Issue 16172: Clarify difference between EXISTS and OCCURS (sbvr-rtf) Source: Escape Velocity (Mr. Don Baisley, donbaisley(at)live.com) Nature: Uncategorized Issue Severity: Summary: Summary: SBVR makes an important distinction between the meanings of the word “exists” (existential quantification) and the word “occurs” (used to describe a state of affairs). A state of affairs can exist and thereby be involved in other things (e.g., plans, desires, fears, expectations) even if it does not occur, even if it never occurs. SBVR should explicitly define and explain the characteristic ‘state of affairs occurs’, and should then use that characteristic to define ‘actuality’. Note that this issue is related to issue 14849 and became important in discussing 14849, but its resolution should be independent of 14849. Resolution: Revised Text: Actions taken: May 7, 2011: received issue Discussion: End of Annotations:===== m: Don Baisley To: "issues@omg.org" Subject: SBVR issue -- Clarify difference between EXISTS and OCCURS Thread-Topic: SBVR issue -- Clarify difference between EXISTS and OCCURS Thread-Index: AcwNEnJ3MYfQNcMgR4q0OaFVsPUXWg== Date: Sat, 7 May 2011 23:57:01 +0000 Accept-Language: en-US X-MS-Has-Attach: X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: x-originating-ip: [157.54.51.32] Hi Juergen, Title: Clarify difference between EXISTS and OCCURS Summary: SBVR makes an important distinction between the meanings of the word .exists. (existential quantification) and the word .occurs. (used to describe a state of affairs). A state of affairs can exist and thereby be involved in other things (e.g., plans, desires, fears, expectations) even if it does not occur, even if it never occurs. SBVR should explicitly define and explain the characteristic .state of affairs occurs., and should then use that characteristic to define .actuality.. Note that this issue is related to issue 14849 and became important in discussing 14849, but its resolution should be independent of 14849. Best regards, Don From: Don Baisley To: "sbvr-rtf@omg.org" Subject: RE: issue 16172 -- SBVR RTF issue Thread-Topic: issue 16172 -- SBVR RTF issue Thread-Index: AQHMDnG9STJrdyGLD0uM4XyKUxX26JSE4Idw Date: Mon, 9 May 2011 19:39:09 +0000 Accept-Language: en-US X-MS-Has-Attach: yes X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: x-originating-ip: [157.54.51.71] I have attached a proposed resolution to SBVR issue 16172. The resolution is comprised of material requested from me at last week.s SBVR conference call in reference to issue 14849. However, it was further recognized in that meeting that resolution of issue 14849 should specifically target that issue and not spread to other areas of concern. The new issue, 16172, focuses on a specific problem that came up while discussing 14849, but which is not the same issue. Best regards, Don From: Juergen Boldt [mailto:juergen@omg.org] Sent: Monday, May 09, 2011 10:50 AM To: issues@omg.org; sbvr-rtf@omg.org Subject: issue 16172 -- SBVR RTF issue From: Don Baisley To: "issues@omg.org" Subject: SBVR issue -- Clarify difference between EXISTS and OCCURS Thread-Topic: SBVR issue -- Clarify difference between EXISTS and OCCURS Thread-Index: AcwNEnJ3MYfQNcMgR4q0OaFVsPUXWg== Date: Sat, 7 May 2011 23:57:01 +0000 Accept-Language: en-US X-MS-Has-Attach: X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: x-originating-ip: [157.54.51.32] Hi Juergen, Title: Clarify difference between EXISTS and OCCURS Summary: SBVR makes an important distinction between the meanings of the word ?exists? (existential quantification) and the word ?occurs? (used to describe a state of affairs). A state of affairs can exist and thereby be involved in other things (e.g., plans, desires, fears, expectations) even if it does not occur, even if it never occurs. SBVR should explicitly define and explain the characteristic ?state of affairs occurs?, and should then use that characteristic to define ?actuality?. Note that this issue is related to issue 14849 and became important in discussing 14849, but its resolution should be independent of 14849. Best regards, Don Juergen Boldt Director, Member Services 140 Kendrick Street, Building A Suite 300 Needham, MA 02494 USA Tel: 781 444 0404 x 132 fax: 781 444 0320 www.omg.org SBVR 16172.doc Disposition: Resolved OMG Issue No: 16172 Title: Clarify difference between EXISTS and OCCURS Source: Microsoft, Don Baisley (don.baisley@microsoft.com) Summary: SBVR makes an important distinction between the meanings of the word .exists. (existential quantification) and the word .occurs. (used to describe a state of affairs). A state of affairs can exist and thereby be involved in other things (e.g., plans, desires, fears, expectations) even if it does not occur, even if it never occurs. SBVR should explicitly define and explain the characteristic .state of affairs occurs., and should then use that characteristic to define .actuality.. Resolution: 1. Add a new characteristic, .state of affairs occurs. and use it to define .actuality.. 2. Explain the difference between .occurs. and .exists. with respect to states of affairs. Revised Text: In 8.6 REPLACE Figure 8.9 with the following figure (which adds .state of affairs occurs. and .actuality.). In 8.6 after the entry for .state of affairs. ADD the following: state of affairs occurs Definition: the state of affairs happens (i.e., takes place, obtains) Note: The meaning of .occurs. should not be confused with .exists., meaning existential quantification. A state of affairs can exist and thereby participate in relationships to other things (e.g., plans, desires, fears, expectations and perceptions) even if it does not occur, even if it never occurs. Example: .The EU-Rent London-Heathrow Branch wants to be profitable.. Even when that branch is unprofitable, the previous statement can correspond to an actuality that involves the state of affairs that the EU-Rent London-Heathrow Branch is profitable. The state of affairs exists as an object of desire and planning regardless of whether it ever occurs. The state of affairs occurs only when the branch is profitable, but it exists and is involved in an actuality (an instance of the fact type .company wants state of affairs.) even when the branch is unprofitable. In 8.6 in the definition of .actuality., REMOVE the words .in the actual world. and CHANGE the style of the word .occurs. to the verb style. The definition should look like this: Definition: state of affairs that occurs Disposition: Resolved From: "Donald Chapin" To: Subject: RE: issue 16172 -- SBVR RTF issue Date: Fri, 13 May 2011 15:07:00 +0100 X-Mailer: Microsoft Office Outlook 11 Thread-Index: AcwOcaBGmVPg1JMGTe+3ZYz2ffdgLADBF/xA X-Mirapoint-IP-Reputation: reputation=Fair-1, source=Queried, refid=tid=0001.0A0B0301.4DCD3B05.00EE, actions=tag X-Junkmail-Premium-Raw: score=9/50, refid=2.7.2:2011.5.13.124215:17:9.975, ip=81.149.51.65, rules=__TO_MALFORMED_2, __TO_NO_NAME, __BOUNCE_CHALLENGE_SUBJ, __BOUNCE_NDR_SUBJ_EXEMPT, __HAS_MSGID, __SANE_MSGID, INVALID_MSGID_NO_FQDN, __MIME_VERSION, __CT, __CTYPE_HAS_BOUNDARY, __CTYPE_MULTIPART, __CTYPE_MULTIPART_MIXED, __HAS_X_MAILER, __OUTLOOK_MUA_1, __USER_AGENT_MS_GENERIC, DOC_ATTACHED, __ANY_URI, LINK_TO_IMAGE, __FRAUD_CONTACT_NUM, __CP_URI_IN_BODY, __C230066_P5, __HTML_MSWORD, __HTML_BOLD, __HTML_FONT_BLUE, __HAS_HTML, BODY_SIZE_10000_PLUS, BODYTEXTP_SIZE_3000_LESS, BODYTEXTH_SIZE_10000_LESS, __MIME_HTML, __IMGSPAM_BODY, __TAG_EXISTS_HTML, __STYLE_RATWARE_2, RDNS_GENERIC_POOLED, HTML_50_70, RDNS_SUSP_GENERIC, __OUTLOOK_MUA, RDNS_SUSP, FORGED_MUA_OUTLOOK, IMGSPAM_BODY X-Junkmail-Status: score=10/50, host=c2bthomr14.btconnect.com X-Junkmail-Signature-Raw: score=unknown, refid=str=0001.0A0B020D.4DCD3B74.01B6,ss=1,vtr=str,vl=0,fgs=0, ip=0.0.0.0, so=2010-07-22 22:03:31, dmn=2009-09-10 00:05:08, mode=multiengine X-Junkmail-IWF: false It is a good idea to separate out and focus on being able to communicate to a wide audience the difference between .exists. and .occurs., before we finish the Issue about whether .state of affairs. is a thing in the universe of discourse or a meaning in the SBVR Terminological Dictionary / Rulebook. To help our efforts to clarify the distinction between .exists. and .occurs., I have copied forward the three examples that talk about states of affairs .occurring. and .not occurring.. Donald -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- From: Juergen Boldt [mailto:juergen@omg.org] Sent: 09 May 2011 18:50 To: issues@omg.org; sbvr-rtf@omg.org Subject: issue 16172 -- SBVR RTF issue From: Don Baisley To: "issues@omg.org" Subject: SBVR issue -- Clarify difference between EXISTS and OCCURS Thread-Topic: SBVR issue -- Clarify difference between EXISTS and OCCURS Thread-Index: AcwNEnJ3MYfQNcMgR4q0OaFVsPUXWg== Date: Sat, 7 May 2011 23:57:01 +0000 Accept-Language: en-US X-MS-Has-Attach: X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: x-originating-ip: [157.54.51.32] Hi Juergen, Title: Clarify difference between EXISTS and OCCURS Summary: SBVR makes an important distinction between the meanings of the word exists (existential quantification) and the word occurs (used to describe a state of affairs). A state of affairs can exist and thereby be involved in other things (e.g., plans, desires, fears, expectations) even if it does not occur, even if it never occurs. SBVR should explicitly define and explain the characteristic state of affairs occurs and should then use that characteristic to define actuality Note that this issue is related to issue 14849 and became important in discussing 14849, but its resolution should be independent of 14849. Best regards, Don Juergen Boldt Director, Member Services 140 Kendrick Street, Building A Suite 300 Needham, MA 02494 USA Tel: 781 444 0404 x 132 fax: 781 444 0320 www.omg.org SBVR 16172 -- with Additional Examples 2011-05-13.doc Date: Fri, 13 May 2011 18:34:39 -0400 From: Ed Barkmeyer Reply-To: edbark@nist.gov Organization: NIST User-Agent: Thunderbird 2.0.0.23 (Windows/20090812) To: SBVR RTF Subject: Re: SBVR Issue 16172 -- all uses of 'state of affairs' X-NISTMEL-MailScanner-Information: Please contact postmaster@mel.nist.gov for more information X-NISTMEL-MailScanner-ID: p4DMYjUA028520 X-NISTMEL-MailScanner: Found to be clean X-NISTMEL-MailScanner-SpamCheck: X-NISTMEL-MailScanner-From: edbark@nist.gov X-NISTMEL-MailScanner-Watermark: 1305930888.00502@mBXITfvCLAzzHbB5FLaG5w X-Spam-Status: No X-NIST-MailScanner: Found to be clean X-NIST-MailScanner-From: edbark@nist.gov The following is a list of all uses of 'state of affairs' in the current interim version of SBVR p.17 an example in the table -- OK p.25 Note under proposition -- OK p.40 entry for state of affairs, actuality -- in work p. 42 state of affairs involves thing in role The Definition restricts the correspondence to a fact type to actualities, but per Issue 14849, this may be incorrect. Since 'is actual' is not a requirement for 'exists', it appears that fact types correspond to states of affairs in general. p. 43 Each proposition corresponds to at most one state of affairs. This rule is the problem for Date/Time. No proposition can describe a recurring event, if the world of interest contains more than one occurrence. "The Thames being at high tide" is an example. p. 69-70 entry for 'objectification' One problem with example 1 has been resolved by changing the term 'occurs' in the definition of 'actuality' to 'is actual'. The problem was that the example of 'state of affairs occurs at place' seems to restrict 'state of affairs' to 'actuality' by using the term 'occurs'. But in the example, the variable that is to take the state-of-affairs value is stated to range over a fact type, with the consequence that all of its referents must be actualities. But this takes us back to issue 14849. Similarly, in example 2, the relationship of 'has occurred' to 'occurs' was problematic, but its relationship to 'is actual' can be explained has 'is in the past' (an EU Rent concept that also exists in Date/Time). p.84-85 entry for 'question' There are examples here of using 'state of affairs' as the type of answers to How and Why. Whether this is a problem for 'state of affairs' v 'actuality' is philosophical. p. 173-177 relating elements of guidance to states of affairs There is a difference between permitting/requiring a state of affairs to be an actuality and permitting/requiring a conceptual state to have an instance. Elements of guidance do refer to recurring situations and categories of situations. And the entailment can involve being an instance of such a category. In the example: Any ice road that is north of the Arctic Circle may be used by any vehicle. the intent is to permit each separate instance of the fact type (vehicle) uses (ice road that is North of the Arctic Circle) to be an actuality. The individual states of affairs that are permitted are permitted because they are instances of this fact type. This implies that a fact type must correspond to states of affairs. This rule makes it correspond to actualities, while a prohibition would prevent that correspondence. p. 245 C.1.5 These examples are taken from Annex E. Again, I think the issue here was whether the word 'occurs' here is the same as that in the definition of actuality. Much of the rest of this section is describing features of someone's tool that are irrelevant to SBVR, and involve mirrors and magic, but that is a separate issue. p. 271 E.1.4 ff Examples of use of the 'state of affairs' and 'occurs ' in EU rent. Again this is about the symbol 'occurs'. All of the uses in Annex E appear to be references to individual states of affairs, rather than categories. p. 340 E.2.3.3 State of affairs occurs at date/time . Again this is about 'occurs'. The point here is that 'occurs at date/time' has nothing to do with actuality. -Ed -- Edward J. Barkmeyer Email: edbark@nist.gov National Institute of Standards & Technology Manufacturing Systems Integration Division 100 Bureau Drive, Stop 8263 Tel: +1 301-975-3528 Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8263 Cel: +1 240-672-5800 From: Don Baisley To: "sbvr-rtf@omg.org" Subject: RE: issue 16172 -- SBVR RTF issue Thread-Topic: issue 16172 -- SBVR RTF issue Thread-Index: AQHMDnG9STJrdyGLD0uM4XyKUxX26JSLRoIAgACGuUA= Date: Sat, 14 May 2011 05:11:37 +0000 Accept-Language: en-US X-MS-Has-Attach: yes X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: x-originating-ip: [157.54.51.76] I have attached an updated resolution to issue 16172. Regards, Don From: Donald Chapin [mailto:Donald.Chapin@BusinessSemantics.com] Sent: Friday, May 13, 2011 7:07 AM To: sbvr-rtf@omg.org Subject: RE: issue 16172 -- SBVR RTF issue It is a good idea to separate out and focus on being able to communicate to a wide audience the difference between .exists. and .occurs., before we finish the Issue about whether .state of affairs. is a thing in the universe of discourse or a meaning in the SBVR Terminological Dictionary / Rulebook. To help our efforts to clarify the distinction between .exists. and .occurs., I have copied forward the three examples that talk about states of affairs .occurring. and .not occurring.. Donald -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- From: Juergen Boldt [mailto:juergen@omg.org] Sent: 09 May 2011 18:50 To: issues@omg.org; sbvr-rtf@omg.org Subject: issue 16172 -- SBVR RTF issue From: Don Baisley To: "issues@omg.org" Subject: SBVR issue -- Clarify difference between EXISTS and OCCURS Thread-Topic: SBVR issue -- Clarify difference between EXISTS and OCCURS Thread-Index: AcwNEnJ3MYfQNcMgR4q0OaFVsPUXWg== Date: Sat, 7 May 2011 23:57:01 +0000 Accept-Language: en-US X-MS-Has-Attach: X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: x-originating-ip: [157.54.51.32] Hi Juergen, Title: Clarify difference between EXISTS and OCCURS Summary: SBVR makes an important distinction between the meanings of the word exists (existential quantification) and the word occurs (used to describe a state of affairs). A state of affairs can exist and thereby be involved in other things (e.g., plans, desires, fears, expectations) even if it does not occur, even if it never occurs. SBVR should explicitly define and explain the characteristic state of affairs occurs and should then use that characteristic to define actuality Note that this issue is related to issue 14849 and became important in discussing 14849, but its resolution should be independent of 14849. Best regards, Don Juergen Boldt Director, Member Services 140 Kendrick Street, Building A Suite 300 Needham, MA 02494 USA Tel: 781 444 0404 x 132 fax: 781 444 0320 www.omg.org SBVR 161721.doc Disposition: Resolved OMG Issue No: 16172 Title: Clarify difference between EXISTS and OCCURS Source: Microsoft, Don Baisley (don.baisley@microsoft.com) Summary: SBVR makes an important distinction between the meanings of the word .exists. (existential quantification) and the word .occurs. (used to describe a state of affairs). A state of affairs can exist and thereby be involved in other things (e.g., plans, desires, fears, expectations) even if it does not occur, even if it never occurs. SBVR should explicitly define and explain the characteristic .state of affairs occurs., and should then use that characteristic to define .actuality.. Resolution: 1. Add a new characteristic, .state of affairs is actual. and use it to define .actuality. (.is actual. is taken as a preferred alternative to .occurs.). 2. Explain the difference between .is actual. and .exists.. Revised Text: In 8.6 REPLACE Figure 8.9 with the following figure (which adds .state of affairs is actual. and .actuality.). In 8.6 after the entry for .state of affairs. ADD the following: state of affairs is actual Definition: the state of affairs happens (i.e., takes place, obtains) Note: The meaning of .is actual. should not be confused with .exists., meaning existential quantification. A state of affairs can exist and thereby be involved in relationships to other things (e.g., plans, desires, fears, expectations and perceptions) even if it is not actual, even if it never happens. Example: .The EU-Rent London-Heathrow Branch wants to be profitable.. Even when that branch is unprofitable, the previous statement can correspond to an actuality that involves the state of affairs that the EU-Rent London-Heathrow Branch is profitable. The state of affairs exists as an object of desire and planning regardless of whether it is ever actual. The state of affairs is actual only when the branch is profitable, but it exists and is involved in an actuality (an instance of the fact type .company wants state of affairs.) even when the branch is unprofitable. In 8.6 in REPLACE the definition of .actuality., which says .state of affairs that occurs in the actual world., with this: Definition: state of affairs that is actual In 8.6 in ADD the following example at the end of the entry for .actuality.: Example: Consider two unitary concepts, the first defined as .state of affairs that EU-Rent London-Heathrow Branch is profitable. and the second defined as .actuality that EU-Rent London-Heathrow Branch is profitable.. The two definitions use the same objectification. The first concept always has an instance, regardless of profitability. The second concept has an instance (the same instance) only if the branch is profitable. Disposition: Resolved Date: Fri, 16 Sep 2011 10:40:17 -0400 From: Ed Barkmeyer Reply-To: edbark@nist.gov Organization: NIST User-Agent: Thunderbird 2.0.0.23 (Windows/20090812) To: SBVR RTF Subject: Issue 16172: Possible batteries X-NISTMEL-MailScanner-Information: Please contact postmaster@mel.nist.gov for more information X-NISTMEL-MailScanner-ID: p8GEeMZw013272 X-NISTMEL-MailScanner: Found to be clean X-NISTMEL-MailScanner-SpamCheck: X-NISTMEL-MailScanner-From: edbark@nist.gov X-NISTMEL-MailScanner-Watermark: 1316788824.48645@yOWTdHxRXR65Y9RGuKuz1A X-Spam-Status: No X-NIST-MailScanner: Found to be clean X-NIST-MailScanner-From: edbark@nist.gov The resolution to issue 16172 represents a complete misunderstanding of Plantinga and further confuses SBVR users and toolsmiths. According to SBVR, the "logic" that motivates the distinction between existence and occurrence of 'states of affairs' is that there are situations that we need to talk about and instantiate that are not 'actual', i.e. are not happening. Therefore they need to 'exist' so that we can talk about them, and we must distinguish that from 'actually occurring'. Consider the following example: Sometime in mid-July, I ordered a Dell #667788 battery for my laptop. It was out of stock, and it was finally delivered on 12 September. What that undoubtedly means is that the battery I ordered had not yet been made in July, but sometime in early August it was made in Singapore and shipped to Dell, who then shipped it to me. Therefore, when I ordered the Dell #667788 battery in July, it was not 'actual'. But according to SBVR, it had to exist, because it could not otherwise have been mentioned in the order. If existence and actuality are the same, there did not exist an instance of Dell #667788 that I ordered in July. But I did successfully order one. Following the idea in 16172, therefore, it is necessary for SBVR to distinguish between existing batteries and actual batteries. And this is much more important than Pam being in Hawaii, because it affects our ability to talk about Orders, which is an important business concept. Therefore, the resolution to Issue 16172 is way too narrow to be what is needed. What we need is 'thing is actual', to distinguish things like batteries that are ordered but are not yet fabricated from the things that are actual like batteries that can be plugged into my laptop to make it run. And then of course I cannot say that there is a battery in my laptop; I have to say there is an actual battery in my laptop. Now, I am sure that this example will provoke a fancy song and dance from the philosophical formal logic experts in SBVR that will explain why batteries on order are different from situations that are desirable or planned, but that will take at least two more pages of new semantic theory. Alternatively, in attempting to address real business concerns, the RTF might consider that Dell #667788 Battery, which is a res that is a catalog item, is in this case being treated as a 'mass noun', and that what is ordered is one 'unit' of that mass noun. In fact, that is exactly what appears on the order form. Some catalog items are ordered in kilos; others are ordered in 'each' or 'count' or 'unit'. Batteries are of the latter kind. The point is that a quantity of a mass noun has nothing to do with logical quantification, and therefore it has nothing to do with 'existence'. From the point of view of supporting business needs, it would be far better for SBVR to have addressed this kind of conceptualization, rather than constructing an artificial distinction between existence and actuality. My point is that the resolution to Issue 16172 is a WRONG idea that is a misreading of Plantinga. Its motivation leads to distinguishing batteries from actual batteries and customers from actual customers and deliveries from actual deliveries. The adoption of this text into SBVR further removes it from having any possibility of a formal logic basis. -Ed -- Edward J. Barkmeyer Email: edbark@nist.gov National Institute of Standards & Technology Manufacturing Systems Integration Division 100 Bureau Drive, Stop 8263 Tel: +1 301-975-3528 Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8263 Cel: +1 240-672-5800 Date: Fri, 16 Sep 2011 13:33:20 -0400 From: Ed Barkmeyer Reply-To: edbark@nist.gov Organization: NIST User-Agent: Thunderbird 2.0.0.23 (Windows/20090812) To: SBVR RTF Subject: Issue 16172: misreading Plantinga X-NISTMEL-MailScanner-Information: Please contact postmaster@mel.nist.gov for more information X-NISTMEL-MailScanner-ID: p8GHXPNK028902 X-NISTMEL-MailScanner: Found to be clean X-NISTMEL-MailScanner-SpamCheck: X-NISTMEL-MailScanner-From: edbark@nist.gov X-NISTMEL-MailScanner-Watermark: 1316799210.54124@D8yf3LcB0vOi3is38e9W5w X-Spam-Status: No X-NIST-MailScanner: Found to be clean X-NIST-MailScanner-From: edbark@nist.gov The resolution of Issue 16172 misreads the actualist theory of Plantinga and standardizes nonsense. In Plantinga's theory, there is a set of possible worlds which are in effect large 'states of affairs' that include many other states. A thing 'exists' in this global theory if it exists in any possible world. A thing 'exists in a possible world' if its existence is a state that is included in the possible world. In a conceptual schema, all of the propositions are necessities, possibilities, impossibilities or deontic rules. Deontic rules have nothing to do with the existence and actuality concepts. The universe of discourse of the conceptual schema is all of the things that exist in all of the possible worlds. A necessity, possibility, or impossibility is a statement about the characteristics of all possible worlds, and SBVR correctly defines these terms in that way. A 'fact model' selects one 'possible world' to be 'actual' and describes (some aspects of) that possible world. The fact model must be consistent with the conceptual schema, because the world it chooses to be 'actual' is a possible world and is therefore bound by all the conceptual schema statements about all possible worlds. The universe of discourse of an 'actual world' is precisely the collection of things whose existence is included in that particular possible world -- the 'actual world'. The universe of discourse of the actual world does not include any thing whose existence is not part of (included in) the chosen actual world; it does not include things that are only included in other possible world(s). Thus, in the actual world described by a given fact model, 'existing' and 'being actual' are the SAME idea. (This is why the 'batteries' example -- if you distinguish 'exist' and 'actual', the distinction must apply to 'thing', because it is about the collection of things that is the universe of discourse.) Plantinga and others define '(state of affairs) obtains in (world)' to mean that the state of affairs is included in the possible world. The distinction usually made in non-Davidsonian logic is that 'states' are not 'things'. SBVR discards that distinction, it says a 'state' is a 'thing'. Thus, a state obtains in a possible world if and only if it is included in the possible world, and since it is a thing, if and only if its existence is included in the possible world. So, a state obtains in an SBVR possible world if and only if it exists in that possible world. The fact model specifies THE possible world that is 'actual' when that fact model is 'taken to be true'. If a state of affairs exists in that world, it is included in that world, so it obtains in that world, and it is therefore 'actual'. The world that is defined by a fact model never includes any state of affairs (event, situation, circumstance) that is not 'actual'. Such states do not 'exist' in the actual world. So, what the balloted resolution to Issue 16172 describes is a logical contradiction -- semantic nonsense. [That is my understanding of the merger of the Plantinga and Davidson theories as they are apparently used in SBVR. I know that Don believes he knows better, because his education in formal logic and philosophy is so much better, but I suggest that someone with real credentials should be asked to resolve this difference. I suppose I should just ask Chris Menzel, who is a colleague.] Where does that leave us with respect to talking about planned, future and possible events within the context of an 'actual world' that reflects current reality? It leads us back to distinguishing between the conceptualization of a state, which is independent of the existence of the state, and an actual state, which is one that exists, i.e., is described by a proposition that is taken to be true. If we say that a proposition is the conceptualization of a state, then a fact is the conceptualization of an 'actuality'. Going back to basics, "The books of EU Rent are audited at the end of each fiscal year" is interpreted: For each fiscal year, there is an actuality that the proposition "The books of EU Rent are audited" corresponds to and that occurs in a time interval that ends the fiscal year. This latter is not "what a business person would say", but it is a formal interpretation in terms of SBVR and Date/Time concepts and fact types. (Note that this is stated using 'meaning corresponds to thing'.) Similarly, we can formally construct a concept from a proposition using existing SBVR concepts. Example: 'actuality that "The books of EU rent are audited" corresponds to' is the definition of a concept using SBVR 'meaning corresponds to thing'. Every instance of that concept is an actuality, an actual occurrence of the books being audited. But we can use that concept to refer to instances that only may exist. We can talk about a 'risk' as an instance of some concept that is similarly defined, e.g., "the possibility that a supplier goes out of business" means "any instance of the concept 'actuality that the proposition corresponds to'". There may not ever be any such instance, but we can still talk about what properties such an instance would have, and what effects such an instance would have on other states of the business. Yes, the phraseology is ugly, but it is a consistent model of the relationship between propositions and actualities that does not require the invention of 'states that exist but are not actual'. The business language will talk about the possibility that XXX or the risk that XXX, etc. The ugliness only arises in the way the tool formulates the exchange form. By constructing such concepts, we can talk about situations that are planned for the future by making statements about actualities that occur in the future and are characterized the proposition in the plan, and we can talk about possible situations just by referring to actualities that the proposition corresponds to. There don't have to be any. So, we can talk about risk and "possibility" as subtypes of whatever term is used for 'event, situation or circumstance' ('actuality'), even though the only instances of that any of those concepts are the ones that are actual. The semantic distinctions are in the conceptualization, not in the instances. What we mean when we say a proposition is a risk, we mean that the proposition corresponds to states we don't want to see happen. A state that exists is not a risk; it is a problem. (In formal logic, we talk about things that exist in other worlds via the concept, and the notion that it can be instantiated. We can talk about the properties its instances have, in the sense that they do have those properties in the worlds in which they exist. We can say that every flying pig has a 2-metre wingspan, but that says nothing whatever about the existence of flying pigs.) The remaining problem is how to deal with modalities that are not possibility and not temporal -- Don's worst-case example: Pam wants to be in Hawaii. John Sowa models 'wants' in the same way as he models 'believes' and 'says'. He says these verbs take an operand that is a 'theme' -- a mental object -- and the 'theme' is based on a proposition. So he models 'Pam wants to be in Hawaii' as 'Pam wants the theme t, where t is based on 'Pam is in Hawaii'. Similary, 'Don thinks Pam is in Hawaii' is interpreted Don thinks the theme t, where t is based on 'Pam is in Hawaii'. Don insists that there is a big difference between a reference to the proposition and a reference to the state it conceptualizes. What we have seen above is that references to the state it conceptualizes can be formulated for all of the business examples in SBVR and BMM. But this one is an outlier. Don says that 'Don thinks that Pam is in Hawaii' is a reference to the proposition, while 'Pam wants that Pam is in Hawaii' is a reference to the state it conceptualizes. It is all about the choice of verb, and the interpretation of the verb. Ultimately, I think a business person might see '(person) wants (proposition) to be true' to be a useful alternative interpretation, which is the essence of Sowa's choice. The problem with trying to construe this as a reference to a state is that we can't quantify the variable used as the instance of the derived concept 'actuality that "Pam is in Hawaii" corresponds to'. Pam wants a thing that is an instance of that concept, but there may not actually exist any thing that is an instance of that concept. So there does not exist s such that Pam wants s and s is an actuality that Pam is in Hawaii. But this is the same as ordering a product that is made-to-order -- the product does not exist when the order is placed, so there is no thing that I can order. And that is solved (previous email) by ordering a quantity of 1 unit of the product treated as a mass noun. In a similar way, what Pam wants is then a quantity of 1 unit of the concept of Pam being in Hawaii, treated as a mass noun. And that generalizes to cover 'Pam wants a pony', which has the same property as 'Ed orders a battery'. This is ugly, to be sure. Don has used this one weird case to demonstrate that no model other than the "non-actual state of affairs that exists" can be used to cover this case. And that is only true as long as we agree that the verb 'wants' MUST take as a direct object a state that may not exist, as distinct from a proposition that conceptualizes it and might not be true. Don's solution is to construct the concept "situation that the proposition 'Pam is in Hawaii' corresponds to in some other world". The trouble is that the instance of that concept -- a potential situation -- isn't what Pam wants; she wants an actuality. She wants the concept "actuality that the proposition 'Pam is in Hawaii' corresponds to" to have an instance, she wants the proposition 'Pam is in Hawaii' to be true. So what value arises from constructing this 'potential situation that exists in some other world' have? It doesn't meet the perceived semantic need any better than Sowa's solution: she wants the proposition to be true. So, can we stop perverting the concept of existence and actuality to support this one dubious requirement? What part of SBVR semantics will be seriously compromised by our adopting the fact type -- (person) wants (proposition) to be true? How will this impair our ability to represent business facts and rules? -Ed -- Edward J. Barkmeyer Email: edbark@nist.gov National Institute of Standards & Technology Manufacturing Systems Integration Division 100 Bureau Drive, Stop 8263 Tel: +1 301-975-3528 Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8263 Cel: +1 240-672-5800 "The opinions expressed above do not reflect consensus of NIST, and have not been reviewed by any Government authority."