explanation. The issues that I raise above must be addressed in text that explains how that necessity could be true. It may follow from the definition, but it requires a semantic interpretation that is not presented. On its surface, the proposed Necessity is contradicted by distinguishable events of the die coming up 6 over time. That ain't rocket science, it is common sense. No business person will believe that "the die coming up 6" corresponds to exactly one event over time. If there is some interpretation in which these words mean something no business person (and no mathematical logician) will intuitively grok, you have to explain that interpretation, and it would help if you can also cite the CDP for your explanation. I don't care whether the divine Terry has revealed this and his prophet Baisley has inscribed it in stone. This cannot remain a religious mystery. If we don't understand how it relates to what business people understand by 'event, situation, activity or circumstance', we can't use it in describing the relationships of events to time. -Ed -- Edward J. Barkmeyer Email: edbark@nist.gov National Institute of Standards & Technology Manufacturing Systems Integration Division 100 Bureau Drive, Stop 8263 Tel: +1 301-975-3528 Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8263 Cel: +1 240-672-5800 "The opinions expressed above do not reflect consensus of NIST, and have not been reviewed by any Government authority." To: sbvr-rtf@omg.org Subject: RE: State of Affairs Examples (re Issue 10803 & 14849) X-KeepSent: 1CEF1A12:9193113B-85257A59:0001D0B8; type=4; name=$KeepSent X-Mailer: Lotus Notes Release 8.5.3 September 15, 2011 From: Mark H Linehan Date: Sun, 12 Aug 2012 20:28:28 -0400 X-MIMETrack: Serialize by Router on D01MC604/01/M/IBM(Release 8.5.3 ZX853HP5|January 12, 2012) at 08/12/2012 20:28:29, Serialize complete at 08/12/2012 20:28:29 X-Content-Scanned: Fidelis XPS MAILER x-cbid: 12081300-6078-0000-0000-00000E2E26E4 The main comment I want to make about this is that we do NOT want to use a verb concept such as 'company reviews account during time interval'. Verb concepts that incorporate a time role, such as "during