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# DDS in Multi Level Security Environments for System F6

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# Future Fast, Flexible, Fractionated, Free-Flying Spacecraft (F6)

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- ▶ **Objective:** Develop and demonstrate a satellite architecture where the functionality of a traditional monolithic spacecraft is replaced by a cluster of wirelessly connected modules
- ▶ **Advantages:**
  - ▶ Increased flexibility during design and acquisition
  - ▶ Reduced development and launch costs
  - ▶ Increased adaptability and survivability of space systems on-orbit
  - ▶ Potential to apply economies of scale to satellite design & manufacture
- ▶ Key program objective is the promulgation of open interface standards for hardware and software.



# High Level System F6 Technical Goals

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
1. **Distributed system with network addressability**
  - ▶ Everything and anything (modulo security permissions) can be accessed and addressed
2. **Cope with highly variable network quality & availability**
  - ▶ Inter-satellite links are highly unreliable with unpredictable bandwidth; ground links are infrequent and flow
3. **Dynamism**
  - ▶ Dynamically deployed applications, security configurations, and cluster architectures
4. **Resource sharing**
  - ▶ Specific resources can be shared across applications: CPU, communication links, memory, services
5. **Fault tolerance**
  - ▶ Faults in components, services, communication links, computing nodes are detected, isolated, and their effects mitigated
6. **Multi-level security**
  - ▶ The architecture enforces mandatory access control based on MLS

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
# Solution: F6MDA (Model-driven Architecture)

Layered architecture supported by a model-driven development toolchain



# Solution: F6OS

- ▶ The ‘Operating System’ that provides
  - ▶ Restricted OS calls for application actors
  - ▶ Privileged calls for platform (‘service’) actors
  - ▶ All system calls are time-bounded
- ▶ Provides messaging services
  - ▶ All component interactions are via messages
  - ▶ No other interactions are possible
- ▶ All component interactions are facilitated by a ‘secure transport’ that verifies security labels on messages
- ▶ Resource management functions
  - ▶ CPU time: temporal partitioning for actors, utilization cap per actor within partition
  - ▶ Memory: space partitioning, limit caps
  - ▶ Network bandwidth: diffserv, bandwidth budget, differentiated routing
- ▶ F6OS is part of the TCB



F6OS enforces Mandatory Access Control (MAC) on all inter-actor interactions

# F6OS Secure Transport (1 / 2)

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- ▶ **Goals:**
  - ▶ Secure information sharing (confidentiality, integrity, authenticity)
  - ▶ No unauthorized information flows
  - ▶ (Application) Actors do not have to be trusted
  - ▶ Support for real-time ('timely') communication and fault tolerance
  - ▶ Individual actors should be addressable
- ▶ **Approach:**
  - ▶ Communication connections are *explicitly* set up by a privileged and trusted actor
    - ▶ *Information flows must be set up by trusted entities.* Communication endpoints are addressed in a manner that is independent of the underlying node's identity.
    - ▶ *Allows the actors to be relocated at runtime without disrupting the application level logic.*
  - ▶ Actors are given the endpoints of connections at initialization time
    - ▶ *Actors cannot simply create endpoints, they must be given to them by a trusted entity*
  - ▶ Actors supply security labels when communicating
    - ▶ *Actors can handle multiple communications simultaneously on different labels, hence they must inform the kernel which one is needed*
  - ▶ F6OS verifies labels against labels independently supplied in actor's meta-data
    - ▶ *Trusted entity verifies label matching (or compatibility)*

# F6OS Secure Transport (2/2)


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- ▶ All inter-actor communication happens via *endpoints* that are *logically connected* via flows.
  - ▶ Endpoints ...
    - ▶ Are like sockets (connect an actor to another endpoint – of another actor)
    - ▶ But can be created by only privileged actor(s)
  - ▶ Flow....
    - ▶ Associations between one source and one or more destination endpoints
    - ▶ Special case: destination endpoint can be multicast group
    - ▶ Configured by only privileged actor(s)
  - ▶ Endpoint/flow configuration is part of the ‘Deployment Plan’
- ▶ Labels
  - ▶ Generated and assigned by a trusted party (system integrator)
    - ▶ There has to be one authoritative source of labels
  - ▶ Both actors and endpoints have labels
    - ▶ Multi-label actors communicating on multi-label endpoints are possible
  - ▶ Write Equal/Read Equal and Write Equal/Read Down are supported



# Solution: Middleware

- ▶ The ‘middleware layer’ that provides:
  - ▶ Synchronous and asynchronous point-to-point communication with call/response semantics (→ Subset of CORBA RMI)
    - ▶ Location transparency
    - ▶ Request (de)multiplexing
    - ▶ Message (de)marshalling
    - ▶ Error handling
    - ▶ Support for QoS (client timeouts, reliable one-ways)
  - ▶ Anonymous publish/subscribe communications with one/many-to-many data distribution patterns (→ Subset of DDS)
    - ▶ Datatype specification
    - ▶ Static discovery



CORBA and DDS are complex standards; certification as part of the Trusted Computing Base (TCB) would be prohibitive

# Implications for DDS


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- ▶ **DDS Implementation must be label aware**
  - ▶ Must use secure transport APIs to transmit data samples
  - ▶ Must associate labels with DDS entities
- ▶ **Restricts Quality of Service properties that may be supported**
  - ▶ Low label actors can not be aware of high label actors
  - ▶ Any QoS that requires such knowledge can not be supported
- ▶ **Complicates conventional DDS discovery process**
  - ▶ Participants can not spontaneously connect to peers for discovery
  - ▶ Unrestricted discovery creates a significant covert channel



# Security Label Associations (1/2)

- ▶ **Transport Object**
  - ▶ Interacts with a F6ST Endpoint
  - ▶ May have multiple labels; subset of endpoint labels
- ▶ **Writer**
  - ▶ Assigned a single label at creation
  - ▶ Label may not change, and it applied to all samples
- ▶ **Reader**
  - ▶ Unlabeled
  - ▶ Each sample's label is communicated via Sample Info mechanism



# Security Label Associations (2/2)


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- ▶ Topics and domains may have multiple labels
- ▶ Write-Equal/Read-Equal
  - ▶ Publishers/Subscribers are the same label
  - ▶ Publishers and Subscribers may mutually “know” each other
  - ▶ Allows for both unicast and multicast communication
  - ▶ Nearly full range of DDS QoS supported
- ▶ Write-Equal/Read-Down
  - ▶ Publishers have a lower label than subscribers
  - ▶ Publishers **may not** have any knowledge of subscribers
  - ▶ Only allows multicast communication
  - ▶ QoS requiring such knowledge is forbidden
    - ▶ Reliability
    - ▶ Ownership




# F6 Discovery Participants

- ▶ **Actor Home**
  - ▶ Generic process that hosts application business logic hosted in components
  - ▶ Hosts the DDS implementation
- ▶ **Deployment Manager**
  - ▶ Trusted deployment infrastructure local to the node on which an Actor runs
  - ▶ Responsible for configuring Secure Transport
  - ▶ Part of the TCB
- ▶ **Cluster Dictionary Manager**
  - ▶ Trusted cluster repository of DDS entities and topics
  - ▶ Responsible for matching publishers and subscribers
  - ▶ Part of the TCB




# F6 Discovery: Entity Registration



- ▶ Process is similar for subscriber entity
- ▶ Proxy objects provide a trusted mediator between discovery service and untrusted actor

# F6 Discovery: Subscription Match



- ▶ Discovery services is label aware
- ▶ Only matches entities of compatible labels
- ▶ Proxy objects intercept discovery events and configure Secure Transport before informing entity of matches
- ▶ F6 Discovery generates “fake” meta data (GUID, etc) when matching low writers to high readers



# Lessons Learned

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- ▶ DDS is a useful and popular platform for future space systems
  - ▶ Most submitted designs for the System F6 IAP featured DDS as a communication mechanism
  - ▶ Shown to be an effective tool to write distributed flight software for fractionated spacecraft
- ▶ Segregating Discovery substantially simplifies integrating DDS in MLS systems
  - ▶ DDS need not be part of the TCB, substantially simplifying analysis and design
  - ▶ Reduces possibility of covert channels between low and high actors
- ▶ Proprietary F6 discovery process could present a interoperability concern

More Information:

<http://www.isis.vanderbilt.edu/projects/F6>

[http://www.darpa.mil/Our\\_Work/tto/Programs/System\\_F6.aspx](http://www.darpa.mil/Our_Work/tto/Programs/System_F6.aspx)