Issues for Mailing list of the Semantics of Business Vocabulary & Business Rules Finalization Task Force

List of issues (green=resolved, yellow=pending Board vote, red=unresolved)

List options: All ; Open Issues only; or Closed Issues only

Issue 9226: Making Annex A Normative
Issue 9227: Location of and Notation for Formal Logic Grounding Examples
Issue 9228: Making Annex A Normative -- No Connection with SBVR Definitions
Issue 9257: Fact-types and templates (and subscripts)
Issue 9258: Logical formulations are fact-types
Issue 9344: define 'is less than' on 'quantity'
Issue 9366: description of the type theory of SBVR needs to be included in 10.1.1
Issue 9368: Issue: Improve linkage to Rule/Business Rule in 10.1.1 Narrative
Issue 9399: Section: Section F.2.1.2 (RuleSpeak Annex)
Issue 9444: Chapter 12 page 139: Add Synonyms
Issue 9446: Add 'Synonym: aspect' caption
Issue 9447: Integrate use of 'fact model' terminology in 10.1.1 with SBVR term/concept
Issue 9448: Add (and explain) styling for 90 days where it appears in formal statement
Issue 9449: SBVR-FTF Issue: 10 Example Rules material
Issue 9450: 10 Examples - applying a standard pattern in the "10 Examples"
Issue 9451: Individual Concept Not Necessarily a Noun Concept
Issue 9452: Reference Scheme’s Reference Scheme is Incomplete
Issue 9453: Unnecessary Grammatical Structure
Issue 9454: Tie Category and More General Concept to a Fact Type
Issue 9455: Fact Type Templating Diagram Error
Issue 9456: Symbolization Diagram Error
Issue 9457: XMI Names for ESBVR
Issue 9458: Bad Example of Extensional Definition
Issue 9459: Synonymous Statement
Issue 9462: Use Plural Rather than “Set of Each”
Issue 9467: Implicit Passive Forms
Issue 9468: XML Schema and Namespace URIs
Issue 9470: specification does not address the mapping of rules to MOF and XMI
Issue 9471: supporting documents
Issue 9472: XMI in bei/05-08-02 and representing many vocabulary and rules aspects
Issue 9473: XMI has some internal inconsistencies
Issue 9474: SBVR vocabularies
Issue 9475: missing definitions
Issue 9476: Interchange issue
Issue 9477: The current notion of "actionable" falls short in several regards
Issue 9579: "Logic Rule" issue
Issue 9580: Page: 296
Issue 9586: Binding to Individual Concepts
Issue 9607: Body of Shared Meanings
Issue 9608: Clarification Remnants
Issue 9609: A fact is not a logical formulation
Issue 9613: Chapters 8,9,11,12
Issue 9614: dictionary basis
Issue 9621: Annex E/EU-Rent vocabulary's 'characteristic' entries
Issue 9623: Mapping SBVR logical formulation terms to formal logic terms
Issue 9707: What is the "business vocabulary" in 10.3
Issue 9708: business jurisdiction
Issue 9709: SBVR Issue - Circular definition of logical operator and logical operand
Issue 9711: Definition of Body of Shared Guidance
Issue 9712: Definitions of 'projection'
Issue 9713: Projection position and reference scheme for variables
Issue 9714: Use of 'modality' in 8.1.2
Issue 9715: Definition of 'proposition'
Issue 9721: SBVR Issue - wrong proposition in 8.1.2 and modal formulation
Issue 9723: Quantification definitions
Issue 9724: quantifications based on cardinality
Issue 9725: Meaning of objectification is unclear
Issue 9726: What is a projecting formulation?
Issue 9727: What is an aggregation formulation?
Issue 9728: Meaning of noun concept formulation
Issue 9729: True/False meaning of logical formulations must be specified
Issue 9730: bindable target should be 'constant' not 'text'
Issue 9731: Meaning of fact-type formulation and fact type projection
Issue 9732: Correct glossary entry for proposition nominalization
Issue 9733: Complete support for question nominalization
Issue 9734: Correct specification of question and answer nominalization
Issue 9753: wrong proposition in 8.1.2 and modal formulation
Issue 9832: Thing’ Defined Tentatively
Issue 9835: SBVR Issue: What is concept1?
Issue 9874: Annex E - editorial issues
Issue 9882: Define ‘true’ and ‘false’
Issue 9929: Note and Example for “text is for placeholder”
Issue 9930: Section 1 - modeling based on MOF does not have all of the capabilities
Issue 9931: SBVR Issue - 'meaning has representation'
Issue 9932: SBVR Issue - Is a representation an actuality?
Issue 9934: SBVR Issue - Concept Expression versus Meaning Expression
Issue 9935: SBVR Issue - Bug in Namespaces Diagram
Issue 9938: SBVR Issue - 'role has role binding'
Issue 9939: ‘vocabulary has URI’
Issue 9940: SBVR Issue - Logical Formulation Kinds of Quantifications
Issue 9941: Section: 8.3, + 11.2
Issue 9942: Section: 8
Issue 9944: Section: 11.2.1.3
Issue 9945: “Admonition” and “Affirmation” are the same concept
Issue 9947: SBVR Issue - Projection Diagram - Variable Maps to Role
Issue 9948: Section 2.2.1.1.1 Fac Type: "concept1 specializes concept2"
Issue 9949: Section: F.2.2
Issue 9950: Section: Annex C
Issue 9952: Section: 8.3.5, 11.1.1, 11.2.1
Issue 9953: Section: 8.1.1
Issue 9955: Section: 11.1.1 page 112
Issue 9956: Section: 11.1.1 pages 110 - 113
Issue 9957: Section: Clause 2
Issue 9958: Section: 8.3.4
Issue 9959: Section: Clause 10 pages 71 - 108
Issue 9960: Association Names in UML Diagrams
Issue 10099: use of 'designation', definition of 'term'
Issue 10377: clarification needed for 'reference scheme uses characteristic'
Issue 10422: H.4.3 (Term for a Role in a Form of Expression), page 323-324
Issue 10423: Clean Up based on resolution of issue 9467, 9258, 9934, 9882
Issue 10442: Examples in the normative part of spec should use SBVR Structured English
Issue 10443: SBVR Issue - Annex C.1.1.3 "only if"
Issue 10444: Error in sentence on double negation
Issue 10470: Section: 10 & 12
Issue 10504: SBVR Issue on Authorizations / Dark World Assumptions
Issue 10505: Universal AND
Issue 10506: Exceptions
Issue 10508: Authorizations & Support for "Dark World" Assumptions
Issue 10523: Logical Formulation of Restricted Permission and Possibility Statements
Issue 10525: SBVR Issue -- Relationship between "Business Policy" and "Advice"
Issue 10528: SBVR Issue: MOF/XMI Vocabulary and Rules Cleanup
Issue 10562: Under-the-Covers SBVR Support for ‘Dark’ Rules
Issue 10563: Scope of Rules & Advices – Body of Shared Guidance
Issue 10567: Relating Vocabularies to Namespaces
Issue 10568: Number Namespace
Issue 10569: Simple Fixes - editorial issues
Issue 10570: ‘expression’ as a bindable target
Issue 10571: "'Concept' incorporates 'characteristic'" is ambiguous
Issue 10572: SBVR Does Not Adopt ISO 1087 "Essential Charactertic" Fully and Correctly
Issue 10573: Section: 8.1.1
Issue 10574: Section: 8.1.1 (02)
Issue 10575: Major Disconnect Between Structural Rule and a Concept's Characteristics
Issue 10577: Distinguish Between Concepts
Issue 10578: Section: 11.1.1.1
Issue 10580: Section: 12.1.1
Issue 10596: SBVR Issue - Restrictions on Variables
Issue 10620: Section: 12.1.2 & 12.2.1
Issue 10622: Closed logical formulation formalizes statement
Issue 10629: URI is not a role
Issue 10630: Rule-Set is not a defined concept
Issue 10632: definition of 'prohibited symbol'
Issue 10633: The unary fact type/characteristic "category is inactive"
Issue 10639: implicit passive form for partitive fact type that uses the verb "includes"
Issue 10779: SBVR Issue - "is" vs. "equals"
Issue 10790: No Way to Specify What the Instance of an Individual Concept Is
Issue 10798: Two SBVR Normative Definitions Use Deontic Logic in Error
Issue 10800: Vocabulary should be mandatory
Issue 10801: Definition of 'fact type'
Issue 11153: "Definition of Category"
Issue 11263: NIAM Annex
Issue 11264: Sjir Nijssen Revisions to Clause 10
Issue 11283: SBVR Issue: OMG URLs
Issue 11288: Section 9.2.5
Issue 11289: Section 9.3 editorial
Issue 11290: In 8.7 in the definition of “cardinality”, remove the word “distinct”
Issue 11291: SBVR Annex E minor corrections
Issue 11292: 1. swap the sequence of two entries
Issue 11293: Correct styling in characteristic
Issue 11294: Correct the leading term of definition
Issue 11295: One global change too far
Issue 11297: corrected Figure 11.2
Issue 11298: Corrected Fig. 11.6
Issue 11299: Unnecessary Necessities
Issue 11300: Mysteries & miscellany

Issue 9226: Making Annex A Normative (sbvr-ftf)

AB SBVR ISSUE: Making Annex A Normative -- Incorporation into Clause 10 with ORM Tutorial Material Remaining in Annex All ORM tutorial material that does not not assert the formal logic grounding needs to be separated out and remain in the Annex and the formal logic grounding material moved to become Clause 10.1 in the normative section of the bei/05-08-01 (or whereever that section ends up in the FAS). Formal logic grounding examples need to be clearly labelled as such independent of the notation used to express them. (This issue was raised as result of the AB review of the submission on Monday 12th September, and AB recommendation for adoption was made conditonal on its application. It is therefore being filed early, against the Submission, rather than waiting for the Final Adopted Specification, as would be preferable.)

All ORM notation and verbalization examples for the formal logic grounding of SBVR are to remain in the informative Annex J as per file dtc/2006-09-02.
The statement of the formal logic grounding of SBVR that was in the informative Annex J is moved to the normative Clause 10.1.1 with revisions and new ORM-neutral examples as agreed and documented in file dtc/2006-09-01.

AB SBVR ISSUE: Making Annex A Normative -- Location of and Notation for Formal Logic Grounding Examples Including a SBVR Structured English version of the formal logic grounding examples in the formal logic grounding content may be desirable: either in addition to the ORM examples, or in place of them. A decision is required regarding the location of the formal grounding examples: either embedded in the formal logic grounding text where they are referenced, or separated out into an different Annex. (This issue was raised as result of the AB review of the submission on Monday 12th September, and AB recommendation for adoption was made conditonal on its application. It is therefore being filed early, against the Submission, rather than waiting for the Final Adopted Specification, as would otherwise be preferable.)

All ORM notation and verbalization examples for the formal logic grounding of SBVR are to remain in the informative Annex J as per file dtc/2006-09-02.
The statement of the formal logic grounding of SBVR that was in the informative Annex J is moved to the normative Clause 10.1.1 with revisions and new ORM-neutral examples as agreed and documented in file dtc/2006-09-01.

AB SBVR ISSUE: Making Annex A Normative -- No Connection with SBVR Definitions There is nothing in Annex A that ties the formal logic grounding into normative SBVR concepts. A chart is needed cross-referencing current ORM concepts with SBVR concepts. If the FTF decides to require Annex A examples to be expressed in SBVR Structured English (see separate issue), a translation of the examples from ORM notation to SBVR Structured English is required. (This issue was raised as result of the AB review of the submission on Monday 12th September, and AB recommendation for adoption was made conditonal on its application. It is therefore being filed early, against the Submission, rather than waiting for the Final Adopted Specification, as would otherwise be preferable.) 

All ORM notation and verbalization examples for the formal logic grounding of SBVR are to remain in the informative Annex J as per file dtc/2006-09-02.
The statement of the formal logic grounding of SBVR that was in the informative Annex J is moved to the normative Clause 10.1.1 with revisions and new ORM-neutral examples as agreed and documented in file dtc/2006-09-01.

In SBVR clause 8, subscripts occur in fact-type term entries.  In clause 14, those subscripts are omitted from the fact-type term entries.  This is inconsistent, apparently because the entries in clause 8 are doing double duty: as fact-type definitions and as SBVR Structured English templates.


Subscripts occurring in fact-type definitions (Glossary Fact Type entries) are not part of the entry for the fact-type.  They are an accidental part of definition of the template for the corresponding form-of-expression.
    A fact type is an abstract concept, and the glossary item apparently defines both the fact-type and a form-of-expression for the fact-type.  That form of expression belongs to "SBVR Structured English", and there may well be other forms of expression for the selfsame fact-type in other languages.  So the specification has to make this distinction *very* clear.
    But the subscripts are not in fact a part of that form of expression, either.  They are not keywords in the template itself.  They are rather a lexical mechanism used to distinguish two *roles* in the template (and in the fact type) that happen to require the same underlying concept type.  That is, in  "concept#1 specializes concept#2"
SBVR defines the fact-type
  "concept specializes concept",
and at the same time, defines the fact-type *template*:
  "concept#1 specializes concept#2"
where "concept#1" designates a "concept" and "concept#2" designates a "concept".  That is, "concept#1" is just a template parameter that lexically represents one role in the fact-type "concept specializes concept".  For the template, "concept#1" could just as well have been called "parameter#1" or "x".  "concept#1" is neither a "term" nor a "keyword"; it is a template parameter -- a lexical stand-in that is to be uniformly replaced by one actual "term" or "name" in all uses of the template and in all occurrences in the corresponding definition.  The current notation makes this confusing.
    Note that this situation is not really different from "concept incorporates characteristic".  The fact-type is "concept incorporates characteristic" and the template is "concept#1 incorporates characteristic#2", but we didn't happen to need the parameter-subscripts to distinguish the roles in this case, *only because* the concepts playing the roles are distinct.
    Given the role of this standard, this notation is confusing, and marking the subscripts as keywords is technically wrong.  SBVR can continue to use this notation only if it is very clear about the distinction between the fact-type
  "concept specializes concept"
and the template
  parameter#1 (concept) specializes (concept) parameter#2


* Proposed solution:


Clarification is needed.  How to do it is not clear.

More basic Issues had to be resolved first, and we ran out of time

In SBVR clause 9.1.1.6 (or 9.2.6 in later editions?), a "logical operator" is defined to be a (subtype of) logical formulation.  The definition of logical-formulation says it is the *interpretation* of a logical formula.  So logical formulation has to assign a semantic fact-type to a formula.  But what is modeled in 9.2.6 is the logical *formula*, not the interpretation.  What is modeled is "operator has operands", which is a grammatical notion, or perhaps a computational notion (Boolean expression).  But the logical formulation is the interpretation of the operator and its operands as a fact-type.


Example 1: The logical formulation that underlies the terms "equivalence", "condition_1" and "condition_2", which appear in 9.1.1.5, and the formula fact-types "equivalence has condition_1" and "equivalence has condition_2", which appear in 9.1.1.6, is the fact-type
  "logical-formulation is-equivalent-to logical-formulation"
This fact-type expresses the interpretation of a formula involving an equivalence operation and two 'condition' operands.  The corresponding fact-type template might be
  "condition_1 is-equivalent-to condition_2",
where condition_1 and _2 are roles fulfilled by logical formulations.


Example 2: The logical formulation that underlies the terms "conjunction", conjunct_1 and conjunct_2, and the formula fact-types "conjunction has conjunct_1" and "conjunction has conjunct_2" is the fact-type
  "Both logical-formulation (#1) and logical-formulation (#2) hold."
This fact-type expresses the interpretation of the formula involving a conjunction symbol and two 'conjunct' operands (conjugends).  The term "conjunction" is a 'name' for this fact-type.


The failure to define the logical formulations properly in 9.1.1.6 causes the roles in those fact-types to become 'terms with subscripts' in clause 9.1.1.5 (or 9.2.5 in later editions?).  As indicated in the 'Fact types and templates' issue, the SBVR notation for a fact-type role is a 'local name' for a parameter to the fact-type template.  In clause 9.1.1.5, this notational convention has been elevated to a concept term!  In most (but not all) cases, this error is recognizable by the fact that the "concept term" is *subscripted*.  In what speech community would 'condition_1' be a term?


Roles, in this sense, are only meaningful with respect to a given fact-type -- they are NOT self-standing terms that go in the glossary.  Every logical operand "term" in clause 9.1.1.5 is just a role in a logical fact type that should be, but isn't, actually defined as a fact-type in 9.1.1.6.


If the logical operators are recast as fact-types, condition#1 would be the name of a template parameter, and the definitions would resemble those in Clause 8.  The only difference between the logical formulations in Clause 9 and the fact-types in clause 8 is that, in clause 9, the roles are named something different from the participating concept (term).


Note, however, that some of these "role names" really are terms in mathematical logic.  In particular, the roles "antecedent" and "consequent" are important to the discussion of "implication", because the roles are importantly different.  These terms should be introduced as 'glossary terms'.


Conversely, the 'conjunct' roles in a conjunction and the 'condition' roles in an equivalence are not actually distinct -- all conjugends have the same behavior in a conjunction.  And this is true of all subscripted role names in 9.1.1.5.  These terms convey nothing more interesting than 'operand', but they can be defined, if desired, as 'terms' in 9.1.1.5.  If they are defined, they should be defined without the subscripts, because the subscripts are nothing more than elements of the templates -- they don't distinguish behavior.



* Proposed solution:


9.1.1.6 needs to be restructured as logical fact types, and ALL the roles in 9.1.1.5 should be defined in those fact-type definitions.  In most cases, the logical operator can become the 'Name:' of the fact-type.  The relationship between these fact-types and their template definitions is the subject of another Issue.


Some or all of the role names with distinct behaviors (no subscripts) that are currently in 9.1.1.5 should be defined as 'terms' in 9.1.1.6.  It does not seem appropriate to move them to a different section from the one that defines their semantics as roles in the logical formulations of the operations.

Give definitions to the categories of 'logical operation' that directly explain the meanings rather than referring to formal logic operators.  Remove unnecessary operand roles such as 'conjunct 1', etc.  Add 'binary logical operation' and explain the distinction between the roles 'logical operand 1' and 'logical operand 2'.

Problem Description:


Clause 8.7 defines 'integer' as "a number with no fractional part".  But the concept 'number' to which this definition appeals is not defined, and the entry does not cite a source for the definition.  'number' should be defined as well.


SBVR clause 8.7 defines the fact-type 'integer is-less-than integer'.
This is a narrow definition of the 'less-than' concept, which applies, with the same semantics, to 'numbers' and to arbitrary quantities.  'Quantity' is the general concept on which comparison for less and greater is defined for business purposes.  It is the concept for which is-less-than should be defined in 8.7.


In Annex D, 'is less than' is used as a fact-type for prices and durations in several places, but it is never defined.  This usage requires a wider definition of the is-less-than fact-type that is defined in 8.7, namely a definition on 'quantity'.  D.2.3.3 defines 'duration' as "a quantity of time", but the term 'quantity' is not a vocabulary entry in either 8.7 or Annex D. And D.2.3.3 defines the fact-type 'duration is-at-most duration', but it has the same semantics as quantity is-less-than (or equal to) quantity.  It is clear that this example is a model for the definition of "measurement" vocabularies, and 8.7 should provide the base term 'quantity' to support that.



* Proposed solution:


(1) define the term 'quantity' in SBVR, e.g.,
  Definition: a determinate or estimated amount [of a thing]
  Definition: the aspect in which a thing is measurable in terms of greater, less or equal
  Source: MW
  Note: The concept quantity can be elaborated into mathematical systems, such as integer and real numbers, and into systems of measures.  This specification elaborates only the concepts for integer, because they are commonly used in structural rules (See x.x).  For measurement systems and units of measure there are accepted vocabularies and perhaps standard ontologies, but the specification of such a vocabulary is beyond the scope of this specification.


(2) replace the the fact-type 'integer is-less-than integer' with the fact-type 'quantity is-less-than quantity'.


(3) add the concept 'number'
  Definition: a [quantity] belonging to an abstract mathematical system and subject to laws of succession, addition and multiplication
  Source: MW


(4) make integer a subtype of number, and number a subtype of quantity.


(5) correct the "term" style for 'number' in the definition of integer in 8.7, and for 'quantity' in the definition of duration in D.2.3.3.


(6) In D.2.3.3, add to the definition of duration is at most duration:
  Synonymous form: duration is less than or equal to duration

Introduce "quantity" as a defined concept.
Introduce "number" as a category of "quantity".
Define "integer" as a category of "number".

This sentence appears near the end of 10.1.1: "We do not adopt a type theory such as Russell’s type theory, where each set may belong only to a set of a higher type." This is about all that is said in section 10 about the theory of types in SBVR. When I asked about the failure to include a description of SBVR's type theory, Tony said that the reason there was no description of SBVR's type theory was that there is no type theory in SBVR, or something to that effect. While it may be true that SBVR does not allow a hierarchy of degrees of types like that of Russel, and does not admit statements about whether or not sets can be members of themselves, it is not true that SBVR has no theory of concepts, which correspond to types. SBVR contains several asserted or implied general conditions on relationships among concepts. Should these be pointed out and tied to formal logic in section 10? The interpretation of a conceptual model that is described in terms of SBVR's vocabularies is crucially dependent on how SBVR formally regards the notions of consistency and unification of the concepts in the conceptual model, as a set of types. 
 
Here are some questions that such a logical grounding of SBVR concepts might be expected to answer: How is the logical consistency of concepts to be determined? What is the most general concept? Under what conditions can new concepts be admitted into a conceptual schema or into a possible world? How are these rules affected by open/closed world assumptions? How is it determined if a set of concepts is well formed? 
 
Some entries whose definitions, notes, and necessities bear on these questions are 'thing', 'concept', 'concept type', 'concept generalizes concept', 'intensional definition', 'delimiting characteristic', 'concept is closed in conceptual schema', 'fact type is internally closed in conceptual schema', and others.

As this issue raised about SBVR's "type theory" was precipitated by a statement Terry made in the former "logics appendix" (viz., "We do not adopt a type theory such as Russell's type theory, where each set may belong only to a set of a higher type"), I spoke with Terry about this issue, and would like to relate what I found out. Let me start, however, with two connected, pertinent observations about the issue:
1) The issue appears to arise from a misunderstanding of the technical sense in which Terry was using this term "type theory" (if you want a reasonably clear discussion of which, you might try http://planetmath.org/encyclopedia/AxiomOfReducibility.html);
2) The issue arose at a time when there was some enthusiasm for introducing a generous portion of upper-ontology stuff into SBVR, but on which SBVR, or at least the formal-grounding part of it, has no need to offer a commitment or make a statement.
In light of these two observations, I would recommend this issue be simply thrown out, as a misunderstanding of the formal-logics issue and an unnecessary expansion of SBVR into ontological issues.
For this issue, and the questions raised with it, are not at all formal-logics issues, says Terry. Certainly "type theory" in the sense that Terry was using it is; but even there, he says, the purpose of his statement in the "logics appendix" was precisely NOT to force any user of SBVR to adopt any particular type theory. (Indeed, Terry and Pat Hayes did not even discuss "type theory" when they were agreeing on what was to go in the "logics appendix"; Pat simply agreed implicitly to Terry's above statement.) So, while there are indeed options a user has with regard to "type theory" (cf. the above URL's article), SBVR does not adopt any specific one.

 Problem Description:


The narrative in 10.1.1 created artificial terminology ('logical rule',
'logic rule') as an interim step, but this left the material unconnected
with the SBVR senses of 'rule'.  The connection between the sense of 'rule'
-- as used in 10.1.1 and in the normative vocabularies of SBVR -- needs to
be made.


* Proposed solution:


Mark-up provided that:
 
(1) cites the SBVR definitions of the terms 'rule' and 'business rule'


(2) removes the interim language of 'logical rule' and 'logic rule',
replacing these terms with 'rule' or 'business rule' (incl. 'statements of
...'), as appropriate.

Revise narrative such that it:
(1) cites the SBVR definitions of the terms 'rule' and 'business rule'
(2) removes the interim language of 'logical rule' and 'logic rule', replacing these terms with 'rule' or 'business rule' (incl. 'statements of ...', etc.), as appropriate.

Based on the Feb. 23 FTF meeting, I retracted a correction that I had sent in for the RuleSpeak Annex, as below. It was pointed out that my correction was improperly worded (especially regarding "represented"), and that the phrase did not convey my actual intent. *** Replace "if all roles for" with: *** "If all noun concepts represented by roles for" The correct phrasing may need to reference "fundamental concepts". In any event, the correct wording involves a larger issue than simply RuleSpeak, or the specific point I was making here.

Add Synonyms for the following 3 entries:
    
   CURRENT ENTRY                SYNONYM (to be added)
   ==============       ================
   structural rule                    definitional rule
   structural business rule       definitional business rule
   operative business rule       behavioral business rule

Add 3 synonyms to 3 existing SBVR vocabulary entries; reflect the synonyms on the diagram

Add 'Synonym: aspect' caption that is currently missing under the entry for
'facet'
    
There is an entry for 'aspect', which is a secondary term for the concept
termed 'facet'.  However, the entry for 'facet' is missing the corresponding
'Synonym:' caption referring to  'aspect'.


Action:  Add the following caption under the entry for 'facet':
   Synonym:  aspect
(using the paragraph style for 'synonym' with 'term' character styling
applied to the word 'aspect').

Integrate use of 'fact model' terminology in 10.1.1 with SBVR term/concept


p. 32, entry for 'conceptual model':
  add caption:  Synonym:  fact model  ==>[with 'fact model' styled term]


p. 32, add entry for 'fact model':
fact model    ==> [styled as appropriate for an entry]
  See:  conceptual model    ==>[styled appropriately]
    
p. 72, final paragraph:  after "is a fact model, not a process model." to
read:
"is a fact model (in SBVR, termed 'conceptual model'), not a process model."

Resolution:
1.	Add "fact model" to Meaning and Representation Vocabulary (for the meaning now given to "conceptual model").
2.	Make "fact model" the preferred term, making "conceptual model" a synonym.
3.	"A fact model is specified as a conceptual model …" on page 73 (10.1.1.2) must be changed to "A fact model is a conceptual model …."

Add (and explain) styling for "90 days" where it appears in a formal
statement
    
In the 10 Example Rules (several places throughout the Annexes), "90 days"
appears unstyled in a rule statement.


Actions needed:


1) Add styling to "90 days"  [pages: 223, 282, 293 (2 places), 306 (2
places)] where it appears in a formally-styled rule statement (i..e., this
does not apply to its use in Notes, etc.)


2) Add an explanatory section to Annex C, using this as an example,
describing in general how an individual that involves the representation of
some 'quantity' is represented in a formal (fully-styled) SBVR expression.
Make reference to other standards/words, as appropriate.
[ref. earlier discussion thread on SBVR-FTF]

More basic Issues had to be resolved first, and we ran out of time

The "10 Example Rules" material is a useful reference in training and other
explanatory applications.  However, its current presentation makes that
difficult -- it is:  redundantly presented (leading to some inconsistencies,
and extra work as updates are made), is incomplete (does not reflect the ORM
expression style), and needs other minor updates.


Actions needed:


1) Move and consolidate the presentation of the "10 Example Rules" from
Annexes E and F into a new Annex.


2) Correct inconsistencies, as needed.


3) Add the expression of each of the 10 rules in ORM notation.


4) Correct the supporting (based on) fact types to match the entries in the
EU-Rent vocabulary (Annex E).

More basic Issues had to be resolved first, and we ran out of time

Description:
The "10 Example Rules" material makes use of some 'convenience concepts'**
in several of the rules.  A consistent approach needs to be applied for
making vocabulary entries for these in SBVR-SE, and a discussion of that
pattern should be added to Annex D.


Actions needed:


1) Using the "10 Examples" material, change as needed to apply a consistent
approach to specifying this kind of vocabulary entry(s), which appear as
cited vocabulary entries in the 'Supporting fact types' material of the "10
Examples" (and from there into the EU-Rent Vocabulary (Annex E)).


2) Add a section to the "Patterns" annex, describing this.


3) Decide if an SBVR term is needed for what this issue terms a 'convenience
concept'.  If yes, agree to the term.  If no, agree to a consistent, short
characterization.


**'convenience concept' is an interim term, selected to avoid
conflict/confusion with overloaded terms in other discussions.  Such a
concept/term establishes an equivalency to other defined concepts to allow
rules (and definitions) to be expressed in a less verbose manner.  From the
"10 Examples" this includes:  business currency, drop-off branch, pick-up
branch, rented car, requested car group, return branch, and some concepts
from the EU-Rent common vocabulary for time periods and durations (e.g.,
actual pick-up date-time).

More basic Issues had to be resolved first, and we ran out of time

Based on ISO’s ‘individual concept’ a fact type could be an individual concept.  But the specification gives ‘noun concept’ as the more general concept of ‘individual concept’.  Also, as it stands, ‘individual concept’ is inconsistent with ‘general concept’.

 

Recommendation:

8.1.1 (pg. 17)

Remove line in the entry for “individual concept” that says, “General Concept:  noun concept”.

 

I can provide an updated Figure 8.1 on page 15.

More basic Issues had to be resolved first, and we ran out of time

The reference scheme for ‘reference scheme’ needs to consider characteristics used by the reference scheme, but it does not.  This is necessary because a reference scheme that considers a characteristic is always different from one that does not.

 

Recommendation:

8.4 (pg. 29, bottom)

Add the following to the end of the “Reference Scheme:” paragraph for the ‘reference scheme’ entry:  

 

            and the set of each characteristic that is used by the reference scheme

 

The term style should be used for “characteristic” and “reference scheme”, the verb style for “is used by” and the keyword style for the rest.

 

To the reference scheme for 'reference scheme', add "and the set of characteristics that are used by the reference scheme". 

The specializations of ‘noun form’, namely ‘nominal restrictive form’, ‘mathematical form’ and ‘gerund form’, delve into grammatical structure, which SBVR generally avoids.  It is sufficient to distinguish forms of expression into being propositional versus being nounish.  The examples given for the different kinds of noun forms are helpful, but they can be given without introducing the added grammatical complexity into the formal metamodel.  Also, these specializations are not complete with respect to noun forms and it is beyond the scope of SBVR to make the specializations complete.

 

Recommendation:

The following edits preserve and combine explanatory material and examples from the unwanted specializations and then delete the specializations.  Brackets are used to show words that should be underlined (not the term style).  The numerals attached to “number” should all be subscripts.

 

8.3.4 (pg. 25-26)

 

Add the following note to the entry for ‘noun form’ just below its definition.

Note:               A noun form can have a placeholder for each role of a fact type, in which case the noun form result comes from the of role the first placeholder is for.  A noun form can also have one less placeholder than there are roles, in which case the noun form result comes from the role that no placeholder is for. 

 

Replace the examples in the entry for ‘noun form’ with these:

Example:        ‘[transferred car] of [car transfer]’ for the fact type ‘[car transfer] has transferred car]’.  This form yields a transferred car.

Example:        ‘| [number] |’ for the fact type ‘[number] has [absolute value]’.  The form yields the absolute value of the number.

Example:        ‘[number1] + [number2]’ for the fact type ‘[number1] + [number2] = [number3]’.  This form yields the third number – the sum of adding the first two numbers.

Example:        ‘transferring [rental car]’ for the fact type ‘[car transfer] has [transferred car]’.  This form yields the car transfer, which is an action.  Gerunds are used in noun forms like this for actions, events and states.  They are used in sentences like this: “A rental car must be cleaned before transferring the rental car.”

 

Remove the entire entries for ‘mathematical form’, ‘nominal restrictive form’ and ‘gerund form’.

 

I can provide an updated Figure 8.4 on page 24.

 

Combine relevent explanatory material and examples from the unwanted specializations and then delete the specializations.

The fact type that connects “category” and “more general concept” is shown in Figure 11.2, but is missing from section 11.1.2.  That fact type is defined in the Meaning and Representation Vocabulary, but the role designations “category” and “more general concept” are introduced in 11.1.2.3.  The forms of expressions that use these designations are missing.  The form of expression “concept has category” must be put in the vocabulary in order to make the 50 or so uses of the phrase “category of …” formally understandable.

 

Recommendation:

11.1.2.3 (pg. 116)

Add the following after the entry for “more general concept”.  The numerals are all in the subscript style.  The words “has” and “specializes” are in the verb style.  The other words are in the term style.

 

concept1 has more general concept2

   see:  concept1 specializes concept2

   synonymous form:  concept2 has category1

Add the forms of expression 'concept has more general concept' and 'concept has category'.

Figure 11.5 on page 123 shows associations for two fact types that do not exist.  If they did exist, an ambiguity would be created.  The associations are for:

 

   categorization fact type has more general concept

   categorization fact type has category

 

Recommendation:

Remove the two associations from Figure 11.5.

In Fig. 11.5 (pg. 123):
1.	Remove the 2 lines between the box labeled 'categorization fact type' and the box labeled 'concept'.
2.	Remove the line-labels 'more general concept' and 'category' that are associated with the 2 removed lines.

Figure 11.6 on page 126 has the following errors:

 

“signifier” within the rectangle should be “expression”.

“is sensory manifestation of” should be “[signifier] is sensory manifestation of”

“regulates its usage of” should be “regulates its usage of [signifier]”

 

Recommendation:

Fix the diagram as noted.

In Fig. 11.6 (pg. 128):
3.	Change 'signifier' inside the box to 'expression'.
4.	Add '[signifier]' to the line-label between the 'speech community' box and the 'expression' box, so that it now reads:
	regulates its usage of [signifier]
5.	Add '[signifier]' to the line-label between 'res' box and 'expression' box, so that it now reads:  
	is sensory manifestation of [signifier]
6.	Correct the arrowhead that accompanies the text on the line between 'res' box and 'expression' box so that it points to the 'expression' box.

The following “Necessity” statements in 13.2 (pages 153-154) are not needed and should be removed.

 

‘fact’ is the XMI name of the Fact Class.

‘instantiation’ is the XMI name of the Instantiation Class.

‘integer’ is the XMI name of the Integer Class.

‘text’ is the XMI name of the Text Class.

‘extension’ is the XMI name of the Extension Class.

 

Recommendation:

Remove the lines containing the statements listed above from the specification.

The following example given in C.3.2.1 (pg. 202) is no longer correct.

 

semantic formulation

  Definition: logical formulation or projection

 

Recommendation:

Replace that example with ‘bindable target’ as follows:

 

bindable target

 Definition: variable or text

 

Replace the sentence above the example that says “For example, a semantic formulation is anything that is a logical formulation or a projection” with this: “For example, a bindable target is anything that is a variable or a text”.

The caption “Synonymous Form” should not be used for synonymous statements in the SBVR Structured English because the term has a different meaning which is related to forms of expression.  See C.5.6 (pg. 210).

 

Recommendation:

Change the caption “Synonymous Form” to “Synonymous Statement” in the following places:

 

C.5 (pg. 209) in the list under <Rules Statement or Clarification Statement>.

C.5.6 (pg. 210) in the section heading and in the paragraph.

E.2.2.2.4 (pg. 278 near top).

E.2.2.2.5 (pg. 280 near bottom).

E.2.2.2.7 (pg. 282 top of section).

E.2.2.2.9 (pg. 284 near top).

F.3.3 (pg. 303 above middle).

F.3.8 (pg. 307 near middle).

Change the caption "Synonymous Form" to "Synonymous Statement" in the places where it labels a statement.

When a reference scheme extensionally uses a role of a fact type, the SBVR Structure English takes the form “the set of each <singular noun> that <singular verb> …”.  This is a very awkward wording.  Plurals should be used:  “the set of <plural noun> that <plural verb> …”.  Examples of how this improves understandability are readily seen in the recommended changes below.

 

Recommendation:

 

Make the following changes, in each case removing the word “each” and pluralizing the noun, and verb if given.  Keep the fonts as they are.

 

Pg. 25, “the set of each placeholder” becomes “the set of placeholders”.

Pg. 29, “the set of each role that is” becomes “the set of roles that are”, twice.

Pg. 43, “the set of each concept that is” becomes “the set of concepts that are”, twice.

Pg. 45, “the set of each role binding” becomes “the set of role bindings”.

Pg. 57, “the set of each logical formulation that restricts” becomes “the set of logical formulations that restrict”.

Pg. 58, “the set of each logical formulation that is” becomes “the set of logical formulations that are”, thrice.

Pg. 58, “the set of each logical formulation that restricts” becomes “the set of logical formulations that restrict”, thrice.

Pg. 59, “the set of each logical formulation that is” becomes “the set of logical formulations that are”, thrice.

Pg. 59, “the set of each logical formulation that restricts” becomes “the set of logical formulations that restrict”, thrice.

Pg. 60, “the set of each logical formulation that is” becomes “the set of logical formulations that are”.

Pg. 60, “the set of each logical formulation that restricts” becomes “the set of logical formulations that restrict”.

Pg. 68, “the set of each variable that is” becomes “the set of variables that are”.

Pg. 68, “the set of each logical formulation that constrains” becomes “the set of logical formulations that constrain”.

Pg. 129, “the set of each symbol context that qualifies” becomes “the set of symbol contexts that qualify”.

Pg. 206, “the set of each role that is” becomes “the set of roles that are”, twice.

 

Pg. 206, in the second paragraph of C.3.9, change “the set of each” to “the set of”.

It is a matter of grammar that verbs have passive forms.  The standard passive formation uses the past participle of a verb preceded by “is” and followed by “by”.  For example, I can say a cat eats a mouse or I can say a mouse is eaten by a cat.  The vocabularies defined in SBVR explicitly include passive forms.  But this is not necessary any more than it is necessary to include infinitive, subjunctive and plural forms.  The forms are produced by rules of grammar.  Synynomous forms should be given where a different verb is being used, but not for simply showing the same verb in different grammatical configurations.

 

In general, passive forms have been left out of diagrams.  But they are explicitly listed in the vocabulary entries.  It would be benefitial to simply explain in the appendix on SBVR Structured English that passive forms are implicitly usable and then omit passive forms from the vocabulary entries.  This simplifies and shortens the specification without losing any meaning and without changing the meaning of any definition or statement.  It makes the SBVR MOF metamodels and XMI schemas smaller without losing any semantic content.  It also sets a better example for future users of SBVR.

Specify in Annex C that implicit passive forms are understood in SBVR, just as subjunctive and plural forms are understood.  Then remove synonymous forms from the SBVR vocabularies that are implicit passive forms.

SBVR uses URIs in a reference scheme for namespaces.  The URIs are particularly important for standardized namespaces so that standard designations can be identified.  But SBVR does not give the namespace URIs needed for its own vocabularies or for source vocabularies.  These URIs are needed in order to facilitate interchange.

 

Also, XMI documents based on an SBVR vocabulary need to identify an xmlns URI for the particular metamodel being used and for Essential SBVR.  Xmlns URIs are needed for each of these:

·       Essential SBVR

·       SBVR

·       Meaning and Representation

·       Logical Formulation of Semantics

·       Vocabulary for Describing Business Vocabularies

·       Vocabulary for Describing Business Rules

·       Vocabulary-to-MOF/XMI Vocabulary

 

I have seen examples of such xmlns URIs for OMG specifications, but the pattern is not completely consistent.

·       http://schema.omg.org/spec/XMI/2.1

·       http://schema.omg.org/spec/MOF/2.0/cmof.xml

·       http://org.omg//UML/2.0/UML2L1.xml

 

We need to determine a pattern to use for SBVR.  Then for each corresponding vocabulary namespace, either use the same URI or some variation.  Here is one possible set of xmlns URIs.

·       http://schema.omg.org/spec/SBVR/1.0/SBVR

·       http://schema.omg.org/spec/SBVR/1.0/Meaning-and-Representation

·       http://schema.omg.org/spec/SBVR/1.0/Logical-Formulation-of-Semantics

·       http://schema.omg.org/spec/SBVR/1.0/Vocabulary-for-Describing-Business-Vocabularies

·       http://schema.omg.org/spec/SBVR/1.0/Vocabulary-for-Descibing-Business-Rules

·       http://schema.omg.org/spec/SBVR/1.0/Vocabulary-to-MOF/XMI-Vocabulary

·       http://schema.omg.org/spec/SBVR/1.0/Essential-SBVR

 

One possible variation for the namespace URIs would be to replace “schema” with “namespace”.  E.g. http://namespace.omg.org/spec/SBVR/1.0/Meaning-and-Representation

 

This needs to be coordinated with OMG so that it fits a planned general structure.

 

Recommendation:

 

Note that this recommendation is incomplete.  It needs an agreement in the FTF and with OMG on the OMG-based URIs to be assigned.

 

7.1.1 and 7.1.2 (pg. 11-12), add a “Namespace URI:” line under the “General Concept:” line or “Definition:” line of each entry in the sections.  Give the appropriate URI.

 

7.1.3 (pg. 12), add a “Namespace URI:” line under the “Definition:” line of each name.

 

C.3 (pg. 201), add ‘Namespace URI:” to the end of the list of captions under “<primary representation>”.

 

Add “C.3.16  Namespace URI” at the end of section C.3 (pg. 208) as follows:

 

C.3.16  Namespace URI

 

If the primary entry is for a namespace, the ‘Namespace URI” caption is used to indicate a URI of the namespace.  If the primary entry is for a vocabulary, the ‘Namespace URI” caption is used to indicate a URI of a vocabulary namespace for the vocabulary.  Here is an example:

 

Meaning and Representation Vocabulary

  General Concept:  vocabulary

  Namespace URI:  <INSERT OFFICIAL URI HERE – same as what is used in 7.1.1>  

 

In section 15, (starting on pg. 169), give the xmlns URIs for the XML schema documents.

 

More basic Issues had to be resolved first, and we ran out of time

The specification does not address the mapping of rules to MOF and XMI.  The following sections address in detail the mapping of vocabulary to MOF and XMI.  It seems to me that -- absent equivalent detail about mapping of rules -- the goal of effectively interchanging rules may not be achieved. 
        * Section 13.3, "Vocabulary-to-MOF/XMI Mapping Rule Set" gives rules for mapping vocabulary to MOF and XMI, but ignores the question of mapping rules to MOF and XML. 
        * Annex K, "Design Rationale Details for the Use of MOF and XMI", contains lots of discussion about the representation of vocabularies in MOF and XMI but mentions rules only in passing. 
        * Annex L, "Examples of SBVR's Use of MOF" shows how a subset of the EU-Rent vocabulary should be represented in MOF and XMI but again overlooks rules. 

More basic Issues had to be resolved first, and we ran out of time

Chapter 15 promises various supporting documents.  The latest I can find (in bei/05-08-02) are out-of-date with respect to the current draft.  Others don't exist at all. 

More basic Issues had to be resolved first, and we ran out of time

The XMI in bei/05-08-02 provides no means of representing many vocabulary and rules aspects shown in the specification and the EU-Rent example: 
        * Concept Type, Guidance Type 
        * Synonym, Synonymous Form 
        * Note, Example 
        * Necessity, Possibility 

More basic Issues had to be resolved first, and we ran out of time

The XMI has some internal inconsistencies.  For example, it references type "proposition" but does not define that type.

More basic Issues had to be resolved first, and we ran out of time

SBVR vocabularies are represented (e.g. in SBVR.xsd)  as "Instantiation" types, when sections 13.1.1 and 13.3.3 say they should be mapped to packages

More basic Issues had to be resolved first, and we ran out of time

Referencing dtc/06-03-02, section 8.1.2 defines four basic modalities (necessity, possibility, obligation, permissibility).  This agrees with table 10.2. 

Section 10.1.2 defines a total of eight modes of thinking, of which one (contingency) "is not relevant in a business rules context."   This leaves three alethic modes (necessity, possibility, and impossibility), and four deontic modes (permission, obligation, nonpermission/forbidden/prohibition, and non-obligation). 

Table I.3 lists six  modal operators: necessary, possible, impossible, obligatory, permitted, forbidden.  This matches section 10.1.2 if we assume that non-obligation (like contingency) is not relevant. 

Section 12.2.1 defines six forms of business rule statements: obligation, prohibitive, restricted permissive, necessity, impossibility, restricted possibility.  The two restricted forms are defined as composites of either permission or possibility and a condition.  Notice that unrestricted permissive and unrestricted possibility statement forms are not mentioned. 

Section F.1.1 describes eight statement forms: obligative statement, prohibitive statement, restricted permission, unrestricted permission, necessity, impossibilty, restricted possibility, unrestricted possibility.  It has both of the forms (unrestricted permission, unrestricted possibility) that seem to be missing from section 12.2.1. 

Section 10.1.2 defines prohibition but not impossibility. 

Suggestions: 

1. It seems that section 12.2.1 should include the two unrestricted forms: unrestricted permission, unrestricted possibility.  Alternatively, section F.1.1 should be aligned with section 12.2.1 -- but that seems undesirable since the unrestricted forms do appear in the real world. 
2. Section 10.1.2, in the discussion of deontic modality, should make it clear that "non-obligation" is not relevant, as it already does for "contingency" in the definition of alethic modality. 
3. Make the definition of the restricted forms explicit by defining them in terms of the equivalent logical formulations using the underlying basic modalities plus implications. 
4. Adopt a consistent approach to the negative forms (prohibition, impossibility): 
        a) Adopt one designation for nonpermission/forbidden/prohibition. 
        b) Define impossibility in section 10.1.2. 
        c) Make the definition of the negative forms (impossibility, prohibition) explicit by defining them in terms of the equivalent logical formulations using "not" and the underlying basic modalities. 

Make the following set of changes, based on FTF discussion, with final agreement in the telcon of 01/03/2007.

The Interchange discussion in chapters 13 and Annexes K and L  appear to discuss exchange of *meaning* between tools.   But what about *representations* and *expressions*?  Presumably users would want to preserve their forms of expression when moving rules between tools.   Is that a goal of the Interchange design?   If the answer is yes, then tool implementors will need more detail about how to accomplish that. 

Consider the first example in chapter 9, "A rental must have at most three additional drivers".   I can think of several ways to associate the expression with the semantic formulation described in this chapter. 

1. Use the fact type "statement is formalized by closed logical formulation" to associate the complete rule statement  with the top-level semantic formulation. 
2. Use the fact types "representation has expression", "representation represents meaning" and "closed semantic formulation formulates meaning" to associate the complete rule statement (as an expression) to a representation that then gets associated to a meaning that then gets associated with the semantic formulation.  This seems like one too many levels of indirection: why isn't a semantic formulation a type of meaning? 
3 . Decompose the statement into sub-statements such as "rental has at most three additional drivers" and "rental has additional drivers" and associate these individually with the corresponsing logical formulations that compose the complete formulation.  That is, exchange the expression corresponding to each logical formulation. 

Absent further guidance, tool vendors will choose different answers to such questions.  That will defeat the goal of interoperability between tools and repositories. 

More basic Issues had to be resolved first, and we ran out of time

The current notion of "actionable" falls short in several regards:
* It does not take into account structural (definitional) rules.
* Its wording is based on "complying", which is only appropriate for operative (behavioral) rules.
* It fails to address the issue of lexical indexicals -- conversational references to person, place and time.


The attached document (SBVR-Actionable-pp138+178.doc) reflects the detail of
the proposed revision.

Make separate fact types for 'is practicable' and 'is actionable'.  Rearrange the generalization hierarchy in 12.1 to better represent commonly understood usage of terms.  Add further explanation to Annex A.

The root of many problems is the flawed definition of "rule" in SBVR,
which differs from the sense that was intended in the formal logic
appendix. The SBVR definition is also at odds with the dictionary
definition of "rule" and includes some riders that seem a little
bizarre.


The intended meaning of "rule" in the formal logic appendix was the
dictionary meaning of the term. The definitive source (the ODE - Oxford
Dictionary of English) has the following:


Rule (core meaning)
"One of a set of explicit or understood regulations or principles
governing conduct or procedure within a particular area of activity."


Rule (main subsidiary meaning)
"A law or principle that operates within a particular sphere of
knowledge, describing or prescribing what is possible or allowable." 


You will recall that when we tried to make such a definition explicit in
the revision of the formal logic appendix there was vehement opposition
from some members of the FTF, and we were obliged to indulge in the
unhappy compromise of using the term "logic rule" to mean the above
(although it is indeed the correct definition of "rule").


By the way, the ODE defines "logical" as: 
"Of or according to the rules of logic."
(and, yes, it does dare to say "rules"!)


In contrast, here are the relevant SBVR definitions:


======================================================


rule
Definition: element of guidance that introduces an obligation or a
necessity Dictionary Basis: standard by which something is judged or
valued; criterion [MWUD (2B) 'rule'] Dictionary Basis: principle or
standard by which something may be judged or decided [determined] [NODE
'criterion'] Dictionary Basis: standard on which a judgment or decision
may be based [MWCD (2) 'criterion']


element of guidance
Definition: directive that is actionable, whose purpose is to advise or
inform with a goal of resolving a problem or difficulty, especially as
given by someone in authority
Necessity: No business policy is an element of guidance.


directive
Definition: means that defines or constrains some aspect of an
enterprise General Concept: proposition
Note: This sense of 'means' (as in 'ends and means', rather than 'is
meant as') arises from the Business Motivation Model.
Note: Intended to assert business structure or to control or influence
the behavior of the enterprise.
Note: Its formulation is under the enterprise's control by a party
authorized to manage, control or regulate an enterprise, by selection
from alternatives in response to a combination of assessments.
Dictionary Basis: an official or authoritative instruction [NODE]


directive is actionable
Concept Type: characteristic
Note: 'Actionable' means that a person who knows about the directive
could observe a relevant situation (including his or her own behavior)
and decide directly whether or not the business was complying with the
directive. Dictionary Basis: subject to or affording ground for an
action or suit at law [MWUD 'actionable'] Dictionary Basis: a thing done
: DEED [MWUD (5a) 'action']
Note: The sense intended is: "It's actually something you can put to use
or apply."


====================================================


As you can see, SBVR effectively treats "rule" as a synonym of
"criterion". I fear that this is fundamentally incorrect. The ODE says
that a criterion is: "A principle or standard by which something may be
judged or decided." The ODE does not equate "criterion" with "rule", as
the SBVR definition implies.


For example, a bank may decide that one criterion for determining that a
customer should be treated as a Gold Customer is the length of time they
have held an account. Another criterion might be balance held in the
account, averaged over some period. The bank might then define a "Gold
Customer" rule that uses these (and probably other) criteria. In simple
cases, a rule may boil down to not much more than a single criterion,
but that does not change the fact that "rule" and "criterion" are
different concepts, and are clearly identified as such in the ODE. It's
hard to see what SBVR gains by attempting to muddle the two together.
Why not let "rule" simply mean "rule"?


A second problem is the use of "actionable" in the SBVR definitions. The
intent of SBVR was to provide business level descriptions, not
prescriptions for processing. It may well be that a rule necessitates
some actions at a machine level, but that should be outside the SBVR
scope. It's hard to see how alethic constraints fit with the SBVR idea
of "actionable". For example, how does one "action" something like "a
person is born in exactly one country"? A strict interpretation of the
current SBVR definitions would appear to disallow alethic constraints of
this kind.


The dictionary justification quoted for "actionable" (and, by
inheritance, "rule" too) is also rather weird -- I doubt that many
business rules are framed with legal action in mind.


A further problem is the demotion of a rule to just being a piece of
advice or information, rather than defining what must or must not be the
case. A rule *may* advise or inform, but that's not necessarily its
primary purpose, as claimed in the SBVR definitions.


In summary, the SBVR definition of "rule" could be paraphrased as "an
advisory criterion used to invoke a deed for which one could be sued",
which is very different from the ODE definition (and the common English
usage) of "rule". This SBVR meaning is NOT the meaning intended in the
formal logic section. Simply replacing "logic rule" by "rule" without
changing the SBVR definition of "rule" would therefore change the
meaning of the formal logic section.


A common-sense solution would be to change the term in SBVR from "rule"
to something like "SBVR rule", so that the term "rule" could be used
where necessary in its normal English language sense. In this case,
"logic rule" in the formal logic section could revert to just being
"rule" and no definition would be necessary since we would be using it
in its everyday sense. Where we can use ordinary English words in their
ordinary English sense it's hard to think of any reason why we should
not do so.

First part.  See revisions below.
Second part.  Covered by resolution of Issue 9477.

Problem Description Under the list of Operative Rule Keywords in the first paragraph of the page, the following is listed: << only ... often as in 'only if' ... rule keyword >> The actual full rule keyword is "may ... only". "Only" may not be used without "may". "Only" produces a restricted permissive form of a rule; "may" must be present to indicate that permission is being restricted. (Note: the corresponding structural rule keyword is "can ... only", which is given correctly in the list for the next paragraph on that same page.) Proposed Solution: 1. Change << only ... often as in 'only if' ... rule keyword >> to: << may ... only ... often as in 'only if' ... rule keyword >> 2. In the third paragraph of text, item 1, which reads: ‘Should’ may be used in place of ‘must’ in expressing a business rule only if one of the following is true: • The business rule does not have an enforcement level. • The business rule has an enforcement level, and that enforcement level is consistent with the English sense of ‘should’. ... change the very first "may" (second word in the extracted text) to styled text for rule keyword. 

1.	Change the keyword phrase to "may … only".
2.	Correct a rule given for RuleSpeak (given in RuleSpeak) by giving the proper styling to "may". 

In semantic formulations, only variables and text are bindable targets.  Because a role binding cannot bind to an individual concept, the formulation of rules involving individual concepts are overly large and complicated.  For example, a formulation of something a simple as “1 + 2 = 3” must involve three quantifications and three variables, but it should be accomplished with a single atomic formulation.  Or a formulation of “EU-Rent uses FedEx” must have quantifiers and variables for EU-Rent and for FedEx.

 

An early submission of SBVR had individual concepts as bindable targets.  This was removed because individual concepts do not necessarily have the same extension across all time and in all possible worlds.  Binding directly to individual concepts might not work when formalizing statements like “The President was once not the President” or “In 1776 there was no Statue of Liberty”.  Explicit quantification would guarantee a precise formulation in all cases.

 

However, there is a way to allow binding to individual concepts while preserving precision.  The way is to rigorously explain what is meant by a binding to an individual concept, and to explain it in terms of quantification.  If that is done, then all bindings to individual concepts have a precise meaning.  Special cases can continue to be handled using quantification.

More basic Issues had to be resolved first, and we ran out of time

The dictionary basis of ‘body of shared meanings’ is the dictionary definition of ‘universal set’, which is way off track and can only produce confusion.  No body of shared meanings is the universal set.

 

Since ‘body of shared meanings’ is defined with respect to “a given semantic community”, why isn’t it a ‘role’.  A set of concepts and guidance that is a body of shared meanings of one community is not necessarily a body of shared meanings for another community, but it is still a set of concepts and guidance.

 

Either the second necessity listed under ‘semantic community understands body of shared meanings’ is incorrect or there needs to be a definition of that fact type that gives a particular meaning of “understands” that is different from normal usage.  The contradiction is seen in a simple example.  Assume a semantic community EU-Rent has a subcommunity EU-Rent Mechanics.  EU-Rent Mechanics’ body of shared meanings includes everything in EU-Rent’s and more.  Both EU-Rent and EU-Rent Mechanics understand the body of shared meanings that is understood by EU-Rent, which contradicts the necessity that “Each body of shared meaning [sic] is understood by exactly one semantic community”.

 

I suspect that the necessity is what is intended and that making ‘body of shared meanings’ a role and simply using the verb “has” rather than “understands” will clear things up.

More basic Issues had to be resolved first, and we ran out of time

Pg. 209, C.5 uses “Clarification Statement”, which is an out-of-date signifier left over from an earlier SBVR submission.

 

C.5, page 209, change “<Rule Statement or Clarification Statement>” to “<Guidance Statement>”.

C.5.1, page 209, change the section title from “Rule Statement or Clarification Statement” to “Guidance Statement”.  And then change the beginning of the paragraph from “rule statement or clarification statement” to “guidance statement”.

C.5.2, page 209, change “rule or clarification.” to “element of guidance”.

Change the combined uses of "clarification statement" and "rule statement" into "guidance statement".  Similarly, change combined uses of "rule" and "clarification" to "element of guidance".

Page 103 of SBVR says ‘fact’ is “logical formulation that is taken as true…”, but a fact is a proposition and a logical formulation is not a proposition

"Explicitly Stated SBVR Architectural Principles for Relationships among 'Definitions' 'Rules' and 'Semantic Formulations'" Issue Statement: The lack of an explicitly stated, concise set of SBVR architectural principles regarding the relationship of 'definitions' 'rules' and 'semantic formulations' is causing much needless SBVR-FTF discussion around related topics. If this lack is causing a problem for the creators of SBVR, then it's going to be even harder for people in the rest of the world to understand and agree on this critical aspect of SBVR. A (strawman) set of SBVR architectural principles needs to be explicitly stated in SBVR as follows: 1. 'Definitions' and 'rules' are not the same thing as 'semantic formulations'. 2. 'Semantic formulations' structure the meaning of 'definitions' and of 'rules'. 3. The meaning of an 'operative business rule' is structured by a 'semantic formulation' that introduces an 'obligation'. 4. The meaning of a 'structural rule / definitional rule / definitional criterion' is structured by a 'semantic formulation' that introduces a 'necessity' which itself means 'true by definition'. 5. 'Intensional definitions' are made up of definitional components of two types: a. a 'more general concept' b. one or more 'delimiting' components 6. These 'delimiting' components may take either of two forms which are equivalent in meaning and can be converted to the other form at will without loss of meaning: a. the form of a 'characteristic' b. the form of a 'structural rule / definitional rule / definitional criterion' 7. The 'intensional definitions' in an SBVR Vocabulary can be composed using three combinations of these two forms: a. All definitions composed only of a 'more general concept' plus one or more 'structural rules / definitional rules / definitional criteria' b. All definitions composed only of a 'more general concept' (plus one or more 'characteristics'. c. Definitions composed of a 'more general concept' plus some 'structural rules / definitional rules / definitional criteria' and some 'characteristics' -- (the way many of the SBVR concepts are defined). 8. 'Structural rules / definitional rules / definitional criteria' exist only as components of an 'intensional definition'. This is a corollary of 'true by definition'.. 9. For a given discrete meaning there is a set of 'semantic formulations' that give form to its meaning. 10. There is a one-to-one relationship between an 'operative business rule' and the set of 'semantic formulations' of its discrete meaning. 11. There is a one-to-one relationship between a 'delimiting' component of an 'intensional definition' and the set of 'semantic formulations' of its discrete meaning.

More basic Issues had to be resolved first, and we ran out of time

Much of the recent discussion of "rule" and "actionable" have swirled around the use of "dictionary basis". I decided to have a look at what "dictionary basis" actually means in SBVR.

        It's not defined in the normative part of the standard. It appears in Annex C (C.3.4), where the following description is given:

This caption labels a definition from a common dictionary that supports the use of the primary representation. The entry source reference (written in the ‘Source’ style described above) is supplied at the end of the quoted definition. A dictionary basis should not be interpreted as an adopted definition. 

         Have I missed a seeing a definition somewhere else? If not, perhaps we should include this term in the normative part of the standard so it can be given a tighter definition? Most other captioned items have SBVR definitions. It's obviously a source of some confusion.

        The above definition clearly indicates "not interpreted as an adopted definition." I had always thought dictionary basis "informs" a definition ... provides background, source ideas and insight ... but does not in and of inside need to be complete. Wouldn't it be the case that several definitions need to be aggregated to form a complete picture (basis)?

        Anyway, it had never occurred to me this might be a problem until the recent discussions. Does it need to be raised as an issue?

Ron Ross never intended that this should be made into an Issue and has said that it should be closed.

There are some inconsistencies between Annex C (which explains proper SBVR
Structured English) and Annex E (which illustrates proper usage of SBVR
Structured English), as follows:


point-1) The unary fact type definitions are not written as fact type
definitions -- i.e., beginning with a definite article ("the") plus the
placeholder term, and then saying something propositional.  Instead, they
are written in the style appropriate to a noun concept -- i.e., leading with
a term, followed by restrictive clauses.


point-2) The form of expression of the entry concept uses a participle --
e.g., 'having' or 'being') rather than an active verb.  I was told that, in
SBVR Structured English, using the participle implies meaning in addition to
the naked fact type.  That additional meaning is generally handled within a
semantic formulation that uses the fact type.


point-3)  There is some ambiguity about the use of quantifiers (etc.) in the
form of expression.  (ref. SBVR p. 201, final sentence of C.3.1), which
says, "It is recommended that quantifiers (including articles) and logical
operators not be embedded within designations and forms of expression."
    Often we see a 'characteristic' (unary fact type) that uses an article
or quantifier.  Is that incorrect?  Or does 'unary fact type' have a
different set of guidelines for its form of expression?

More basic Issues had to be resolved first, and we ran out of time

Clause 10.2 promises a formal mapping from the "logical formulation vocabulary" in clause 9.1.1 to the mathematical logic vocabulary presented in 10.1.2.  But the content of clause 10.2 is empty.  No such mapping is provided.


Note that several logical concepts defined in 9.1.1 (e.g. negation, conjunction, disjunction, equivalence) have no direct cognates in the vocabulary presented in 10.2.  For these concepts, either 10.1.2 must be expanded to include the definitions, or the mapping table must specify the equivalent logical formula (wff) as a composition of implications.


Note further that Clause 10.2 defines many of its terms as elements of a grammar for a surface syntax (expression) for the logical concepts defined here and there in clause 10.1.  Clause 9.1.1 appears to define an abstract syntax for the same purpose.  There is no reason why these two grammars should not describe the same expressions.


Recommendation:


Provide the mapping, revising clause 9.1.1 and/or 10.1.2 as needed to align the grammars.

More basic Issues had to be resolved first, and we ran out of time

Clause 10.3 says it is a mapping from "the selected subset of (important) SBVR business terms" to the formal logic terms in 10.1.2.  It is not clear how these terms were selected.  They are all drawn from clause 8 and 9, but they don't correspond to any defined vocabulary, and they are not complete with respect to clause 8 or 9.  Those terms that are defined in Clause 9 should apparently be mapped in 10.2.  Those coming from clause 8 should represent an organized set of concepts.


All of 8.1 is covered except for 'concept' and 'question'.
8.2 is not covered.
8.3 is not covered at all, except for 'statement'.
8.4 is covered, but the mapping is nonsense.  Reference schemes have no counterpart in mathematical logic.
8.5 is covered.
8.6 is covered.
8.7 is covered.


9.1[only] is covered but the mapping is nonsense.  A "semantic formulation" doesn't necessarily correspond to a logical proposition or predicate; it may be defined by the mathematics of sets or arithmetics or functions.
9.1.1 is covered, except for question nominalization and answer nominalization.
9.1.2 is covered in theory, but the mapping is nonsense.  A projection is an operation on sets that has no logical result, although it may involve a logical formulation.


Many terms that are said to be adequately mapped by their supertypes in 10.3.3 are not, in that the subtype creates an importantly different mathematical logic interpretation.


And most of the subtypes of quantification defined in clause 9 have no image in mathematical logic.  (Clause 10 would have to introduce set theory and model cardinality and basic arithmetic to support these.)


Recommendation:


a.  Move and correct the mappings of terms defined in clause 9.1.1 from 10.3 into 10.2.  (This may depend on other issues related to clause 9.1.1.)


b.  Define the 'sub-vocabulary' of Clause 8 for which what remains in 10.3 defines a mapping, complete and correct the mapping of that vocabulary.


c.  Delete the mappings for the terms from 9.1[only] or 9.1.2.

More basic Issues had to be resolved first, and we ran out of time

Section 12.1.2  defines "business rule" as a "rule that is under business jurisdiction".   This is a key definition, yet it is not clear what "under business jurisdiction" really means.  Presumably a law of physics is not "under business jurisdiction", hence is not a rule.   How about a national or state law?  How about a regulation?  A standard or best practice? 

Something like "All transactions must be archived for three years" seems like a rule.  Say it starts as a rule created by a particular company for itself, hence is clearly a "business rule."   Over time, it evolves to an industry standard and maybe a regulatory requirement.  Has it morphed from a "business rule" to something else because it is no longer "under business jurisdiction?"  What kind of rule is it once no longer "under business jurisdiction?"

More basic Issues had to be resolved first, and we ran out of time

The definitions of 'logical operator' and 'logical operand' are circular.
From 9.1.1
logical operator - logical formulation that operates on a logical operand
logical operand - logical formulation upon which a logical operation operates


Recommendation:


Redefine 'logical operator', e.g., to:
 logical formulation whose meaning is derived from the meanings of one or more other logical formulations by a particular semantic relationship.

More basic Issues had to be resolved first, and we ran out of time. Terry: logical operation = propositional operation = an operation that operates on one or more propositions to produce a proposition.  Operand is a role of a proposition in a logical operation.
Ed: SBVR uses 'proposition' for the meaning and 'logical formulation' for the expression.  Here we are talking about formulations.
Don:  Logical operations are different from other logical formulations in that they only consider the truth of their operands, nothing else.  This makes them distinct from modal operations which go beyond considering truth alone to consider necessity (possible worlds), obligation, etc.  This also makes them distinct from other formulations that consider counting things, objectifying, etc.  I was assisted in reaching this conclusion by the following from the definition of 'logical operation' in American Heritage Dictionary: "An instruction in which the quantity being operated on and the results of the operation can each have two values".  Also, in surveying the definitions of the specific logical operation kinds I found that every one is about being true and false.

SBVR’s definition of ‘body of shared guidance’ uses the word ‘guidance’ styled as a term.  But no term ‘guidance’ is in the SBVR vocabularies.  The word should either be unstyled or else replaced with the defined term ‘elements of guidance’.

Name: Definitions of 'projection'
Doc: dtc/06-03-02
Date: March 2006
Version:  Interim Convenience Document
Chapter:  9.1.1
Pages: 101
Nature:  Revision/correction
Severity: Significant


Description:


9.1 defines 'semantic formulation' as: conceptual structure of meaning.


9.1.2 defines 'projection' as: semantic formulation that operates over one or more variables and results in a set or multiset.


How does a 'conceptual structure' 'operate' or 'result'?  Structure is a static notion.  A 'projection' must rather be a semantic formulation whose meaning is the SET -- the conceptual structure -- that results from applying a function to some collection of things.


The term 'multiset' is undefined, and does not have a NODE definition (it's IT jargon).  In a formal model, a 'multiset' is either a set of pairs (thing, occurrence), each of which has a reference scheme, or a set of pairs (thing, count), for which thing has a reference scheme and count is a nonnegative integer.  Whichever definition is chosen, if any, the conceptual structure of the projection is a SET.  The only question is what it is a set of.


The example of a 'bag projection' indicates that the result is actually a set of pairs (balance, customer) and then says: "Only balances are in the result, but there can be duplicates where multiple customers have the same balance." This is true in SQL, but it has nothing to do with reality or logic.  It can only be true in business if the result somehow carries the customer notion with the balance -- a different line, a different position, a different memory cell -- so that occurrences can be distinguished.  In SQL, the result is a LIST of balances with distinguished positions, a SET of pairs (position, balance).


The projection (set) doesn't result from applying a function to 'variables', it results from applying the function to the things the variables range over.
So the concept 'variable ranges over concept' from 9.1.1 is critical to the meaning of a projection!  (Note that much of the discussion of 'variables' in 9.1.1 is about projections and not about 'variables' in logical predicates.)


The projection is not 'on a variable'.  A projection INTRODUCES a variable to denote the individual concepts in the range from which the result set will be extracted.  The logical formulation that constrains the projection is called the 'selection criterion'.  It involves the projection variable as a 'free variable'.  Each individual concept for which the selection criterion holds appears in the result set.


In addition to projections, there are mathematical functions whose operands are sets and whose results are simple values, like 'average'.  These should not be confused with projections.  In the example "the average of ages of rental cars owned by each local area", the conceptual structure is a TABLE of cars with ages, created by the "projection"
  TableOfAges = { c: OwnedCars, a: Age | (CarHasAge c a) }
over the projection
  OwnedCars = { c: Car | (Exists b: branch)(owns b c) }
but the result of interest is the function
  AverageOfColumn(TableOfAges, Age)
which is not a projection or anything the like.


If database Select and Project operations and arbitrary mathematical functions whose operands can be structures are all part of "semantic formulations", let us call a spade a spade.  The relational database formulation of "semantics" is well understood, and we can use that.  The current text for projections does not have any hope of capturing meaning.


Recommendation:


The real fix:
a.  Define the 'relation' concept, and the cross product, select and project operations a la relational algebra.  It is a perfectly usable form of "semantic formulation": "relational formulation"
b.  Provide a concept for mathematical function that applies to arbitrary operands.


The minimal fix:
a.  Correct the definition of projection, and decide on the model of projection (result) to be used.
b.  Repair or delete the concepts bag projection and set projection according to the model chosen.
c.  Correct the definitions of the relationships among the projection, the range variable(s), and the selection condition.
d.  Eliminate 'auxiliary variable'.  It is either a logical variable in the selection condition (logical formulation) or a (parallel) range variable depending on the model of projection results.
e.  Remove the example about the average of ages of rental cars, and other such examples, whose formal representation is well out of the scope of SBVR.

More basic Issues had to be resolved first, and we ran out of time

Doc: dtc/06-03-02
Date: March 2006
Version:  Interim Convenience Document
Chapter:  9.1.1
Pages: 101
Nature:  correction
Severity: minor


Description:


In the definition of 'variable' in 9.1.1, there are two Reference Schemes given for variables.  The one for projection variables indicates that the scheme is a pair (projection, variable range concept).


In 9.1.2, the definition of 'projection position' says that it "distinguishes a variable", but it is not mentioned in the reference scheme in 9.1.1.


But 9.1.2 defines the 'projection position' to be the reference scheme for 'auxiliary variable'.  Since an auxiliary variable could have the same range concept as the primary range variable for the projection, the reference scheme in 9.1.1 cannot be correct.  The scheme given in 9.1.1 should be the same as that for auxiliary variable, and then it need not be restated for auxiliary variable.


Further, the reference scheme given for logical variables in 9.1.1 is:
"a quantification that introduces the variable and the set of each concept that is ranged over by the variable and whether the variable is unitary".


This is mostly unnecessary.  The reference scheme is the quantification that introduces the variable, full stop.  The scope of the quantification is the scope in which the variable refers to that one.


Now, since variables do not appear to be distinguished by type: logical variable vs. projection variable, it is difficult to manage incompatible reference schemes, when both kinds can appear in the logical formulation that is the selection criterion for a projection!  So variables have to have either a common reference scheme or have distinguished subtypes with distinguished reference schemes.


Recommendation:


a.  Define two subtypes of variable, 'logic variable' or 'quantified variable' in 9.1.1 and 'projection variable' (in lieu of 'auxiliary variable') in 9.1.2.


b.  For the logic variable, the reference scheme should be: the quantification that introduces the variable.


c.  For the projection variable, the reference scheme should be as given for 'auxiliary variable' in 9.1.2.


(I'm not sure this really solves the problem for parsing logical formulations that appear in projections.)

More basic Issues had to be resolved first, and we ran out of time. There is an alternative to having reference schemes that have partial loops, but the alternative adds new concepts and structure along with additional complexity that would likely complicate semantic interchange.  Adding a description of how reference schemes are used for semantic formulations is preferable, if it can be made understandable, to adding the new concepts and relationships.

Doc: dtc/06-03-02
Date: March 2006
Version:  Interim Convenience Document
Chapter:  8.1.2
Pages: 19
Nature:  Correction
Severity: minor


Description:


8.1.2 defines 'modality' (a pure mathematical logic concept) so that it can be the ConceptType for 'necessity', 'possibility', 'obligation' and 'permissibility'.


But in fact, 'necessity' is said to be a kind of 'fact', and the others are said to be 'propositions'.  That is, the corresponding GeneralConcepts are not 'modality'.  And they are not individual concepts, so they shouldn't have a ConceptType.


Recommendation:


a.  Move the glossary entry for 'modality' to 9.1.1, or delete it if it is used nowhere else.


b.  For 'necessity', replace "ConceptType: modality", with
"GeneralConcept: fact"


c.  For 'possibility', 'obligation' and 'permissibility', replace
"ConceptType: modality",
with
"GeneralConcept: proposition"

More basic Issues had to be resolved first, and we ran out of time

Doc: dtc/06-03-02
Date: March 2006
Version:  Interim Convenience Document
Chapter:  8.1.2
Pages: 18
Nature:  Editorial
Severity: minor


Description:


In 8.1.2, the definition of 'proposition' says:
"meaning that is asserted when a sentence is uttered or inscribed and which is true or false"


If the meaning is *asserted* when the sentence is uttered, the proposition is taken by the speaker to be true.  Whether the meaning corresponds to the actual 'state of affairs' determines whether it *is* true or false, and even then not when the sentence is in the future tense.  I think the intent here is: "meaning that is asserted by a sentence", full stop.  Whether it is true, false, unknown, possible, etc., is irrelevant to the definition.  And the time of the utterance ("WHEN it is uttered") is not intended to be important to the meaning of an arbitrary proposition.


The definition of 'question' in 8.1.3 uses the undefined term 'interrogatory', but is probably intended to be distinct from 'proposition'.  This means that a proposition is not the meaning of an interrogative sentence, and therefore not of an arbitrary sentence, but only of a declarative sentence.


Recommendation:


In 8.1.2, replace the definition of 'proposition' with:
"meaning that is asserted by a declarative sentence"


For consistency, in 8.1.3 replace "interrogatory" with "interrogative sentence".

More basic Issues had to be resolved first, and we ran out of time

In 8.1.2, 'obligation' is defined as follows:
"Definition: proposition that is required to be true, that is obligatory, that is not permitted to be false"


And 'permission', 'necessity' and 'possibility' are similar.


The problem is that an obligation is not a proposition that is required to be true.  It is rather a proposition that requires another proposition be true.


Example:
  "It is an obligation that every rental car has a scheduled service."
The proposition
  'Every rental car has a scheduled service'
is what the obligation requires to be true.  But that proposition itself is not an obligation.  It is just a statement, like "all roads lead to Rome".


The 'obligation' is:
  "It is an obligation that every rental car has a scheduled service."
or equivalently:
  "Every rental car is required to have a scheduled service."
which is a different proposition.


The obligation itself is a proposition that (per the definition of 'proposition') can be true or false -- that 'obligation' may or may not actually be a rule at UDriveIt.


The Note under the glossary entry for 'modal formulation' has this same error.  It says:
"The meaning of a modal formulation is the proposition that the proposition meant by the embedded logical formulation is an instance of the modality claimed by the modal formulation."


I read this to say that the meaning of
  "It is an obligation that every rental car has a scheduled service."
is the proposition:
  "(The proposition) 'every rental car has a scheduled service' is
an (instance of) obligation."
This is incorrect.  As above, the embedded proposition 'every rental car has a scheduled service' is not an obligation.  The obligation is the meaning of the modal formulation itself.


That is, the meaning of a modal formulation is the proposition resulting from interpreting the proposition meant by the embedded logical formulation under the modality claimed by the modal formulation.


Recommendation:


In 8.1.2,


a. change the definition of 'necessity' to
"proposition that another proposition is necessarily true, always true"


b. In the definition of 'possibility', after "proposition that" insert "another proposition"


c. In the definition of 'obligation', after "proposition that" insert "another proposition"


d. In the definition of 'permissiblity', after "proposition that" insert "another proposition"


In 9.1.1,


a.  Replace the text of the Note under 'modal formulation' with:
"The meaning of a modal formulation is the proposition resulting from interpreting the proposition meant by the embedded logical formulation under the modality claimed by the modal formulation."


b.  Under the entry for 'modal formulation claims modality', add a note:
Note:  The meaning of 'modal formulation claims modality' is that the proposition meant by the modal formulation is an instance of the concept that corresponds to the modality.

More basic Issues had to be resolved first, and we ran out of time

Doc: dtc/06-03-02
Date: March 2006
Version:  Interim Convenience Document
Chapter:  9.1.1.7
Pages: 
Nature:  Editorial
Severity: minor


Description:


In 9.1.1.7, the model of quantification shows it to be a kind of logical formulation that MAY (0..1) scope over a logical formulation.  A quantification has to "scope over" something.  And it binds a variable in that something.  The definition does not reflect this requirement.  
Further, iIf a quantification doesn't 'scope over' a logical formulation, it isn't itself a logical formulation. A logical formulation represents a proposition that is true or false.


If necessary, define logical quantification with the well-defined properties and define some other kind of quantification for whatever else a quantification may "scope over".


Recommendation: 


In the entry for 'quantification'
a. Modify the definition of quantification to read:
logical formulation that applies a logical quantification operator to a free variable in the logical formulation that the quantification scopes over.


b. Add a Note
Note: the variable must be free in the logical formulation scoped over.  The quantification binds that variable in the resulting logical formulation. 


c. Modify Necessity (3) to read:
Necessity: Each quantification scopes over exactly one logical formulation.  
(Not "at most one".)


In the entry 'logical formulation restricts quantification', At the end of the Note, add:  
The logical formulation represented by the quantification is logically equivalent to scoping over the conjunction of the logical formulation that restricts the logical quantification with the logical formulation it scopes over."


In the entry 'universal quantification', replace the text of Definition with:
quantification that is true if the logical formulation it scopes over is true for all admissible referents of the variable, and false in any other case.


In the entry 'existential quantification', replace the text of Definition with:
quantification that is true if the logical formulation it scopes over is true for any admissible referent(s) of the variable, and false only if it is true for no admissible referent.


Add Note:  An existential quantification is equivalent to an at least n quantification where n=1.

More basic Issues had to be resolved first, and we ran out of time

Doc: dtc/06-03-02
Date: March 2006
Version:  Interim Convenience Document
Chapter:  9.1.1.7
Pages: 
Nature:  Editorial
Severity: minor


Description:


General problems in clause 9.1.1.7: 


a.  Logical quantifications are intensive; they do not require the materialization of the set of satisfying instances.  Cardinality quantifications are extensive; they require materialization of the set.  It is not clear that the extensions of all SBVR concepts are sets, and it is clear that many of them cannot be materialized.  In general, cardinality-based quantifications can only apply to projections.


Note:  The intensive version of the "at most 1" quantification for a predicate P is a "uniqueness rule" (a Necessity):  IF P(x) AND P(y) THEN x = y.  So it is possible to specify "at most 1" and "exactly 1" quantification without using cardinalities.


b.  Cardinality requires a notion of "equality" defined on the instances from which the set is drawn.  Otherwise cardinality cannot be measured.  SBVR appears to introduce this concept via Reference Schemes, but it does not do so explicitly in discussing cardinality.  


c.  The current definitions of the cardinality-based 'quantifications' (at least n, at most n, etc.) refer to undefined operations.


Other problems:


In what fact-type is Cardinality a role?  
Cardinality is a property of a set, that is, a fact-type about a set, viz. 'set' has cardinality 'non-negative integer'.


The definitions of maximum and minimum cardinality are meaningless.  These terms are roles in some unspecified fact types that make use of 'integer' is less than 'integer'.



Recommendation: 


Before Cardinality, insert new section heading.


Change the definition of 'cardinality' to read:
non-negative integer designating the number of *distinguished things* in a collection


Specify the fact-types in which maximum and minimum cardinality are 'roles'.  Or don't bother and specify cardinality quantifications as fact-types.  E.g. at-most-n quantification:
   X has at most n Ys
is interpreted: 
 for any given X, the cardinality of the projection = 'set of all Y such that X has Y' is-less-or-equal n
Note that such a construct IS a logical formulation, but it is NOT a "logical quantification".

More basic Issues had to be resolved first, and we ran out of time

Doc: dtc/06-03-02
Date: March 2006
Version:  Interim Convenience Document
Chapter:  9.1.1.8
Pages: 
Nature:  Editorial
Severity: minor


Description:


In 9.1.1.8, Objectification: The intent here is completely obscure.  


The example refers to a use that isn't at all clear.  It appears to be two fact-types that are synonymous forms:  'car is assigned to rental' and 'car assignment of car to rental'.  


If the intent is to construct a noun concept from a fact-type, the definition should say that, and the example should illustrate that.  Alternatively, it is possible that an objectification is just a 'proposition nominalization' for an 'atomic formulation'.

Change the definition of 'objectification'.  Give better examples and show formulations.  Also, explain the tie between free variables and meaning in a note for semantic formulations in general.

Doc: dtc/06-03-02
Date: March 2006
Version:  Interim Convenience Document
Chapter:  9.1.1.9
Pages: 
Nature:  Editorial
Severity: minor


Description:


In 9.1.1.9, the definition of 'projecting formulation' is obscure. How is 'a thing considered with respect to a projection' true or false.  It might mean 'x occurs in the set resulting from projection y', but that wouldn't have 3 or 4 confusing subtypes.  Or it might mean the set produced by a 'projection' (considered as some kind of function).  It seems to be a supertype with no direct usage, e.g. 'semantic formulations that involve projections', and it models several relationships at a uselessly abstract level.


It is said to be a 'logical formulations', but with the possible exception of 'aggregation formulation', the subordinate concepts are not 'logical formulations'.


Recommendation:


Delete the concept 'projecting formulation'.

More basic Issues had to be resolved first, and we ran out of time

Doc: dtc/06-03-02
Date: March 2006
Version:  Interim Convenience Document
Chapter:  9.1.1.9
Pages: 
Nature:  Editorial
Severity: minor


Description:


Recommendation: 


In 9.1.1.9, the definition of 'aggregation formulation' is difficult to interpret.  It seems to say it is an assertion of equality between two sets (or multisets), one of which is the value of a variable (bindable target?) and the other is the result of the projection.  If that is what is intended, at least a Note should say this.


And in the Example about averages of ages, it is difficult to tell exactly what is supposed to be the 'aggregation formulation'.  The model is:
  AVERAGE( project car.age from car such that car is-owned-by b such that b is local-branch )
that is, a function of a projection that is based on a selection that is based on a selection.  Which of these four operations is the aggregation formulation?  But the logical formulation that is the rule has the form:
 number is-less-than number
where the first number is the result of the 'average' function (which has no SBVR model I can find).

More basic Issues had to be resolved first, and we ran out of time

Doc: dtc/06-03-02
Date: March 2006
Version:  Interim Convenience Document
Chapter:  9.1.1.9
Pages: 
Nature:  Editorial
Severity: minor


Description:


In clause 9.1.1.9, 'noun concept formulation', the definition is
"projecting formulation of a referent noun concept whose intension is formulated in a particular projection"


a.  It is not clear in this definition what 'referent noun concept' is being referred to.  
b.  'projecting formulation' as a  GeneralConcept has no semantics.  Use 'logical formulation'?
c.  This apparently means that the noun concept is defined to be the set that is the projection, which is the extension, not the intension.  (I suppose the intension is "is a member of that set".)  The problem here is that while a projection has the form of an intensional definition, it has the semantics of an extensional definition.  Perhaps the problem is that this use of the projection syntax does not have the same semantics as other uses.
d.  This definition provides no indication as to the role of the bindable target (from 'projecting formulation').  The thing being defined is a noun concept -- not a variable, although perhaps a constant -- so the bindable target must enter into the definition, but the note says there is some "understood reference".
e.  This definition is only a 'logical formulation' if the noun concept is treated as a classifying predicate, like an instantiation formulation.  And in that case, the bindable target would be the thing whose referent is to be tested for membership in the projection set.
f.  In the closed form, one possible interpretation of this construct is that it is a test for whether the bindable target is a member of the projection set.  If that is the case, it would certainly be helpful to the reader to say exactly that, at least in a Note.
g.  One possible 'open form' would apparently define a function of the bindable target whose result is the closed projection that corresponds to the substitution of the bindable target for the (sole?) free variable in the projection, but that is not a logical formulation in that its meaning is not a proposition.
h.  Of itself, the open form does not define a noun concept.  There must be a further requirement that all free variables in the projection are bound in the context in which the would-be noun concept is 'defined'.  And what this means is that a noun concept formulation is only well-defined when it is closed by substitution.  All of this should be part of the definition and not of some attached Note. 
i.  Another possible interpretation is that this really was intended to represent the definition of a term to refer to a noun concept defined by an intensional formulation.  In that case, the 'bindable target' should be a constant (text?) whose referent is being defined, the noun concept formulation should introduce a single variable, and the intensional definiens should be a logical formulation with exactly one free variable, and that variable corresponds to the variable introduced.  No projection ("set") is involved.


"Note: A noun concept formulation is satisfied for each referent that is a noun concept defined by the projection."
Whatever this was supposed to mean, it is wrong.  A noun concept formulation is satisfied if the referent of the bindable target is actually in the set defined by the projection.
 
The Examples are strangely phrased.  E.g. in the 2nd example, the noun concept formulation is: 'the distance that is the reading of the rental car's odometer', and anything that satisfies that formulation IS a distance, because 'distance' is the concept over which odometer-reading(?car) projects.  
The 'distance concept' is in the formulation, but the referents are individual distances.

Provide a better definition of 'noun concept formulation'.  Improve the note.  Improve the examples and give their formulations.

Doc: dtc/06-03-02
Date: March 2006
Version:  Interim Convenience Document
Chapter:  9.1.1
Pages: 
Nature:  Editorial
Severity: minor


Description:


In 9.1.1, 'logical formulation' is defined as:
"semantic formulation that is an abstract interpretation of a well-formed logical formula"


One may ask why it isn't just the expression as a wff.  A Note to the effect that this is some kind of computational "abstract syntax" for a wff would help in putting this clause in perspective.


A 'closed logical formulation' has the property:
The meaning formulated by each closed logical formulation is a proposition.


It should be Noted that *every kind* of logical formulation can be closed by binding all of its free variables to constants.  Consequently, it is important that every kind of 'logical formulation' specifies, for the case, in which it is closed, the circumstances under which the corresponding proposition is 'satisfied' or 'true', and those under which it is 'false'.


9.1.1.2 atomic formulation does not specify this.
9.1.1.3 instantiation formulation does not specify this.
9.1.1.4 modal formulation is a convenience concept, only its subtypes have meaning, and they do not specify it.
9.1.1.6 logical operation is a convenience concept, only its subtypes have meaning, and they do not specify it.
9.1.1.7 quantification is a convenience concept, only its subtypes have meaning, and they do not specify it.
9.1.1.8 objectification does not specify this.
9.1.1.9 projective formulation is a convenience concept, only its subtypes have meaning
aggregation formulation does specify this, but in a Note.
noun concept formulation does specify this, but in a Note.
fact type formulation does specify this, but in a Note.
proposition nominalization does specify this, but in a Note.
question nominalization does specify this, but in a Note.
answer nominalization does specify this, but in a Note.


Recommendation: 


Add a Note to the glossary entry for 'closed logical formulation' that every kind of logical formulation can be closed by binding all of its free variables to constants, and thus formulates a proposition that is either true or false.


For each kind of logical formulation, specify the true/false/satisfaction behavior of the closed form in the normative/definitive text, e.g., the Definition, and not in a Note.

Update definitions, except where the updates are handled in resolution of other issues, so that they clearly state the meaning of each kind of logical formulation.  Change the definition of 'logical formulation' to not refer to "well-formed logical formula".
Note that the following concepts are covered by other issue resolutions:
·	Issue 9258 - Logical operations
·	Issue 9714 - Modal formulations
·	Issue 9723 - Quantifications
·	Issue 9725 - Objectification
·	Issue 9727 - Aggregation formulation
·	Issue 9728 - Noun concept formulation
·	Issue 9731 - Fact type formulation
·	Issue 9732 - Proposition nominalization 
·	Issue 9734 - Question nominalization, answer nominalization

Doc: dtc/06-03-02
Date: March 2006
Version:  Interim Convenience Document
Chapter:  9.1.1
Pages: 
Nature:  Editorial
Severity: minor


Description:


In clause 9.1.1, a 'bindable target', the thing to which a variable can be bound, is said to be either a variable (i.e. to its current referent) or to 'text'.  'text' is defined in 8.1.1 to have its conventional dictionary interpretation, which is inappropriate here.  For a bindable target, the alternative to a variable is a 'constant' -- a reference to a specific fixed individual concept (a 'name').  'text' may be the physical expression of the reference.


And the first Example under the glossary item 'variable' appears to be a constant that has been transmogrified into some unnecessary doubletalk.


Recommendation: 


1. In clause 9.1.1, after 'variable', add a glossary item for 'constant':


'constant'
Definition: a reference to a specific fixed individual concept (a 'name').  


Necessity: the referent of a constant is exactly 1 individual concept.


Note: By definition, every constant is unitary.


Example:  
Given the individual concept ‘London-Heathrow Branch’ defined as “the EU-Rent branch
located at London-Heathrow Airport”, the constant expressed as the name 'London-Heathrow Branch' refers to that EU-Rent branch in all occurrences.


2.  In the definition of 'bindable target', replace all occurrences of 'text' with 'constant'.

More basic Issues had to be resolved first, and we ran out of time

Doc: dtc/06-03-02
Date: March 2006
Version:  Interim Convenience Document
Chapter:  9.1.1.9
Pages: 
Nature:  Editorial
Severity: minor


Description:


In 9.1.1.9, 'fact type formulation' is defined as:
"projecting formulation of a referent fact type whose intension is formulated in a particular projection"


I don't know what this means.  There is no referent fact type.  If the formulation is closed, then it defines a fact-type.  And there is no reference to the bindable target.  


Is this intended to mean:
 "definition of a fact type by a projection that formulates its intension"?
If that is the intent, the fact type formulation should have a referent (text?) constant, which is its name.  And it introduces a set of variables corresponding to the roles of the fact type.  And the intension is represented by a logical formulation in which each of those variables is free, and no other variable is free.  Note that this description does not involve a projection, because there is no "set" involved.  The definiens has the same syntactic structure as a projection (except that the bound variables are associated with the roles of the fact type and not with the projection per se), but the definiens means the logical formulation (the intension), while the projection means the "set" (of things that satisfies it -- the extension).


If this is the intent, I would also say a fact-type formulation is not a 'logical formulation' in the usual sense -- it is a definition, and cannot be substituted for 'logical formulation' in other uses.


Note also that the 'referent fact type' must be a constant, not a variable, and therefore not a 'bindable_target'.  (If one allows the definition of variable fact types, it creates problems with the Henken semantics model in clause 10 -- the fact types of a given SBVR model might not be enumerable.)


Now the above is all guesswork, because I don't understand the definition, and the example doesn't identify any part of it as the fact type formulation.


In the Example, the interpretation of "drinking and driving violates the rental agreement" is:  
For any person:p such that p is-renter, IF p drinks AND p drives, THEN p violates-rental-agreement.
I don't see where any projection fits in here, except possibly for p is-renter.



In 9.1.1.10 'projection' (whose definition appears to be "some operation that results in a set"), the concept of formulating a fact type appears in the Note:
"A projection’s result can be taken in multiple ways. Which way depends on how the
projection is used. When used in an aggregating formulation or as defining a concept other
than a fact type, the result elements are simply the referents of the variable in the projection.
When used to define a fact type, each result element is taken as an actuality that involves the
referents of the variables in the projection."


This supports the idea above that 'projection' has more than one semantic interpretation, and the interpretations are only loosely consistent.  And that means it fails as a "structure of meaning".  It is a structure, but the meaning is imposed by something else.


Now, to define a fact type, the referents of the variables in the projection would have to be assigned to "roles", so the presumption must be that the different variables represent different roles.  A "result element" must then be a tuple of referents, one for each variable, in which each 'position' corresponds to a role.  Since no verb is associated with the tuple, such a tuple can be "taken as an actuality" only in the sense that the collection of referents in the tuple is related by satisfying the logical formulation that constrains the projection.  But relating a variable that ranges over actualities (states of affairs) to such a tuple would be very difficult.  You can only get the tuple by having a fact-type to interpret the actuality.  (As Antoine says, a fact is an actuality interpreted by a fact-type.)

More basic Issues had to be resolved first, and we ran out of time

Doc: dtc/06-03-02
Date: March 2006
Version:  Interim Convenience Document
Chapter:  9.1.1.10
Pages: 
Nature:  Editorial
Severity: minor


Description:


In 9.1.1.10, there are several problems with 'proposition nominalization'


Definition: logical formulation that a referent proposition is formulated by a particular logical formulation 


What can refer to a proposition?  A proposition nominalization is a noun concept, one that refers to a structure of meaning (a logical formulation) as a thing separate from its meaning. The concept is not itself a logical formulation.  
Change the definition to:
"noun concept referring to all propositions for which a given 'logical formulation' is the structure of meaning"


Add Note:
When the formulation contains free variables, the noun concept corresponds to a collection of such structures of meaning, one for each possible substitution for the free variables.  That collection may not be a finite set.  For each possible binding of those variables to constants, the result is a particular closed formulation that corresponds to a proposition.


In Example (1), 2nd sentence: "The variable bound from the ‘proposition’ role is also the
bindable target of a proposition nominalization that considers a logical formulation
formulating “EU-Rent accepts no checks”."
replace "is also the bindable target of a proposition normalization" with
"is bound in the atomic formulation to a constant proposition normalization"


Replace the text of Example(2) with: 
In the statement, “An agent must tell each new customer that the customer cannot use a check”,
an atomic formulation based on a fact type ‘agent:person tells customer:person proposition’ binds to three
variables, one for each role. The variable bound from the ‘customer’ role is also the
bindable target of a proposition nominalization that considers a logical formulation
formulating “customer:person cannot use a check”. 
Because the variable for ‘customer’ is free within the proposition nominalization, the proposition nominalization corresponds to a set of propositions, one for each possible referent of 'customer', and the variable in the atomic formulation that is bound to 'proposition' ranges over that set.  But in each fact that satisfies the atomic formulation, the referent for 'customer' in "agent tells customer proposition" and the referent for 'customer' in the referent for 'proposition' have to be the same.


In the entry for 'proposition nominalization considers logical formulation'
Definition: the proposition nominalization is based on the logical formulation
should be:
Definition: the proposition nominalization represents all propositions for which the 'logical formulation' is the structure of meaning.


In the entry for 'proposition nominalization binds to bindable target'
Definition: the bindable target indicates the referent proposition identified by the proposition
nominalization
No.  The proposition nominalization may have associated variable bindings.  The variables must be free in the logical formulation considered by the proposition nominalization, but may be bound in a reference to the proposition nominalization (to constrain the set), and must all be bound in order to select an individual proposition.

Improve the definition of 'proposition nominalization', clarify its first note, and give a full semantic formulation in an example.

Doc: dtc/06-03-02
Date: March 2006
Version:  Interim Convenience Document
Chapter:  9.1.1.10
Pages: 
Nature:  Editorial
Severity: minor


Description:


There are several kinds of questions:  
- those that ask for confirmation/denial of a proposition (whether), 
- those that ask for the identification of an individual or set of things (who, what, where, when),
- those that ask for a reason or a proof (why).


In 9.1.1.10, 'question nominalization', SBVR only addresses the second.  It should also address the first, and there is no reason why it could not also address the third.


Confirmation/denial (whether) questions look like proposition nominalizations, except that their meaning is a question.


Rationalization (why) questions look like proposition nominalizations, but they assert the proposition and have the meaning of asking for the rationalization for that state of affairs.


So both of these could be accomplished by subtypes of proposition nominalization that have the same structure but different meaning.  And the assertion nominalization is the current kind of proposition nominalization.

Add notes and an example to the entry for 'closed projection means question' that explain how questions using different interrogatives (what, when, how, why, where, whether, etc.) are formulated

Doc: dtc/06-03-02
Date: March 2006
Version:  Interim Convenience Document
Chapter:  9.1.1.10
Pages: 
Nature:  Editorial
Severity: minor


Description:


In 9.1.1.10, there are several problems with the specification of 'question nominalization'


"Definition: projecting formulation of a referent question being formulated by a particular projection"


No modeled property of a question nominalization refers to a question.  Change to:
"noun concept that refers to all questions whose structure of meaning is formulated by a given projection" 


'question nominalization' is not a logical formulation kind; it is a projecting formulation kind, if that has any significance.


The reference scheme cannot be the bindable target, unless a question nominalization is unique to its occurrence instead of its content.  In general, the reference scheme for a question nominalization should be that of the projection, plus any attached bindings.


Replace the Note text with:
For a closed projection, the projection formulates exactly one question.
Otherwise, the projection formulates one question for each possible substitution of a referent for each free variable in the projection.  The question normalization may include a set of bindings for the free variables that constrain the possible substitutions.


Replace the Example text with:
In the statement, “An agent must ask each new customer what kind of car the customer wants”,
an atomic formulation based on a fact type ‘agent:person asks customer:person question’ binds to three
variables, one for each role. The variable bound from the ‘question’ role binds to the question nominalization for a projection formulating “'kind of car' such that 'customer' wants 'kind of car'". Because the variable for ‘customer’ is free within the projection, the question nominalization would refer to one such question for each possible 'customer'.  So the question nominalization must include a binding that binds 'customer' in the projection to 'customer' in the atomic formulation that includes the question.


A question nominalization should have zero or more bindings instead of one bindable target.  It can have one binding for each free variable in the projection.



In 9.1.1.10, 'answer nominalization' has many of the same problems.


It is difficult from the definition to determine the intent.  The example suggests that the intent is:
Definition: noun concept that refers to all noun concepts whose structure of meaning is formulated by a given projection (i.e. whose structure of meaning is a noun concept formulation)


It is not a logical formulation kind; it is a projecting formulation kind, if that has any significance.


The reference scheme should be that of the projection, together with any bindings.  


Like question nominalization (above), add bindings and modify the Note and Example similarly.

Provide clearer definitions of question nominalization and answer nominalization.  Give examples with full logical formulations.  Clarify notes.

Doc: dtc/06-03-02
Date: March 2006
Version:  Interim Convenience Document
Chapter:  8.1.2 and 9.1.1, modal formulation
Pages: 101
Nature:  Editorial
Severity: minor


Description:


In 8.1.2, 'obligation' is defined as follows:
"Definition: proposition that is required to be true, that is obligatory, that is not permitted to be false"


And 'permission', 'necessity' and 'possibility' are similar.


The problem is that an obligation is not a proposition that is required to be true.  It is rather a proposition that requires another proposition be true.


Example:
  "It is an obligation that every rental car has a scheduled service."
The proposition
  'Every rental car has a scheduled service'
is what the obligation requires to be true.  But that proposition itself is not an obligation.  It is just a statement, like "all roads lead to Rome".


The 'obligation' is:
  "It is an obligation that every rental car has a scheduled service."
or equivalently:
  "Every rental car is required to have a scheduled service."
which is a different proposition.


The obligation itself is a proposition that (per the definition of 'proposition') can be true or false -- that 'obligation' may or may not actually be a rule at UDriveIt.


The Note under the glossary entry for 'modal formulation' has this same error.  It says:
"The meaning of a modal formulation is the proposition that the proposition meant by the embedded logical formulation is an instance of the modality claimed by the modal formulation."


I read this to say that the meaning of
  "It is an obligation that every rental car has a scheduled service."
is the proposition:
  "(The proposition) 'every rental car has a scheduled service' is
an (instance of) obligation."
This is incorrect.  As above, the embedded proposition 'every rental car has a scheduled service' is not an obligation.  The obligation is the meaning of the modal formulation itself.


That is, the meaning of a modal formulation is the proposition resulting from interpreting the proposition meant by the embedded logical formulation under the modality claimed by the modal formulation.


Recommendation:


In 8.1.2,


a. change the definition of 'necessity' to
"proposition that another proposition is necessarily true, always true"


b. In the definition of 'possibility', after "proposition that" insert "another proposition"


c. In the definition of 'obligation', after "proposition that" insert "another proposition"


d. In the definition of 'permissiblity', after "proposition that" insert "another proposition"


In 9.1.1,


a.  Replace the text of the Note under 'modal formulation' with:
"The meaning of a modal formulation is the proposition resulting from interpreting the proposition meant by the embedded logical formulation under the modality claimed by the modal formulation."


b.  Under the entry for 'modal formulation claims modality', add a note:
Note:  The meaning of 'modal formulation claims modality' is that the proposition meant by the modal formulation is an instance of the concept that corresponds to the modality.

In SBVR 10.3.4 on page 107, there is a comment on ‘thing’ talking about its “current definition” as if the definition is about to change.

 

Recommendation:  Remove the word “current” from the comment.

In SBVR clause 8.1.1, the fact type 'concept1' specializes 'concept2' is defined.  What are 'concept1' and 'concept2'?


They seem to be roles.  But the necessity in the definition of 'role' in the same section -- a role is in at most one fact-type -- would then disallow the use of 'concept1' in any other fact-type, and the very next fact type glossary entry is 'concept1' is coextensive with 'concept2'.  So they aren't roles, by the principles of definition.  What are they?

More basic Issues had to be resolved first, and we ran out of time

E.1.4 example 2 and also the 2nd rule in E.2.2.2.7 use " rental has duration" 

        The correct fact type at E.2.2.1.5 is "rental has rental duration".  Probably E.2.2.1.5 should be changed, plus the reference in E.2.2.2.3. 

E.1.4 example 3 and numerous other places use "rental has driver". 

        The fact type "rental has driver" seems to be missing entirely, though cited at E.1.4 and elsewhere.   Suggest adding it to E.2.2.1.11. 

        This also affects rules (e.g. in E.2.2.4) that depend upon "rental has primary driver" and "rental has additional driver". 

        And it affects E2.2.2.10 rule 4 that depends upon "rental has additional driver". 

E.1.4 example 4  and several other places use "branch has drop-off location" 

        E.2.2.1.9 has "rental uses drop-off location".  Maybe it should be marked as an "is-part-of fact type" or given a synonym "branch has drop-off location" 

E.1.4 example 5 and several other places use "rental has rental charge" 

        "rental charge" is given in E.2.2.1.7 but not "rental has rental charge" 

E.1.4 example 6 and E.2.2.2.3 rule 1 use "rental has estimated rental charge" 
        
        "estimated rental charge" is given in E.2.2.1.7 but not "rental has estimated rental charge" 

        Also, these two rules elide "of a rental" from "... an estimated rental charge [of a rental] is provisionally charged ...."   Maybe that's ok since there is no 
        other kind of estimated rental charge, but if so the spec should say that somewhere. 

E.1.4 example 6 and several other places use "rental has renter" 

        "rental has renter" presumably belongs in E.2.2.1.11 
E.1.4 example 7 uses "branch is included in local area" 

        Question: "branch is included in local area" is a partitive fact type.   Is that what makes "local area of branch" a legitimate usage? 

E.1.4 example 7 uses "rental has rented car" 

        "rental has rented car" is missing from the list of Supporting Fact types, but see below about it. 

E.1.4 examples 7 & 8 and various other places use "rental has rented car" 

        "rental has rented car" presumably belongs in E.2.2.1.5, but according to figure E-7 it is the renter, not the rental, that has the rented card 

E.2.2.2.2 rule 2 uses "rental has rental period" 

        "rental has rental period" presumably belongs in E.2.2.1.5, maybe as a synonymous form of "rental includes rental period " 

E.2.2.2.3 rule 4 and elsewhere use "cash rental has lowest rental price" 

        "cash rental has lowest rental price" presumably belongs in E.2.2.1.7, maybe as a synonymous form of "cash rental honors lowest rental price" 

        Also, this fact type is not listed in "Supported Fact Types". 

E.2.2.2.3 rule 6 uses "rental has car group" 

        the correct fact type is "rental has requested car group" 

E,2.2.2.5 rule 1 uses "rented car" in the rule but "local area owns rental car" in the Supporting Fact Types. 

E.2.2.2.8 rule 1 uses "rental car has scheduled service" 
        ... which probably belongs in E.2.2.1.10 

E.2.2.2.14 rule 1 uses "rental has base rental price" 
        ... which probably belongs in E.2.2.1.7 

E.2.2.2.15 rule 1 uses "operating company has insurer" 

        "insurer" appears in Figure E.5 but is not defined anywhere, much less "operating company has insurer".  Both belong in E.2.2.1.3. 

More basic Issues had to be resolved first, and we ran out of time

SBVR talks a great deal about propositions and particular types of propositions, such as facts and rules, but never defines what it means for a proposition to be true or false.  Understanding these characteristics of propositions is essential to understanding semantic formulations and other parts of SBVR.

 

Recommendation:

 

In section 8.1.2, page 19, add the following entries after the entry for ‘proposition’.

 

proposition is true

   Definition:  the proposition corresponds to an actuality

 

proposition is false

   Definition:  the proposition does not correspond to an actuality

 

Add the characteristics 'proposition is true' and 'proposition is false'.  Where appropriate in the document, change "fact" to "proposition that is true".

In 13.1.1, page 148, under “text is for placeholder”, there is the following:

 

Example:        The placeholder ‘Note that a text is normalized to have no leading
                        or trailing spaces and no other white space than single spaces.

 

An editing error seems to have deleted whatever was supposed to be most of the example and has pulled in what is clearly a Note.

 

Recommendation:

 

Complete the example and show the note as a Note paragraph. 

add 2nd example using subscripts and explain that they are not part of the form.

Complete the example and show the note as a Note paragraph.  Add a 2nd example using subscripts and explain that they are not part of the form.

The SBVR specification defines a metamodel that is not a MOF metamodel and then defines a transformation from the SBVR metamodel to a MOF metamodel for rules defined in the SBVR metamodel. This means that modeling based on MOF does not have all of the capabilities (e.g., reflective definition of vocabulary) of the SBVR model, and that MOF technologies (e.g. QVT) cannot be applied to the SBVR metamodel. Furthermore, this means that aspects of the SBVR metamodel cannot be integrated into other metamodel specifications so that, for example, business vocabularies (multiple) and business rules mught be specified for an organization structure model or a business process model.

This Issue was received just before the Issue deadline which was only 6 weeks before the FTF report was due, and more basic Issues had to be resolved first.

‘meaning has representation’

 

There places in the document such as in the definition of ‘symbol’ in 11.2.1.1 that assume there is a form of expression ‘meaning has representation’ given as a synonymous form of ‘representation represents meaning’.  But that synonymous form is not given. 

 

Recommendation:  Add the synonymous form ‘meaning has representation’ and show it in Figure 8.3.  In the definitions of ‘designation’, ‘definition’, ‘statement’, ‘form of expression’ and ‘placeholder’, put the “of a” after the word “representation” in styled text as is done in the definition of ‘symbol’.

 

Add the synonymous form 'meaning has representation' and show it in Figure 8.3.  In the definitions of 'designation', 'definition', 'statement', 'form of expression' and 'placeholder', put the "of a" after the word "representation" in styled text as is done in the definition of 'symbol'.

Is a representation an actuality?

 

Remarks often made by people involved in SBVR have indicated that a representation is an actuality – an objectification of the portrayal of a meaning by an expression.  This same generalization applies to all of the specializations of ‘representation’ such as ‘designation’, ‘definition’ and ‘symbol’.  But SBVR does not define ‘representation’ this way.

 

Recommendation:  Change the definition of ‘representation’ from “portrayal of a meaning by an expression” to “actuality that an expression portrays a meaning”.  Alternatively, add a General Concept paragraph under ‘representation’ that identifies ‘actuality’ as a more general concept.

This Issue was received just before the Issue deadline which was only 6 weeks before the FTF report was due, and more basic Issues had to be resolved first.

Concept Expression versus Meaning Expression

 

The following fact types in 11.2.2.2 and 11.2.2.3 relate to concepts:

 

concept is portrayed by description

concept is illustrated by descriptive example

concept is commented on in note

concept is supported by reference

 

All of these relationships should be generalized to relate to ‘meaning’ rather than to ‘concept’.  As it is, SBVR does not support having a description, descriptive example, note or reference for a business rule because a business rule is another kind of meaning (a proposition rather than a concept). 

 

Recommendation:  replace the fact types above with these:

 

meaning is portrayed by description

meaning is illustrated by descriptive example

meaning is commented on in note

meaning is supported by reference

 

Replace the fact types above with these:
description portrays meaning
descriptive example illustrates meaning
meaning is commented on in note
reference supports meaning

Bug in Namespaces Diagram

 

In Figure 8.5, page 27, to properly match the normative text, the box marked “URI” should say “text” and the “also: uniform resource identifier” should be moved out of the box and added to the “URI” association end.

role has role binding’

 

Figure 9.4 shows a fact type ‘role has role binding’, but the normative text has ‘role binding is of role’.  By the rules of SBVR Structured English (and normal English), ‘role has role binding’ implies that we can use ‘role binding is of role’, but not the other way around.  All of the current usage within the document appears to use “is of”, not “has”.

 

Either change Figure 9.4 to show ‘role binding is of role’ (not ‘role has role binding’) or else change the entry ‘role binding is of role’ in the normative text to ‘role has role binding’.

Change the entry 'role binding is of role' in the normative text to 'role has role binding'.

In 11.1.1.3, page 113, the reference scheme for ‘vocabulary’ is “a URI of the vocabulary”, but there is no fact type ‘vocabulary has URI’ to support the reference scheme.

Logical Formulation Kinds of Quantifications

 

In 9.1.1.7, page 57, under “existential quantification”, the Concept Type paragraph should be removed.  The logical formulation kind for an existential quantification is the concept ‘at-least-n quantification’.

 

In 9.1.1.7, page 59, under “at-most-one quantification”, the Concept Type paragraph should be removed.  The logical formulation kind for an at-most-one quantification is the concept ‘at-most-n quantification’.

 

In 9.1.1.7, page 59, under “exactly-one quantification”, the Concept Type paragraph should be removed.  The logical formulation kind for an exactly-one quantification is the concept ‘exactly-n quantification’.

ISSUE: Rationalize 'Representation' and Support 'Cocnept'/'Object' Distinction 1. Remove duplication and unnecessary Complexity between Clause 8.3 and 11.2, especially the relationship between Namespace and Speech Community & Symbol Context 2. Add the distinction from ISO of verbal (linguistic) and non-verbal (but still text) representations. 3. Align subcategories of 'representation' with ISO terminology community SEE: a. Terminology Summer School 2006 slides - ftp://ftp.omg.org/pub/sbvr-ftf/Issue%20Attachments/TSS2006%20Verbal%20and%20Non-Verbal%20Representations.doc b. ISO 12620 Annex A.5 (Normative) Concept Related Description 4. Create a table show which types of representation go with which major categories of 'thing' (see related Issue). 

This Issue was received just before the Issue deadline which was only 6 weeks before the FTF report was due, and more basic Issues had to be resolved first.

: Representations of 'Objects' Belong in Vocabularies Indications of 'objects' by representations (that can be treated as existential assertions) need to be able to be included as entries in 'vocabularies' without having to form an'individual concept' about them. The original justification for omitting this capability "because ISO requires everything in a vocabulary (terminology) to be a concept" turns out to be based on a lack of knowledge about the ISO TC 37 position on this subject. In conjunction, 'definite' description' for 'objects' needs to be added to support statements that uniquely identify (not form or define a concept about) 'objects'. SEE: 1. InfoTerm -- ISO Terminology TC 37 Secretariat - http://www.infoterm.info/standardization/basic_principles.php 2. Terminology Summer School 2006 Slides - ftp://ftp.omg.org/pub/sbvr-ftf/Issue%20Attachments/TSS2006%20Objects%20and%20Concepts.doc

This Issue was received just before the Issue deadline which was only 6 weeks before the FTF report was due, and more basic Issues had to be resolved first.

ISSUE: Better Term and Definition for 'Res' Change definition of 'res' to "thing that is not a meaning" and find a more common term for this concept. (see related Issue on Major Categories of Thing)

Discussion at the Anaheim Sept. 2006 OMG meeting (see Meeting Notes):  
Why give up the term 'res' (simply because someone commented on a BLOG that he found it odd)? 

Issue name: “Admonition” and “Affirmation” are the same concept

Location: SBVR Section 12.1 Categories of Guidance

Issue: 

“Admonition” and “Affirmation” are both elements of guidance that there is not a business rule where one might be expected (especially if members of the semantic community have been acting as if there were such a rule). 

There is only one concept there, and “Admonition Statement” and “Affirmation Statement” are two different forms of representation for it. 

Proposed Solution:

Replace “Admonition” and “Affirmation” by a single concept. The detail of the change may depend on the restructuring around “Directive” and “Guidance” that was discussed at the London face-to-face meeting. 

This Issue was received just before the Issue deadline which was only 6 weeks before the FTF report was due, and more basic Issues had to be resolved first.

In Figure 9.12 on page 67 there is a small error.  In order to agree with the normative text, the box at the upper right that says “fact type role” must be changed to say only “role”.  The fact type being shown is “variable maps to role” from page 70.

Fac Type: "concept1 specializes concept2"
 
This definition of this fact type includes the following example:
 
"The role ‘sum’ specializes the noun concept ‘number’, the differentiator being that each sum is the result of adding up a set of numbers.  It turns out that every number is a sum of that number added to zero, so the extensions of the concepts ‘sum’ and ‘number’ are always the same."
 
Issue on: "the extensions of the concepts ‘sum’ and ‘number’ are always the same"
The extension of a role is not a set of things but a set of involvement of things. In extension of sum example, it is not a set of numbers but a set of an involvement of numbers
 3 + 2  = 4  implies that 4 is involved in sum with an involvement of 3 and an involvement of 2
 2 + 2  = 4 implies that 4 is involved in sum with an involvement of 2 and an other involvement of 2
Therefore, the extension of the "sum" role is: {..., "involvement of 4 in 3+2, involvement of 4 in 2+2, etc }. 
 
In version 6 of the SBVR specification, fact-type role was changed to "role", which is now a direct specialization of "concept". To express what concept can range over a role (play the role), the only available mechanism is concept specialization. Hence the example provided by Don: 
wife
  General Concept:  woman

  Concept Type:  role

 
We should be able to specify the role of "wife" in the context of marriage with husband without specializing it from woman or even from person.
We should then be able to define the range of concepts to which the wife and husband roles can be applied:  "woman/men", "female/male" or in a Disney movie, like Robin Hood, "animals".
I don't see the value of being forced to go to the hierarchy of concepts (specialization) has a fact-type between role and noun-concept.
 

This Issue was received just before the Issue deadline which was only 6 weeks before the FTF report was due, and more basic Issues had to be resolved first.

Precise Differentiation of Structural Rule vs. Operative Rule in RuleSpeak section. (1) Change the sentence that reads "If not followed (applied) in creating a booking, the booking is simply invalid." to "If not followed (applied) in attempting to make a booking, no booking results." (2) Change the sentence that currently reads "In borderline cases, RuleSpeak best practice is the following:" to "Refer to the RuleSpeak best practices presented in [Ross2005]." Retain the fotnote (7). Delete the boxed item entirely. (The use of "should" is too confusing without additional explanation.)

ISSUE: SBVR Structured English is Inadequate to Enable the Full Specification of SBVR in Terms of SBVR Fully specifying SBVR in terms of SBVR was a fundamental design objective and the basis for the expression of the SBVR metamodel. 1. Need a table to show how every SBVR metamodel construct can be expressed by SBVR Structured English. 2. Need to add SBVR Structured English Capability where the table shows it to be missing.

This Issue was received just before the Issue deadline which was only 6 weeks before the FTF report was due, and more basic Issues had to be resolved first.

Issue: Need to Check the Core Structures in the ISO Terminology Stnadards to Make Sure SBVR Builds on Them Correctly There may be some small adjustments needed to enable SBVR to build seemlessly on the ISO Terminology standards,, especially regarding 'term', 'subject field/area', and language. The concept adoption seems to be in good order.

This Issue was received just before the Issue deadline which was only 6 weeks before the FTF report was due, and more basic Issues had to be resolved first.

ISSUE: 'Role' has Multiple Meanings that Need to be Separate Concepts 1. Role in Situation 2. Role in Process 3. Role as part of the composition of a 'fact type' or 'fact' 4. Role bound to a group of 'fact types' These needs to be clearly defined and contrasted.

This Issue was received just before the Issue deadline which was only 6 weeks before the FTF report was due, and more basic Issues had to be resolved first.

ISSUE: SBVR Uses the Signifier 'Vocabulary' with Multiple Meanings which Require Separate Concepts Some of the meanings for which the signifier, "vocabulary", is used are: 1. Synonyn for Body of Shared Concepts 2. Synonym for Body of Shared Meanings 3. "representational vocabulary" composed of representations for a Speech Community a. including only all concepts b. including all concepts + all rules 3. 'Representations' sepearate from naked meanings as in " we must talk about shared concepts and not shared vocabulary". 4. A packaging unit of less than a. all concept b. all concepts and all rules 5. A document containing any of the above 

This Issue was received just before the Issue deadline which was only 6 weeks before the FTF report was due, and more basic Issues had to be resolved first.

ISSUE: BRT Decisions about Relationships & Necessities Among Community, Langugage, Vocabulary, Vocabulary Version Didn't Make it into the SBVR Specification Add these decisions based on flipchart documentation. (See tp://ftp.omg.org/pub/sbvr-ftf/Issue%20Attachments/Vocabulary%20Decisions.doc)

This Issue was received just before the Issue deadline which was only 6 weeks before the FTF report was due, and more basic Issues had to be resolved first.

ISSUE: Current SBVR Conformaance Clause Does Not Meet the Criteria for an OMG Specification The Conformance clause needs to be specified according to the follwoing rules from the OMG Specification tremplate: "The Conformance clause identifies which clauses of the specification are mandatory (or conditionally mandatory) and which are optional in order for an implementation to claim conformance to the specification. For conditionally mandatory clauses, the conditions must, of course, be specified. One side effect of this is that the clause numbering must be sufficiently fine grain to make it easy to distinguish between mandatory and optional clauses. It is for the writers of the specification to determine what material should be mandatory, conditionally mandatory, or optional for conformance. This is not easy. One way of summarising the difficulty is that it is probably impossible to define conformance such that the set of all conformant implementations is the same as the set of all useful implementations. However, you must try to ensure your conformance requirements means that all useful implementations are conformant, not that all conformant implementations are a subset of all useful implementations." 

This Issue was received just before the Issue deadline which was only 6 weeks before the FTF report was due, and more basic Issues had to be resolved first.

ISSUE: Clean Up 'Form of Expression' 1. Pick a better signifier that is less confusing e.g. 'Verb Concept Reading' 2. Fix definition and necessities

This Issue was received just before the Issue deadline which was only 6 weeks before the FTF report was due, and more basic Issues had to be resolved first.

ISSUE: Work Needed to Clean Up Mapping to Formal Logics (Clause 10) 1. Clause 10.1.1 -- Leave only formal logic 'interpretation' material a. Move term definitions currently in Clause 10.1.1 to Clause 10.1.2 b. Add term definitions from ISO 247xx to Clause 10.1.2 c. Add definitions for terms used in Clause 10.1.1 not in Clause 10.1.2 now or from steps 1a. or 1b. to Clause 10.1.2 d. Remove any remaining tutorial material not required to specifiy the interpretation of the formal logic grounding from Clause 10.1.1 2. Clause 10.1.2 -- Complete / Minimal Formal Logic Vocabulary a. In addition to steps 1a., 1b., and 1c., - remove all terms in Clause 10.1.2 not needed for the mapping in Clause 10.2 (was Clause 10.3). - add terms needed for the mapping in Clause 10.2 (was Clause 10.3) 3. Clause 10.2 (was 10.3) -- Clear Mapping from SBVR o Formal Logics a. Renuber Clause 10.3 to 10.2 by combining Clause 10.3 into Clause 10.2 b. Identify any SBVR Vocabulary entries that should be marked 'FL' but are not c. Verify that all SBVR Vocabulary entries marked 'FL' have an entry in the Clause 10.2 mapping, or remove the 'FL' from the SBVR Vocabulary entry. d. Remove mappings in Clause 10.2 that do not and should not have an 'FL' marking next to the corresponding SBVE Vocabulary entry. f. Revise the mapping information in Clause 10.2 to remove any ambiguity in the interpretation of each SBVR Vocabu;ary entry (with an 'FL') in terms of the formal logic vocabulary in Clause 10.1.2 as elaborated in Clause 10.1.1 

This Issue was received just before the Issue deadline which was only 6 weeks before the FTF report was due, and more basic Issues had to be resolved first.

Location: SBVR Annex H


Issue: Is it legitimate in UML to have bidirectional association names with black triangles indicating direction, as in Figure H.4?


Resolution: none proposed as yet - need to have the question answered first.

Annex H describes a UML profile for Business Object Models in which sentential forms of fact types are shown using a notation similar to that of UML Associations.  UML's profile capability allows for UML to be extended by reusing basic UML notations for new meanings and by adding new notations.  The profile described in Annex H takes advantage of this extensibility.  The verb phrases that appear in diagrams for a fact type are not names of an association.  The arrows do not show an order of association ends, but rather show the direction of reading of the verb phrases with respect to the roles of the fact type.
To make clear that the profile of Annex H is used in figures, the disclaimer under the figures is expanded with a reference to Annex H.
A small change is made to the introduction to Annex H in order to clarify where the profile is being used.

A quick search of the Final Adopted Specification shows that the terms 'term' and 'symbol' are consistently used to mean 'signifier'.  This view is clearly outlined in Annex A.3.4:
SBVR supports mapping of business meaning to concrete language by associating elements of the body of shared meanings with signifiers, e.g., terms such as “customer”, “car”, “branch” for concepts, and fact symbols (often verb phrases) such as “rents”, “is located at” for fact types. Logical formulations provide the structure, and signifiers are placed in logical formulations to provide the expression.


So what Don meant was that a "fact symbol" is an expression that means a fact type.  Note please that
 an expression that means a fact type
and
 the representation of a fact type by an expression
are lingustically entirely different things.  The first is a noun concept that refers to a thing characterized by its use.  The second is a noun concept that refers to a state of affairs -- a relationship -- that involves two kinds of thing.  The second is a nominalization (gerund) of
 expression represents fact type


In ISO, in the NODE, and in Merriam-Webster, 'term' is defined to be an expression or a sign, whereas (in M-W) 'designation' (4) is the relationship and 'designation' (3) is the expression.


It was my perception (when I reviewed the penultimate revised proposal for SBVR) that 'representation' and 'designation' are consistently used in SBVR to mean the relationship of expression to meaning, rather than the expression itself. A quick search reveals the following possibly inconsistent usages:


In Table


Under 'form of expression' several Examples speak of "the designation 'rents'" and others, and the Note refers to forms of expression involving designations.


'placeholder' is said to be a representation (relationship) but it has a "starting character position".  This appears to be assigning the attribute to the wrong object.  It is rather the (sub-)expression of the placeholder that has the starting character position.


In 'placeholder uses designation', the Synonymous Form should probably be "is used by" or "is used in" rather than "is used for".


Under 'role namespace', "a designation ... is typically a role" is clearly wrong.  And "a designation ... can be for a characteristic" should be "can designate".  And "the designation 'assigned'", etc., is inconsistent.


Under 'integer', "designations for all of the integers" should be "designations of ..."


In the introduction to Clause 9, "designations like 'rental' ... are used to refer to concepts" seems also to mean the thing and not the relationship.


In 11.2.1, symbol and all of its subtypes are said to be representations, and that might be made consistent with the SBVR definition with enough weasel wording, but it is completely at odds with the terminology of linguistics and semiotics, and the DictionaryBasis confirms that:  "a thing representing ..."

This Issue was received just before the Issue deadline which was only 6 weeks before the FTF report was due, and more basic Issues had to be resolved first.

The discussion of  'reference scheme uses characteristic' on page 29 or 30  in section 8.4 is poorly worded and confusing: 

  *  The diagram and text can be misread to imply that a reference scheme can be based solely on a characteristic.    Perhaps there should be a necessity 
      rule along the lines of "Each reference scheme simply uses at least one role or each reference scheme extensionally uses at least one role" and 
       a possibility rule such as "Each reference scheme uses some characteristics". 

  *  The Note is garbled, where it says "Using a characteristic in a reference scheme is equivalent to using a binary fact type with a Boolean role whose 
       value is true then ...."   This could be misread as saying that using a characteristic is equivalent to using a binary fact type, which of course is not true. 
       Or one could parse this as "a binary fact type with a Boolean role" which also doesn't make sense.  What's really meant is something like "... using a 
       binary fact type in conjunction with a Boolean role ...." 

  *   The last sentence of the Note doesn't make sense.  It says "But business vocabularies don't tend to define binary relationships to Booleans, but, rather, 
       they define characteristics."   Booleans are unary (not binary) fact types.  So what would it mean to "define binary relationships to Booleans? 

In the Interim SBVR specification, in H.4.3 (Term for a Role in a Form of Expression), page 323-324, the first example does not match SBVR, which has ‘characteristic’, not as a role of ‘unary fact type’, but as a synonym.  A different example is needed to illustrate the point being explained.

There is some clean up needed with respect to completing changes introduced by previously accepted issue resolutions and which come from reading the updated interim specification.  The clean up is combined here as one issue. 

 

Per the accepted resolution of Issue 9467, implicit passive forms are not supposed to be explicitly shown in the SBVR specification.  Many of these were removed in the editing instructions of that issue.  There are some others that were missed:

 

Remove “Synonymous Form:  concept is ranged over by variable”.

Change “Synonymous Form:  bindable target is referenced by role binding” to “Synonymous Form: role binding references bindable target”, and change Figure 9.4 accordingly.

Remove “Synonymous Form:  variable is introduced by quantification”.

Remove “Synonymous Form:  quantification is restricted by logical formulation”.

Remove “Synonymous Form:  logical formulation is scoped over by quantification”.

Remove “Synonymous Form:  logical formulation is considered by objectification”.

Remove “Synonymous Form:  logical formulation is considered by proposition nominalization”.

Remove “Synonymous Form:  projection is constrained by logical formulation”.

Remove “Synonymous Form:  definition is formalized by closed projection”.

Remove “Synonymous Form:  concept is defined by closed projection”.

Remove “Synonymous Form:  question is meant by closed projection”.

Replace the entry “speech community is of semantic community” with “semantic community has speech community” and then remove “Synonymous Form: semantic community has speech community”.

Replace the entry “subcommunity is of community” with “community has subcommunity” and then remove “Synonymous Form: community has subcommunity”.

 

The synonymous form ‘note comments on concept’ was missed in the resolution of Issue 9934.  It needs to be changed to ‘note comments on meaning’.

Change “Synonymous Form:  note comments on concept” to

“Synonymous Form:  note comments on meaning” per Issue 9934.

 

In the definition of ‘necessity’, “fact” needs to be changed to “proposition”, and Figure 8.1 needs to be changed accordingly.  This was widely agreed in light of the resolution to issue 9882.

 

In the first paragraph of clause 9 on page 37, the words “conjuncts, disjuncts, negands” are used, but those have been removed from the clause 9 vocabulary by the resolution to issue 9258.  I recommend that the words be replaced (such as by “disjunction”) so that the concepts given by way of example in that paragraph are representative of actual content of clause 9.

 

Also in the introduction to clause 9, but in the middle of page 38 in the paragraph that starts, “Within the one …”, the final statement needs a little editing to be clear (no change in meaning).  Change the sentence that says:

 

But the obligation claim has a meaning (the rule), and even the logical universal quantification within the obligation claim each has a meaning because each of those two formulations is closed. 

 

to say this:

 

But the obligation claim has a meaning (the rule) and so does the universal quantification within the obligation claim because both are closed. 

 

On page 39 in the last paragraph of the introduction to clause 9 that starts, “A propositional nominalization is …”, the last sentence can be made more clear and grammatically correct with some minor editing.  Change the sentence that says:

 

Furthermore, rules about change often involve concept formulations, which are special formulations that allow concepts to be a subject or object of a proposition in much the same way that proposition nominalization allows propositions to a subject or object. 

 

to say this:

 

Furthermore, rules about change often involve concept formulations, which are special formulations that allow a concept to be a subject or object of a proposition in much the same way that proposition nominalization allows a proposition to be a subject or object. 

Examples in the normative part of the specification should be given using the "SBVR Structured English" expression form described in Annex C.   This avoids confusion by using one way to express the examples. 

It may be desirable in some cases to provide alternative expressive forms of some examples.  Such cases should be clearly labelled as using RuleSpeak (Annex F) or UML Notation (Annex H) or whatever.  Such cases should also always be additional to giving the same examples in "SBVR Structured English" so that readers will not be forced to learn these alternative forms in order to understand the examples. 

Note: this issue is NOT requesting that examples always be given in prefix form.   Mixed-fix form is described in Annex C and thus should be fine for use in examples. 

Specific sections that should be addressed in this issue include: 

clause 12.1.2 in the entry for "business policy" 
clause 12.1.4 in the entry for "admonition" 
clause 12.1.4 in the entry for "affirmation" 
clause 12.2.1 in the entry for "admonition statement" 
clause 12.2.1 in the entry for "affirmation statement" 
clause 12.2.2 in the entry for "impossibility business rule statement" 
clause 12.2.2 in the entry for "restricted possibility business rule statement" 

I scanned all the other examples in the normative section of the specification, and in Annexes C and E.  There are remarkably few rule examples.  The list above identifies the ones I could find that are not expressed in "SBVR-SE". 

Annex C.1.1.3 includes the following text about "only if" 

        The key word phrase “only if” is used in combination with some of the key words and phrases shown above to invert a modality. 

         … may … only if p                 obligation claim over an implication 
        it is permitted that q only if p         obligation claim over an implication 
        it is possible that q only if p         necessity claim over an implication 

        The key word “only” can also be used with “may” in an expression before a preposition to invert a modality. 

        … may … only … obligation claim over an implication 

However, there is nothing to explain what is meant by "invert a modality".   This section should be extended to define "invert a modality", for example 

        it is permitted that q only if p        (apparently) is equivalent to         it is obligatory that p if q 

And an example would help. 

Without this material, different readers undoubtly will interpret the concept "invert a modality" differently.   For example, it would be reasonable to assume this is the same as "negate a modality" and then assume that the text about (for example) "obligation claim over an implication" must be ignored as being inconsistent.

Location:  SBVR Clause 10.1.1.4, last sentence of the paragraph following Table 10.2 (p. 86).

Issue:  This sentence has an error.


In principle, these rules could be used with double negation to get by with just one alethic modal operator (e.g., ...



Proposed Resolution:  Change sentence to:


In principle, these rules could be used with double negation to get by with just one alethic and one deontic operator (e.g., ...

Basing Clause 12 Vocabulary on Clause 10 Vocabulary. The structure of SBVR features layering from surface expression to deep meaning, independent of surface expression. Based on recent work, SBVR will now have a Clause 10 (especially modalities) that will express all concepts from pure logic needed for Clause 12 (rules, etc.). So the entries for Clause 12 should all be based on the vocabulary of Clause 10, rather than the vocabulary of Clause 9, which is more in the nature of engineering specifications.

SBVR makes a 'light world'  assumption about rules. In a 'light world', anything that is not expressly prohibited is assumed permitted. Business rule practice indicates that this choice is the appropriate one for the large majority of business problems. 
Occasionally, practitioners may discover cases in which the opposite assumption is appropriate. In such 'dark world' circumstances, anything not expressly permitted is assumed prohibited. Such cases might involve use of, and/or access to, resources that are deemed especially sensitive, dangerous, scarce, and/or valuable. For that reason, it makes sense to grant permission for use and/or access explicitly. Such permissions are often called "authorizations".
SBVR does not offer any specialized support for authorizations. None is needed. Support for authorizations is accomplished as follows:
·	A rule is expressed to declare that some general area of business activity is prohibited except where expressly permitted (i.e., 'dark').
·	Specific advices of permission, qualified as appropriate, are given to indicate selective authorizations. 
The following examples illustrate.
Example 1. 
Fact type: person makes payment
'Dark' Rule Statement: A person may make a payment only if making the payment is expressly permitted for the person.
Advice of Permission Statements:
·	A senior manager may make a payment. 
Note: This rule statement could also be expressed: A person may make a payment if the person is a senior manager.
·	Jane Smith may make a payment.
Note: This rule statement could also be expressed: A person may make a payment if the person is "Jane Smith".
Example 2. 
Fact type: ice road is used by vehicle
'Dark' Rule Statement: An ice road may be used by a vehicle only if using the ice road is expressly permitted.
Advice of Permission Statements:
·	An ice road may be used by a vehicle if the ice road is north of the arctic circle.
·	The ice road with the name, Yukon 12,000 Foot Lake Road, may be used by a vehicle.
·	An ice road may be used by a vehicle if the average temperature at the southern-most point has been below 0o C for at least 5 days.

Universal AND -- SBVR assumes a universl AND between all elements of guidance stated separately/individually, but doesn't say so explicitly in Clause 12. This problem was noted in last week's meeting, and I was requested to create an issue and proposed resolution for it.

Exceptions -- It has been pointed out by Markus and others that SBVR does not currently address "exceptions" adeqately in its discussion of practicable elements of guidance (e.g., rules). This is a significant omission. I believe this warrants a new section - 12.4. I will circulate a draft separately, as requested by the team in last Wednesday's meeting. Note that resolution to this issue depends on the new 12.3 material on Authorizations. The good news is that as for "Authorizations", nothing new is really required for SBVR.

ISSUE NAME: Authorizations & Support for "Dark World" Assumptions PROBLEM: The current approach in SBVR is based on a "light world" assumption (everything permitted unless expressly prohibited). As has been pointed out by Mark Linehan and others, there are cases where the opposite assumption ("dark world") is appropriate (everything is prohibited unless expressly permitted), especially for authoization. PROPOSED RESOLUTION: SBVR already has the support necessary for 'dark world' assumptions; it simply needs to be explained and illustrated. I propose the following text be inserted into SBVR at the appropriate point, perhaps in 12.1. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ (PROPOSED TEXT TO BE INSERTED) Authorizations SBVR makes a ‘light world’(1) assumption about rules. In a ‘light world’, anything that is not expressly prohibited is assumed permitted. Business rule practice indicates that this choice is the appropriate one for the large majority of business problems. Occasionally, practitioners may discover cases in which the opposite assumption is appropriate. In such ‘dark world’ circumstances, anything not expressly permitted is assumed prohibited. Such cases might involve use of, and/or access to, resources that are deemed especially sensitive, dangerous, scarce, and/or valuable. For that reason, it makes sense to grant permission for use and/or access explicitly. Such permissions are often called “authorizations”. SBVR does not offer any specialized support for authorizations. None is needed. Support for authorizations is accomplished as follows: * A rule is expressed to declare that some general area of business activity is prohibited except where expressly permitted (i.e., ‘dark’). * Specific advices of permission, qualified as appropriate, are given to indicate selective authorizations. The following examples illustrate. Example 1. Fact type: person makes payment ‘Dark’ Rule Statement: A person may make a payment only if making the payment is expressly permitted for the person. Advice of Permission Statements: * A senior manager may make a payment. Note: This rule statement could also be expressed: A person may make a payment if the person is a senior manager. * Jane Smith may make a payment. Note: This rule statement could also be expressed: A person may make a payment if the person is “Jane Smith”. Example 2. Fact type: ice road is used by vehicle ‘Dark’ Rule Statement: An ice road may be used by a vehicle only if using the ice road is expressly permitted. Advice of Permission Statements: * An ice road may be used by a vehicle if the ice road is north of the arctic circle. * The ice road with the name, Yukon 12,000 Foot Lake Road, may be used by a vehicle. * An ice road may be used by a vehicle if the average temperature at the southern-most point has been below 0o C for at least 5 days. 1 (footnote) Ronald G. Ross, "The Light World vs. the Dark World ~ Business Rules for Authorization," Business Rules Journal, Vol. 5, No. 8 (August 2004), URL: http://www.BRCommunity.com/a2004/b201.html 

Issue: It is unclear from the specification how to formulate a restricted permission or restricted possibility statement.   From the definition, of these statements as "... permission (or possibility) being granted only when a given condition is met" it would appear that these statements should be formulated as the permission or possibility modality applied to an implication.   However, this formulation would be indistinguishable from a conditional advice of permission or possibility. 

Another formulation could be derived from the rephrasing of restricted permission or possibility statements as their corresponding conditional prohibition or impossibility statements.   

A third formulation has been suggested by an FTF member as: 

        if <some condition> then it is permitted (or possible) that <some statement> 

... in other words, embedding the permission or possibility modality in the consequence of an implication. 

Requested resolution:  extend the glossary entries for restricted permission and possibility statements, by adding notes and examples describing the logical formulation of these statement forms.  This will avoid confusion among implementers, and support interoperability among tools.

Clause 12.1 shows that "business rule" is derived from "business policy".   A similar relationship should be shown for "advice" (or "advice of permission" or whatever we call it in the resolution of issue 9475) and "business policy". 

Consider this example, derived from one given by Ron Ross: 

Fact type: person makes payment
Rule Statement: A person may make a payment only if making the payment is expressly permitted for the person.
Advice Statement:  A senior manager may make a payment. 

How could it be that one of these is derived from business policy but not the other?

Here are some minor clean-up items needed in chapter 13.  These were discovered in two ways:  (1) while generating and verifying a MOF metamodel for SBVR and (2) parsing the chapter contents using Unisys Rules Modeler.

 

In 13.1, the entry labeled “Vocabulary to MOF/XMI Vocabulary” shows “Logical Formulation of Semantics Vocabulary” as an included vocabulary.  Actually, the vocabulary that needs to be included is the Meaning and Representation Vocabulary.  The reference to the Logical Formulation of Semantics Vocabulary appears to be a remnant of a time before the Meaning and Representation Vocabulary was formed.  In 13.1, page 159, under the entry for “Vocabulary to MOF/XMI Vocabulary”, change the paragraph that says:

  “Included Vocabulary: Logical Formulation of Semantics Vocabulary”

to say:

   “Included Vocabulary: Meaning and Representation Vocabulary”.

Then change the occurrence of “Logical Formulation of Semantics Vocabulary” in the first paragraph of clause 13 to “Meaning and Representation Vocabulary”.

 

Also, there is a typo:  hyphens are missing in the entry heading.  The entry heading should say “Vocabulary-to-MOF/XMI Vocabulary” (and also in the index).

 

A fact type is missing from 13.1 that is used by the rules in 13.3.  Add the following at the end of 13.1:

 

expression1 combines expression2 with expression3

  Definition: the expression1 is the result of concatenating the expression2 to the front of the expression3 

 

Two fact types are missing that are used by the rules in 13.3.  These should be added after ‘property’ in 13.1.2:

property has lower bound

property has upper bound

 

In 13.1.3 in the entry for “XMI name”, “XMIname” should be “xmiName” in the Source paragraph and in “org.omg.xmi.XMIname” in the Definition.    In 13.1.3 in the entry for “XMI name”, change “XMIname”  to “xmiName” in the Source paragraph and in “org.omg.xmi.XMIname” in the Definition.

 

In 13.3.2, rule 10, change the word “is” to “comes”.

 

In 13.3.3 in rule 5 replace the words “text that represents” with “expression of”.

 

In 13.3.3 in rule 6 replace the word “represents” with “is the expression of”.

 

In 12.3.4 in rule 1 replace “is mapped to” with “maps to” and replace “be mapped to” with “map to”

 

Also, 13.3.2 (Designation Mapping Rules) does not have a rule about the XMI name for the attribute of an Instantiation subclass.  A new rule is needed, similar to the rule for attributes of Fact subclasses, in order for XMI to work properly for Instantiation subclasses.  In 13.3.2 add rule 12 as follows:

12.  The XMI name of the owned attribute of each class that comes from a designation must be derived from the name of the owned attribute.

Under-the-Covers SBVR Support for ‘Dark’ Rules The scope of Issue 10504, which focuses on ‘Dark World’ Assumptions and Authorizations, extends only to section 12, which is the business-facing side of SBVR. A draft resolution is now reasonably well-defined for Issue 10504 (but not finalized), which outlines how ‘dark’ rules and authorizations can be expressed in SBVR-compliant fashion. Mark Linehan has pointed out that the specific mechanisms for SBVR support of ‘dark’ rules and authorizations have not been worked out in SBVR. There seems to be general agreement on that point. Andy Carver has pointed out that Terry addressed the issue in one of the examples in section 10 to some degree. He has suggested that such support could be provided via a new fact type and derivation rule. Discussion of specifics has ensued. I have noted that it appears the derivation rule (and possibly the fact type) could be derived automatically. The current situation is therfore as follows. Evolving resolution of Issue 10504 has now demonstrated the need for some under-the-covers support by SBVR for ‘dark’ rules. However, that support is outside the scope of section 12, which therefore makes it out of scope for Issue 10504. It therefore requires its own issue

Scope of Rules & Advices – Body of Shared Guidance – Rule Sets In evaluating SBVR support for ‘dark’ rules, Mark Linehan has observed that it is important to know the precise intended scope of a ‘dark’ rule – that is, what are all the rules and advices it affects. One suggestion for indicating intended scope is the notion of ‘rule sets’. Don Baisley pointed out that SBVR already has a concept that might serve to delimit intended scope – body of shared guidance. The question arises – is that concept as currently defined in SBVR adequate for the purpose? Keri Anderson Healy noted that there is currently no means to specify sub-bodies, which might be useful or necessary for applying the concept for many organizational needs. Ed Barkmeyer and I have both (in our own ways) expressed *very* strong reservations about the un-SBVR-like way the notion of ‘rule set’ is often understood and used by current rule technologies. Various people, including Ed, have noted the importance of resolving these questions for the sake of consistent interchange. Ed stated, “I think that failing to deal with rule relationships, … and properties of 'bodies of shared guidance' is a failing of SBVR that may become crippling in certain exchange situations.” (However, Ed also stated, “I also think dealing with it now is out of scope for the FTF. All of this is fodder for SBVR v2, if there is ever a v1.” But I believe I disagree with that. Also, emerging resolutions of 10504, 10505 & 10506 are addressing exceptions and priorities, which he also mentions.) In any event, I pointed out that the issue of intended scope for rules and advices does not apply simply to ‘dark’ rules and authorizations, but to the issue of conflicts in general. More precisely, the potential for conflicts exists even without ‘dark’ rules and authorizations. Therefore, the questions above cannot be resolved under 10504, whose scope is merely the former, but requires its own issue. 

In an email of Jan. 17, 2007, Ron documented the summary (with corrections/clarifications) from the Jan. 10, 2007 telcon.  That summary follows.  Note that the examples below have been evolved by the Resolution to Issue 10504.
In the 1/10 meeting, Donald made an extremely helpful summary of the 3 different 'scopes' involved in issue 10563 (and 10562 and 10504-06 as well). They are the following, listed from most narrow to most broad.

1. Scope of a 'dark' area. The 'dark' area pertains only to the fact types and/or state of affairs mentioned by a 'dark' rule.

2. Scope of authorization. The scope of authorizations includes not only the 'dark' rule and 'dark' area, but all permissions (advices) given for the 'dark' area as well. (Note: These permissions would normally be found in conflict with the 'dark' rule had not the 'dark' rule in some way allowed for exceptions.)

**Note: The larger question here is really the following. Does SBVR give sufficient guidance such that all elements of guidance related to *any* set of one or more fact types can be reliably and consistently determined.**

3. Scope of conflicts. The fullest potential or actual scope of conflicts is the body of shared guidance, whose boundaries are fixed within or by some *body of shared meaning*.

        With respect to the example chosen for discussion in 10562, the 3 scopes are evident as follows;

Example 1. 
Fact Type: person makes payment
Dark‚ Rule Statement: A person may make a payment only if making the payment is expressly permitted for the person.

1. This 'dark' rule establishes the 'dark' area.

Advice of Permission Statements:
        A senior manager may make a payment. 
        Note: This Statement could also be expressed: A person may make a payment if the person is a senior manager.
        Jane Smith may make a payment.
        Note: This Statement could also be expressed: A person may make a payment if the person is "Jane Smith".

2. These additional advices of permission establish the current complete scope of authorizations.

3. The body of shared guidance that includes the 3 elements of guidance above establishes the complete scope within which conflicts might be discovered (with other elements of guidance that might be included). 

There should be a fact type that relates a vocabulary to a vocabulary namespace.  That fact type could be instantiated for any vocabulary whose designations and fact type forms are distinguishable.  If this is done, the “vocabulary has URI” fact type can be removed because a vocabulary namespace can have a URI.

SBVR provides the Integer Namespace having designations for all integers, but SBVR provides no standard means to represent all decimal numbers nor to represent common fractional numbers having Unicode symbols that are common in business expression.  A Numbers Namespace is needed in order to support a common means of representing numbers occurring in the formulations of rules and definitions.

 

Recommendation:

 

Change “Integer Namespace” to “Number Namespace”.  Change its definition to this:

 

the vocabulary namespace that consists of the following designations for numbers:

1.     any sequence of one or more decimal numerals

2.     any sequence of zero or more decimal numerals followed by a decimal point and a sequence of one or more decimal numerals

3.     any sequence of zero or more decimal numerals followed by a Unicode vulgar fraction

4.     any of the above preceded by a minus sign (“-“)

 

Example:  2, 25, 2.5, .5, ?, 33?, -10.00

 

Move the note under ‘integer’ to be under ‘number’ and make it refer to the Number Namespace.

 

Alternatively, is there any ISO standard namespace or other standard namespace that we can refer to using a URI for this purpose?

These simple corrections are combined as one issue.

 

 

In 8.1.2 add “FL” to entries for ‘proposition is true’ and ‘proposition is false’.

 

In 8.3.2 move the second Necessity under ‘definition’ that starts “Each closed projection…” into 9.3 and put it in place of the 7th Necessity under ‘closed projection’ which says the same thing but not as well.

 

In 8.3.4 move the second Necessity under ‘statement’ that starts “Each closed logical formulation…” into chapter 9 and add it at the bottom under “closed logical formulation” (which is where this Necessity belongs). 

 

In 8.6.1 add “FL” to the entries for ‘concept has extension’ and ‘concept has instance’.

 

In 8.6.2 in the seventh Necessity which says “Each actuality of a fact type involves some thing in each role of the fact type”, add the words “that is an instance” after the word “actuality”.

 

In 9.2.3, Figure 9.5, show the inverse reading of “binds to”, which is given in the text as “is bound to”.

In 9.2.7, Figure 9.9, show the inverse reading of “binds to”, which is given in the text as “is bound to”.

In 9.2.8, Figure 9.10, show the inverse reading of “binds to”, which is given in the text as “is bound to”.

In 9.2.9, Figure 9.11, show the inverse reading of “binds to”, which is given in the text as “is bound to”.

 

In 9.2.9 remove the Necessity under ‘question nominalization’ and the Necessity under ‘answer nominalization’.  They are not necessarily true.

 

In 9.3, remove the first Necessity under ‘closed projection’ (“Each closed projection that defines a fact type is a set projection”).  It is not necessarily true.

 

In 11.2.2, Figure 11.7, show the inverse reading of “is commented on in”, which is given in the text as “comments on”.  Or preferably, change “note comments on meaning” to be the preferred fact type form and have no synonymous form – ‘is commented on by’ then becomes the implicit passive voice.  The active form ‘comments on’ is used in multiple places.  The passive form now given as the primary entry is never used.

 

In 12.1, remove the second Necessity under ‘element of governance is directly enforceable’ (“An element of governance that is not directly enforceable is not practicable.”).  It is plainly does not hold for structural rules.

 

In 13.1, remove the two footnotes about MOF 2 and XMI for MOF 2 being in finalization.  Verify that the names given for the specifications of MOF 2 and XMI for MOF 2 are correct.

 

In C.1.1.3, change “(often modified to be infinitive)” to “(often modified to be subjunctive)”.

 

In C.1.2 in the description of “a given”, replace “demonstrative expression” with “logical formulation”.  Add the following sentence to the description:  “Within a definition, ‘a given’ introduces an auxiliary variable into the closed projection that formalizes the definition.”

Have any expression be a bindable target, rather than just a text.  Note the referent of the binding is the expression itself, not a meaning of the expression.  The reason the initial SBVR submission was limited to ‘text’ is that only ‘text’ expressions occur in XMI.  But other sorts of expressions should work just fine if a reference scheme is used.

ISSUE DESCRIPTION: 1. "'Concept' incorporates 'characteristic'" is ambiguous with respect to the relationship between the characteristics in the intension that makes up a concept that are part of each essential characteristic set that creates the concept, and those that are not. Since there can be many characteristics in the intension (necessary characterisitc set) of a concept that are not, and do not need to be made, explicit in an SBVR vocabulary, "'concept' incorporates 'characteristic'" is additionally ambiguous for the above purposes. Using this SBVR verb concept without the additional language and criteria below gives a false sense of adequacy. - It might be better not to have this fact type so this ambiguity cannot be inadvertently introduced. Otherwise we need a necessity something like "any characterisitc incorporated into a concept must be either in each essential characterisitc set that creates the concept or implied by any essential characteristic set that it is not in".

1. "Essential Characterisitc" is not defined as "Necessary and Sufficient Characterisitc" is it is considered to be in ISO 1087 from which it is adopted. 2. "Essential Characteristic" is not defined as it is in ISO 1087 to be the sum of all the Delimiting Characterisitcs up the chain of 'more general concepts' to the top.

ISSUE TITLE: SBVR Does Not Make It Clear How to Tell Whether Two Concepts are Really the Same Concept or Two Different Ccncepts ISSUE DESCRIPTION: The definition of 'concept' and the concepts it references should together give two people or communities an objective basis for agreeing whether or not two concept entries are really the same concept or two different concepts. The only sound basis for defining (meaning, not representation) concepts is a set of essential (necessary & sufficient) characteristics. This is what creates the concept. If two sets of essential characteristics are equivalent, the two concepts they create are the same concept. - This requires (some binary/ternary form of): - "'characteristic' is essential to 'concept'" - 'essential characterisitc' - "'characterisitc set' sufficiently defines 'concept'" - 'essential characteristic set'. - these SBVR verb concepts must make it clear that it is the set (of essential characteristics) that 'creates' the concept, while necessary characteristics 'make up' a concept individually. - In addition there must be an unambiguous way to identify all the essential characteristics in a concept's essential characterisitc set from the concept's intensional definition and the intensional definitions of all its more general concepts using the more general concept and delimiting characteristics represented by the intensional definition. - In addition determining the equivalence of two essential characterisitc sets requires the ability to assert the equivalence between two characteristics and between a characteristic and a set of characteristics. This is provided in "Issue9613-v5.doc" by: - characteristic1 is equivalent to characteristic2 - characteristic is equivalent to characteristic set - essential characteristic set1 is equivalent to essential characteristic set2 - equivalent set of essential characteristic sets NOTE: There is nothing here that says a tool must be able to do this, but we must have the vocabulary and criteria so that people can do it. If tools do it, so much the better, but it does not need to be required as a tool function by SBVR. 

ISSUE TITLE: Some Way is Required to Identify Which Characteristics of a Concept are Referenced in its Definition Directly, or Indirectly Through the More General concept; and Which are Not Butare Instead Implied by the Definition ISSUE DESCRIPTION: The characteristics that are made explicit in an intension in an SBVR vocabulary and that are not in a given essential characteristic set must be able to be implied from that essential characterisitc set plus the other concepts in the semantic community's body of shared meanings related to the concept. Otherwise they cannot be in the intension of the concept. - This requires the ability to ask the question "Is each explicit characteristic that is incorporated into a concept and that is not part of each given essential characterisitc set implied by that essential characteristic set and related concepts in the body of shared meanings?" and to get a consistent answer from members of the semantic community. - to document the assessment that a characteristic can be implied, or simply assert that, the following is required: - 'implied characteristic' - 'essential characteristic set' sufficiently defining 'concept' implies 'characteristic'" (or some other form of this) NOTE: This provides the ability to assess that even though the explicit characteristics in the intensions of two concepts that have equivalent essential characterisitc set are different, the concepts are still equivalent because it can be shown that the explicit implied characteristics in one are also implied in the other. Again no one is saying this must be automated, but it must be possible for people to do consistently or SBVR is without foundation. 

ISSUE TITLE: Major Disconnect Between Structural Rule and a Concept's Characteristics and Definition ISSUE DESCRIPTION: There is currently an incomplete and therefore ambiguous connection between 'necessity' (proposition represented by 'necessity statements' in SBVR SE; 'proposition that another proposition is a necessity'), and 'essential characteristic sets' and/or 'implied characteristics'. Without knowing whether a given 'necessity' is intended to specify an 'essential characteristic set' or an 'implied characterisitc' for a given concept, it is not possible to determine what the concept is and whether its intension is correct (i.e. characteristics not in an essential characteristic set are implied by it). This is true for all the concepts that a given 'necessity' applies to. - Need a required way to specify that each 'necessity', for each concept it applies to, either provides the specification for an essential characteristic set or that it does not. If the 'necessity' does not provide the specification for an essential characterisitc set, it must meet the requirements above of being a characteristic implied from each of the essential characteristic sets that create any of the concepts that the 'necessity' applies to. How this is expressed in an SBVR vocabulary must be unambiguous. 

ISSUE TITLE: Need to Be Able to Distinguish Between Concepts that have No Instances in an SBVR model and Those That Do ISSUE DESCRIPTION: SBVR says that it is a vocabulary for business vocabulary and business rules. There are some concepts that are essential for vocabulary specialists (terminologists) and rule stewards to use to communicate well with each other when they are using SBVR that will never have instance in an SBVR model (or in an SBVR XMI interchange file). This kinds of concept is critical to the semantic communities wanting to create quality vocabulary and rule content. Currently, some of these critical concepts are being resisted because we are not being explicit that they will not appear in an SBVR XMI interchange file. We need some indicator like the "FL" symbol to identify such concpets. SUGGESTED RESOLUTION: Create an indicator "VO" (vocanulary only)and use it like "FL" to identify this kind of concept.

ISSUE TITLE: Semantic Community and Speech Community are not in SBVR's Core Compliance Point ISSUE DESCRIPTION: The entry for each term in in an SBVR vocabulary, among other things, is an existence assertion that "there exists in the minds of the members of the Semantic Community of the Speech Coomunity of this Vocabulary a concept that is known to the Speech Community of this vocabulary as ...(character string that expresses the term)...". No concept documented in an SBVR model exists outside the minds of the members of of a Semantic Community

ISUUE TITLE: "Decided or Calculated" Should Read "Understood" to be Consistent with the Rest of Clause 12 ISSUE DESCRIPTION: In other parts of Clause 12 it was agreed that "understood" carried an aceptable meaning in place of 'decided or calculated". SUGGESTED RESOLUTION: On page 139 in the definition of 'element of guidance is practicable', replace "decided or calculated" with "understood". 

SBVR supports restrictions on variables introduced by quantifications, but does not support them on variables introduced by projections.  The result is that projections fails to fully formulate meanings in some cases.

 

Consider the following two statements:

 

A receptionist at a hospital may decide what doctor employed by the hospital sees a given patient. 
 

A receptionist at a hospital may decide what doctor is employed by the hospital and sees a given patient. 
 

These two statements clearly have different meanings.  In the first case, there is no stated permission for a reception to decide about who is employed by a hospital.  The receptionist is permitted to decided from among doctors employed by the hospital which one sees a patient.  But in the second, the permission to decide applies to the conjunction of a doctor being employed and seeing a patient (a decision not likely to be given to a receptionist).

 

The problem is that SBVR currently supports formulating only the second statement, not the first.  An attempt to formulate the first ends up with the formulation of the second because SBVR does not support restrictions on variables introduced by projections.  Formulations of both statements incorporate an answer formulation having a projection on a variable that ranges over the concept ‘doctor’.  For the second statement, the projection is constrained by a conjunction of two atomic formulations based on ‘hospital employs person’ and ‘doctor sees patient’ respectively.  For the first statement, the variable should be restricted by an atomic formulation based on ‘hospital employs person’ and the projection should be constrained by an atomic formulation based on (‘doctor sees patient’) showing that a receptionist’s decision is about what doctor sees the patient and the choice is restricted to doctors employed by the hospital.  But SBVR does not allow the restriction on the variable because it is introduced by a projection.

 

In the original conceptualization of restrictions on variables, they were supported for all variables, but at that time it seemed that there was no need for restrictions on variables introduced by projections, so the “restricts” fact type was moved to ‘quantification’ so that it would only apply to variables introduced by quantifications.  But now it is clear from examples that the “restricts” fact type needs to be moved from ‘quantification’ to ‘variable’ where it can be used for all sorts of variables.

Correction of Unintended Effect of Issue 9475 Resolution ISSUE DESCRIPTION: There was an unintended effect of the Issue 9475 Resolution that was approved in Ballot 2 which removed the longstanding definitions of Structural Rule and Structural Rule Statement when they should have been kept as second definitions. The removal of these two definitions was not discussed explicitly either in meetings or on the SBVR FTF email list. The removal of these definitions was not explicitly shown in the Issue 9475 editing instructions that were submitted to ballot. In addition, the team agreed, with regard to another related point, not to make changes under Issue 9475 that affected Issue 9613. SUGGESTED RESOLUTION; Restore these two definitions as they appeared before the Issue 9475 Resolution was applied as second definitions; not to make them permanent, but so they can be dealt with as needed under the other open SBVR Issues.

Doesn't the fact type "closed logical formulation formalizes statement" associate such formulations directly to representations?   Isn't that in conflict with the indirect relationship in the general SBVR design, which is that "closed logical formulations formulates meaning", and then "statement expresses meaning".   Isn't this an error? 

Note: this issue relates to existing issue 9945

Description:


In clause 8.2, p. 21, the entry for URI contains:
  "Concept type: role"
  "General concept: text"


This is incorrect, in both regards.  Per RFC 2396, a URI is a category of symbol or term that has a particular expression syntax and refers to some information element or information resource that is nominally available on the Internet.  The URI expression plays the signifier role in the designation of that information resource.


It might be acceptable to leave URI as a subtype of 'text', but that is a narrowing of the definition given in the cited source.


Recommendation:
a.  delete: "Concept type: role"
b.  replace: "General concept: text" with:
  "General concept: term"

Clause 7.1.2 is titled:
 Other Namespaces and Rule Sets Presented in this Document
and it defines the symbol Vocabulary-to-MOF/XMI Mapping Rule Set
as: "General Concept: set"


Clause 13 specifies the mapping of vocabularies and rule sets from the SBVR Structured English form to a MOF/XMI exchange form.  And clause 13 defines several information resources that are said to be "rule sets".


Clause C.4 is titled:  Specifying a Rule Set


But the concept 'rule set' is not defined anywhere in the specification!


This term should not be used in so fundamental a way without being formally defined.


Further, 7.1.2 should specify that the individual concept 'Vocabulary-to-MOF/XMI Mapping Rule Set' is an instance of 'rule set', i.e.,
  "General Concept: rule set"

Doc: SBVR, dtc/06-08-05
Date: September 2006
Version:  FTF Interim Specification
Chapter:  11.2.1.4
Related issues: none


Title: definition of 'prohibited symbol'
Source: Ed Barkmeyer, NIST, edbark@nist.gov


Description:


In clause 11.2.1.4, the definition of 'prohibited symbol' is:
"symbol that is declared unacceptable by its owning speech community
creating a vocabulary that excludes the symbol"


It is not clear how to parse this.


If it said just:
"symbol that is declared unacceptable by its owning speech community",
it would be clear what is meant.  And there does not seem to be a need for SBVR to deal with how such a declaration is phrased.  (It can clearly be formulated in SBVR by Referent (expression) 'is prohibited symbol'.)


If the intent is "symbol that is declared unacceptable by the fact that its owning speech community creates a vocabulary that excludes the symbol", that is simply wrong.  Failing to include a symbol in the vocabulary does not prohibit its use, although it may implicitly deprecate it.


Recommendation:


In clause 11.2.1.4, in the definition of 'prohibited symbol', DELETE
"creating a vocabulary that excludes the symbol"

The unary fact type/characteristic "category is inactive" is included in the business-facing vocabulary (Clause 11).




This characteristic was originally intended to document that "a vocabulary management decision was taken to have this concept as a category even though it may never play any role in any fact type."

Note, however, that the meaning of this fact type says that its instances are automatically derived for all (and only) cases of a category that does not participate as a role in a fact type, so this "vocabulary management decision" is not a direct one; it is a function of the ‘decision’ to define a category and then that category not currently being used in any fact type.  In other words, any 'unused' category in an SBVR vocabulary will automatically be deemed to be “inactive”.

Now that 'role' has been specialized as ‘situational role’ and ‘fact type role’, no tool/technique should assume that a role that does not participate in a fact type is an error.  Thus, the "category is inactive" fact type is not needed to communicate that the category is intentional/not an error.

Furthermore, the meaning of "is inactive" as specified by this entry is not the typical sense in the business world that makes core use of categorization schemes -- e.g., marketing research product category schemes and financial charts of account (to name two).  In those contexts, "is inactive" means the category is retained for historical reference/reporting while specifying that the category is not to be used for current population.  Presenting this same verb phrase in the SBVR business-facing vocabulary with a vastly different business meaning will be confusing.

Resolution:

Simplify the Clause 11 Vocabulary and remove the potential misunderstanding by deleting the "category is inactive" fact type.

Issue:  implicit passive form for partitive fact type that uses the verb
"includes"


To avoid the need to define an explicit Synonymous Form clause of "is
included in" for every partitive fact type that uses the verb "includes",
SBVR Structured English should provide for this as a special, implicit case.


(From the SBVR-FTF telcon of Feb. 2, 2007)

SBVR has “thing equals thing” as a synonymous form of “thing is thing”, but “equals” should not be used in this way by SBVR.  The integer 2 is not the same number as 2.0.  But 2 equals 2.0.  “Equals” can mean the same as “is” when talking about things other than quantities, but “equals” means something a little different for quantities.

 

“equals” is defined in the dictionary differently than “is”. 
A model of quantities and units of measure that would extend SBVR would define “equals” differently than SBVR now defines it so that the model would fits normal usage. 
 

Recommendation:

 

Remove “thing equals thing”, “thing is equal to thing” and “thing = thing” from the list of synonymous form of “thing is thing”. 
Change the two uses of “equals” in SBVR (in 8.1.1.1 and 8.6.2) that mean “is” to say “is”. 

ISSUE STATEMENT

 

The definition of “individual concept” in SBVR is:

 



 

SBVR does not provide a means to specify what the instance of the individual concept is at any given point in time.

 

Since the instance of an individual concept can clearly be different at different points in time (possible worlds), we need a way to specify whether ‘Air Force One” in the example below is “the Boeing 777 with tail number nnn”, “the Apache Helicopter number xxxx”, or some other aircraft.

 

Air Force One

 

            Definition: aircraft that the President of the United States is on board      

 

Concept Type: Individual Concept

STATEMENT

 

The following two definitions in Clause 8.1.2 of the SBVR Specification are wrong and need to be fixed:

 



 

In SBVR deontic logic is about organizational behaviour and nothing else.  In SBVR alethic logic is about organizational meaning (“true by definition”) and nothing else.

 

1.       The definitions need to be reworded without using deontic logic

 

2.       Wording to make these two points absolutely clear needs to be added to the normative part of the SBVR Specification

Name: Vocabulary should be mandatory
Doc: dtc/06-08-05
Date: August 2006
Version:  Interim Convenience Document
Chapter:  11.1.1


In SBVR, support for Clause 11 is a separate 'compliance point', not required for conformance.  The 'vocabulary' concept is defined in Clause 11. Therefore, support for the 'vocabulary' concept is effectively a feature of only some SBVR implementations.


On the other hand, most of the SBVR specification is structured around the vocabulary concept.  Moreover, an implementation that does not support the 'vocabulary' concept cannot usefully support business rules.  Support for the vocabulary concept should be mandatory.


The appropriate solution would appear to be to move 'vocabulary' to clause 8.  In fact, 'vocabulary' (in clause 11) and 'vocabulary namespace' (in clause 8) are coextensive, and the "incorporated characteristics" of the two concepts differ only in minor facets important to different users.  The proper solution is to merge these concepts in clause 8.

Name: Definition of 'fact type'
Doc: dtc/06-08-05
Date: August 2006
Version:  Interim Convenience Document
Chapter:  8.1.1


Description:


In clause 8.1.1, the key concept 'fact type' is defined as:
"concept whose instances are all actualities and that is a basis for atomic formulation, having at least one role".
And 'noun concept' is defined as: "concept that is not a fact type"


This effectively makes all forms of 'concept' in SBVR dependent on whether or not they are the "basis for atomic formulation", which is a form of representation.  It makes the whole idea of being able to separate meaning from formulation/representation a sham.  The reference to atomic formulation is out of place and unnecessary.


Recommendation:


In 8.1.1, Replace the definition of 'fact type' with:
"concept whose instances are all actualities in which at least one role is distinguished, and which differ from one another in the things that play the roles."


Add a Note:


Note: An actuality in which roles are not distinguished is an instance of a noun concept, not a fact type.  But whether roles are distinguished or not is a part of the conceptualization of the situation that is the actuality.

In clause 11.1.2, the term 'category' is defined as:
 'concept in a generic relation having the broader intension'
Similarly, the term 'more general concept' is defined as:
 'concept in a generic relation having the narrower intension'


I don't know, and the text doesn't say, what a 'generic relation' may be.  One might conclude that it means "any instance of the concept 'relation'", but SBVR doesn't define the concept 'relation', either.
Assuming the 'relation' is an undocumented synonym for 'fact type', the only "relation" that involves these terms jointly is
 'concept1 has more general concept2'
Synonymous Form:  'concept2 has category'


(1) It appears that both of these are synonymous forms for 'concept1 specializes concept2', which is defined in clause 8.1.1.  These could easily have been defined to be roles in that fact type, e.g.:
 category specializes more general concept
This would make it clear that the relationship is 'specializes' and not some undefined 'generic relation'.


(2) The terms 'broader intension' and 'narrower intension' appear to be assigned to the wrong concepts.  Does a 'broader intension' mean
 "an intension that applies to more things"
or
 "an intension that involves more characteristics"?
For the existing text to be correct, the meaning must be the latter -- the 'category' applies to *fewer* things, so its 'broader intension' must mean that it involves more characteristics.  This usage is counterintuitive -- people think of "more general concepts" being "broader concepts".


Recommended action:


These two definitions should be rewritten to
(a) specify that the 'generic relation' is the "specializes" relationship, preferably by defining the roles as part of the definition of that relationship, in clause 8.1.1,
and
(b) discard "broader intension" and "narrower intension" in favor of wording that says specifically that it is about more "things" or more "characteristics".

NIAM Annex -- NIAM is the grandfather of fact-based semantic approaches, and has significant current application. However, it is not represented in the SBVR document. Its approach should be represented among the Annexes, in a manner corresponding to SBVR-SE, RuleSpeak and ORM.

Sjir Nijssen Revisions to Clause 10 -- "With respect to Clause 10 I would like to make the following suggestions which are primarily communication motivated:" 10.1.1.2 1. Facts refer to individuals ... please change to: Instantiated roles of facts refer to individuals 2. The schema declares ... please change to: The conceptual schema declares 3. Derivation rules indicate how a fact type may be derived from one or more fact types ... please change to: Derivation rules indicate how the population of a fact type may be derived from the populations of one or more fact types 4. machine-oriented technical language (such as C#, Java, or SQL) ... please change to: machine-oriented technical language (such as C# or Java) [It could be argued that SQL is another way of expressing first order logic and SBVR does not regard this as a machine-oriented language.] 5. An existential fact is used to simply assert the existence of an individual ... please change to: An existential fact is used to simply assert the existence and identification of an individual 6. The domain-specific component includes declarations of ... please change to: The domain-specific component includes the concept definitions and declarations of 7. The classification of facts as forwarded last saturday could help in Clause 10 or be put in Annex M. 

The URLs of SBVR’s XML documents must be changed to match OMG’s new file structure whose base directory is www.omg.org/spec.

In 9.2.5 in the definition of ‘binary logical operation’, CHANGE “logical formulation” to “logical operation”.

In 9.3 in some Necessity statements the term “scoped-over variable” is used, but is undefined.  The Necessity statements need to be reworded.

In 8.7 in the definition of “cardinality”, remove the word “distinct”.  Note that “distinct” remains in the definition of “set has cardinality”, but is not appropriate for cardinalities of all collections types (e.g. bags).

In the final read through of Annex E (EU-Rent example) a few errors of content were noticed.
Corrections are given below. 

Revised Text:
E.2.2.1.1: rental car is assigned to car movement
Necessity:
replace "…car movement is of the car model …" 
with "…car movement is of some car model …"
E2.2.1.2: transfer drop-off branch
Definition:
replace "branch from which the transferred car of a car transfer is picked up"
with "branch at which the transferred car of a car transfer is dropped off"
E.2.2.1.5: pick-up branch
Necessity:
replace "The pick-up branch of a rental may not be changed."
with "The pick-up branch of a rental is not changed."
E.2.2.1.5: rental
Definition:
replace "… specifying use of a car of a car group…"
with "… specifying use of some car of a car group…"
E.2.2.1.9 drop-off branch
replace Necessity "A car may be returned to a location other than …"
with Note "A car may be returned to a branch other than …"
E.2.2.1.10 rental car is of car model
Insert new entry immediately following:
rental car is of car group
Concept Type:		associative fact type
Necessity:		A rental car is of a car group if and only if the rental car is of some car model that is included in the car group. 
E.2.2.1.11 renter is responsible for rental
Necessity
Replace "The renter of a rental may not be changed"
With "The renter of a rental is not changed"
E.2.2.2.5 Page 380, second rule
Rule statement
Replace "If the actual pick-up date/time of each rental is after the end date/time …"
With "If the actual return date/time of a rental is after the end date/time …"
Supporting fact types
Replace "rental has actual pick-up date/time"
With "rental has actual return date/time"
Related facts
Delete "the noun concept 'actual pick-up date/time' is a role that ranges over the noun concept 'date/time'"
E.2.2.2.11.2 First rule
Rule statement
Replace "… is provisionally charged to a credit card …"
With "… is provisionally charged to some credit card …"
 
Repeated error in Necessity for inclusion in a segmentation
In several places the Necessity is incorrectly stated as
 "aaa is included in Bbbbbbb" instead of 
"The concept 'aaa' is included in Bbbbbbb". 
For example, in E.2.2.1.3, city branch:
replace "city branch is included in Branches by Type."
with "The concept 'city branch' is included in Branches by Type."
The same change needs to be made for:
E.2.2.1.6 in-country one-way rental
E.2.2.1.6 in-country rental
E.2.2.1.6 international rental
E.2.2.1.6 international inward rental
E.2.2.1.6 international outward rental
E.2.2.1.6 local one-way rental
E.2.2.1.6 round-trip rental
E.2.2.1.6 walk-in rental
E.2.2.1.7 cash rental
E.2.2.1.7 cash rental price
E.2.2.1.7 driver charge
E.2.2.1.7 extras charge
E.2.2.1.7 penalty charge
E.2.2.1.7 points rental
E.2.2.1.7 points rental price
E.2.2.1.11 corporate renter
E.2.2.1.11 individual customer

 
Characteristics used to define states.
There is a mixture of use of the verb form and the gerund form. The verb form seems better for states. The changes are:
Section	Replace	With
E.2.2.1.6	advance rental being assigned	advance rental is assigned
E.2.2.1.6	advance rental being reserved	advance rental is reserved
E.2.2.1.6	rental being returned	rental is returned
E.2.2.1.9	rental being late	rental is late
E.2.2.1.9	rental being overdue	rental is overdue
E.2.2.1.9	rental car being in need of repair	rental car is in need of repair
E.2.2.1.9	rental car being in need of service	rental car is in need of service
E.2.2.1.9	driver being barred	driver is barred

Disposition:	Resolved

Multiple changes (different Issues) resulted in ambiguous instructions for placement of entries.  On p. 169, move the new entry for "definite description" to follow the entry for "intensional definition uses delimiting characteristic".

On p. 171, in the entry for "definition serves as designation", the text for "serves as designation" should be entirely styled using verb styling.
Per Issue 9952:   In 11.1.3 REPLACE the entry for 'definition is used as term of concept' with this:
definition serves as designation
Definition:	the definition acts as a designation of the concept defined by the definition 
Note:	In the case of a concept for which no designation is given, the concept is represented by its definition.

On p. 184, in the entry for "icon", the leading term should be "nonverbal designation" (not simply "designation").
Per Issue 9941:  In the definition of 'icon' (as updated in the resolution to Issue 9952) REPLACE 'designation' with 'nonverbal designation'.

The "change all" of 'symbol' to 'designation' specified that 'fact symbol' was to be left unchanged.  Revert the following two changes.
* On p. 184, change the entry now shown as "fact designation" back to "fact symbol".
* On p. 270, undo the strike-out of "fact symbols" (and its replacement with "designations").
P One global change too far er Issue 9941:  In clause 11 REPLACE each remaining occurrence of "symbol" with "designation" (including plural cases), keeping font and capitalization the same, EXCEPT RETAIN "fact symbol" unchanged, everywhere (including in its plural form "fact symbols").

The entry for 'general concept' was removed from Clause 11; accordingly, the box for it should be shaded.  Replace Fig. 11.2 (p. 164) with this:   figure attached to issue 11297 email

Two text changes from the global change ('symbol' to 'designation') were made in the text (see p. 181) but missed in the corresponding fact types in the Figure.  Replace Fig. 11.6 (p. 180) with this: (email to issue 11298

When "nonverbal designation" was added into the taxonomy, the Necessities specifying its mutual exclusivity with 'term' and 'name' were provided.  Since it is now a category of 'nonverbal designation', 'icon' no longer needs to specify this as well.  On p. 184, delete the two Necessities shown under "icon".

Issue 10504 (Ballot 8) gave an instruction to add a Definition clause to an existing entry, but the Edit Instruction indicated the wrong Clause location of that existing entry.  This resulted in duplicate fact types for "body of shared meanings includes body of shared guidance" in Clauses 11 and 12.