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conformance with this specification. In the event that testing suites are implemented or approved by Object
Management Group, Inc., software developed using this specification may claim compliance or conformance
with the specification only if the software satisfactorily completes the testing suites.
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Preface

OMG

Founded in 1989, the Object Management Group, Inc. (OMG) is an open membership, not-for-profit computer industry standards consortium that produces and maintains computer industry specifications for interoperable, portable and reusable enterprise applications in distributed, heterogeneous environments. Membership includes Information Technology vendors, end users, government agencies and academia. OMG member companies write, adopt, and maintain its specifications following a mature, open process. OMG's specifications implement the Model Driven Architecture® (MDA®), maximizing ROI through a full-lifecycle approach to enterprise integration that covers multiple operating systems, programming languages, middleware and networking infrastructures, and software development environments. OMG's specifications include: UML® (Unified Modeling Language™); CORBA® (Common Object Request Broker Architecture); CWM™ (Common Warehouse Metamodel); and industry-specific standards for dozens of vertical markets. More information on the OMG is available at http://www.omg.org/.

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• UML, MOF, CWM, XMI
• UML Profile Specifications

Platform Independent Model (PIM) - Platform Specific Model (PSM) - Interface Specifications

• CORBAServices
• CORBAFacilities
• OMG Domain Specifications
• CORBA Embedded Intelligence Specifications
• CORBA Security Specifications

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The type styles shown below are used in this document to distinguish programming statements from ordinary English. However, these conventions are not used in tables or section headings where no distinction is necessary.

Times/Times New Roman - 10 pt.: Standard body text

**Helvetica/Arial - 10 pt. Bold:** OMG Interface Definition Language (OMG IDL) and syntax elements.

**Courier - 10 pt. Bold:** Programming language elements.

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**Note** – Terms that appear in *italics* are defined in the glossary. Italic text also represents the name of a document, specification, or other publication.

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0. Section 0
- The full name of the submission

Risk Analysis and Assessment Modeling Language
- A complete list of all OMG Member(s) making the submission, with a named contact individual for each

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Dassault Systemes, Andrius Armonas andrius.armonas@3ds.com
Dassault Systemes, Tomas Junkevičius tomas.juknevicius@3ds.com
Gesellschaft für Systems Engineering, Tim Weilkiens tim.weilkiens@oose.de
- The acronym proposed for the specification (e.g. UML, CORBA)
RAAML
- The name and OMG document number of the RFP to which this is a response
Safety and Reliability for UML RFP, ad/17-03-05
- The OMG document number of the main submission document
ad/2020-12-04
- Overview or guide to the material in the submission

Section 1.1, 1.4 and section 7 provides overview to the material in the submission.
- Statement of proof of concept (see 4.8)

ISO2626 already has a commercial implementation. See Cameo Systems Modeler plugin: ISO 26262 Functional Safety plugin.

For the FTA, there is an example provided and the (upcoming) INCOSE 2021 paper, detailing how to model fault trees with the standard UML/SysML tools, without any need for additional extensions.

FMEA consists of a simple tabular view, which is based on the same modeling principles as ISO 26262 case, but is semantically less complex than ISO 26262 case. As it has been demonstrated that ISO 26262 is implementable, so FMEA is.

GSN is a simple profile with some stereotyped model elements (classes) and dependency-based relationships. A simple class diagram is enough to capture this domain. There is an example provided, capturing and visualizing the example case.

STPA is based on the same modeling principles as ISO 26262 case. As it has been demonstrated that ISO 26262 is implementable, so STPA is. For STPA, an example is provided in the specification.
- If the proposal does not satisfy any of the general requirements stated in Section 5, a detailed rationale explaining why

General requirements in section 5 are satisfied.

- Discussion of each of the “Issues To Be Discussed” identified in Section 6.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Req #</th>
<th>Requirement text</th>
<th>Satisfied by</th>
<th>Comment</th>
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<tr>
<td>6.7.1.1</td>
<td>Proposals shall discuss how the profile/model library can be used in conjunction with SACM, and how the proposed profile/model library’s argument notation compares with SACM and GSN [GSN].</td>
<td>As per <a href="https://www.omg.org/spec/SACM/2.0/PDF">https://www.omg.org/spec/SACM/2.0/PDF</a>, details of the of the mapping between GSN elements and SACM maintained by the Safety Critical Systems Club (SCSC) at the following URL: <a href="https://www.scsce.org.uk/scsc-141B">https://www.scsce.org.uk/scsc-141B</a> <a href="http://www.goalstructuringnotation.infoMETAMODEL">http://www.goalstructuringnotation.infoMETAMODEL</a></td>
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<td>6.7.1.2</td>
<td>Proposals shall provide a representative list of common tasks in safety and reliability that can be automated using their profile/model library. Note: Proposals need not specify how such automation should be realized.</td>
<td>- Calculation of FTA probabilities - Calculation of FMEA RPN values - ASIL propagation (ISO 26262) - Failure propagation</td>
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<td>6.7.1.3</td>
<td>Proposals shall discuss the degree to which the safety information can be displayed in alternative views such as safety integrity level matrices.</td>
<td>Safety integrity level matrices can be shown in tables, e.g. HARA in ISO 26262.</td>
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<td>6.7.1.4</td>
<td>Proposals shall discuss the degree to which the profile/model library can be adapted to a specific safety/reliability process used by an organisation, and the impact of this adaptation on the use of the profile/model library. This includes modeling of specific information used by that organisation (for example, a particular probability) and differing representations used by an organisation (for example, representing probabilities as numerical values or as labelled levels). Proposals shall also discuss how this may impact the use of automated model processing facilities inbuilt in modeling tools, and integration with external tools via model transformations. In particular, proposals shall provide the design rationale for their approach to supporting the requirement for customisability, and</td>
<td>General</td>
<td>The general package provides value properties which can be redefined in the package of a specific method (e.g. FMEA library). Calculations can be defined and redefined using SysML parametrics. Additional concepts and value properties can be introduced as well by inheriting from the provided libraries. The design rationale for the library approach is provided in section 7.2 and 9.1. This has been discussed at length in the paper submitted to INCOSE IS 2019 (the paper was recognized as INCOSE IS 2019 Best paper): OMG standard for integrating safety and reliability analysis into MBSE: Concepts and applications. Geoffrey Biggs (Tier IV, Inc.); Andrius Armonas, Tomas Juknevicius (No Magic / Dassault Systemes); Kyle Post (Ford); Nataliya Yakymets (CEA LIST LECS);</td>
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compare it to the use of stereotyping and enumerations, if that approach is not selected.

Axel Berres (German Aerospace Center).

The paper can be retrieved from https://www.nomagic.com/images/papers/v20199315_1-INCOSE-IS-2019.pdf

| 6.7.1.5 | Proposals shall discuss any common properties of safety- and reliability-related elements supported by the profile/model library, and the degree to which the list of represented properties is optional and extensible. | occurrence [1] premitigationOccurrence s [0..*] severity [1] premitigationSeverities [0..*] probability [1] premitigationDetectabilities [0..*] score |
| 6.7.1.6 | Proposals shall discuss the degree of traceability that the profile/model library provides, with particular focus on its ease of use by and display for users. | Connector is a standard UML metaclass and its usage usability is well supported by tool vendors. The same applies for dependencies which the rest of stereotypes in the list extends. Tool vendors provide various means to visualize and create dependencies and connectors, e.g. matrices, relation maps, tables, or diagrams. |
| 6.7.1.7 | Proposals shall discuss how closely their submission relates to any international safety and reliability standards, and the potential impact of updates to those standards on the usefulness of the profile/model library. | The following standards are supported: FMEA: IEC60812 FTA: IEC61025 Functional Safety in Automotive: ISO 26262 RAAML follows the standard where it is explicit (for example ASIL levels in |
ISO 26262) and RAAML is adaptable where the standard allows it (for example occurrence, detectability and severity in FMEA).

Changes in the parent standards will have to be addressed in RAAML. However since RAAML allows easy extendability and redefinition, it is likely that minor changes to parent standards can be easily accommodated. Major changes in parent standards will require release of major versions of RAAML, but that is less likely since FTA, FMEA and ISO 26262 are mature standards (e.g. FMEA is used for more than 50 years in practice).

<table>
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<tr>
<th>6.7.1.8</th>
<th>Proposals may discuss how the profile can be used in conjunction with the UML Testing Profile [UTP] to facilitate test design for reliability testing and/or risk-based testing of safety-critical systems.</th>
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<td>It is decided to defer this to later versions of the specification.</td>
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- An explanation of how the proposal satisfies the specific requirements and (if applicable) requests stated in Section 6.

### 6.5 Mandatory requirement

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<th><strong>6.5.1.2</strong></th>
<th>Proposals shall be compatible with the ReqIF specification and the relationship between ReqIF and SysML.</th>
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<tr>
<td>The specification extends SysML, meaning it is compatible with ReqIF. Requirements created as a result of safety and reliability analysis are either SysML requirements or extended SysML requirements which makes them compatible with the ReqIF standard.</td>
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<td>6.5.1.3</td>
<td>Proposals shall support traceability from safety and reliability elements to relevant SysML and/or UML elements.</td>
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<td>6.5.1.4</td>
<td>The profile/model library shall be extensible to be used in any domain with safety and/or reliability concerns.</td>
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<td>6.5.1.5</td>
<td>The profile/model library shall include suitable diagrams for displaying the safety and reliability information and related system information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.5.1.6</td>
<td>The profile/model library shall include support for displaying safety and reliability information in tabular views.</td>
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<tr>
<td>6.5.1.7</td>
<td>Proposals shall include the capability for model transformations to extract safety and reliability information and relevant system information from the model. The method of performing these model transformations need not be specified.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6.5.1.8 Proposals shall include the capability to model properties of safety- and reliability-related elements, such as probabilities and severities.

| Standard UML/SysML mechanisms are being used and UML properties/SysML value properties can be used to describe various quantitative attributes of situations. Provided libraries define the standard set of these properties. |

6.5.2 Specification of safety information

6.5.2.1 Proposals shall provide modeling support for safety aspects relevant to one or more of the following domains: aerospace, automotive, medical, railways.

| ISO 26262 | ISO 26262 packages provides support for safety analysis in automotive. |

6.5.2.2 Proposals shall comply with the existing safety standard(s) relevant and applicable to the selected domain. Proposals shall choose, at their discretion, whether or not to provide complete coverage of the standard(s).

| FMEA | The following standards are supported: FMEA: IEC60812 FTA: IEC61025 Functional Safety in Automotive: ISO 26262 |

6.5.2.3 Proposals shall support the assignment of the integrity levels to safety-related information, including SysML elements. For example, the SIL concept from IEC 61508 [IEC61508]. Common SysML specification practice shall be obeyed.


ISO 26262 library and profile provides means to specify SIL.

6.5.3 Specification of reliability information

6.5.3.1 Support for Fault Tree Analysis

6.5.3.1.1 Proposals shall include modeling elements, relations, additional notations, and diagrams to allow the specification of a Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) as defined in IEC 61025 [IEC61025].

| FTA | FTA library and profile defines modeling elements and relations for Fault Tree Analysis. SysML IBD diagram is used for notation. |

6.5.3.1.2 Proposals shall provide a method to mark a FTA as complete or incomplete.

| UndevelopedEvent Undeveloped [Element] | The specification provides UndevelopedEvent library element and UndevelopedEvent stereotype to mark an FTA as incomplete. |

6.5.3.2 Support for Failure Mode and Effects Analysis

6.5.3.2.1 Proposals shall include modeling elements, relations, diagrams, and tabular views to allow the specification of the Failure Mode.

<p>| FMEA | Modeling elements and relationships for FMEA and FMECA are defined in the FMEA package. Section 7.3 specifies how |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>6.5.3.2.2</th>
<th>Proposals shall provide a method to mark a FMEA/FMECA as complete or incomplete.</th>
<th>Undeveloped [Element]</th>
<th>The Undeveloped stereotype is used for marking incomplete FMEA/FMECA.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### 6.5.4 Support for model transformations

| 6.5.4.1 | Proposals shall include support for transforming the combined system/safety/reliability model such that the safety/reliability information and relevant system information can be extracted in a structured format for use with external tools. [Note: Model transformation in this context refers to APIs for import/export of model data, import/export of XML and other structured formats, and diagram interchange.] | As information in the model corresponds to safety and reliability standards and it is represented in elements based on UML/SysML, files in UML XMI format can be imported and exported. OMG QVT could be used for transformations. |
| 6.5.4.2 | Proposals shall include support for reversing the transform specified in item 6.5.4.1 such that the results of processing by external tools can be imported into the model, retaining the structure and completeness of the information. | As information in the model corresponds to safety and reliability standards and it is represented in elements based on UML/SysML, data can be imported to the model to build corresponding structures. XMI can be used to import/export data from external tools. |
| 6.5.4.3 | The model transformations specified in items 6.5.4.1 and 6.5.4.2 shall be deterministic and repeatable. | Data exchange through UML XMI format is repeatable and deterministic. |

### 6.5.5 Support for argument specification

| 6.5.5.1 | Proposals shall include support for specifying safety assurance case arguments. | GSN | GSN profile defines stereotypes for specifying safety assurance case arguments. |
| 6.5.5.2 | Proposals shall include support for representing safety assurance case arguments in a visual manner. | GSN | UML class diagram is used for representing GSN models. |
| 6.5.5.3 | The support for safety assurance case argument specification shall allow specification of safety goals, strategies for achieving the goals, evidence provided by the system model or to be provided during development for achieving | Goal [Class] Strategy [Class] Justification [Class] InContextOf [Dependency] ContextStatement [Class] | Stereotypes of the GSN profile (see the cell on the left) provide necessary support. References to external sources can be captured in the model as a comment or by other element. |
those goals, and context from the system model and external sources (such as safety standards and regulations) for all of the above.

| SupportedBy [Dependency] | Supplier of SupportedBy relationship can point to non-GSN concept (e.g. a comment). |

6.5.4 Proposals shall include support for displaying, in a single diagram, the derivation of one safety goal and the related assurance case information.

| SupportedBy [Dependency] | GSN support is provided by a profile whose stereotypes extend classes and dependencies, thus all GSN elements can be displayed in a single UML Class or SysML BDD diagram. |

6.5.5 Proposals shall include support for specifying modular safety assurance case arguments.

| Goal [Class] Strategy [Class] SupportedBy [Dependency] Justification [Class] | Having assurance case specified as a collection of model elements facilitates reuse by allowing references from one argument to another and to the goal. |

6.5.6 Support for fault modeling

6.5.6.1 Proposals shall include support for modeling faults in system elements. [Note: explicit modeling of faults is intended to support additional automated analysis of faults beyond the FTA and FMEA/FMECA support required by 6.5.3.]


6.5.6.2 Proposals shall allow the modeling of the propagation of faults from source elements to other elements.

| FTAElement DysfunctionalEvent AbstractCause AbstractEffect AbstractFailureMode AbstractEvent AbstractFMEAItem FMEAItem | Concept of fault is defined by the usage in the scenario – what is an effect at the lower level, can be treated as a fault in the upper level in the error propagation chain. |

6.5.6.3 The fault modeling features shall be integrated with the FTA and FMEA/FMECA modeling support.

| FTA elements and FMEA cause, failure mode, and effects are inherited from concepts in the General concepts library providing common denominator, and thus can be integrated. |
### 6.5.6.4
Proposals shall support the modeling of the context in which a fault occurs.

**RelevantTo**
[Dependency]

**RelevantTo** provides system context. Enclosing scenario provides situational context.

### 6.5.6.5
Proposals shall support the modeling of the connection between faults and their results (such as harms caused).

**Association:**
- Activation
  - fault:AbstractCause - error:DysfunctionalEvent

**Association:**
- ErrorPropagation
  - from:Error:DysfunctionalEvent - to:Error:DysfunctionalEvent

**Association:**
- ErrorRealization
  - error:DysfunctionalEvent - failure:DysfunctionalEvent

See 6.5.6.1 and 6.5.6.2.

### 6.5.6.6
Proposals shall support the modeling of the connection between faults and safety goals/measures directed at them.

**Detection**
[Dependency]

**Prevention**
[Dependency]

**Mitigation**
[Dependency]

**Recommendation**
[Dependency]

The relationships in the cell on the left are “downstream” relationships allowing modeling of the connection between any kind of situation (including faults) and safety goals/measures.

### 6.6 Non-mandatory features

#### 6.6.1.1
The profile/model library may allow use with pure UML models.

The proposal requires SysML.

#### 6.6.1.2
Proposals may provide direct support for additional safety/reliability analysis methods, for example a hazard and operability study (HAZOP) [HAZOP].

The proposal does not provide support for HAZOP.

#### 6.6.1.3
Proposals may provide support for domains with safety concerns in addition to the domain(s) chosen in compliance with 6.5.2.1

STPA

STPA support is added in addition to other domains.

#### 6.6.1.4
Some concepts of safety may be common to other dependability-related fields. Proposals may be structured such that these concepts are reusable by other profiles.

Core

General

The core and general package is targeted for methodologists aimed at providing support for additional safety domains (see section 9.1 and 9.2).

#### 6.6.1.5
Proposals may provide a mapping from the safety assurance case model included in the profile/model library to the SACM version 2 meta-model [SACM2].

The mapping is not provided by this proposal, however proposal includes GSN. Details of the of the mapping between GSN elements and SACM maintained by the Safety Critical Systems Club (SCSC) at the following URL:

https://scsc.uk/scsc-141B

http://www.goalstructuringnotation. info/gsn-metamodel

**Commented [AA2]: RAAML-51**
6.6.1.6 Proposals may use SACM version 2 to provide the support required by section 6.5.5.

The proposal does not use SACM version 2.

- If adopting the submission requires making changes to already-adopted OMG specifications, include a list of those changes in a clearly-labelled subsection in Section 0. Identify exactly which version(s) of which OMG specification(s) shall be amended, and include the list of precise wording changes that shall be made to that specification.

No changes in other OMG specifications are necessary.
1. Scope

1.1 Introduction

There are two parts to this specification, one being normative and another informative. The normative part is:

- The Risk Analysis and Assessment Modeling Language (RAAML) Library and Profile (this document) defines concepts and relationships for capturing safety and reliability aspects of a system in the library and profile form.

The informative part is:

- The RAAML Example Model, Annex A (see document ad/2020-11-01), which illustrates practical usages of RAAML.

1.2 RAAML Background

Model-Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) is gaining popularity in organizations creating complex systems where it is crucial to collaborate in a multi-disciplinary environment. SysML, being one of the key MBSE components, has a good foundation for capturing requirements, architecture, constraints, views and viewpoints. However, SysML does not provide the constructs to capture safety and reliability information in the system model. A group of industry experts at the OMG has been working since 2016 to define a new specification providing the necessary capabilities.

The need for a standardized UML profile/library for addressing safety and reliability aspects emerged long ago. Working group members have seen multiple commercial-grade model-based safety and reliability solution implementations being developed during the recent years and successfully used in practice. While the various safety and reliability implementations may fit the needs for a specific purpose, there are many instances where information needs to be traced and shared across multiple organizations. These inconsistent model-based solutions prohibit direct model sharing between organizations and across the various tools. One of the key goals for the working group is to reconcile these different approaches to alleviate the industry from repeatedly formulating safety and reliability constructs in their tools. The specification provides the modeling capabilities for tool vendors to build safety and reliability modeling tools that provide traditional representations (e.g. trees, tables, etc.) while using a modern model-based approach.

This RAAML 1.0 specification defines extensions to SysML needed to support safety and reliability analysis. It describes:

- the core concepts and shows how the simple concepts are powerful enough to unite all safety and reliability information across a variety of analysis methods
- the approach to automating several safety and reliability analyses, which is built on leveraging existing SysML functionalities to ensure that the profile and library is usable with existing tooling
- specific safety and reliability analysis methods and application domains that are supported
  - Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA)
  - Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)
  - Systems Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA)
  - Goal Structuring Notation (GSN)
  - ISO 26262 Road Vehicles - Functional Safety
- extension mechanisms that are typically needed by the industry to apply the specification in practice

1.3 Intended Usage

The RAAML specification provides the foundation for conducting various safety and quality engineering activities including safety and reliability analysis methods. Besides the method support, linkages to the SysML model-of-interest are provided, enabling integration with and traceability to the analyses. The specification can be used for modeling safety
and reliability aspects directly in the model or as a standard language to import and export from external safety and reliability tools.

The organization of RAAML facilitates tailoring the methodologies to specific engineering domains and industries to support the various assessment and certification agencies.

1.4 Related Documents

The specification is delivered as a set of related documents. The primary normative document is this document, while a set of additional machine-readable documents is provided to specify the UML profiles and model libraries, specified by this standard.

For each safety/reliability domain, supported by this standard (FMEA, FTA, ISO-26262 and STPA) there is a pair of profile and library.

In addition to that there is a pair of profile and library for the concepts used in multiple domains – General; and a pair of profile and library for the very core concepts that might be useful for the implementers of other standards in the safety/reliability domain.

GSN stands separately, as it is an add-on, which can be used with any of the aforementioned domains for additional substantiation of the safety models. It consists of just the profile; no library is necessary. [The GSN profile only covers the GSN version 2 standard core notation.]

Non-normative examples document is also provided, illustrating how to apply RAAML for capturing safety and reliability data.

Table 1.1 – Table of Related Documents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Document Number</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>File Name</th>
<th>Normative</th>
<th>Machine Readable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ad/2020-07-05</td>
<td>Core portion of the RAAML</td>
<td>CoreRAAML.xmi</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ad/2020-07-06</td>
<td>Library portion of the RAAML</td>
<td>CoreRAAMLLib.xmi</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>ad/2020-07-08</td>
<td>General portion, shared across domains of the RAAML</td>
<td>GeneralRAAML.xmi</td>
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<td>Y</td>
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<tr>
<td>ad/2020-07-09</td>
<td>General Library portion, shared across domains of the RAAML</td>
<td>GeneralRAAMLLib.xmi</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ad/2020-07-10</td>
<td>Goal Structuring Notation profile</td>
<td>GSN.xmi</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ad/2020-07-11</td>
<td>FMEA portion of the RAAML</td>
<td>FMEA.xmi</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ad/2020-07-12</td>
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<td>FMEALib.xmi</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>FTA.xmi</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>ad/2020-07-14</td>
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<td>FTALib.xmi</td>
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<tr>
<td>ad/2020-07-15</td>
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<td>ISO26262.xmi</td>
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<tr>
<td>ad/2020-07-16</td>
<td>ISO26262 Functional Safety Standard Library portion of the RAAML</td>
<td>ISO26262Lib.xmi</td>
<td>Y</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>ad/2020-07-17</td>
<td>STPA (Systems Theoretic Process Analysis) portion of the RAAML</td>
<td>STPA.xmi</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ad/2020-07-18</td>
<td>STPA (Systems Theoretic Process Analysis) Library portion of the RAAML</td>
<td>STPALib.xmi</td>
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<td>Y</td>
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</table>

Commented [AA3]: RAAML-56
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>id/2020-11-04</th>
<th>Risk Analysis and Assessment Modeling Language 1.0 Examples</th>
<th>OMG RAAML Examples 1.0.docx</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>id/2020-12-06</td>
<td>Original Cameo Systems Modeler file to produce XML files for RAAML</td>
<td>RAAML Libraries and Profiles.mdzip</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Commented [PK(4)]: Editorial change to remove model file listed as it is not on the published OMG page.
2. Conformance

RAAML specifies two types of conformance.

- Type 1 Conformance: RAAML model interchange conformance. A tool demonstrating model interchange conformance can import and export conformant XMI for all valid RAAML models.
- Type 2 Conformance: RAAML View specification conformance. A tool demonstrating view specification conformance shall implement the views specified in RAAML specification.

A tool vendor may choose to implement one method supported by the specification (FMEA, FTA, STPA, GSN or ISO 26262) and claim conformance to it.
3. References

3.1 Normative References

The following normative documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this specification. For dated references, subsequent amendments to, or revisions of, any of these publications do not apply.

3.2 OMG Documents (Normative References)

- XMI Metadata Interchange (XMI), 2.5.1, June 2015, https://www.omg.org/spec/XMI

3.3 Other Normative References

- GSN metamodel mapping to SACM, https://scsc.uk/file/go/GSN_metamodelV2-2-1210.pdf [accessed on October 7, 2021]

3.4 Informative References

4. Acknowledgements

The following companies and organizations submitted or supported parts of the original version of this standard:

Industry
- Dassault Systemes [submitter]
- Ford Motor Company [submitter]
- The Aerospace Corporation

Government
- NASA/Jet Propulsion Laboratory
- Commissariat à l’énergie atomique
- German Aerospace Center
- National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology (AIST)

Vendors
- No Magic owned by Dassault Systemes

Academia
- Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Liaisons
- Gesellschaft für Systems Engineering [submitter]
- MACE
- Assystem

The following persons were members of the team that designed and wrote this International Standard: Achim Weiss, Andreas Knapp, Andrius Armonas, Amelisa Sturgeon, Axel Berres, Christian Lalitsch-Schneider, Christoph Barchanski, Christopher Davey, Damun Mollahassani, Dave Banham, Edith Holland, Geoffrey Biggs, George Walley, Ilse Adamek, Jean-François Castet, JIanlin Shi, John Thomas, Kyle Post, Laura Hart, Manfred Koethe, Mark Sampson, Matthias Nagorni, Myron Hecht, Nataliya Yakymets, Rajiv Murali, Regis Casteran, Sarra Yako, Stephan Boutenko, Thomas Krynicki, Tim Weilkiens, Tomas Juknevičius, Vanessa Sehon, Victor Arcos Barraquero, Yan Liu.

For the final edition of the standard, the following people contributed: Andrius Armonas, Axel Berres, Dave Banham, Kyle Post, George Walley, Tomas Juknevičius.
### 5. Terms and Definitions

New terms and definitions have been required to create this specification. They are listed in the table below.

**Table 5.1 – Description of terms and definitions used in this specification**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Situation</td>
<td>A situation describes a set of situation occurrences of some type. The system, place, time and state parameters are described by classifiers rather than individual descriptions. A situation occurrence is a system being in a given place at given time and in a given state. For example, “Boeing 747 with S/N 12305 is being refueled at Gate 7 of Amsterdam Schiphol at 11:45 on Monday, 30th of July 2018.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Causality</td>
<td>Identifies cause-effect relationship between two situations. Causality could be direct (non-conditional), conditional, probabilistic or any other inter-situation relationship, defined by the user. Multiple situations can cause one situation and vice versa - one situation can cause multiple other situations. For example, a car in frequent contact with salt, causing safety-critical parts to corrode, which causes leaks in the brake line, causing the brakes to fail, causing a car accident, causing a passenger injury.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relevant To</td>
<td>The Relevant To relationship is used to link situations to system model elements to provide context and relevance for the Situation. For example, in an insulin pump, a Situation where the insulin pump cannot be charged would be related to the main battery element in the system model.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controlling Measure</td>
<td>A measure taken to address (mitigate severity, reduce probability of occurrence, increase probability of detection) a potential or real adverse situation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6. Acronyms and Abbreviations

For the purposes of this specification, the following List of acronyms and abbreviations apply.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ASIL</td>
<td>Automotive Safety Integrity Level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DET</td>
<td>Detectability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMEA</td>
<td>Failure Mode and Effect Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FTA</td>
<td>Fault Tree Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSN</td>
<td>Goal Structuring Notation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HARA</td>
<td>Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAZOP</td>
<td>A hazard and operability study</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MBSE</td>
<td>Model-Based Systems Engineering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISO</td>
<td>International Standardization Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCC</td>
<td>Occurrence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OMG</td>
<td>Object Management Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAAML</td>
<td>Risk Analysis and Assessment Modeling Language</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPN</td>
<td>Risk priority number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEV</td>
<td>Severity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STPA</td>
<td>Systems Theoretic Process Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SysML</td>
<td>Systems Modeling Language</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAF</td>
<td>Universal Architecture Framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UML</td>
<td>Unified Modeling Language</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7. Additional Information (non-normative)

7.1 Language Architecture

The RAAML specification reuses a subset of UML 2.5.1 and SysML 1.6 and provides additional extensions needed to address the Safety and Reliability for UML RFP (ad/2017-03-05) requirements. Those requirements form the basis for this specification. This document specifies the language architecture in terms of UML 2.5.1 and SysML 1.6. It explains the design principles and how they are applied to implement RAAML.

7.2 Philosophy

The RAAML working group uses a library approach heavily with a light UML profile support. Using model libraries has several significant benefits compared with implementing everything in a profile:

• It makes use of the full UML structural modeling capabilities instead of just using metamodeling, which are further limited by the UML prescriptions for stereotyping. The tools with good support for UML/SysML class and composite structure diagrams can make use of their existing generic functionality for modeling safety and reliability aspects of a system.

• It enables end users to extend the libraries and profiles provided by the specification because safety and reliability practices vary across domains (automotive, aerospace, nuclear, etc.) and organizations.

• Finally, it is typically easier to make modifications and extensions to model libraries than to profiles, as extensions occur at lower metalevels.

The RAAML development uses a model-driven approach. A simple description of the work process is:

• The specification is generated from the UML model used to describe RAAML. This approach allows the working group members to concentrate on architecture issues rather than documentation production. The UML tool automatically maintains consistency.

7.3 Principles of Creating, Editing, and Displaying of Composite Situations in Diagrammatic and Tabular Views

This standard uses UML/SysML structural modeling capabilities to capture safety and reliability data. The safety and reliability data are captured by a collection of scenarios and situations as shown in

Figure 7.1
Figure 7.2
Complex scenarios can be built by inheriting from other scenarios and composing other situations as parts. Scenarios defined in libraries of this standard provide template scenarios from which to be inherited from. This way multilevel composite situations can be built.

- Situations are UML Classes, SysML Blocks.
- Scenario steps are captured using SysML parts - UML Properties with aggregation set to composite, and type set to sub-situation (which is UML Class, SysML Block); usually an association is also created for this property.
- Situation attribute values are captured using value properties - UML properties with type describing possible values (which is UML DataType, SysML ValueType) with the value specified in the defaultValue field.

When inheriting from library situations the properties of the user defined situations redefine or subset the properties of the library situation.

Note that user’s model can have additional properties (including sub situations, and attributes and other kinds of properties), beyond those defined in the library. However, from the viewpoint of this standard, they carry user-specific extensions and are not relevant.

Situation in the user model can be inherited from the situation in the standard library indirectly through intermediate situations. This can be used to capture generality/specificity between the real-world situations being described and introduce user-specific library extensions.

Creation and Displaying of situation and scenario models can be done in diagrams, usual for UML/SysML tools, e.g., Class or Block Definition and Composite Structure or Internal Block diagrams. This suits rather well for the safety and reliability domains, which are used to graphical information input such as Fault Tree Analysis. However, users of many safety and reliability domains such as FMEA, STPA or ISO26262 are accustomed to tabular information input. Therefore, the principles of how these models can be described in a tabular format are explained in section §7.3.2.

### 7.3.1 Diagrammatic Situation Specification

Taking the operational situation TypicalAutomotiveSituation from ISO26262 library as an example, here is how the situation “Highway Driving Straight as Speed” would be defined in a diagram.

The ISO26262 library shown in (Figure 7.2) stipulates, that TypicalAutomotiveSituation is described by specifying trafficAndPeople, vehicleUsage, roadCondition, location, and environmentalCondition sub-situations and an Exposure attribute.
Figure 7.2 – Typical Automotive Situation definition in the ISO26262 Library

The “Highway Driving Straight at Speed” situation, in the user model (Figure 7.3) specifies, that Exposure level is E4 (chosen from the level enumeration defined in the library), trafficAndPeople is “Traffic Free Flow” (another situation defined by the user or coming from a library of operational conditions), the vehicleUsage is “Driving at Speed”, location is “City Roads” and “Highway” (two values), while roadCondition and environmentalCondition are left unspecified.

Note that:

a) The scenario and sub-situations are inherited from the situations defined in the library.

b) Exposure, which is a value attribute (i.e., an attribute, whose type is not a situation, but some data type instead a numeric or enumerated value) is specified by redefining a library attribute and specifying a default value.

c) The trafficAndPeople and vehicleUsage attributes, which specify sub-situations, are redefining corresponding library attributes, and specifying a different type. The normal rules for UML attribute redefinition apply, i.e., redefined attribute type must be narrower than the parent attribute type.

d) The roadCondition and environmentalCondition are not redefined, therefore they are left unspecified. The attributes type remains the maximally wide, library type (“RoadCondition” and “EnvironmentalCondition” library types)

e) Two values are being specified for location attribute. Therefore, two attributes location1 and location2 are defined in the situation. These attributes are sub-setting the parent location attribute instead of redefining, as in case 3 above. Note that, according to UML rules, names of the sub-setting attributes are not regulated and therefore they can be anything. However, it is strongly recommended, that the tool vendor adopt some intuitive, user-friendly naming scheme like parent_attribute_name+number.
7.3.2 Tabular Situation Specification

The same TypicalAutomotiveSituation, defined by the ISO26262 library and again shown in Figure 7.2, can also define a table format for entering automotive situation user model data in a tabular format.

The table for specifying typical automotive situations comprises the main Name column for defining the situation itself, plus one column per each attribute. A table for typical automotive situations, as defined by TypicalAutomotiveSituation library situation class would then have columns for Exposure, vehicleUsage, trafficAndPeople, location, roadCondition, and environmentalCondition. The column’s name does not need to follow library attributes strictly. They can be beautified, for the sake of user-friendliness. It is important that when the user adds or edits rows in this table, the underlying model data must be created in accordance to the chapters above.

The table below (Table 7.1) shows the same “Highway Driving Straight at Speed” situation defined in tabular format as in the previous chapter. Therefore, the underlying UML model structures must be the same as those shown in diagrammatic format (Figure 7.1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Exposure</th>
<th>Vehicle Usage</th>
<th>Traffic and People</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Road Condition</th>
<th>Environmental Condition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Highway Driving Straight at Speed</td>
<td>E4</td>
<td>Driving at Speed</td>
<td>Traffic Free Flow</td>
<td>Highway, City Roads</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A typical safety and reliability domain such as ISO26262 will then use multiple tables, one for each of the structures defined in the library for that domain.

The tables can have additional columns, at the vendor’s discretion, for specifying additional data about the situation, being described in a row. An example of such data could be a description (realized by e.g., UML Comment) of the situation.

Sub-classing by using a generalization relationship between situations can be expressed in tabular format, using hierarchical indented text in table row. In the above table, the “Highway Driving Straight at Speed, Dangerous Conditions” situation is a subclass of the “Highway Driving Straight at Speed” situation. Therefore, a generalization relationship is created between the two in the model. Note that the more specific situation can narrow down the field types of the parent. In this example, the sub-classing situation provides additional data for road and environmental conditions by using attributes and redefining attributes from the library. Using UML redefinition overrides the parent exposure to E3. The vehicle use, traffic and people, and location settings are inherited from the parent and do not require additional model elements.

In case of multiple composition levels between the situations defined in the library, it is possible to show multi-level composite situation data in a single table instead of the multiple interrelated tables by using hierarchical grouped column approach.

An example of using this hierarchical approach is shown for the main situation - HazardousEvent - in the library for ISO26262 standard (Figure 7.4):
malfunctioningBehavior and operationalSituation. OperationalSituation is composed of a multitude of operational condition sub-situations vehicleUsage, trafficAndPeople, location, roadCondition, and environmentalCondition.

If tabular format is used for entering this information, there could be 3 simple tables:

1. Table for operational situations, having columns for vehicleUsage, trafficAndPeople, location, roadCondition, and environmentalCondition.
2. Table for accident scenarios, having columns for malfunctioningBehavior and operationalSituation.
3. Table for hazardous events, having columns for hazard, systemLevelEffect, vehicleLevelEffect, and accidentScenario.

Alternatively, all this data can be entered in a single table, as shown in Table 7.2:

1. Table for hazardous events, having columns for hazard, systemLevelEffect, vehicleLevelEffect, and an accidentScenario.

1.1. Accident scenario is a column group, comprising of columns malfunctioningBehavior and operationalSituation.

1.1.1. Operational situation is a column group comprising of columns vehicleUsage, trafficAndPeople, location, roadCondition, and environmentalCondition.

Table 7.2 – Hazardous Event Table with Grouped Columns

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Hazard</th>
<th>Accident Scenario</th>
<th>Malfunctioning Behavior</th>
<th>Operational Situation</th>
<th>System Level Effect</th>
<th>Vehicle Level Effect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Vehicule Usage</td>
<td>Traffic and People</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Road Condition</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note – some columns (like ASIL level, or names of accident scenario, operational situation) have been skipped in the table for compactness reasons; in the actual tool that is not limited by page width they would be present.
8. Diagram Legend (non-normative)

The section 9 is comprised of diagrams that represent elements from the RAAML 1.0 specification. The diagrams are color-coded to help the reader to understand the model easier. Please refer to the legend in Figure 8.1 to understand the diagrams.

Diagram shapes color-coded using gray color represent elements belonging to other packages than the one being specified in the current diagram.

Diagram shapes color-coded using white color represent elements belonging to packages that are being specified in the current diagram.

Figure 8.1 – Legend of color codes

An example in Figure 8.2 demonstrates how legends are used. Elements that belong to FTA (Fault Tree Analysis) library will be represented in white color in diagrams which belong to FTA method specification. Other elements like DysfunctionalEvent will be represented in gray since they belong to the General part of the specification.

Figure 8.2 – An example of using a legend
9. Risk Analysis and Assessment Modeling Language (RAAML) Library and Profile

The RAAML library and profile imports the entire SysML profile. The use of this import is intended to provide more seamless integration with system modeling using SysML and to be able to fully leverage the capabilities of SysML.

9.1 Core

The core concepts domain model is depicted in Figure 9.1. The submission team uses this domain model to derive the CoreLibrary and CoreProfile packages (specified in sections 9.1.1 and 9.1.2 respectively). The other libraries and profiles of the specification are based on the CoreLibrary and CoreProfile packages, and contain elements and relationships representing concepts common across safety and reliability analysis methods.

Figure 9.1 – Core concepts domain model

The central element in the core concepts domain model is the “Situation” concept. A situation occurrence is defined as a system being in a given place at given time and in a given state. For example, “Boeing 747 with S/N 12305 is being refueled at Gate 7 of Amsterdam Schiphol at 11:45 on Monday, 30th of July 2018.” An elementary situation is a classifier. It describes a set of situation occurrences of some type. The system, place, time and state parameters are described by classifiers rather than individual descriptions.

When describing a situation, some of its parameters may be omitted if the situation does not need to be specific with respect to that parameter. For example:

- Fire in the engine compartment of the ship.
- Finger injury of the circular saw operator.

Different Situations can have generalization/specialization relationships between them. Generalization between two situations expresses the subset/superset relationship between the sets of occurrences that these situations represent. For example, “bone fracture” may be defined as a subtype of “Injury”.

Situations can have quantitative attributes, such as probability of occurrence. These are defined using the DependabilityAttribute class. Quantitative attributes can be related to each other and to attributes of the system by formulæ using the AttributeRelation class. Formulæ can be expressed in any language that the modeling tool can compute, including OCL and other executable languages. For example:

\[
\text{FMEAItem.RiskPriorityNumber} = \text{Cause.Occurrence} \times \text{FailureMode.Detectability} \times \text{Effect.Severity}
\]

Different Situations can be associated with each other using the Causality class, expressing semantic relationships between situations such as simple causality, conditional causality, and probabilistic connections. These relations may also have quantitative attributes, such as the probability of occurrence of the “to” situation if the “from” situation occurs. For example, a car in frequent contact with salt, causing safety-critical parts to corrode, which causes leaks in the brake line, causing the brakes to fail, causing a car accident, causing a passenger injury.

A non-elementary situation (the “Composition” relationship in Figure 9.1) is a concept encompassing multiple elementary situations: a single system or combination of several systems in a mutable layout, flowing in time through a sequence of states. The choice of whether to use a composite situation with parts described by substitutions, or to use a
single situation, is at the discretion of the modeler. It depends on the modeler's needs, such as the depth of analysis required.

Situations can violate requirements, constraints defined/prescribed for the system, or other specifications describing how the system should operate. For example, a Situation where the system can-not detect glucose level violates the requirement that “the insulin pump must work for 1 week without the need to replace batteries”.

The RelevantTo relationship is used to link situations to system model elements to provide context and relevance for the Situation. For example, in the aforementioned insulin pump, a Situation where the insulin pump cannot be charged would be related to the main battery element in the system model.

Situations can be mitigated, detected, and prevented via the ControllingAction. The use of this relationship introduces new safety requirements.

It was decided early on to reuse as many concepts from the SysML language as possible and only add concepts that are missing in SysML to address safety and reliability aspects of systems. This avoids duplication between two languages that will typically be used together. It also enables tool vendors to implement the new profile and library without requiring new tool capabilities, assuming SysML is supported. This leads to a very small library and profile on top of SysML/UML being sufficient to cover all core concepts. The core domain model is covered by SysML/UML concepts as shown in Table 1. The CoreLibrary package is specified in section 9.1.1. The CoreProfile package is shown in 9.1.2. The Core profile and library are used by all domain-specific methods in the specification.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Core concept</th>
<th>SysML/UML concept</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Situation</td>
<td>A specialization of a Block in SysML and a new stereotype «Situation »</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DependabilityAttribute</td>
<td>SysML Value Property</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AttributeRelation</td>
<td>SysML Constraint Block</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generalization</td>
<td>UML Generalization relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Composition</td>
<td>UML Composition relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violates</td>
<td>A stereotyped UML dependency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RelevantTo</td>
<td>A stereotyped UML dependency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Causality</td>
<td>An association/connector combination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ControllingAction</td>
<td>A stereotyped UML dependency</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9.1.1 Core::Core Library

AnySituation

Package: Core Library
isAbstract: Yes
Applied Stereotype: «Situation»

Description

AnySituation is the universal root of all situations. All situations inherit from AnySituation. A situation describes a set of situation occurrences of some type. The system, place, time and state parameters are described by classifiers rather than individual descriptions. A situation occurrence is a system being in a given place at given time and in a given state.

For example, “Boeing 747 with S/N 12305 is being refueled at Gate 7 of Amsterdam Schiphol at 11:45 on Monday, 30th of July 2018.”
Figure 9.2 - AnySituation

Attributes
from: AnySituation[0..*] (member end of Causality association)
to: AnySituation[0..*] (member end of Causality association)

Causality
Package: Core Library

Description
Universal root relationship between situations. All situation relationships inherit from this relationship. Identifies cause and effect relationship between two situations. Causality could be direct (non-conditional), conditional or probabilistic or any other inter-situation relationship, defined by the user. Multiple situations can cause one situation and vice versa - one situation can cause multiple other situations.

For example, a car in frequent contact with salt, causing safety-critical parts to corrode, which causes leaks in the brake line, causing the brakes to fail, causing a car accident, causing a passenger injury.

Figure 9.3 - Causality

Association ends
from: AnySituation[0..*] (member end of Causality association)
to: AnySituation[0..*] (member end of Causality association)

9.1.2 Core::Core Profile

Situation
Package: Core Profile
isAbstract: No
Generalization: Block
**Extension:** Class

**Description**
A situation is a SysML v1.6 Block. The situation reuses the following functionality from the Block concept: generalizations, parts, value properties, and Parametrics. The situation stereotype is only needed to distinguish situations from other types of blocks. See AnySituation for the definition of a situation concept.

**Figure 9.4 - Situation**

**RelevantTo**

**Package:** Core Profile

**isAbstract:** No

**Generalization:** DirectedRelationshipPropertyPath

**Extension:** Dependency

**Description**
The RelevantTo relationship is used to link situations to system model elements to provide context and relevance for the Situation. For example, in an insulin pump, a Situation where the insulin pump cannot be charged would be related to the main battery element in the system model. The RelevantTo relationship reuses the following functionality from the DirectedRelationshipPropertyPath concept: targetContext and targetPropertyPath.

**Figure 9.5 - RelevantTo**

**Constraints**

[1] ClientIsSituation  
-- client of the RelevantTo must be a Situation  
Situation.allInstances().base_Class->includesAll(self.base_Dependency.client)

**ControllingMeasure**

**Package:** Core Profile

**isAbstract:** Yes
**Generalization:** DirectedRelationshipPropertyPath  
**Extension:** Dependency

**Description**
A measure taken to address (mitigate severity, reduce probability of occurrence, increase probability of detection) a potential or real adverse situation.

![Diagram of DirectedRelationshipPropertyPath and Dependency](image1)

**Figure 9.6 - ControllingMeasure**

**Attributes**
- `affects : Property[0..*]`  
  Indicates that this controlling measure influences (typically improves) a particular quantitative attribute of the situation.

**Constraints**
- [1] SupplierIsSituation  
  -- supplier of the ControllingMeasure must be a Situation  
  Situation.allInstances().base_Class->includesAll(self.base_Dependency.supplier)

**Violates**
- **Package:** Core Profile  
- **isAbstract:** No  
- **Extension:** Dependency

**Description**
The violates relationship indicates a situation where a system is violating a prescription (requirement, constraint, etc.). It is used to connect situations to requirements, design constraints and any other elements of system models which prescribe a characteristic of the system.

For example, a Situation where the insulin pump drains the battery in 3 days violates the requirement that “The system must work for 1 week without the need to replace batteries”.

![Diagram of Violates](image2)

**Figure 9.7 - Violates**
Constraints

[1] ClientIsSituation -- client of the Violates must be a Situation

Situation.allInstances().base_Class->includesAll(self.base_Dependency.client)

Constraints

IDCarrier

Package: ISO 26262 Profile

isAbstract: No

Extension: Element

Description

Additional stereotype for carrying human-readable identification data.

Figure 9.8 - IDCarrier

Attributes

id : String[1]

9.2 General

The specification includes a general safety and reliability package that extends the core package. It defines common concepts that are used or extended in the method- and domain-specific reliability and safety packages. The package provides a model library, specified in section 9.2.1, and a profile, specified in section 9.2.2.

The general concepts contained in this package can be used as-is to model the safety and reliability related aspects of a system. However, the intended purposes of the package are as follows.

1. Provide a common base for the method- and domain-specific reliability and safety modeling packages. The same concepts are used in a number of safety and reliability techniques (such as FMEA and FTA), so the role of this package is to prevent duplication of common concepts in other packages. This also enables movement of information between domains for cross-domain issues. This is particularly important as different domains may use the same concepts with different vocabulary. A common foundation provides a way to translate between these.

2. Provide traceability links between safety and reliability artefacts across the system life cycle. For example, the failure modes defined during Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment (HARA, defined in the ISO 26262 package) and in an FMEA could be traced and considered during an FTA.

3. Provide a foundation on which additional methods, techniques and domains with safety and reliability concerns not currently included in the profile can be built by users. For example, a tool vendor could build an additional package for the railway domain by building on the general safety and reliability foundation. This both reduces effort to introduce an additional domain and allows additional domain packages to be compatible with the existing specification content.

9.2.1 General::General Concepts Library

AbstractEvent

Package: General Concepts Library

isAbstract: Yes
Generalization: AnySituation
Applied Stereotype: «Situation»

Description
Anything that causes a change in a system under analysis or environment. Event has an identifiable starting point in time.

Figure 9.9 - AbstractEvent

Attributes
likelihood [1]
A placeholder attribute for indicating probability likelihood of occurrence of an event. It is intentionally left without a type. Method developers can derive more specialized ways to characterize probability likelihood.

AbstractCause
Package: General Concepts Library
isAbstract: Yes
Generalization: AbstractEvent
Applied Stereotype: «Situation»

Description
An AbstractCause is a precursor event that activates other events. The AbstractCause is a root class for all kinds of causes; method developers should derive from it more specific kinds of causes with specific types for occurrence property. One case is demonstrated in the Cause element that redefines the occurrence property of the AbstractCause with the type Real.
See the diagram GeneralConceptsLibrary.
See also: fault association end of the Activation association.
Figure 9.10 - AbstractCause

Attributes

occurrence : [1], redefines probability

A placeholder attribute without a type declared, for indicating how often
this situation occurs. It is a redefinition of probability.

premitigationOccurrences : [0..*]

A placeholder attribute for indicating how often this situation occurred
prior to mitigation. This property can have more than one value.

Cause

Package: General Concepts Library

isAbstract: Yes

Generalization: AbstractCause

Applied Stereotype: «Situations»

Description

A Cause is a specific implementation of AbstractCause that defines occurrence property with the type Real.
Figure 9.11 - Cause

Attributes
occurrence : Real[1], redefines occurrence  An attribute with the type Real, for indicating how often this situation occurs.
premitigationOccurrences : Real[0..*], redefines premitigationOccurrences  An attribute for indicating how often this situation occurred prior to mitigation. This property can have more than one value.

DysfunctionalEvent
Package: General Concepts Library
isAbstract: Yes
Generalization: AbstractEvent
Applied Stereotype: «Situation»

Description
An event whose occurrence can cause a dysfunctional behavior of a system or a part of the system.
The DysfunctionalEvent concept is a generalization of such concepts as failure, feared event, etc. that are considered in the domain-specific safety standards. It might be extended for introducing new safety and reliability methods and techniques.

Figure 9.12 - DysfunctionalEvent

AbstractFailureMode
Package: General Concepts Library
isAbstract: Yes
Generalization: UndesiredState
Applied Stereotype: «FailureModes»

Description
The manner in which a system or part of a system (e.g. functions, components, hardware, software, hardware parts, software units), can fail (ISO 26262-1:2018, definition 3.51, modified).

The AbstractFailureMode is a root class for all failure modes; method developers should derive more specific kinds of failure modes with specific types for the detectability property. One case is demonstrated in the FailureMode element that redefines the detectability property of the AbstractFailureMode with the type Real.

![AbstractFailureMode Diagram](image)

Figure 9.13 - AbstractFailureMode

Attributes
- detectability : [1]  
  A placeholder attribute without a type declared, for indicating how easy it is to detect this failure mode.
- premitigationDetectabilities : [0..*]  
  A placeholder attribute for indicating how easy it would have been to detect the situation with the previous design iteration. This property can have more than one value.

FailureMode
Package: General Concepts Library
isAbstract: Yes
Generalization: AbstractFailureMode
Applied Stereotype: «FailureModes»

Description
FailureMode is a specific implementation of AbstractFailureMode that defines the detectability property with the type Real.
A failure is an instance of a FailureMode.

![FailureMode Diagram](image)

Figure 9.14 - FailureMode

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Attributes
detectability : Real[1], redefines detectability
premitigationDetectabilities : Real[0..*], redefines premitigationDetectabilities

An attribute with the type Real, for indicating how easy it is to detect the situation.
An attribute for indicating how easy it would have been to detect the situation with the previous design iteration. This property can have more than one value.

AbstractEffect
Package: General Concepts Library
isAbstract: Yes
Generalization: DysfunctionalEvent
Applied Stereotype: «Situation»

Description
An AbstractEffect is a DysfunctionalEvent that is a result or a consequence of another Situation. The AbstractEffect is a root class for all effects; method developers should derive more specific kinds of effects with specific types for the severity property.
One case is demonstrated in the Effect element that redefines the severity property of the AbstractEffect with the type Real.
See the diagram GeneralConceptsLibrary.
See also: ErrorPropagation, ErrorRealization associations.

Figure 9.15 - AbstractEffect

Attributes
severity : [1]
premitigationSeverities : [0..*]

A placeholder attribute without a type declared, for indicating the estimate of the extent of harm.
A placeholder attribute for indicating the estimate of the extent of harm that would have resulted from the previous design iterations. This property can have more than one value.

Effect
Package: General Concepts Library
isAbstract: Yes
Generalization: AbstractEffect
Applied Stereotype: «Situation»

Description
An Effect is a specific implementation of AbstractEffect that defines the severity property with the type Real.
Figure 9.16 - Effect

Attributes

severity: Real[1], redefines severity

premitigationSeverities: Real[0..*], redefines premitigationSeverities

An attribute with the type Real, for indicating the estimate of the extent of harm.

An attribute for indicating the estimate of the extent of harm that would have resulted from the previous design iterations. This property stores more than one value.

Activation

Package: General Concepts Library

Generalization: Causality

Description

A causal relationship describing the propagation of the initial AbstractCause situation to the DysfunctionalEvent situation in the system.

Figure 9.17 - Activation
Association ends
error : DysfunctionalEvent[0..*]  
(member end of Activation association, redefines to)

fault : AbstractCause[0..*] (member end of Activation association, redefines from)

ErrorPropagation
Package: General Concepts Library
Generalization: Causality

Description
A causal relationship describing the propagation of errors (one error leading to another) throughout the system.

Figure 9.18 - ErrorPropagation

Association ends
toError : DysfunctionalEvent[0..*]  
(member end of ErrorPropagation association, redefines to)

fromError : DysfunctionalEvent[0..*] (member end of ErrorPropagation association, redefines from)

ErrorRealization
Package: General Concepts Library
Generalization: Causality

Description
A causal relationship describing the propagation of an error to a failure.
Figure 9.19 - ErrorRealization

Association ends

failure : DysfunctionalEvent[0..*] The resulting failure.
(member end of ErrorRealization association, redefines to)

type : DysfunctionalEvent[0..*] The predecessor error.
(member end of ErrorRealization association, redefines from)

HarmPotential

Package: General Concepts Library

isAbstract: Yes

Generalization: AnySituation

Applied Stereotype: «Situation»

Description

A state where there is the potential of harm. This includes all types of harm arising from malicious or non-malicious causes.

Figure 9.20 - HarmPotential

Hazard

Package: General Concepts Library

isAbstract: Yes

Generalization: HarmPotential

Applied Stereotype: «Situation»

Description

A potential source of harm (IEC 61508-4, 3.1.2). Source of harm is non-malicious.

The term includes danger to persons arising within a short time scale (for example, fire and explosion) and also those that have a long-term effect on a person’s health (for example, release of a toxic substance).
Figure 9.21 - Hazard

Scenario
Package: General Concepts Library
isAbstract: Yes
Generalization: AnySituation
Applied Stereotype: «Situation»

Description
A composite situation, consisting of multiple steps (that are themselves situations). Steps should have causal ordering, indicated by Causality relationships or sub-types thereof.

Figure 9.22 - Scenario

Attributes
scenarioStep : AnySituation[0..*] (member A situation which is a part of a bigger situation - scenario. end of association)

AbstractRisk
Package: General Concepts Library
isAbstract: Yes
Generalization: Scenario
Applied Stereotype: «Situation»

Description
An AbstractRisk is a Scenario - combination of harm potential (Hazard or Vulnerability), triggering event (AbstractEvent), and resulting harm (AbstractEffect). The AbstractRisk is a placeholder to enable modelers to specify methodology-specific kinds of risks.
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**Figure 9.23 - AbstractRisk**

Attributes

- **score**: Combination of the probability of occurrence of abstract event resulting from abstract harm and the severity of that harm (IEC 61508-4, 3.1.5, modified).
- **trigger**: AbstractEvent[0..*] (member end of association, subsets scenarioStep) Triggering event (AbstractEvent) which causes harm to materialize.
- **harm**: AbstractEffect[0..*] (member end of association, subsets scenarioStep) Resulting harm (AbstractEffect).
- **harmPotential**: HarmPotential[0..*] (member end of association, subsets scenarioStep) Pre-existing risk (HarmPotential).

**UndesiredState**

**Package**: General Concepts Library

**isAbstract**: Yes

**Generalization**: DysfunctionalEvent

**Applied Stereotype**: «Situation»

Description

An element's condition as a specific time which represents an unintended situation.

**Figure 9.24 - UndesiredState**

### 9.2.2 General::General Concepts Profile

**FailureMode**

**Package**: General Concepts Profile

**isAbstract**: No

**Generalization**: Situation

**Extension**: Class
Description
See FailureMode library class for the definition of a situation concept.
The FailureMode stereotype is only needed to distinguish FailureModes from other types of situations.

Figure 9.25 - FailureMode

Error
Package: General Concepts Profile
isAbstract: No
Generalization: Situation
Extension: Class

Description
The discrepancy between a computed, observed or measured value or condition and the true, specified or theoretically correct value or condition. [IEC 61508-4, 3.6.11].
The Error stereotype is needed to distinguish this type of situations.

Figure 9.26 - Error

Fault
Package: General Concepts Profile
isAbstract: No
Generalization: Situation
Extension: Class

Description
Abnormal condition that may cause a reduction in, or loss of, the capability of a functional unit to perform a required function. [IEC 61508-4, 3.6.1].
Abnormal or undesired condition that can cause an element or a system to fail. [ISO 26262-1:2018, 3.54, modified]
The Fault stereotype is needed to distinguish this type of situations.
**Figure 9.27 - Fault**

Detection

**Package**: General Concepts Profile

**isAbstract**: No

**Generalization**: ControllingMeasure

**Extension**: Dependency

**Description**
A kind of ControllingMeasure taken to increase probability of detecting the situation under analysis. In hardware these measures may include built-in diagnostic tests, or physical inspection and manual tests.

**Figure 9.28 - Detection**

Prevention

**Package**: General Concepts Profile

**isAbstract**: No

**Generalization**: ControllingMeasure

**Extension**: Dependency

**Description**
A kind of ControllingMeasure taken to reduce probability of occurrence of the situation under analysis.
Figure 9.29 - Prevention

Mitigation
Package: General Concepts Profile
isAbstract: No
Generalization: ControllingMeasure
Extension: Dependency

Description
A kind of ControllingMeasure taken to reduce severity of the situation under analysis.

Figure 9.30 - Mitigation

Recommendation
Package: General Concepts Profile
isAbstract: No
Generalization: ControllingMeasure
Extension: Dependency

Description
Recommendation is used to connect the situation to an action item.
An action item is normally a Requirement but it can be a less "strong" type of advice - comment, rationale, etc.
The requirement is further managed by the requirements management system - it can have responsible persons, due date, verification properties etc.
9.3 Methods::FMEA

The Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is a method of inspecting a system to analyze potential failures. Therefore, as many components, assemblies and subsystems as possible are examined in order to identify these failure modes in a system and their causes and effects.
The FMEA package contains all required elements to implement a Failure Model and Effects Analysis. Thus, for each item (e.g., component or function), the failure modes and their resulting effects on the rest of the system are defined in a SysML BDD and IBD.

9.3.1 Methods::FMEA::FMEALibrary

AbstractFMEAItem

Package: FMEALibrary
IsAbstract: Yes
Generalization: AbstractRisk
Applied Stereotype: «FMEAItem»

Description
An AbstractFMEAItem is a scenario (more specifically, AbstractRisk scenario) composed of a failure mode, (potentially multiple) cause(s) and effect(s). It stores assessed and mitigated risk priority numbers.

![Diagram of AbstractFMEAItem]

Attributes
- **RPN**: [1], redefines `score`
  - The risk priority number ranks the risk of the FMEA item. It is a specialization of AbstractRisk::score.
- **failureMode**: AbstractFailureMode[1] (member end of association, subsets scenarioStep)
  - Represents the failure mode which is reached if a system element fails.
- **cause**: AbstractCause[1..*] (member end of association, subsets scenarioStep)
  - Represents the cause of the failure of a system element.
- **finalEffect**: AbstractEffect[1..*] (member end of association, redefines harm)
  - Represents the effect which occurs on the system border.
- **previousRPNValues**: [0..*]
  - Represents the assessed risk priority number before mitigating the risk of a failure.
- **harmPotential**: HarmPotential[0] (member end of association, redefines harmPotential, subsets scenarioStep)
  - Pre-existing risk. Not used in FMEA method, therefore redefined in this library with multiplicity [0]
FMEAItem
Package: FMEALibrary
isAbstract: Yes
Generalization: AbstractFMEAItem
Applied Stereotype: FMEAItem

Description
A FMEAItem is a specialization of AbstractFMEAItem with the Real implementation of quantitative attributes.

Attributes
- finalEffect : Effect[1..*] (member end of association, redefines finalEffect)
- cause : Cause[1..*] (member end of association, redefines cause)
- RPN : Real[1], redefines RPN
- failureMode : FailureMode[1] (member end of association, redefines failureMode)
- calculation : RPNCalculation
- previousRPNValues : Real[0..*], redefines previousRPNValues

RPNCalculation
Package: FMEALibrary
isAbstract: No
Applied Stereotype: ConstraintBlock
Description
A formula for RPN calculation. This implementation uses multiplication of Occurrence x Detectability x Severity to calculate RPN.

Attributes
RPN : Risk priority number
SEV : Severity
OCC : Real
Occurrence
DET : Detectability

Constraints
[1] Reduced priority number is calculated by simple multiplication of Severity, Detectability and Occurrence.

LossOfFunction
Package: FMEALibrary
isAbstract: Yes
Generalization: FailureMode
Applied Stereotype: «FailureModes»

Description
A failure mode representing loss of function e.g., the function is inoperable, or suddenly fails.

Figure 9.35 - LossOfFunction

DegradationOfFunction
Package: FMEALibrary
isAbstract: Yes
Generalization: FailureMode
Applied Stereotype: «FailureModes»

Description
A failure mode representing a degradation of function or loss of function over time.

Figure 9.36 - DegradationOfFunction

IntermittentFunction
Package: FMEALibrary
isAbstract: Yes
Generalization: FailureMode
Applied Stereotype: «FailureMode»

Description
A failure mode representing an intermittent function or the random stops and starts of a function.

Figure 9.37 - IntermittentFunction

PartialFunction
Package: FMEALibrary
isAbstract: Yes
Generalization: FailureMode
Applied Stereotype: «FailureMode»

Description
A failure mode representing a partial function or loss of performance.

Figure 9.38 - PartialFunction

UnintendedFunction
Package: FMEALibrary
isAbstract: Yes
Generalization: FailureMode
Applied Stereotype: «FailureMode»

Description
A failure mode representing an unintended function, function operating at the wrong time, with unintended direction, or unequal performance.

Figure 9.39 - UnintendedFunction

ExceedingFunction
Package: FMEALibrary
isAbstract: Yes
Generalization: FailureMode
Applied Stereotype: «FailureMode»

Description
A failure mode representing a function exceeding the acceptable operational performance.

![ExceedingFunction Diagram](image1)

**Figure 9.40 - ExceedingFunction**

DelayedFunction
Package: FMEALibrary
isAbstract: Yes
Generalization: FailureMode
Applied Stereotype: «FailureMode»

Description
A failure mode representing a delayed function or function operating after an unintended time interval.

![DelayedFunction Diagram](image2)

**Figure 9.41 - DelayedFunction**

### 9.3.2 Methods::FMEA::FMEAProfile

FMEAItem
Package: FMEAProfile
isAbstract: No
Generalization: Block
Extension: Class

Description
See AbstractFMEAItem library class for the definition of a FMEA Item concept.
9.4 Methods::FTA
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is a top-down failure analysis in which an undesired state of a system is analyzed using Boolean logic to combine a series of lower-level (basic) events. This analysis method is used to understand how systems can fail, to identify the best ways to reduce risk and to determine event rates of a safety accident or a functional failure.

The FTA package contains all required elements to implement this analysis. Support for Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) modeling is based on the IEC 61025:2006 standard. Using this standard ensures that the specification offers a form of FTA that is based on best practices and accepted by practitioners. It is also possible for a user to extend the capabilities of the FTA package to enable, for example, dynamic fault tree analysis and component fault tree modeling while still remaining compatible with other information modeled using the specification.

In order to combine FMEA and FTA analysis, a connection between a failure mode and a fault tree event needs to be made. Therefore, the Cause of an FMEAItem can be interpreted as the event which leads to a failure of a system item. By combining FMEAs and FTAs, both analyses can be used to verify the analysis results. This may lead to a better understanding of the behavior of a system during erroneous behavior.

9.4.1 Methods::FTA::FTALibrary
FTAElement
Package: FTALibrary
isAbstract: Yes
Generalization: DysfunctionalEvent
Applied Stereotype: «Situation»

Description
Any of the Events and Gates needed for the evaluation of the TopEvent probability.
Figure 9.43 - FTAElement

Attributes
probability : Real [redines likelihood] The probability that the event represented by the owning FTA element occurs. Probability is a Real value between 0 and 1.

source Gate : Gate (member end of input association)

FTATree
Package: FTALibrary
isAbstract: No
Generalization: FTAElement, Scenario
Applied Stereotype: «Tree»

Description
A collection of FTAElements and their interrelationships for the evaluation of the top event probability.

Figure 9.44 - FTATree

Attributes
topEvent : Event[1] (member end of association) Undesired event which lead to the failure of the system.

Methods::FTA::FTALibrary::Events
Package of events for building fault trees.

Event
Package: Events
isAbstract: Yes
Generalization: FTAElement
Applied Stereotype: «Situation»

Description
The Event is a base class for all types fault tree events. It is a kind of DysfunctionalEvent.

Figure 9.45 - Event

Attributes
source Gate : Gate (member end of input association)
priority : Integer[0..1] The priority field is only used to indicate the order of this event when multiple events are inputs of Priority AND (SEQ) gate.
target Gate : Gate (member end of output association)

BasicEvent
Package: Events
isAbstract: No
Generalization: Event
Applied Stereotype: «BasicEvent»
Description
A basic initiating failure requiring no further development.

Figure 9.46 - BasicEvent

IntermediateEvent
Package: Events
isAbstract: No
Generalization: Event
Applied Stereotype: «IntermediateEvent»

Description
An intermediate event is a failure which occurs because of one or more antecedent events acting through logic gates.

Attributes
probability: Real, redefines probability  Probability of the intermediate event is derived. It is calculated by the gate from the probabilities of the more basic events.

Figure 9.47 - IntermediateEvent

TopEvent
Package: Events
isAbstract: No
Generalization: Event
Applied Stereotype: «TopEvent»

Description
Undesired event - failure or effect - at the top of the fault tree.
The probability of the top event is the result of the fault tree calculation.

**ConditionalEvent**
- **Package**: Events
- **isAbstract**: No
- **Generalization**: Event
- **Applied Stereotype**: «ConditionalEvent»

**Description**
Specific conditions or restrictions that apply to any logic gate (used primarily with PRIORITY AND and INHIBIT gates).

**DormantEvent**
- **Package**: Events
- **isAbstract**: No
- **Generalization**: Event
- **Applied Stereotype**: «DormantEvent»

**Description**
The dormant event is similar to BasicEvent but indicates the latent failure which is discovered by periodical tests.

**UndevelopedEvent**
- **Package**: Events
- **isAbstract**: No
- **Generalization**: Event
- **Applied Stereotype**: «BasicEvent», «Undeveloped»

**Description**
An event which is not further developed either because it is of insufficient consequence or because information is unavailable.
Figure 9.51 - UndevelopedEvent

HouseEvent
Package: Events
isAbstract: No
Generalization: Event
Applied Stereotype: «HouseEvent»

Description
An event which can be set to occur or not occur.

Figure 9.52 - HouseEvent

 Attributes
probability: HouseEventProbability, redefines probability

Probability of the house event is 0 or 1. It is set before doing a fault tree evaluation.

ZeroEvent
Package: Events
isAbstract: No
Generalization: Event
Applied Stereotype: «ZeroEvent»

Description
An event which represents a condition or an event that will never occur.

Figure 9.53 - ZeroEvent

 Attributes
probability : Real, redefines probability

The probability of zero event is always 0.
Methods::FTA::FTALibrary::Gates
Package of logical conditions for building fault trees.

Gate
Package: Gates
isAbstract: Yes
Applied Stereotype: «Situation»

Description
An FTAElement that combines input Event probabilities in a prescribed manner to determine output Event probability. The output event occurs if the combination of input events is satisfied. The gate subtypes specify the necessary combination.

Figure 9.54 - Gate

Attributes
source Event : Event[0..*] (member end of input association)
target Event : Event[1] (member end of output association)

AND
Package: Gates
isAbstract: No
Generalization: Gate
Applied Stereotype: «Block», «AND»

Description
The output event occurs only if all input events occur.
Figure 9.55 - AND

OR
Package: Gates
isAbstract: No
Generalization: Gate
Applied Stereotype: «Block», «OR»

Description
The output event occurs if at least one of input event occurs.

Figure 9.56 - OR

NOT
Package: Gates
isAbstract: No
Generalization: Gate
Applied Stereotype: «Block», «NOT»

Description
The output event occurs if the input event does not occur.
Figure 9.57 - NOT

XOR
Package: Gates
isAbstract: No
Generalization: Gate
Applied Stereotype: «Block», «XOR»

Description
The output event occurs if exactly one of the input events occurs.

Figure 9.58 - XOR

SEQ
Package: Gates
isAbstract: No
Generalization: Gate
Applied Stereotype: «Block», «SEQ»

Description
The output event occurs if all of the input events occur in a specific sequence.
Figure 9.59 - SEQ

INHIBIT
Package: Gates
isAbstract: No
Generalization: Gate
Applied Stereotype: «INHIBIT», «Block»

Description
The output event occurs if the (single) input event occurs in the presence of an enabling condition.
Figure 9.60 - INHIBIT

Attributes
condition : Event[0..*] (member end of condition association)

MAJORITY_VOTE
Package: Gates
isAbstract: No
Generalization: Gate
Applied Stereotype: «Block», «MAJORITY_VOTE»

Description
The output event occurs if the majority of the input events occurs. It has a threshold parameter m.

Figure 9.61 - MAJORITY_VOTE

Attributes
m : Integer

Methods::FTA::FTALibrary::Gates::ConstraintBlocks
Reference implementation for the FTA gates.

ANDConstraintBlock
Package: ConstraintBlocks
isAbstract: No
Applied Stereotype: «ConstraintBlock»
Description
Reference implementation for the **AND** gate.

**Attributes**
- **output**
- **input**: [0..*]

**Constraints**

[1] Probability of AND node is simply a multiplication of probabilities of incoming nodes. Note - this simplistic calculation assumes that incoming node events are mutually independent.

---

**ORConstraintBlock**

**Package**: ConstraintBlocks
**isAbstract**: No

**Applied Stereotype**: «ConstraintBlock»

**Description**
Reference implementation for the **OR** gate.

**Attributes**
- **output**
- **input**: [0..*]

**Constraints**

[1] Probability of OR node is calculated as opposite probability of the event where neither of the input events happen. This follows De Morgan's theorem - OR(input1, input2, input3...) is equal to NOT AND (NOT input1, NOT input2, NOT input3...). Note - this simplistic calculation assumes that incoming node events are mutually independent.

---

**SEQConstraintBlock**

**Package**: ConstraintBlocks
**isAbstract**: No

**Applied Stereotype**: «ConstraintBlock»

**Description**
Reference implementation for the **SEQ** gate.

**Attributes**
- **output**
- **input**: Real[0..*]

**Constraints**

[1] Probability of SEQ node is calculated the same way as AND node - it is simply a multiplication of probabilities of incoming nodes.
This simplistic calculation cannot capture time-dependency of the events; only more complex simulations can estimate this probability.

**XORConstraintBlock**

*Package:* ConstraintBlocks  
*isAbstract:* No  
*Applied Stereotype:* «ConstraintBlock»

**Description**  
Reference implementation for the XOR gate.

**Attributes**  
output: 
input: [0..*]

**Constraints**  
[1] In case of two inputs, XOR probability is calculated by ORing of two event combination probabilities - probability that first event happened and second did not ORed with probability that second event happened while first did not.  
Input1 XOR Input2 = Input1 AND NOT Input2 OR Input2 AND NOT Input1  
Since combinations are mutually exclusive, simple (+) operation can be used for ORing them. Therefore  
Input1 XOR Input2 = Input1 AND NOT Input2 + Input2 AND NOT Input1  
Further expanding ANDs and NOTs using their corresponding formulas, we get  
Input1 XOR Input2 = Input1*(1 - Input2) + Input2*(1 - Input1) = Input1 + Input2 - 2 * Input1 * Input2  
This formula can be iteratively applied for the case with number of inputs greater than two.  
Note - this simplistic calculation assumes that incoming node events are mutually independent.

**INHIBITConstraintBlock**

*Package:* ConstraintBlocks  
*isAbstract:* No  
*Applied Stereotype:* «ConstraintBlock»

**Description**  
Reference implementation for the INHIBIT gate.

**Attributes**  
output: 
input: [0..*]  
condition: Real

**Constraints**  
[1] Probability of INHIBIT node is calculated the same way as AND node - it is simply a multiplication of probabilities of input nodes and condition nodes.
Note - this simplistic calculation assumes that incoming node events and conditions are mutually independent.

**MAJORITY_VOTEConstraintBlock**

- **Package:** ConstraintBlocks
- **isAbstract:** No
- **Applied Stereotype:** «ConstraintBlock»

**Description**

Reference implementation for the MAJORITY_VOTE gate.

**Attributes**

- **output**
- **input:** [0..*]
- **m**

**Constraints**

1. Majority Vote probability can be calculated by iteratively examining all the combinations of input events, taking those combinations that satisfy the condition that at least m input events happen, then calculating probability of each combination using AND formula (multiplying all individual event probabilities in that combination) and then calculating cumulative probability of all combinations by ORing them.
   
   Note - this simplistic calculation assumes that incoming node events are mutually independent.

   Taking those combinations that satisfy the condition that at least m input events happen, then calculating probability of each combination using AND formula (multiplying all individual event probabilities in that combination) and then calculating cumulative probability of all combinations by ORing them.

   Note - this simplistic calculation assumes that incoming node events are mutually independent.

**NOTConstraintBlock**

- **Package:** ConstraintBlocks
- **isAbstract:** No
- **Applied Stereotype:** «ConstraintBlock»

**Description**

Reference implementation for the NOT gate.

**Attributes**

- **output**
- **input:** [1]

**Constraints**

1. Probability of NOT node is calculated as probability of the event opposite to the input event. Thereby it is unity minus probability of input event.
9.4.2 Methods::FTA::FTAProfile

Tree
Package: FTAProfile
isAbstract: No
Generalization: Situation
Extension: Class

Description
A marker stereotype for fault trees. See FTATree library class for definition.

```
<stereotype>
  Situation
  [Class]

<stereotype>
  Tree
  [Class]
```

Figure 9.62 - Tree

Constraints
[1] TreeIsFTATree
   -- Tree stereotype can only be applied on any class specialized from FTATree from FTA Library
   self.base_Class->asSet()->closure(general).name->includes('FTATree')

Gate
Package: FTAProfile
isAbstract: Yes
Extension: Class, Property

Description
A marker stereotype for fault tree gates. See Gate library class for definition.

```
<stereotype>
  Gate
  [Class]

<stereotype>
  Gate
  [Class, Property]
```

Figure 9.63 - Gate

Event
Package: FTAProfile
isAbstract: Yes
Extension: Class, Property

Description
A marker stereotype for fault tree events. See Event library class for definition.

If the Event stereotype is applied to a class, then that class also must have the Situation stereotype (or its descendants) applied.

**Figure 9.64 - Event**

DormantEvent

Package: FTAProfile

IsAbstract: No

Generalization: Event

Extension: Class, Property

Description

A marker stereotype, carrying icon for dormant events. See DormantEvent library class for definition.

**Figure 9.65 - DormantEvent**
Constraints


```
--DormantEvent stereotype can only be applied on any class specialized from DormantEvent from FTA Library
self.base_Class->asSet()->closure(general).name->includes('DormantEvent') if not
self.base_Class->isEmpty() then
--DormantEvent stereotype can only be applied on any class specialized from DormantEvent from FTA Library
self.base_Class->asSet()->closure(general).name->includes('DormantEvent')
else
--DormantEvent stereotype can only be applied on any property whose type is specialized from DormantEvent from FTA Library
self.base_Property.type->asSet()->closure(general).name->includes('DormantEvent')
endif
```

BasicEvent

**Package:** FTAProfile  
**isAbstract:** No

**Generalization:** Event  
**Extension:** Class, Property

Description

A marker stereotype, carrying icon for basic events. See BasicEvent library class for definition.

![BasicEvent Diagram](Image)

Figure 9.66 - BasicEvent

Constraints
BasicEventIsBasicEvent
-- BasicEvent stereotype can only be applied on any class specialized from BasicEvent from FTA Library
if not self.base_class->asSet()->closure(general).name->includes('BasicEvent') then
-- BasicEvent stereotype can only be applied on any class specialized from BasicEvent from FTA Library
self.base_class->asSet()->closure(general).name->includes('BasicEvent')
else
-- BasicEvent stereotype can only be applied on any property whose type is specialized from BasicEvent from FTA Library
self.base_Property.type->asSet()->closure(general).name->includes('BasicEvent')
endif

UndevelopedEventIsUndevelopedEvent
-- BasicEvent + Undeveloped stereotype combination can be applied on any class specialized from UndevelopedEvent from FTA Library
Undeveloped.allInstances().base_Element->includesAll(self.base_class) implies
self.base_class->asSet()->closure(general).name->includes('UndevelopedEvent')

ConditionalEvent
Package: FTAProfile
isAbstract: No
Generalization: Event
Extension: Class, Property

Description
A marker stereotype, carrying icon for conditional events. See ConditionalEvent library class for definition.
Figure 9.67 - ConditionalEvent

Constraints

[1]
ConditionalEventIsConditionalEvent

```plaintext
--ConditionalEvent stereotype can only be applied on any class specialized from
ConditionalEvent from FTA Library
if self.base.Class->asSet()->closure(general).name->includes('ConditionalEvent')
    then
        --ConditionalEvent stereotype can only be applied on any class specialized
        from ConditionalEvent from FTA Library
        self.base.Class->asSet()->closure(general).name->includes('ConditionalEvent')
    else
        --ConditionalEvent stereotype can only be applied on any property whose type
        is specialized from ConditionalEvent from FTA Library
        self.base.Property.type->asSet()->closure(general).name->includes('ConditionalEvent')
end
```

ZeroEvent

**Package:** FTAProfile
**IsAbstract:** No
**Generalization:** Event
**Extension:** Class, Property

**Description**
A marker stereotype, carrying icon for zero events. See ZeroEvent library class for definition.
### ZeroEvent Constraints

1. ZeroEventIsZeroEvent

   \[
   \text{ZeroEvent}\text{ stereotype can only be applied on any class specialized from ZeroEvent from FTA Library}
   \]

   \[
   \text{if not self.base.Class->isEmpty() then}
   \]

   \[
   \text{ZeroEvent}\text{ stereotype can only be applied on any class specialized from ZeroEvent from FTA Library}
   \]

   \[
   \text{else}
   \]

   \[
   \text{ZeroEvent}\text{ stereotype can only be applied on any property whose type is specialized from ZeroEvent from FTA Library}
   \]

---

### HouseEvent

**Package:** FTAProfile

**IsAbstract:** No

**Generalization:** Event

**Extension:** Class, Property

**Description**

A marker stereotype, carrying icon for house events. See HouseEvent library class for definition.
Figure 9.69 - HouseEvent

Constraints


```plaintext
--HouseEventIsHouseEvent stereotype can only be applied on any class specialized from
--HouseEvent from FTA Library
if not self.base_Class->isEmpty() then
  --HouseEventIsHouseEvent stereotype can only be applied on any class specialized from
  --HouseEvent from FTA Library
  self.base_Class->asSet()->closure(general).name->includes('HouseEvent')
else
  --HouseEventIsHouseEvent stereotype can only be applied on any property whose type is
  --specialized from HouseEvent from FTA Library
  self.base_Property.type->asSet()->closure(general).name->includes('HouseEvent')
endif
```

AND

Package: FTAProfile
isAbstract: No
Generalization: Gate
Extension: Class, Property

Description

A marker stereotype, carrying icon for AND gates. See AND library class for definition.
Figure 9.70 - AND

Constraints

1. ANDIsAND

AND stereotype can only be applied on any class specialized from AND gate from FTA Library

if not self.base_class->isEmpty() then

AND stereotype can only be applied on any class specialized from AND gate from FTA Library

self.base_class->asSet()->closure(general).name->includes('AND')

else

AND stereotype can only be applied on any property whose type is specialized from AND from FTA Library

self.base_Property.type->asSet()->closure(general).name->includes('AND')

endif

Description

A marker stereotype, carrying icon for OR gates. See OR library class for definition.

Package: FTAProfile

isAbstract: No

Generalization: Gate

Extension: Class, Property
Figure 9.71 - OR

Constraints

1. ORIsOR

```plaintext
--OR stereotype can only be applied on any class specialized from OR gate from FTA Library
self.base->asSet()->closure(general).name->includes('OR') if not self.base->isEmpty() then
  --OR stereotype can only be applied on any class specialized from OR gate from FTA Library
  self.base->asSet()->closure(general).name->includes('OR')
else
  --OR stereotype can only be applied on any property whose type is specialized from OR from FTA Library
  self.base.Property.type->asSet()->closure(general).name->includes('OR') end
```

SEQ

- Package: FTAProfile
- isAbstract: No
- Extension: Class, Property

Description

A marker stereotype, carrying icon for SEQ gates. See SEQ library class for definition.
Figure 9.72 - SEQ

Constraints

[1] SEQIsSEQ

SEQ stereotype can only be applied on any class specialized from SEQ gate from FTA Library

if not self.base.Class->asSet()->closure(general).name->includes('SEQ')

SEQ stereotype can only be applied on any class specialized from SEQ gate from FTA Library

else

SEQ stereotype can only be applied on any property whose type is specialized from SEQ from FTA Library

endif

XOR

Package: FTAProfile
isAbstract: No
Generalization: Gate
Extension: Class, Property

Description
A marker stereotype, carrying icon for XOR gates. See XOR library class for definition.
Figure 9.73 - XOR

### Constraints

1. XOR stereotype can only be applied on any class specialized from XOR gate from FTA Library.

   ```
   self.base_.Class->asSet()->closure(general).name->includes('XOR')
   if not self.base_.Class->isEmpty() then
   --XOR stereotype can only be applied on any class specialized from XOR gate from FTA Library
   self.base_.Class->asSet()->closure(general).name->includes('XOR')
   else
   --XOR stereotype can only be applied on any property whose type is specialized from XOR from FTA Library
   self.base_.Property.type->asSet()->closure(general).name->includes('XOR')
   endif
   ```

### Description

A marker stereotype, carrying icon for INHIBIT gates. See INHIBIT library class for definition.
Figure 9.74 - INHIBIT

**Constraints**

[1] INHIBIT is INHIBIT

```
--INHIBIT stereotype can only be applied on any class specialized from INHIBIT gate from FTA Library
self->asSet()->closure(general).name->includes('INHIBIT') if not self.base_Class->isEmpty() then
  --INHIBIT stereotype can only be applied on any class specialized from INHIBIT gate from FTA Library
  self.base_Class->asSet()->closure(general).name->includes('INHIBIT')
else
  --INHIBIT stereotype can only be applied on any property whose type is specialized from INHIBIT gate from FTA Library
  self.base_Property.type->asSet()->closure(general).name->includes('INHIBIT')
endif
```

**MAJORITY_VOTE**

Package: FTAProfile

isAbstract: No

Generalization: Gate

Extension: Class, Property

**Description**

A marker stereotype, carrying icon for MAJORITY_VOTE gates. See [MAJORITY_VOTE](#) library class for definition.
Figure 9.75 - MAJORITY_VOTE

Constraints

[1] MAJORITY_VOTE is MAJORITY_VOTE

A marker stereotype, carrying icon for NOT gates. See NOT library class for definition.
Figure 9.76 - NOT

Constraints
[1] NOTIsNOT
   -- NOT stereotype can only be applied on any class specialized from NOT gate from FTA Library
   if not self.base_Class->asSet()->closure(general).name->includes('NOT') then
     -- NOT stereotype can only be applied on any class specialized from NOT gate from FTA Library
     if not self.base_Class->asSet()->closure(general).name->includes('NOT') then
       -- NOT stereotype can only be applied on any property whose type is specialized from NOT from FTA Library
       if not self.base_Property.type->asSet()->closure(general).name->includes('NOT') then
         -- NOT stereotype can only be applied on any property whose type is specialized from NOT from FTA Library
         endif
       else
       endif
     else
     endif
   else
   endif

IntermediateEvent
Package: FTAProfile
isAbstract: No
Generalization: Event
Extension: Class, Property

Description
A marker stereotype, carrying icon for intermediate events. See IntermediateEvent library class for definition.
IntermediateEvent stereotype can only be applied on any class specialized from IntermediateEvent from FTA Library.

```
if not self.baseClazz->isEmpty() then
    self.baseClazz->asSet()->closure(general).name->includes('IntermediateEvent')
else
    self.baseProperty.type->asSet()->closure(general).name->includes('IntermediateEvent')
end;
```

TopEvent

**Package:** FTAProfile

**isAbstract:** No

**Generalization:** Event

**Extension:** Class, Property

**Description**

A marker stereotype, carrying icon for top events. See TopEvent library class for definition.
Figure 9.78 - TopEvent

Constraints

[1] TopEventIsTopEvent

--TopEvent stereotype can only be applied on any class specialized from TopEvent
from FTA Library

if not self.base_Class->isEmpty() then
  --TopEvent stereotype can only be applied on any class specialized from TopEvent
  from FTA Library
  self.base_Class->asSet()->closure(general).name->includes('TopEvent')
else
  --TopEvent stereotype can only be applied on any property whose type is specialized
  from TopEvent from FTA Library
  self.base_Property.type->asSet()->closure(general).name->includes('TopEvent')
endif

TransferIn

Package: FTAProfile
isAbstract: No
Extension: Property

Description

The node of the current fault tree that indicates that the tree is developed further as a separate fault tree - TransferOut.

Figure 9.79 - TransferIn

Constraints

[1] TypesTransferOut

-- type of TransferIn property must be TransferOut FTA Tree
TransferOut.allInstances().base_Class->includesAll(self.base_Property.type)

TransferOut

Package: FTAProfile
isAbstract: No
Generalization: Tree
Extension: Class
Description
A marker stereotype for partial fault trees. It indicates that this tree is used as a part of another fault tree through TransferIn. The computed probability of the top event of the TransferOut tree is used as a probability of the TransferIn node.

Figure 9.80 - TransferOut

9.5 Methods::STPA

The System Theoretical Process Analysis (STPA) is a hazard analysis technique based on control and system theory. In comparison, most existing hazard analysis techniques are based on reliability theory. In STPA, however, the easy goals are pursued as in any hazard analysis, i.e., collecting information on how hazards may occur. For further information on this approach the handbook\(^1\) describes the method and show the application.

9.5.1 Methods::STPA::STPA Library

OutOfSequence
Package: STPA Library  
isAbstract: Yes  
Generalization: UnsafeControlAction  
Applied Stereotype: «UnsafeControlAction»  

Description
STPA Guideword, describing kind of control.

Figure 9.81 - OutOfSequence

Late
Package: STPA Library  
isAbstract: Yes  
Generalization: UnsafeControlAction  
Applied Stereotype: «UnsafeControlAction»  

Description
STPA Guideword, describing kind of control.

\(^1\) https://psas.scripts.mit.edu/home/get_file.php?name=STPA_handbook.pdf
Figure 9.82 - Late

Early

Package: STPA Library
IsAbstract: Yes
Generalization: UnsafeControlAction
Applied Stereotype: «UnsafeControlAction»

Description
STPA Guideword, describing kind of control.

Figure 9.83 - Early

TooLong

Package: STPA Library
IsAbstract: Yes
Generalization: UnsafeControlAction
Applied Stereotype: «UnsafeControlAction»

Description
STPA Guideword, describing kind of control.

Figure 9.84 - Toolong

TooShort

Package: STPA Library
IsAbstract: Yes
Generalization: UnsafeControlAction
Applied Stereotype: «UnsafeControlAction»

Description
STPA Guideword, describing kind of control.
Figure 9.85 - TooShort

Provided
Package: STPA Library
isAbstract: Yes
Generalization: UnsafeControlAction
Applied Stereotype: «UnsafeControlAction»

Description
STPA Guideword, describing a kind of control.

Figure 9.86 - Provided

NotProvided
Package: STPA Library
isAbstract: Yes
Generalization: UnsafeControlAction
Applied Stereotype: «UnsafeControlAction»

Description
STPA Guideword, describing kind of control.

Figure 9.87 - NotProvided

LossScenario
Package: STPA Library
isAbstract: Yes
Generalization: Scenario
Applied Stereotype: «Situation» «LossScenario»

Description
A sequence of situations starting from Factors, that (through Process Model deficiencies) leads to an UnsafeControlAction (which further leads to risks and possibly losses).

Figure 9.88 - LossScenario

Attributes
Factor : Factor[0..*] (member end of association, subsets scenarioStep)
UnsafeControlAction : UnsafeControlAction[0..*] (member end of association, subsets scenarioStep)
ProcessModel : ProcessModel[0..*] (member end of association, subsets scenarioStep)

ProcessModel
Package: STPA Library
isAbstract: No
Applied Stereotype: «Situation»
A ProcessModel describes a process / control loop model that may lead to an Unsafe Control Action. The four high level kinds of process model deficiencies can be used to specify the section of the control loop.

Process model deficiencies are often called (high level) Scenario in STPA theory.

Attributes
- Factor: Factor[0..*] (member end of ProcessModelFactor association, redefines from)
- unsafeControlAction: UnsafeControlAction[0..*] (member end of ProcessModelConsequence association, redefines to)

Inadequate Controller Decisions
- Package: STPA Library
- isAbstract: Yes
- Generalization: ProcessModel
- Applied Stereotype: «Situation»

Description
A kind of ProcessFlaw.

Figure 9.89 - Inadequate Controller Decisions

Inadequate Control Execution
- Package: STPA Library
- isAbstract: Yes
- Generalization: ProcessModel
- Applied Stereotype: «Situation»

Description
A kind of ProcessFlaw.
Figure 9.90 - Inadequate Control Execution

Inadequate Process Behavior

Package: STPA Library
isAbstract: Yes
Generalization: ProcessModel
Applied Stereotype: «Situations»

Description
A kind of ProcessFlaw.

Figure 9.91 - Inadequate Process Behavior

Inadequate Feedback and Inputs

Package: STPA Library
isAbstract: Yes
Generalization: ProcessModel
Applied Stereotype: «Situations»

Description
A kind of ProcessFlaw.
Figure 9.92 - Inadequate Feedback and Inputs

UnsafeControlAction

Package: STPA Library
isAbstract: Yes
Generalization: UndesiredState
Applied Stereotype: "UnsafeControlAction"

Description

An Unsafe Control Action (UCA), used in STPA, describes in what context providing / not providing a Control Action might lead to an undesired result.

A UCA generally consist of four parts:
- Controller (Subject) that issues the Control Action - inferred from Control Action and model of the system (block/part producing the control action).
- Guideword (provides, does not provide, etc.) - indicated using Generalization relationship
- Control Action - connected with RelevantTo relationship.
- Context in which Control Action leads to undesired outcome - sub situation of (part of) UCA situation.

Figure 9.93 - UnsafeControlAction
Attributes
Context : AbstractOperationalSituation[1]
(process end of association)
processModel : ProcessModel[0..*]
(ProcessModelConsequence association, redefines from)
harmPotential : HarmPotential[0..*]
(unsafeControlActionHarmPotential association, redefines to)

Factor Package: STPA Library
isAbstract: No
Generalization: AbstractCause
Applied Stereotype: «Situation»
Description
A Factor (F) can be used to further refine Process Model inadequacies - specifying causes of deficiencies in the process model and/or other contributing factors.

Loss Package: STPA Library
isAbstract: Yes
Generalization: AbstractEffect
Applied Stereotype: «Situation»
Description
In STPA, is any effect that is unacceptable and should be prevented. Some factors such as environmental conditions may contribute to a loss but are outside our control.
Examples for losses are:
- Loss of human life or injury
- Vehicle/property damage
- Mission loss (inadequate transportation)
- Loss of customer satisfaction
- Financial loss
- Loss of public image
- Environmental pollution
Figure 9.94 - Loss
RiskRealization
Package: STPA Library
isAbstract: No
Generalization: AbstractRisk, Causality
Applied Stereotype: «Block»
Description
Association between the Loss and Hazard (potential harm).

Figure 9.95 - RiskRealization
ProcessModelFactor
Package: STPA Library
Generalization: Causality
Description
Causal relationship between CausalFactor and ProcessFlaw
Association ends
processModel : ProcessModel[0..*]
(member end of ProcessModelFactor
association, redefines to)

Risk Analysis and Assessment Modeling Language (RAAML) Version 1.0
Factor: Factor[0..*] (member end of ProcessModelFactor association, redefines from)

ProcessModelConsequence
Package: STPA Library
Generalization: Causality

Description
Causal relationship between ProcessFlaw and UnsafeControlAction

Association ends
unsafeControlAction : UnsafeControlAction[0..*] (member end of ProcessModelConsequence association, redefines to)
processModel : ProcessModel[0..*] (member end of ProcessModelConsequence association, redefines from)

UnsafeControlActionHarmPotential
Package: STPA Library
Generalization: Causality

Description
Causal relationship between UnsafeControlAction and RiskSource

Association ends
harmPotential : HarmPotential[0..*] (member end of UnsafeControlActionHarmPotential association, redefines to)
unsafeControlAction : UnsafeControlAction[0..*] (member end of UnsafeControlActionHarmPotential association, redefines from)

9.5.2 Methods::STPA::STPA Profile

ControlAction
Package: STPA Profile
isAbstract: No
Extension: Signal, Class, DataType

Description
A Control Action (CA) is an output signal from a functional / logical Controller to a ControlledProcess (via the Actuator), that determines the receiving process behaviour.
Figure 9.96 - ControlAction

Feedback
Package: STPA Profile
isAbstract: No
Extension: Signal, Class, DataType

Description
A Feedback is an input signal to a functional / logical Controller from a ControlledProcess (via the Sensor), that characterizes the current processes behavior (or the environment).

Figure 9.97 - Feedback

UnsafeControlAction
Package: STPA Profile
isAbstract: No
Generalization: Situation/FailureMode
Extension: Class

Description
Stereotype used to demarcate all the UnsafeControlActions.
Figure 9.98 - UnsafeControlAction

ControlledProcess
Package: STPA Profile
isAbstract: No
Extension: Property, Class

Description
An abstract representation of the system and its behaviours that need to be supervised and governed. Controller is controlling this process through the ControlAction via the Actuator.

Figure 9.99 - ControlledProcess

Actuator
Package: STPA Profile
isAbstract: No
Extension: Property, Class

Description
Actuator receives ControlActions from Controller and influences the ControlledProcess in some way.

Figure 9.100 - Actuator

Sensor
Package: STPA Profile
isAbstract: No
Extension: Property, Class

Description
Sensor assesses the ControlledProcess (also environment or other controllers) and gives Feedback to the Controller.

**Figure 9.101 - Sensor**

**Controller**

**Package:** STPA Profile  
**isAbstract:** No  
**Extension:** Property, Class

**Description**

Controller sends the ControlActions and receives Feedback.

**Figure 9.102 - Controller**

**ControlStructure**

**Package:** STPA Profile  
**isAbstract:** No  
**Generalization:** Block  
**Extension:** Class

**Description**

ControlStructure is a system-of-systems composed of ControlledProcess, Controller and their functional relationships - ControlActions, Feedbacks, describing feedback control loops.

**Figure 9.103 - ControlStructure**
Description
Stereotype used to demarcate all the LossScenarios.

Figure 9.104 - LossScenario

9.6 GSN
The GSN profile is an implementation of the core notation described in the GSN version 2 standard. The GSN standard is made available under creative commons licence version 4:

9.6.1 GSN::GSN Profile

Notation
Most of the stereotypes in GSN profile have stereotype images specified. Displaying the stereotyped GSN elements in UML Class diagram may follow the UML standard prescription (UML 2.5.1, Chapter 12.3.4.1 Icon presentation) for displaying elements having stereotypes with icons, namely:

- Showing model element as an image with element name below
- Showing model element as a box with the iconic form image inside the box at the top left

Figure 9.105 - Standard UML notation for stereotyped elements (from UML 2.5.1, Figure 12.25)

However, in addition to the notation described in UML standard, this standard allows additional notation. Namely – using stereotype image as a (resizable) outline/shape of the box, with the same compartments that are prescribed by the UML standard (including name/stereotype/tag values compartment) inside. This notation is recommended i.e. preferred over the standard UML notation.

An example of the SCSC/GSN standard representation of the GSN extension is shown in Figure 9.104. See the SCSC/GSN standard for the shapes and text placement to be used for various model element types.
Combined Stereotype Notation

The UML standard allows a combination of several stereotypes applied on the model element. Namely – the combination of Goal+Undeveloped stereotypes and Strategy+Undeveloped stereotypes is being used. An example of this notation is depicted in Figure 9.105. See the SCSC/DSN standard for the shapes and text placement to be used for various model element types.

In that case, recommended notation is a combination of image shapes for Goal (or Strategy) and Undeveloped.

Figure 9.107 - Stereotype combination

GSNNode

Package: GSN Profile

isAbstract: Yes

Extension: Element

Description

Root type for all the different kinds of nodes in GSN.

Note: name versus human-readable ID

GSN domain elements frequently have both a short phrase, describing the element and human-readable identifier. For example:

G1 Control System is acceptably safe to operate

In this example “Control System is acceptably safe to operate” is a short phrase, describing the goal, while G1 is a human-readable identifier of the goal.

In this standard, the short phrase shall be captured as UML model element name – NamedElement::name field. Human-readable identifier shall be stored in a separate tag, defined in the Core profile – IDCarrier::id. In this standard, the short phrase shall be captured as UML model element name – NamedElement::name field. Human-readable identifier shall be stored in a separate tag, defined in the Core profile – IDCarrier::id.
phrase shall be captured as UML model element name – NamedElement::name field. Human-readable identifier shall be stored in a separate tag, defined in this profile – GSNNode::id.

Figure 9.108 - GSNNode

Attributes
id : String[0..1]

GSNArgumentNode
Package: GSN Profile
isAbstract: Yes
Generalization: GSNNode
Extension: Element

Description
A Goal or a Strategy.
Figure 9.9 - GSNArgumentNode

Solution
Package: GSN Profile
isAbstract: No
Generalization: GSNNode
Extension: Class

Description
A solution presents a reference to an evidence item or items.

Figure 9.10 - Solution

Goal
Package: GSN Profile
isAbstract: No
Generalization: GSNArgumentNode
Extension: Class

Description
A goal presents a claim forming part of the argument.

**Figure 9.111 - Goal**

**Strategy**
- **Package:** GSN Profile
- **isAbstract:** No
- **Generalization:** GSNArgumentNode
- **Extension:** Class

**Description**
A strategy describes the nature of the inference that exists between a goal and its supporting goal(s).

**Figure 9.112 - Strategy**

**SupportingInformationContextualInformation**
- **Package:** GSN Profile
- **isAbstract:** Yes
- **Extension:** Element

**Description**
A ContextStatement or an Assumption or a Justification.

**Figure 9.113 - SupportingInformationContextualInformation**
Attributes

id : String[0..1]

ContextStatement

Package: GSN Profile

isAbstract: No

Generalization: SupportingInformation, ContextualInformation

Extension: Class

Description

A context presents a contextual artefact. This can be a reference to contextual information, or a statement.

Assumption

Package: GSN Profile

isAbstract: No

Generalization: SupportingInformation

Extension: Class

Description

An assumption presents an intentionally unsubstantiated statement.
Figure 9.115 - Assumption

Justification

Package: GSN Profile
isAbstract: No
Generalization: SupportingInformation/ContextualInformation
Extension: Class

Description

A justification presents a statement of rationale.
InContextOf declares a contextual relationship.
Permitted connections are: goal-to-context, goal-to-assumption, goal-to-justification, strategy-to-context, strategy-to-assumption and strategy-to-justification.
SupportedBy

Package: GSN Profile
isAbstract: No
Extension: Dependency

Description

SupportedBy allows inferential or evidential relationships to be documented. Inferential relationships declare that there is an inference between goals in the argument. Evidential relationships declare the link between a goal and the evidence used to substantiate it. Permitted supported by connections are: goal-to-goal, goal-to-strategy, goal-to-solution, strategy to goal.
Figure 9.118 - SupportedBy

Constraints

[1] ClientIsGSNArgumentNode  -- client of SupportedBy must be GSNArgumentNode

GSNArgumentNode.allInstances().base_Element->includesAll(self.base_Dependency.client)

[2] StrategyToGoal  -- if client is Strategy then supplier must be Goal

Strategy.allInstances().base_Class->includesAll(self.base_Dependency.supplier)

Commented [AA166]: RAAML-54

Commented [AA167]: RAAML-54
Strategy.allInstances().base_Class-
>includesAll(self.base_Dependency.client)
implies
Goal.allInstances().base_Class->includesAll(self.base_Dependency.supplier)
-- supplier of SupportedBy can be GSNode or non-GSN concept, but it can
not be SupportInformationContextualInformation

[3] SupplierIsNotSupportingInformation
SupplierIsNotContextualInformation
GSNode.allInstances().base_Element-
>includesAll(self.base_Dependency.supplier)
or
not
SupportInformationContextualInformation.allInstances().base_Element-
>includesAll(self.base_Dependency.supplier)

-- client can not be Undeveloped Strategy nor Goal
-- if strategy or goal is client of SupportedBy - it is developed
not Undeveloped.allInstances().base_Element-
>includesAll(self.base_Dependency.client)

Commented [AA168]: RAAML-54
Commented [AA169]: RAAML-54
Commented [AA170]: RAAML-54
9.7 Methods::ISO 26262

The ISO 26262 package contains elements supporting the analysis and requirement specification aspects of Functional Safety, as specified by ISO 26262 standard for automotive applications. ISO 26262 is a risk based standard derived from IEC 61508. The ISO 26262 package redefines or extends concepts from the Core concepts package and the General Concepts package.

The ISO 26262 package enables modeling a HAZOP, which is typically used to identify malfunctioning behaviors. The failure modes concept is used from the General Concepts and specialized as a malfunctioning behavior. This allows the malfunctioning behavior to be related to the system behaviors through the HAZOP guidewords for construction of the HAZOP table. The risk analysis is performed by identifying Hazards that could result from the MalfunctioningBehavior, which in combination with a particular OperationalSituation could result in an AccidentScenario. This information is contained in the HazardousEvent which provides the risk level assessment for the event. Each of these concepts are modeled using elements defined in the ISO 26262 package as extensions of the Core and General concepts. This means that the same elements can be used in other analyses in the model, such as in an FMEA.

9.7.1 Methods::ISO 26262::ISO 26262 Library

TrafficAndPeople
Package: ISO 26262 Library
isAbstract: Yes
Generalization: OperationalCondition
Applied Stereotype: «OperationalSituation»

Description
TrafficAndPeople extends the «situation>> class, and is used to describe the presence and behaviour of any motorists or non-motorists considered in a hazardous event.

VehicleUsage
Package: ISO 26262 Library
isAbstract: Yes
Generalization: OperationalCondition
Applied Stereotype: «OperationalSituation»

Description
VehicleUsage extends the «situation>> class, and is used to describe the usage of a vehicle during a hazardous event.
RoadCondition
Package: ISO 26262 Library
isAbstract: Yes
Generalization: OperationalCondition
Applied Stereotype: «OperationalSituations»

Description
RoadConditions extends the <<situation>> class, and is used to describe the conditions or state of the surface a vehicle is driving on (Low-traction, Grade(Slope), etc.) during a hazardous event.

![Diagram of RoadCondition](image)

Figure 9.121 - RoadCondition

Location
Package: ISO 26262 Library
isAbstract: Yes
Generalization: OperationalCondition
Applied Stereotype: «OperationalSituations»

Description
VehicleLocation extends the <<situation>> class, and is used to describe the physical location (high speed road, intersection, parking lot, etc.) of a vehicle during a hazardous event.

![Diagram of Location](image)

Figure 9.122 - Location

EnvironmentalCondition
Package: ISO 26262 Library
isAbstract: Yes
Generalization: OperationalCondition
Applied Stereotype: «OperationalSituations»

Description
EnvironmentalConditions extends the <<situation>> class, and is used to describe the environmental conditions at the time of vehicle operation in a hazardous event.
Figure 9.123 - EnvironmentalCondition

OperationalCondition
Package: ISO 26262 Library
isAbstract: Yes
Generalization: AbstractEvent AnySituation
Applied Stereotype: «OperationalSituations»

Description
Component/part of operational situation.

Figure 9.124 - OperationalCondition

AbstractOperationalSituation
Package: ISO 26262 Library
isAbstract: Yes
Generalization: OperationalCondition
Applied Stereotype: «OperationalSituations»

Description
Operational situation is a scenario that can occur in vehicle's life.
Figure 9.125 - AbstractOperationalSituation

Attributes
conditions : OperationalCondition[*] (member end of association)
Exposure : Exposure[1] \( \text{redefines likelihood} \)

Likelihood of being in a particular operational situation.
Must have a Rationale attached.

TypicalAutomotiveSituation
Package: ISO 26262 Library
IsAbstract: Yes
Generalization: AbstractOperationalSituation
Applied Stereotype: «OperationalSituation»

Description
A grouping of operational conditions, including traffic and people, vehicle usage, road conditions, location, and environmental conditions.

Figure 9.126 - TypicalAutomotiveSituation

Attributes
- trafficAndPeople : TrafficAndPeople[0..*] (member end of association, subsets conditions)
- vehicleUsage : VehicleUsage[0..*] (member end of association, subsets conditions)
- roadCondition : RoadCondition[0..*] (member end of association, subsets conditions)
- location : Location[0..*] (member end of association, subsets conditions)
- environmentalCondition : EnvironmentalCondition[0..*] (member end of association, subsets conditions)

Exposure
Package: ISO 26262 Library
isAbstract: No
Applied Stereotype: «ValueType»

Description
Possible values of exposure.

Figure 9.127 - Exposure

Severity
Package: ISO 26262 Library
isAbstract: No
Applied Stereotype: «ValueType»
Description
Possible values for severity.

![Severity Table]

**Figure 9.128 - Severity**

**ASIL**

**Package**: ISO 26262 Library
**isAbstract**: No
**Applied Stereotype**: «ValueType»

Description
Possible ASIL values.

![ASIL Table]

**Figure 9.129 - ASIL**

**Controllability**

**Package**: ISO 26262 Library
**isAbstract**: No
**Applied Stereotype**: «ValueType»

Description
Possible values of controllability.
Figure 9.130 - Controllability

Less

Package: ISO 26262 Library
isAbstract: Yes
Generalization: AnyMalfunction
Applied Stereotype: «MalfunctioningBehavior»

Description
A subclass of malfunctioning behaviour used for classification purposes. Must be connected to a behavioural element (Use Case or Function). This kind of malfunctioning behaviour represents a failure resulting from providing less output/behaviour than required.

Figure 9.131 - Less

More

Package: ISO 26262 Library
isAbstract: Yes
Generalization: AnyMalfunction
Applied Stereotype: «MalfunctioningBehavior»

Description
A subclass of malfunctioning behaviour used for classification purposes. Must be connected to a behavioural element (Use Case or Function). This kind of malfunctioning behaviour represents a failure resulting from providing more output/behaviour than required.

Figure 9.132 - More

No

Package: ISO 26262 Library
isAbstract: Yes
Generalization: AnyMalfunction
Applied Stereotype: «MalfunctioningBehavior»
Description
A subclass of malfunctioning behaviour used for classification purposes. Must be connected to a behavioural element (Use Case or Function). This kind of malfunctioning behaviour represents a failure resulting from the behaviour not being performed when required.

Figure 9.133 - No

Intermittent
Package: ISO 26262 Library
isAbstract: Yes
Generalization: AnyMalfunction
Applied Stereotype: «MalfunctioningBehavior»

Description
A subclass of malfunctioning behaviour used for classification purposes. Must be connected to a behavioural element (Use Case or Function). This kind of malfunctioning behaviour represents a failure from the behaviour being performed intermittently.

Figure 9.134 - Intermittent

Unintended
Package: ISO 26262 Library
isAbstract: Yes
Generalization: AnyMalfunction
Applied Stereotype: «MalfunctioningBehavior»

Description
A subclass of malfunctioning behaviour used for classification purposes. Must be connected to a behavioural element (Use Case or Function). This kind of malfunctioning behaviour represents a failure resulting from the behaviour being provided when not required.

Figure 9.135 - Unintended
Early
Package: ISO 26262 Library
isAbstract: Yes
Generalization: AnyMalfunction
Applied Stereotype: uMalfunctioningBehaviors

Description
A subclass of malfunctioning behaviour used for classification purposes. Must be connected to a behavioural element (Use Case or Function). This kind of malfunctioning behaviour represents a failure resulting from the behaviour being performed earlier than required.

Figure 9.136 - Early

Late
Package: ISO 26262 Library
isAbstract: Yes
Generalization: AnyMalfunction
Applied Stereotype: uMalfunctioningBehaviors

Description
A subclass of malfunctioning behaviour used for classification purposes. Must be connected to a behavioural element (Use Case or Function). This kind of malfunctioning behaviour represents a failure resulting from the behaviour being performed later than required.

Figure 9.137 - Late

Inverted
Package: ISO 26262 Library
isAbstract: Yes
Generalization: AnyMalfunction
Applied Stereotype: uMalfunctioningBehaviors

Description
A subclass of malfunctioning behaviour used for classification purposes. Must be connected to a behavioural element (Use Case or Function). This kind of malfunctioning behaviour represents a failure resulting from the behaviour providing an inverted output.
Figure 9.138 - Inverted HazardousEvent

Package: ISO 26262 Library
isAbstract: Yes
Generalization: AbstractRisk
Applied Stereotype: «Situation»

Description
Combination of hazard and operational situation to identify automotive safety integrity level.

Figure 9.139 - HazardousEvent

Attributes
scenario : AccidentScenario[1] (member end of association, redefines trigger)
hazard : Hazard[0..*] (member end of association, redefines harmPotential)
systemLevelEffect : SystemLevelEffect[0..*] (member end of association)
vehicleLevelEffect : VehicleLevelEffect[0..*] (member end of association, redefines harm)
ASIL : ASIL[0..*]. redefines score

Automotive Safety Integrity Level value - one of four levels to specify necessary requirements for ISO-26262 and safety measures for avoiding unreasonable risks.
AnyMalfunction
Package: ISO 26262 Library
isAbstract: Yes
Generalization: UndesiredState
Applied Stereotype: «MalfunctioningBehaviors»

Description
Root of all malfunctioning behaviours.

AutomotiveEffect
Package: ISO 26262 Library
isAbstract: Yes
Generalization: AbstractEffect
Applied Stereotype: «Situation»

Description
System- or vehicle-level effect which is or could result in harm.

Attributes
Severity : Severity[1], redefines severity
    Estimate of the extent of harm.
    Must have a Rationale attached.

ISO26262SafetyRequirementTemplate
Package: ISO 26262 Library
isAbstract: No
Applied Stereotype: «DependabilityRequirement»
Description
A template for dependability requirements.

Figure 9.142 - ISO26262SafetyRequirementTemplate

Attributes

AccidentScenario
- Package: ISO 26262 Library
- isAbstract: Yes
- Generalization: DysfunctionalEvent, Scenario
- Applied Stereotype: «Situation»

Description
A combination of operational situation and malfunctioning behaviour.

Figure 9.143 - AccidentScenario

Attributes
- situation : AbstractOperationalSituation[1..*]  Ability to avoid a specified harm or damage through timely reactions of individuals involved in the scenario.
- Controllability : Controllability[1]  Must have a Rationale attached.
malfunctioningBehavior:
AnyMalfunction[1] (member end of association, subsets scenarioStep)

AnyTrafficAndPeople
Package: ISO 26262 Library
isAbstract: No
Generalization: OperationalCondition, TrafficAndPeople
Applied Stereotype: «OperationalSituations»

Description
TrafficAndPeople extends the «situation>> class, and is used to describe the presence and behaviour of any motorists or non-motorists considered in a hazardous event.

Figure 9.144 - AnyTrafficAndPeople

AnyVehicleUse
Package: ISO 26262 Library
isAbstract: No
Generalization: OperationalCondition, VehicleUsage
Applied Stereotype: «OperationalSituations»

Description
TrafficAndPeople extends the «situation>> class, and is used to describe the presence and behaviour of any motorists or non-motorists considered in a hazardous event.

Figure 9.145 - AnyVehicleUse

AnyRoadCondition
Package: ISO 26262 Library
isAbstract: No
Generalization: OperationalCondition, RoadCondition
Applied Stereotype: «OperationalSituations»

Description
TrafficAndPeople extends the «situation>> class, and is used to describe the presence and behaviour of any motorists or non-motorists considered in a hazardous event.
Figure 9.146 - AnyRoadCondition

AnyLocation

Package: ISO 26262 Library
isAbstract: No
Generalization: Location, OperationalCondition
Applied Stereotype: «OperationalSituations»

Description

TrafficAndPeople extends the «situation>> class, and is used to describe the presence and behavior of any motorists or non-motorists considered in a hazardous event.

Figure 9.147 - AnyLocation

AnyEnvironmentalCondition

Package: ISO 26262 Library
isAbstract: No
Generalization: EnvironmentalCondition, OperationalCondition
Applied Stereotype: «OperationalSituations»

Description

TrafficAndPeople extends the «situation>> class, and is used to describe the presence and behaviour of any motorists or non-motorists considered in a hazardous event.

Figure 9.148 - AnyEnvironmentalCondition

SystemLevelEffect

Package: ISO 26262 Library
isAbstract: Yes
Generalization: AutomotiveEffect
Applied Stereotype: «Situations»
Description

System- or vehicle-level effect which is or could result in harm.

Figure 9.149 - SystemLevelEffect

VehicleLevelEffect

Package: ISO 26262 Library
isAbstract: Yes
Generalization: AutomotiveEffect
Applied Stereotype: «Situations»

Description

System- or vehicle-level effect which is or could result in harm.

Figure 9.150 - VehicleLevelEffect

Methods::ISO 26262::ISO 26262 Library::Diagrams by elements

9.7.2 Methods::ISO 26262::ISO 26262 Profile

OperationalSituation

Package: ISO 26262 Profile
isAbstract: No
Generalization: Situation
Extension: Class

Description

A situation describes the operational scenario or driving scenario which is considered in a hazardous event, as part of the Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment process.
Figure 9.151 - OperationalSituation

MalfunctioningBehavior
Package: ISO 26262 Profile
isAbstract: No
Generalization: FailureMode
Extension: Class

Description
A malfunctioning behaviour describes a failure or unintended behaviour of an item with respect to its design intent. It is a subtype of failure mode.

Figure 9.152 - MalfunctioningBehavior

Methods::ISO 26262::ISO 26262 Profile::RequirementManagement

IndependenceRequirement
Package: RequirementManagement
isAbstract: No
Generalization: DeriveReqt
Extension: Abstraction

Description
A relationship between requirement elements indicating that the child requirement specifies an independence criterion that needs to be satisfied in order for an ASIL decomposition to be valid. The decomposition between the parent requirement and 2 other children requirements.
Figure 9.153 - IndependenceRequirement

ASILDecompose
Package: RequirementManagement
isAbstract: No
Generalization: DeriveReqt
Extension: Abstraction

Description
An ASIL decompose relation is used to connect two safety requirements for the purposes of performing ASIL decomposition. The target requirement (supplier) should be of a higher abstraction than the source (client). ASIL decompose relations shall be applied in pairs (e.g., a requirement cannot be the supplier of a single ASIL decompose relation).

Figure 9.154 - ASILDecompose

SafeState
Package: RequirementManagement
isAbstract: No
Extension: Dependency

Description
A state of function realized by one or more architectural components. May be composed of several subfunctions or called by other functions. Associated with safety specific behaviours, typically (but not necessarily) triggered by a failure mode.
Figure 9.155 - SafeState

UserInfoRequirement

Package: RequirementManagement
isAbstract: No
Generalization: Satisfy
Extension: Abstraction

Description
A UserInfoRequirement relationship is a dependency which links a State to a requirement. The arrow direction points from a state (client) to a FSR or TSR (supplier). Linked requirements specify information that must be presented to vehicle occupants when the vehicle enters a safe state.

Figure 9.156 - UserInfoRequirement

RecoveryRequirement

Package: RequirementManagement
isAbstract: No
Generalization: Satisfy
Extension: Abstraction

Description
A RecoveryRequirement relationship is a dependency between a safe state and requirement where the requirement indicates the criteria to recover from the safe state to another operational mode.

Figure 9.157 - RecoveryRequirement
OperatingMode

Package: RequirementManagement
isAbstract: No
Extension: Dependency

Description
A state of function realized by one or more architectural components. May be composed of several subfunctions or called by other functions. Associated with specific behaviours.

FunctionalSafetyRequirement

Package: RequirementManagement
isAbstract: No
Generalization: DependabilityRequirement, Requirement
Extension: Class

Description
A functional safety requirement specifies an implementation independent safety behaviour, or an implementation independent safety measure, required for achievement of a safety goal from which it is derived.

SoftwareSafetyRequirement

Package: RequirementManagement
isAbstract: No
Generalization: DependabilityRequirement, Requirement
Extension: Class

Description
A software safety requirement provides implementation details for software. They can express behaviours or specific software mechanisms which realize the technical safety requirements from which they are derived.
Figure 9.160 - SoftwareSafetyRequirement

SoftwareSafetyRequirement
Package: RequirementManagement
isAbstract: No
Generalization: DependabilityRequirement, Requirement
Extension: Class

Description
A software safety requirement specifies software behaviours or software specific details necessary for implementing the safety concept. Software safety requirements are implementation specific and assigned to components or subcomponents.

Figure 9.161 - HardwareSafetyRequirement

HardwareSafetyRequirement
Package: RequirementManagement
isAbstract: No
Generalization: DependabilityRequirement, Requirement
Extension: Class

Description
A hardware safety requirement specifies hardware behaviours or hardware specific details necessary for implementing the safety concept. Hardware safety requirements are implementation specific and assigned to components or subcomponents.
A safety goal extends the SysML <<Requirement>> stereotype. It represents a top-level safety requirement, defined as a result of the Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment process.

**Figure 9.162 - TechnicalSafetyRequirement**

**SafetyGoal**
- **Package:** RequirementManagement
- **isAbstract:** No
- **Generalization:** DependabilityRequirement, Requirement
- **Extension:** Class

**Description**
A safety goal extends the SysML <<Requirement>> stereotype. It represents a top-level safety requirement, defined as a result of the Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment process.

**Figure 9.163 - SafetyGoal**

**DependabilityRequirement**
- **Package:** RequirementManagement
- **isAbstract:** Yes
- **Generalization:** AbstractRequirement, Block
- **Extension:** Class

**Description**
Parent type of all subtypes of safety requirements

**Figure 9.164 - DependabilityRequirement**
Verified
Package: ISO 26262 Profile
isAbstract: No
Extension: Class

Description
Marker, indicating that hazardous event has been verified.

Figure 9.165 - Verified
Attributes
result : String[1] Verification result

Confirmed
Package: ISO 26262 Profile
isAbstract: No
Extension: Class

Description
Marker, indicating that hazardous event has been confirmed.

Figure 9.166 - Confirmed
Attributes
result : String[1] Confirmation result

HazardAndRiskAssessment
Package: ISO 26262 Profile
isAbstract: No
Extension: Package

Description
Grouping package for storing hazardous events.
Figure 9.167 - HazardAndRiskAssessment

IDCarrier

Package: ISO 26262 Profile
isAbstract: No
Extension: Element

Description
Additional stereotype for carrying human-readable identification data.

Figure 9.166 - IDCarrier

Attributes
id: String[1] Human-readable identifier

LessonLearned

Package: ISO 26262 Profile
isAbstract: No
Extension: Comment

Description
Comments about lessons learned from hazard and risk assessment.

Figure 9.168 - LessonLearned

Risk Analysis and Assessment Modeling Language (RAAML) Version 1.0
**Extension:** Element

**Description**
Stereotype for assigning ASIL values on system design elements.

![ASILAssignment Diagram](image)

**Figure 9.169 - ASILAssignment**

**Attributes**
- ASIL : ASIL[1]
- ASILOVERRIDE : ASIL[0..1]

**ASILOverrideRationale**

**Package:** ISO 26262 Profile

**isAbstract:** No

**Generalization:** Rationale

**Extension:** Comment

**Description**
A rationale specifically justifying ASIL Override value.

![ASILOverrideRationale Diagram](image)

**Figure 9.170 - ASILOverrideRationale**
10. Views

10.1 Core

10.1.1 Core::Core Library

View Core::Core Library::Core Library

Figure 10.1 – Core Library

Elements

• AnySituation
• Causality

10.1.2 Core::Core Profile

View Core::Core Profile::CoreProfile
Figure 10.2 - CoreProfile

Elements

Risk Analysis and Assessment Modeling Language (RAAML) Version 1.0
10.2 General

10.2.1 General::General Concepts Library

View General::General Concepts Library::General Concepts Library

Commented [AA180]: RAAML-40
Figure 10.3 - General Concepts Library

Elements
- AbstractCause
- AbstractEffect
- AbstractEvent
- AbstractFailureMode
- AbstractRisk
- Activation
- AnySituation
- Causality
- Cause
- DysfunctionalEvent
- Effect
- ErrorPropagation
- ErrorRealization
- FailureMode
- HarmPotential
- Hazard
- Scenario
- UndesiredState

10.2.2 General::General Concepts Profile

View General::General Concepts Profile::General Concepts Profile
Elements

- ControllingMeasure
- Detection
- Error
- FailureMode
- FailureState
- Fault
- Mitigation
- Prevention
- Recommendation
- Situation
- Undeveloped

10.3 Methods::FMEA

10.3.1 Methods::FMEA::FMEA Library

View Methods::FMEA::FMEA Library::FMEA Library
Figure 10.5 - FMEA Library

Elements

- AbstractCause
- AbstractEffect
- AbstractFailureMode
- AbstractFMEAItem
- AbstractRisk
- Cause
- DegradationOfFunction
- DelayedFunction
- Effect
10.3.2 Methods::FMEA::FMEA Profile

View Methods::FMEA::FMEA Profile::FMEA Profile

Figure 10.6 - FMEA Profile

Elements
- FMEItem

10.4 Methods::FTA

10.4.1 Methods::FTA::FTALibrary

Methods::FTA::FTALibrary::Events

View Methods::FTA::FTALibrary::Events::Events
Figure 10.7 - Events

Elements

- BasicEvent
- ConditionalEvent
- DormantEvent
- Event
- HouseEvent
- IntermediateEvent
- TopEvent
- UndevelopedEvent
- ZeroEvent

View Methods::FTA::FTALibrary::FTA Library
Figure 10.8 - FTA Library

Elements
- AbstractEvent
- AND
- AnySituation
- Causality
- DysfunctionalEvent
- Event
- FTAElement
- FTATree
- Gate
- INHIBIT
- MAJORITY_VOTE
- NOT
- OR
- Scenario
- SEQ
- XOR
10.4.2 Methods::FTA::FTAProfile

Methods::FTA::FTAProfile::Diagrams by elements

View Methods::FTA::FTAProfile::FTA Profile

Commented [AA186]: RAAML-5
Figure 10.9 - FTA Profile

Elements

- AND
- BasicEvent
- ConditionalEvent
- DormantEvent
- Event
- Gate
- HouseEvent
- INHIBIT
- IntermediateEvent
- MAJORITY_VOTE
- NOT
- OR
- SEQ
- Situation
- TopEvent
- TransferIn
- TransferOut
- Tree
- Undeveloped
- XOR
• ZeroEvent

10.5 Methods::STPA

10.5.1 Methods::STPA::STPA Library

View Methods::STPA::STPA Library::STPA Library
Figure 10.10 - STPA Library

Elements
- AbstractCause
- AbstractEffect
- AbstractEvent
- AbstractOperationalSituation
- AbstractRisk
- AnySituation
- Causality
- Early
- Factor
- HarmPotential
- Hazard
- Inadequate Control Execution
- Inadequate Controller Decisions
- Inadequate Feedback and Inputs
- Inadequate Process Behavior
- Late
- Loss
- LossScenario
- NotProvided
- OperationalCondition
- OutOfSequence
- ProcessModel
- ProcessModelConsequence
- ProcessModelFactor
- Provided
- RiskRealization
- Scenario
- TooLong
- TooShort
- UndesiredState
- UnsafeControlAction
- UnsafeControlActionHarmPotential

10.5.2 Methods::STPA::STPA Profile

View Methods::STPA::STPA Profile::STPA Profile
For system safety analysis:

For system annotation:

- `<stereotype>` ControlAction [Class, DataType, Signal]
- `<stereotype>` Feedback [Class, DataType, Signal]
10.6 GSN

10.6.1 GSN::GSN Profile

View GSN::GSN Profile::GSN Profile
Figure 10.12 - GSN Profile

Elements

- Assumption
- ContextStatement
- Goal
- GSNAgentNode
- GSNNode
- InContextOf
- Justification
- Solution
- Strategy
- SupportedBy
- SupportingInformation/ContextualInformation
- Undeveloped

Commented [AA193]: RAAML-25, RAAML-57, RAAML-54, RAAML-55

Commented [AA194]: RAAML-57

Commented [AA195]: RAAML-54

Commented [AA196]: RAAML-40
10.7 Methods::ISO 26262

10.7.1 Methods::ISO 26262::ISO 26262 Library

View Methods::ISO 26262::ISO 26262 Library::ISO26262 Library

Commented [AA197]: RAAML-40
Elements

- AbstractEffect
- AbstractEvent
- AbstractOperationalSituation
- AbstractRisk
- AccidentScenario
- AnyMalfunction
- AnySituation
- ASIL
- AutomotiveEffect
- Causality
- Controllability
- DysfunctionalEvent
- Early
- EnvironmentalCondition
- Exposure
- HarmPotential
- Hazard
- HazardousEvent
- Intermittent
- Inverted
- ISO26262SafetyRequirementTemplate
- Late
- Less
- Location
- More
- No
- OperationalCondition
- RoadCondition
- Scenario
- Severity
- SystemLevelEffect
- TrafficAndPeople
- TypicalAutomotiveSituation
- UndesiredState
- Unintended
- VehicleLevelEffect
- VehicleUsage

Figure 10.14 - All-Encompassing Operational Situations

Elements
- AnyEnvironmentalCondition
- AnyLocation
- AnyRoadCondition
- AnyTrafficAndPeople
- AnyVehicleUse
- EnvironmentalCondition
- Location
- RoadCondition
- TrafficAndPeople
- VehicleUsage

10.7.2 Methods::ISO 26262::ISO 26262 Profile
Figure 10.15 - RequirementManagement

Elements

- ASILDecompose
- DependabilityRequirement
- FunctionalSafetyRequirement
- HardwareSafetyRequirement
- IndependenceRequirement
- OperatingMode
- RecoveryRequirement
- SafeState
- SafetyGoal
- SoftwareSafetyRequirement
- TechnicalSafetyRequirement
- UserInfoRequirement

View Methods: ISO 26262: ISO 26262 Profile: ISO26262 Profile
Figure 10.16 - ISO 26262 Profile

Elements

- ASILAssignment
- ASILOverrideRationale
- Confirmed
- ControllingMeasure
- FailureMode
- HazardAndRiskAssessment
- IDCarrier
- LessonLearned
- MalfunctioningBehavior
- Mitigation
- OperationalSituation
- Situation
- Verified