

# **CORBA Security Semantics**

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# CORBA as Architecture

- **View of information system as units interconnected by Abstract Interfaces.**
- **The design of the units is facilitated by Inheritance and Polymorphism.**
- **Units usually have an implicit semantics or informal semantics.**
- **Semantics often left to implementors.**

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# IDL Specification

- Interfaces are declared using Interface Definition Language.
- IDL formal specs are essentially signature declarations.
  - Only types of arguments, return values and exceptions are specified.
- Expedient: No need for costly and usually uninformative formal analyses.
- Convenient: Diverse vendors are more likely to agree on a specification.

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# IDL Underspecification

- **Particular Methods or Services have intended behavioral requirements associated to them**
  - `CircleBank.ReduceBalance(314159265, 49.95).`
  - `BajaVistaData.Subscribers(BostonGlobe, 01803)`
  - `FlightController.SafeDistance(CurrentSpeed())`
  - `ORB.HasAccess?(GetCurrent(), Request)`
- **Unexpressive: IDL cannot formulate intended behavioral requirements for object methods.**
- **Interoperability “Meltdown”: Clear issue for safety or security critical object services.**

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# Semantic Specification

- Interpretation of specification in some model.
- Provide useful information about system to implementors, designers and customers.
  - `Bank.ReduceBalance(Acct, Bal)`. **Reduces amount in acct by Bal.**
  - `DBase.Subscribers(Paper, AreaCode)` **Returns list of subscribers.**
  - `Controller.SafeDistance(S) ?`.
  - `ORB.HasAccess?(Current, Request) ?`

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# Four types of Reference Models

- Model for information system.
- Model for safety hazards or security threats.
- Model for protection or countermeasures.
- Model for designing protection facilities.

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# Security Threat Models and Analogues

- Model for security threats:
  - Inappropriate access or information flow.
  - Inappropriate modification or use of data.
  - Undesirable loss or unavailability of resources.
- Model for safety hazards:
  - Physical hazards.
  - Component failure.

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# Countermeasure Models and Analogues

- **Security Threat Countermeasures**
  - **Encryption.**
  - **Signature.**
  - **Access Control**
- **For Safety hazards:**
  - **Linear motion with random autonomous displacements.**
  - **Fault Tolerance.**

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# Reference Modeling Concepts

- Any computational paradigm suitable (OMT, CSP, State Machines.)
- Partial or “lightweight” formal methods for various reference models.
  - Partiality in composition: For instance, avoid concurrency issues.
- Design Reference Model for implementors
- Reference Models useful for creating specification simulators.

# Examples

- **Bell-LaPadula and Non-Interference models provided three of the “reference models” mentioned above: Information system model, threat model, protection models.**
- **Original model state-machine based, many subsequent refinements based on other methodologies, including CSP.**
- **Much original research into Computer Security resulted in an attempt at building more accurate threat models.**
- **Very difficult to build real world systems in rigorous conformance to design specification.**

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# CORBA Security Issues

- **Access Control.**
- **User Authentication.**
- **Security of communication**
- **Auditing.**
- **Non repudiation.**
- **Security Domains.**

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# Access Control

- **Extends and Refines File Access Control Concepts.**
  - Control on Method types.
  - Control on Method Arguments.
  - Control on Transaction Principal.
  - Delegation Policies can modify Principal access rights during a transaction.
- **Access control model**
  - Model various access policy types.
  - Model associations between clients and objects.

## Needed Work

- **Determine behavioral specification methodology for CORBA Object Services.**
- **Translate informal semantics of various access control policies and design models into a behavioral specification.**
- **Use behavioral specification to develop useful criteria for product conformance.**

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