

# IONA Security Platform

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# Agenda

- IONA Security Platform (iSP) architecture
- Integrating with Enterprise security services and administration
- iSP adapter internals
- Protecting Web Services
- Q&A



# IONA<sup>®</sup> iSP Architecture




# Why A Security Platform?

## IONA Security Platform (iSP):

- allows to insulate applications from the diverse and changing enterprise security infrastructures.
- provides a uniform standards based approach to communicating security related requests across the enterprise.
- provides applications a single access point to multiple security services such as authentication, authorization and PKI.

***iSP binds IONA products with any enterprise security infrastructure via development of a custom adapter!***

# iSP Architecture



# IONA Security Service (iS2)



## IONA Security Service (iS2):

- Is a servlet running in JART or in any standard application server.
- Uses a very simple flow:
  - receives a request message
  - determines the request type from the message content
  - loads an appropriate protocol specific module (if the module is not loaded yet)
  - dispatches message content to protocol specific module.
- In short: iS2 is a scaleable (intelligent) dispatcher!

***iS2 is iSP's focal point but not a bottleneck!***



# Integration With Enterprise Security Services And Administration



# AuthN and AuthZ Services

- Authentication and authorization services are supported via iS2 adapters.
- Internal protocol: SAML – satisfies purposes and allows extensibility. Could be easily replaced if necessary: internal interface is generic.
- Supported authorization models: coarse grain – RBAC (J2EE, Web Services), fine grain – DAC (CORBASEC, B2Bi).

***SAML protocol allows communicating arbitrary security assertions between applications and iS2!***


# PKI Services



- PKI services are supported via iS2 adapters.
- Internal language: XKMS – powerful and extensible. Endorsed by industry leaders (Verisign, Entrust, MSFT).
- Initial use: integration with certificate stores.
- Advanced use: validation services.

***Many PKI vendors are expected to adopt XKMS: iS2 PKI adapter becomes a pass through!***

# iSP At Work



# iSP Administration


- Solutions integrated with 3<sup>rd</sup> party systems are managed using native administrative tools, e.g. SiteMinder console for an enterprise which uses Netegrity SiteMinder
- IONA applications use iSP authorization models (RBAC, DAC) class libraries to manage native authorization policies via IONA Administrator
- iSP Auditing Component provides logs in a standard format (syslog) easily consumable by event monitoring systems.

***iSP offloads administrative tasks to 3<sup>rd</sup> party tools where possible and provides components to manage custom security information!***




# iSP Adapter internals

# Application Adapter Architecture




# iS2 Plug-In Modules





# Protecting Web Services

# Typical “Secure” Deployment




# Problems With Traditional Deployment


- Internal firewall has to be opened for secondary IOP connections: nothing prevents the attacker from penetrating internal firewall using the secondary protocol!
- Same problem with SSH especially after discovery of a weakness in the SSH protocol (short byte sequences – e.g. key strokes - allow to recover session key).
- FTP client and server in the active mode open listening ports and require a hole in the firewall.
- FTP client and server in the passive mode suffer from the server side PASV exploits (“Pizza Thief”: rogue client connects to a newly opened port) and from port number substitution exploits by rogue servers (see <http://www.securiteam.com/exploits/5YP0E000HG.html>).

***Traditional deployment exposes internal hosts to potentially hostile DMZ environment!***

# Deployment With IONA Secure Gateway (iSG)



# iSG At Work



# iSG Benefits

- The internal firewall is closed to all inbound traffic.
- HTTP headers of the inbound messages are parsed and filtered in the DMZ preventing buffer overflow attacks (e.g. CodeRed Worm, Nimda) on the Intranet machine running Web Service.
- Message headers and content could be scanned for viruses and attack signatures by virus and IDS plugins.
- Incoming messages on the DMZ machine are never written to the disk.

***There are no inbound connections through the Internal firewall!***

# More iSG Benefits

- iSG scales linearly and could be deployed in n:m configuration.
- Computationally intensive SSL handshake is offloaded to machines in the DMZ.
- SSL connections between the Internal Gateway machine and machine in the DMZ could be authenticated using certificates issued by a private CA.

***iSG offloads computationally intensive cryptographic computations from internal application servers!***

# Conclusion



- IONA Security Platform (iSP) provides applications a robust integration layer with Enterprise wide security services.
- iSP architecture is flexible and allows integration with diverse security solutions.
- iSP covers such important aspects of security as network protection, authentication, authorization and PKI services.



# IONA<sup>®</sup> Q&A