

Using the Principle of Least Authority to Improve Software Assurance

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
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- **Principle Of Least Authority (POLA) Introduction**
- **POLA Patterns**
 - **Caretaker**
 - **Membrane**
 - **Facet**
 - **Powerbox**
- **Conclusion**

- Authority versus Permission
- *Principle Of Least Authority (POLA) versus Principle Of Least Privilege/Permission (POLP)*
- Classical (Secure) Capabilities
- Object Capabilities

- **Definitions**

- **Permission:** the specific effect an entity can have in a system *as represented by the explicit ability to use another protected resource in a direct way.*
- **Authority:** the general effect an entity can have in a system *as represented by both its own permissions and the permissions of other entities that will act as its proxies.*



- **Principle Of Least Privilege**
 - Every program and every user of the system should operate using the least set of privileges necessary to complete the job.
- **Principle Of Least Authority**
 - An entity should have no more authority than it needs to accomplish its specified functions
- **Both have the same goal – limiting the damage a broken or malicious entity can cause**
 - POLP only considers first order effects of entity
 - POLA considers all effects
 - Both are “best practice” – not immutable laws

- **Characteristics**

- Protected, unforgeable, reference to an target resource or service
- Possession by a caller (e.g., client) grants that caller the capability to interact with the target resource in specified ways
- Capabilities can be obtained by:
 - Initial conditions
 - Parenthood (for an entity that has created a new resource)
 - Reception as a parameter in a capability invocation

Only connectivity begets connectivity

- System protects confidentiality, integrity, and availability of capability representation

- **System in which ALL computation is performed by objects according to the capability rules**
 - **Prohibits global mutable state**
 - **Prohibits “well-known”, public services**
 - Effect of such services can be simulated by making them part of the Initial Conditions for every entity
- **Assurance Advantages**
 - **Multi-entity application is inherently modular with precisely specified interfaces between modules**
 - **Key security properties of platform can be rigorously analyzed**
 - **Information flow properties of a multi-entity application can be analyzed independently of knowledge of the code**

POLA **(Principle of Least Authority)** **Patterns**

- **Major complaint about basic capability model is that it doesn't provide for access revocation**
- **Caretaker pattern is a variation on the Wrapper pattern**
 - **Caretaker holds the capability to the real object**
 - **Transparently (real object is not aware that Caretaker exists) forwards messages to the object**
 - **There exists a management capability that allows the Caretaker capability to be revoked – thus revoking access to the real object**

Membrane Pattern

- **Extension to the Caretaker pattern**
- **Enforces the best practice that the real object capability should not be communicated beyond the Caretaker**
- **Membrane wraps each capability passing through it in a subsidiary Caretaker, which is revoked with the main Caretaker**

- **Attenuates (selectively reduces) the operations available through a capability**
- **Facet is always a subset of the original capability**
- **Useful for improving robustness and safety, in addition to security**
- **Best practices**
 - **methods included in a facet should be explicitly indicated**
 - **if methods are added to the original interface, they should *not* be added by default to the facet**

- **Powerbox collects authority management into a single object**
- **Powerbox is arbiter of authority transfers across a complex trust boundary**
- **Powerbox be used for dynamic negotiation of authority during operation**
- **Powerbox is particularly useful when**
 - **the object in the less trusted realm does not always get the same authorities**
 - **the authorities granted to the object in the less trusted realm may change during operation**

Discussion?