

DDS in Multi Level Security Environments for System F6

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Future Fast, Flexible, Fractionated, Free-Flying Spacecraft (F6)

- ▶ Objective: Develop and demonstrate a satellite architecture where the functionality of a traditional monolithic spacecraft is replaced by a cluster of wirelessly connected modules
- ▶ Advantages:
 - ▶ Increased flexibility during design and acquisition
 - ▶ Reduced development and launch costs
 - ▶ Increased adaptability and survivability of space systems on-orbit
 - ▶ Potential to apply economies of scale to satellite design & manufacture
- ▶ Key program objective is the promulgation of open interface standards for hardware and software.



High Level System F6 Technical Goals


1. **Distributed system with network addressability**
 - ▶ Everything and anything (modulo security permissions) can be accessed and addressed
2. **Cope with highly variable network quality & availability**
 - ▶ Inter-satellite links are highly unreliable with unpredictable bandwidth; ground links are infrequent and flow
3. **Dynamism**
 - ▶ Dynamically deployed applications, security configurations, and cluster architectures
4. **Resource sharing**
 - ▶ Specific resources can be shared across applications: CPU, communication links, memory, services
5. **Fault tolerance**
 - ▶ Faults in components, services, communication links, computing nodes are detected, isolated, and their effects mitigated
6. **Multi-level security**
 - ▶ The architecture enforces mandatory access control based on MLS



Solution:




F6MDA (Model-driven Architecture)

Layered architecture supported by a model-driven development toolchain



Solution: F6OS

- ▶ The 'Operating System' that provides
 - ▶ Restricted OS calls for application actors
 - ▶ Privileged calls for platform ('service') actors
 - ▶ All system calls are time-bounded
- ▶ Provides messaging services
 - ▶ All component interactions are via messages
 - ▶ No other interactions are possible
- ▶ All component interactions are facilitated by a 'secure transport' that verifies security labels on messages
- ▶ Resource management functions
 - ▶ CPU time: temporal partitioning for actors, utilization cap per actor within partition
 - ▶ Memory: space partitioning, limit caps
 - ▶ Network bandwidth: diffserv, bandwidth budget, differentiated routing
- ▶ F6OS is part of the TCB



F6OS enforces Mandatory Access Control (MAC) on all inter-actor interactions



F6OS Secure Transport (1 / 2)

▶ Goals:

- ▶ Secure information sharing (confidentiality, integrity, authenticity)
- ▶ No unauthorized information flows
- ▶ (Application) Actors do not have to be trusted
- ▶ Support for real-time ('timely') communication and fault tolerance
- ▶ Individual actors should be addressable

▶ Approach:

- ▶ Communication connections are *explicitly* set up by a privileged and trusted actor
 - ▶ *Information flows must be set up by trusted entities.* Communication endpoints are addressed in a manner that is independent of the underlying node's identity.
 - ▶ *Allows the actors to be relocated at runtime without disrupting the application level logic.*
- ▶ Actors are given the endpoints of connections at initialization time
 - ▶ *Actors cannot simply create endpoints, they must be given to them by a trusted entity*
- ▶ Actors supply security labels when communicating
 - ▶ *Actors can handle multiple communications simultaneously on different labels, hence they must inform the kernel which one is needed*
- ▶ F6OS verifies labels against labels independently supplied in actor's meta-data
 - ▶ *Trusted entity verifies label matching (or compatibility)*





F6OS Secure Transport (2/2)

- ▶ All inter-actor communication happens via *endpoints* that are *logically connected* via flows.
 - ▶ Endpoints ...
 - ▶ Are like sockets (connect an actor to another endpoint – of another actor)
 - ▶ But can be created by only privileged actor(s)
 - ▶ Flow....
 - ▶ Associations between one source and one or more destination endpoints
 - ▶ Special case: destination endpoint can be multicast group
 - ▶ Configured by only privileged actor(s)
 - ▶ Endpoint/flow configuration is part of the ‘Deployment Plan’
- ▶ Labels
 - ▶ Generated and assigned by a trusted party (system integrator)
 - ▶ There has to be one authoritative source of labels
 - ▶ Both actors and endpoints have labels
 - ▶ Multi-label actors communicating on multi-label endpoints are possible
 - ▶ Write Equal/Read Equal and Write Equal/Read Down are supported



Solution: Middleware

- ▶ The 'middleware layer' that provides:
 - ▶ Synchronous and asynchronous point-to-point communication with call/response semantics (→ Subset of CORBA RMI)
 - ▶ Location transparency
 - ▶ Request (de)multiplexing
 - ▶ Message (de)marshalling
 - ▶ Error handling
 - ▶ Support for QoS (client timeouts, reliable one-ways)
 - ▶ Anonymous publish/subscribe communications with one/many-to-many data distribution patterns (→ Subset of DDS)
 - ▶ Datatype specification
 - ▶ Static discovery



CORBA and DDS are complex standards; certification as part of the Trusted Computing Base (TCB) would be prohibitive


Implications for DDS

- ▶ **DDS Implementation must be label aware**
 - ▶ Must use secure transport APIs to transmit data samples
 - ▶ Must associate labels with DDS entities
- ▶ **Restricts Quality of Service properties that may be supported**
 - ▶ Low label actors can not be aware of high label actors
 - ▶ Any QoS that requires such knowledge can not be supported
- ▶ **Complicates conventional DDS discovery process**
 - ▶ Participants can not spontaneously connect to peers for discovery
 - ▶ Unrestricted discovery creates a significant covert channel



Security Label Associations (1/2)

- ▶ **Transport Object**
 - ▶ Interacts with a F6ST Endpoint
 - ▶ May have multiple labels; subset of endpoint labels
- ▶ **Writer**
 - ▶ Assigned a single label at creation
 - ▶ Label may not change, and it applied to all samples
- ▶ **Reader**
 - ▶ Unlabeled
 - ▶ Each sample's label is communicated via Sample Info mechanism



Security Label Associations (2/2)

- ▶ Topics and domains may have multiple labels
- ▶ Write-Equal/Read-Equal
 - ▶ Publishers/Subscribers are the same label
 - ▶ Publishers and Subscribers may mutually “know” each other
 - ▶ Allows for both unicast and multicast communication
 - ▶ Nearly full range of DDS QoS supported
- ▶ Write-Equal/Read-Down
 - ▶ Publishers have a lower label than subscribers
 - ▶ Publishers **may not** have any knowledge of subscribers
 - ▶ Only allows multicast communication
 - ▶ QoS requiring such knowledge is forbidden
 - ▶ Reliability
 - ▶ Ownership



F6 Discovery Participants

▶ Actor Home




- ▶ Generic process that hosts application business logic hosted in components
- ▶ Hosts the DDS implementation

▶ Deployment Manager


- ▶ Trusted deployment infrastructure local to the node on which an Actor runs
- ▶ Responsible for configuring Secure Transport
- ▶ Part of the TCB

▶ Cluster Dictionary Manager

- ▶ Trusted cluster repository of DDS entities and topics
- ▶ Responsible for matching publishers and subscribers
- ▶ Part of the TCB




F6 Discovery: Entity Registration



- ▶ Process is similar for subscriber entity
- ▶ Proxy objects provide a trusted mediator between discovery service and untrusted actor

F6 Discovery: Subscription Match



- ▶ Discovery services is label aware
- ▶ Only matches entities of compatible labels
- ▶ Proxy objects intercept discovery events and configure Secure Transport before informing entity of matches
- ▶ F6 Discovery generates “fake” meta data (GUID, etc) when matching low writers to high readers

Lessons Learned

- ▶ DDS is a useful and popular platform for future space systems
 - ▶ Most submitted designs for the System F6 IAP featured DDS as a communication mechanism
 - ▶ Shown to be an effective tool to write distributed flight software for fractionated spacecraft
- ▶ Segregating Discovery substantially simplifies integrating DDS in MLS systems
 - ▶ DDS need not be part of the TCB, substantially simplifying analysis and design
 - ▶ Reduces possibility of covert channels between low and high actors
- ▶ Proprietary F6 discovery process could present a interoperability concern

More Information:

<http://www.isis.vanderbilt.edu/projects/F6>

http://www.darpa.mil/Our_Work/tto/Programs/System_F6.aspx