



*High Assurance ORB and DDS  
Profiles*

# *High Assurance ORB and DDS Profiles*

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Objective Interface Systems

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- Introduction
- What is High Assurance?
- How to Achieve High Assurance in Software
- Industry Standards
- Platforms Available
- How to Achieve High Assurance ORB and DDS Profiles
  - Keep It Simple
  - Languages and Subsets
  - IDL Subset
- Conclusion

- Safety-Critical or High-Assurance systems today require software that must meet stringent criteria
  - Reliability
  - Safety
  - Security
- Traditionally these systems have been custom designed
  - Expansion of this type of system => stove-pipe designs have become impractical
  - Looking to COTS
- Availability of COTS High Assurance RTOSes will create demand for same level of robustness in middleware
  - CORBA, Minimum CORBA and Real-Time CORBA specifications provide a solid foundation to begin addressing the needs.



# What is High Assurance?

High Assurance ORB and DDS Profiles

- To the FAA:
  - One failure per  $10^9$  (1 Billion) hours of operation
    - How long *is* a Billion hours? Do the math!
      - $1,000,000,000 \text{ hours} \times \frac{1 \text{ day}}{24 \text{ hours}} \times \frac{1 \text{ year}}{365.25 \text{ days}}$
      - 114,077 *YEARS!*
  - For National Security Systems processing our most valuable data under severe threat:
    - Failure is *Unthinkable*
- *How do we implement systems that we can trust to be this reliable?*



- High-Quality development process
  - Rigorous traceability from requirements to code
  - Quality assurance
- Predictable, rigorous base
  - Predictable language subsets
  - High quality tools: compilers, linkers, operating systems
- Keep it simple
  - Restrict scope of evaluation
- Independently evaluated or certified

Overall goal: allow evaluation of software



- RTCA DO-178B, *Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification*
- ARINC-653, *Avionics Application Software Standard Interface*
- ISO-15408, *Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation*
- DCID 6/3, *Protecting Sensitive Compartmented Information Within Information Systems*

Challenge: different standards for different industries

Challenge: Safety evaluation is context of system.  
Limited ability to re-use, discourages commercialization



# Assurance Certification Goals

High Assurance ORB and DDS Profiles

<i>Common Criteria</i>  Basic Robustness (EAL3)  Medium Robustness (EAL4+)  High Robustness (EAL6+)	<i>MSLS / MLS Separation Accreditation</i>  System High Closed Environment  System High Open Environment  Multi Level Separation
<i>DCID 6/3 Protection Level 5</i>	<i>Multi Nation Separation Accreditation</i>
<i>DO-178B Level A</i>	<i>Failure is Catastrophic</i>

Challenge: different requirements for different goals



- Certifiable/Certified RTOS
  - Designed to conform to one or more standards
  - Three RTOS systems are under consideration to provide proof of concept:
    - Green Hills Software: INTEGRITY-178B
    - LynuxWorks: LynxOS-178
    - Wind River Systems: Platform for Safety Critical ARINC 653
- Future
  - MILS Separation Kernels (Green Hills, LynuxWorks, and Wind River )



## Overall goal: allow evaluation of software

- High-Quality development process
  - Not the subject of profile
  - Covered by DO-178B, etc.
- Predictable, rigorous base
  - Predictable language subsets – IDL and target language
  - High quality tools – not the subject of the profile
- Keep it simple
  - Reduce code size of ORB and DDS run-time
  - Restrict code size of generated code
- Independently evaluated or certified
  - Not the subject of the profile

Observation: Certification  
costs more than  
development



- Reduce code size of ORB and DDS run-time
  - Restrict functionality
    - Example: eliminate shutdown
    - Example: eliminate LocateForward
  - Resolve resources at program initialization - eliminate most/all dynamic behavior:
    - Thread creation.
    - Memory allocation.
    - Runtime symbol resolution.
    - Runtime path resolution (eg. virtual functions.)
    - Transport connections



- Reduce code size of generated code
  - Need example: JTRS SCA IDL generates
    - 20K of C++ (ORB*express* for C++),
    - 144K of C++ (TAO)
    - 25K of Java (ORB*express* for Java)
    - 12.5K of Ada (ORB*express* for Ada)
  - Solution approach
    - Restrict IDL types
    - Look for other savings



- Pairs of profiles involved
  - One for IDL
  - One for the target programming language (“safe subset”)
- Plus profile of language mapping
- Target Language Mappings
  - Current languages used for High Assurance
    - Ada – SPARC subset, Ravenscar run-time restrictions
    - C – Motor Industry Software Reliability Association (MISRA) C
    - C++ - not as popular
  - Current “safe subsets” being considered
    - Ada and C++ are the forerunners
    - C would require updating the CORBA C mapping



- Programming Language Considerations:
  - Late/Dynamic Binding must be avoided. So...
    - Limit or eliminate virtual inheritance/functions.
    - No exceptions allowed.
  - Code must be traceable, especially for certification. So...
    - No templates.
    - Limit/eliminate multiple inheritance.
  - Memory management.
    - IDL types that always have memory constrained limits.

- IDL Considerations: Limits will be based on ability to map to safe programming language subsets.
  - Different programming languages have different mappings for IDL constructs
    - E.g., fixed types map to
      - Native type in Ada,
      - ORB generated class in C++
  - Different programming languages should have a common IDL subset to promote interoperability,
    - E.g., fixed types
      - OK in Ada, not in C++
      - => Eliminate from profile
- Upcoming list is a work in progress

- Octet
- Boolean
- Char
- Enumerated Type
- Short
- Unsigned Short
- Long
- Unsigned Long
- Long Long
- Unsigned Long Long
- Float
- Double
- Array
- Structures

- Strings
- Sequences
- Unions
- Any
- Fixed

**Challenge: what about Object References?**

- Although significant challenges remain
  - Reducing lines of code
  - Reconciling restrictions of high assurance language subsets
- Significant progress has been made in defining a High Assurance CORBA standard
- It will be possible to define a CORBA subset suitable for High Assurance implementation
  - That retains “interoperability within the subset”
  - That offers advantages of CORBA
    - Portability
    - Time to market
    - Location transparency



## For Additional Information

High Assurance ORB and DDS  
Profiles

- <http://www.omg.org/cgi-bin/docs?realtime/2005-05-02>
  - latest submission
  - In response to RFP - *realtime/2004-02-24*
- Submitters
  - [Objective Interface Systems, Inc.](#)
  - [Rockwell Collins, Inc.](#)