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System Profile for Effective Cyber Threat-based Risk Assessments (SPECTRA), version 1.0

Volume 2: SPECTRA for SysML v1, v1.0 – beta 1

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Preface

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1 Scope

SPECTRA is a language for describing cyber and cyber-physical systems for the purposes of risk assessments, cybersecurity assessments and vulnerability assessments. System descriptions - including models, consist of many artifacts which are of importance for one or more lifecycle phases. For the purposes of a cybersecurity assessment, certain artifacts are of essence - for example, what are the parts of the system, how these parts are connected to convey information, what information is being conveyed, and what is the nature of the parts. Cybersecurity implies a filter for the level of technical detail, compared to other disciplines involved in the system lifecycle. Effectively extracting only the relevant cybersecurity assertions for a system description is a challenging task. SPECTRA language - a set of conceptual entities and relations, collectively referred to as Core Assertions for cybersecurity - extends Systems Engineering languages with means to identify the core entities and their relationships to support the task of interpreting and postprocessing a system description by automated tools and enabling cybersecurity analytics. SPECTRA facilitates ingesting normalized machine-consumable system descriptions into compliant tools for big data analytics in cybersecurity.

SPECTRA's objective is to provide a standard compliance reference for acquisition contracts soliciting models for various assessments, as well as tools and services for performing such assessments automatically.

This specification defines a SysML v1 profile to unambiguously identify Core Assertion in a SysML model and therefore provides a mechanism to interpret a compliant SysML model as a set of core assertions related to the SOI. This specification defines a native approach to insert SPECTRA annotations within SysML v1 models and offers a balance between formality of fully identifying the core assertions (especially relationships) at a certain effort from the modeler, and rules by which some core assertions can be derived from the SysML elements.

This specification provides guidance to the best patterns to use when building models of cyber and cyber-physical systems for the purposes of risk assessment and cybersecurity assessments.

2 Conformance

2.1. Introduction

The SPECTRA for SysML v1 profile specification defines the following two compliance points:

1. Model compliance
2. Analytics Tool (Consumer) compliance
3. Core Assertions compliance

2.2. Model Compliance Point

A SysML v1 model conforms to the SPECTRA Model compliance point shall be a well-formed SysML XMI document where some of the SysML elements are annotated with stereotypes defined in this SPECTRA specification according to the meaning, semantics and constraints described in this specification. It is the responsibility of the producer of the compliant model to choose which meanings to use, based on the need to communicate certain assertions about the system of interest. This involves the mandatory stereotypes defined in the SPECTRA Kernel to communicate the meaning of selected SysML elements in relation to the assertions made about the system of interest, as well as any extended meanings and optional stereotypes suggested by this SPECTRA specification. Authors of compliant models are expected to use the guidance material provided in this specification.

This compliance point facilitates interchange of SysML models for cyber and cyber-physical systems that can be unambiguously interpreted by the SPECTRA Consumer software (including but not limited to cyber risk assessment tools).

2.3. Analytics Tool (Consumer) Compliance Point

Software that conforms to the SPECTRA Consumer compliance point shall ingest SysML XMI documents annotated with stereotypes defined in this SPECTRA specification. A compliant consumer tool shall be able to ingest all stereotypes described in this specification. This compliance point does not restrict the capabilities of the compliant software. For example, the compliant consumer may choose to ignore some of the extended SPECTRA meanings and focus of the mandatory meanings. At this level of compliance SPECTRA allows compliant tools to have the same interpretation of the input SysML model of the SOI, as intended by the modeler achieved through the use of the SPECTRA stereotypes that were added to some SysML model elements.

This compliance point allows various analytics to be performed on the ingested models, included but not limited to the Threat-based Cyber Risk Assessment.

2.4. Core Assertions Compliance Point

Software that conforms to the SPECTRA Consumer compliance point shall ingest SysML XMI documents annotated with stereotypes defined in this SPECTRA specification. A compliant consumer tool shall be able to ingest all stereotypes described in this specification. The software compliant at the level of the Core Assertions shall provide capability to export the Core Assertions from the ingested compliant SysML model in one of the supported formats. This compliance point does not restrict other capabilities of the compliant software. Software compliant at the Core Assertions compliance point shall use the semantic rules describing the process of deriving the core assertions from the combination of the stereotype, tags, and the SysML properties of the stereotyped elements.

3 References

3.1 Normative References

- SysML v1
- UML
- ISO/IEC IEEE 15288:2015, Systems and software engineering - System life cycle process

3.2 Non-normative References

- NIST SP-800-30
- ISO/IEC 27005
- NIST SP-800-37
- SPDX
- CycloneDX v1.6 Ecma, OWASP, 2024
- NIST SP-800-53
- NIST SP-800-53a
- KDM
- Prolog

4 Terms and Definitions

No additional terms or definitions.

5 Symbols

No additional symbols/abbreviations.

6 Additional Information

6.1 How to read this specification

SPECTRA for SysML v1 is organized as a collection of *packages* (see section SPECTRA overview), including a **Kernel**. Each package defines *abstract* and *concrete* stereotypes. Packages and abstract stereotypes provide the backbone of the model organization. There are 30 abstract stereotypes across 13 packages (8 top level, and 5 subpackages of Kernel).

SPECTRA defines 129 concrete stereotypes across all packages.

21 concrete stereotypes elements are **essential** to identifying assertions about the SOI in a larger SysML model that follows a certain methodology and best practices and includes a multitude of artifacts. These 21 concrete stereotypes are closely aligned with the SysML v1, and use information available elsewhere in a SysML model without duplication. These elements can be found in the Kernel package.

The remaining concrete stereotypes constitute **an extended vocabulary** relevant for descriptions of cyber and cyber-physical systems. There are some 90 concrete stereotypes in this category. Most of them can be found in the Characteristics, Artifacts and Traits and Data packages.

The remaining few elements are **optional** and constitute the Model Navigation, Access, Behavior and Mitigation packages.

The elements **essential** for the purposes of SPECTRA are: Replaceable Unit, Conveying Element, Carrier Interface, Conveyable Element/Information Type, Flow, Capability and Thread. They can be found in the Kernel Package.

The section on **Domain Characteristics** is quite **essential** to the organization and objectives of SPECTRA, so it can be reviewed at the same time as the essential elements in the Kernel Package.

6.2 Semantics of SPECTRA metadata for SysML v1

Semantics of the SPECTRA metadata for SysML v1 is defined in terms of the implied Core Assertions about the SOI and how they can be derived from a SysML v1 model with SPECTRA annotations.

When metadata is added to an element of a SysML model, one or more core assertions are made about the SOI. This process involves several steps.

First, a certain initial claim is considered. The name of the claim corresponds to the name of the metadata. The signature of the claim is determined by the Core Assertion Metamodel. Some parameters of the claim are determined by the tags of the stereotypes, while other parameters are derived from the SysML properties of the element. SPECTRA distinguishes mandatory and optional tags and its attributes, since in most cases the parameters required by SPECTRA Core Assertions are already available in a reasonably complete SysML model.

Second, the parameters of the claim are established. These rules describe how parameters are established from the combination of the information supplied in the tags and the information already available in the SysML model and how it can be referenced from the stereotyped element.

Third, a certain custom rule is applied that uses implication to connect the claim and the specific implied Core Assertions. The claim implies making one or more core assertions. It also implies constraints and well-formedness conditions.

SPECTRA semantic description uses Prolog to describe the claims, the core assertion rules, inference rules and the core assertion infrastructure involved in managing core assertions. Prolog is an adequate approach since it combines a database of assertions and logical inference rules.

The rules for deriving parameters to claims from the combination of metadata attributes and information in the SysML model are described informally.

SPECTRA Core Assertions are outlined in Annex B of this specification.

7 SPECTRA overview

7.1 Organization of SPECTRA packages

SPECTRA for SysML v1 specifies a profile (a set of stereotypes) intended to represent the Core Assertions for cyber and cyber-physical systems within SysML v1 models. The stereotypes are arranged in several packages based on their purpose.

SPECTRA has a Kernel package that defines the mandatory stereotypes representing the key Core Assertion entities and relationships. The Kernel package consists of five subpackages.

The Characteristics, Artifacts and Traits and Data packages define extended stereotypes for cyber and cyber-physical systems.

Access, Behavior and Mitigation define some optional stereotypes.

The Model Navigation package defines several stereotypes related to using SPECTRA to annotate and refine existing SysML v1 models.




Figure 1 SPECTRA packages

Table 1 SPECTRA packages

Package	Description
Kernel	Defines the mandatory stereotypes for the parts and assemblies, conveying elements and conveyable elements. Also defines key impactful elements and functional threads. The stereotypes in the Kernel package cover the majority of the Core Assertions. Stereotypes in other packages build upon the ones defined in the Kernel.
Characteristics	Characteristics (together with Artifacts and Traits) provide a shared vocabulary to make assertions about the nature of the elements of SOI. Characteristics describe the common assertions related to the nature of various elements of the SOI.
Artifacts	Artifacts (together with Traits and Characteristics) provide a shared vocabulary to make assertions about the nature of the elements of SOI. Artifacts describe the common assertions related to the nature of the replaceable parts of the SOI, their role in missions and capabilities supported by the SOI, and their place in the supply chain enabling the SOI. Artifacts address assertions related to the unique technologies of the replaceable elements.
Traits and Data	Traits (together with Artifacts and Characteristics) provide a shared vocabulary to make assertions about the nature of the elements of SOI. Traits describe the common assertions related to the nature of the replaceable elements of the SOI and their role in the missions and capabilities supported by the SOI. The vocabulary of Traits is coordinated with the vocabulary of Operational Data (hence this package is named “Traits and Data”).
Access	The Access package defines some optional Core Assertions related to the agents involved in the operations and their access to the SOI. Access package defines stereotypes for Operator, Maintainer and Supplier and some relationships describing their access to the capabilities of the SOI
Behavior	The Behavior package defines some optional Core Assertions related to the custom language of other “activities”, performed by the SOI (either directly by one of the replaceable units or through collaboration of several units). Such activities are usually related to processing, converting, transforming various

	items, producing items, disposing of items, performing computations, making decisions, etc.
Mitigation	The Mitigation package defines some optional Core Assertions related to the Security Domain, in particular the stereotypes in the Mitigation package identify mitigation control elements and their position with respect to the mitigatable elements.
Model Navigation	The Model Navigation package defines an optional “markup by proxy” mechanism and several stereotypes that help navigate the model by excluding no SOI related part and non cyber related parts.

8 SPECTRA Kernel package

8.1 Overview

The Kernel Package defines the mandatory stereotypes needed for the parts and assemblies, conveying elements and conveyable elements. It also defines key impactful elements and functional threads. The stereotypes in the Kernel package cover the majority of the Core Assertions. Stereotypes in other packages build upon the ones defined in the Kernel. The Kernel package consists of five subpackages.




Figure 2 Kernel subpackages

The key package is Information Pathways.

Table 2 Kernel subpackages

Package	Description
Kernel::Information Pathways	Defines the mandatory stereotypes for the parts and assemblies, conveying elements, and several supporting elements that are associated with Digital Information Pathways, such as Flow, Datastore, and Carrier Interface. This package provides several detailed stereotypes for Assemblies and the so-called Independent Configurations. The stereotypes in this package address the “WHERE” clauses in the assertions about the SOI.
Kernel::Conveyable Elements	Defines the mandatory stereotypes for the digital information as it is conveyed, stored and processed within the processing element and the communication fabric, defined by the Information Pathways elements. The stereotypes in this package address the “WHAT/To WHAT” clauses in the assertions about the SOI.
Kernel::Boundary	Defines mandatory stereotypes for describing the assessment boundary, providing distinction between the model elements that refer to “external” and

	“internal” elements of the SOI.
Kernel::Impactful Elements	Defines mandatory stereotypes for identifying elements of the SOI that are of value to the stakeholders of the SOI. Since such elements are sensitive to the losses in one of the cybersecurity domains, such as Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability, the elements of this package provide the means to optionally add the corresponding measurements to the model. The stereotypes in this package address the “WHAT/Impacting WHAT” clauses in the assertions about the SOI.
Kernel::Threads	Defines mandatory stereotypes for identifying model elements that define functional threads for the SOI. The stereotypes in this package address the “WHEN” clauses in the assertions about the SOI.

8.2 Information Pathways Package

8.2.1 Information Pathway (abstract)

An Information Pathway - is a collection of elements that together describe the "geography" of the SOI in terms of "places" (nodes, parts, assemblies and sub-assemblies - referred to as Replaceable Elements), and connectors between them (channels or edges, circuits, buses - referred to as Conveying Elements) and descriptions of the flows of digital information (and some material items) between these places.

Information Pathways describe the core assertions related to the parts and interconnections between these parts and address the “WHERE?” question/clause in the assertions related to the SOI. For example, “Failure of the VHF radio causes loss of the capability to communicate”. Here “VHF Radio” is the “WHERE?” clause. Same “Capability to communicate” (which is the “WHAT/To WHAT” clause) can be also disrupted/denied at other places in the SOI.

The need for dedicated stereotypes is to clearly identify assertions about the parts of the SOI (“X is a part of the SOI”) from the rest of the SysML language-based assertions (“X is a block”).

Properties

key:String	(optional) Specifies the key for an element to be used in formally defining the indented list of equipment and groups
assembly key:String	(optional) Specifies the key of the owner of the element in the indented list of equipment;
group key:String [0..*]	Specifies the set of keys of the groups of which the element is a member

Semantics

An element identified as an Information Pathway represents an identifiable “place” in the SOI (rather than a certain element of the SysML model). Specific meanings are provided by the subclasses of Information Pathway. In particular, SPECTRA distinguishes two types of “places” in cyber systems: Nodes (Processing Elements) and Conveying Elements (communications fabric of the system).

“Places” in a description of a cyber system are usually hierarchically arranged. SPECTRA distinguishes two hierarchies: “indented list of equipment” (single master configuration) and multiple independent configurations. The “indented list of equipment” is related to the process of integrating the SOI from assemblies and parts. Each Information Pathway element can be given a “key” which can be referenced from the assembly key of another element to formally identify the owner element in the hierarchy of assemblies and parts. The key can be also used to formally identify groups to which some element belongs. These attributes are optional, needed only when the whole-part relations within a SysML model do not provide this information.




Figure 3 Information Pathways

8.2.2 Node (abstract)

A Node (can also be called a Processing Element, but SPECTRA reserves this term of a specific Application Trait) - is a block or a part that describes a "place" in the SOI. This "place" can be a set of tangible parts and connections in the actual SOI, rather than one "tangible" place. Some "places" in the SOI are tangible (e.g. a piece of equipment, or a facility), while others are intangible, virtual arrangements of other units (e.g. an Electrical Subsystem).

In any case the SysML model provides that same way of reference to this "place", e.g. a block or a part. A Node can be a bearer of information, a (possibly aggregated) producer and/or consumer of information flows, a performer of a function, a scope for a collaboration, a unit of integration, supply and maintenance, a unit of configuration, and a unit of defense by way of allocated controls.

Semantics

SPECTRA has a two-fold complementary perspective on the SOI: 1) a set of parts (replaceable units, processing elements), plugged into unique places within the communication fabric, and 2) communication fabric (conveying elements) that defines the "placeholders" for the replaceable units. Replaceable Units define the "technical surface" of the SOI. Together with the Boundary elements they identify the exact set of parts under assessment, and help identify the end-to-end dataflows through the system, especially ones originating outside of the SOI and threading through the parts of the SOI. Or ones originating inside of the SOI and threading outside of the SOI. From the CRA perspective, this information is essential to identify possible attack paths for the SOI.

Both Replaceable Units and Conveying Elements constitute the "places" in the SOI. Other "places" are aggregates of some replaceable units (and maybe also some conveying elements) - they are "above" the technical surface of the SOI.

Yet other “places” are internal parts of Replaceable Units (or even Conveying Elements) - they are “below” the technical surface of the SOI.

8.2.3 Replaceable Element (abstract)

A Replaceable Element represents a tangible node in the SOI that plugs into a unique place in a web of buses and links, and thus produces or consumes a unique set of flows and performs a unique set of functions. This is an abstract element; its concrete subclasses are "replaceable unit" and "subcomponent". Replaceable units represent a certain level of the structural decomposition of the SOI that is commensurate with the tangible conveying elements (communications fabric of the system).

A replaceable Element provides a unique opportunity for attacks in the SOI. A replaceable unit may represent a set of interdependent attack opportunities (in terms of suppliable artifacts) (e.g. a custom software image running on a specific type of hardware and a specific type of operating system). Usually, a replaceable unit is pre-integrated, pre-configured, and then supplied to be integrated into the SOI. Since a replaceable unit is pre-integrated, the specific knowledge of how it can be attacked is obtained from studying it as a whole.

The model may choose to further describe subcomponents of a replaceable unit and define their collaborations, and how each subcomponent represents unique traits (see package Traits and Data) and thus unique opportunities for attacks (in terms of suppliable artifacts). It is most beneficial for the purposes of a cyber risk assessment to consider a replaceable unit together with its (abstracted) functions, suppliable artifacts, and the flows that it serves separately from its subcomponents and their interactions. Thus, the complexity of the attack paths throughout the entire SOI end-to-end is reduced.

The interactions of subcomponents of a replaceable unit for a cyber system are quite complex and the corresponding functions are usually emergent. Therefore, it is more practical to treat behavior of Replaceable Units as irreducible, and not try to derive anything from the more elementary functions of subcomponents. This also reduces the complexity of understanding attack paths during the risk assessment.

The level of decomposition called "replaceable unit" of the SOI is relative to the scope of the risk assessment (e.g. mission context, system-of-systems, individual system and its subcomponents, as independent systems would all have different levels of what is considered a replaceable element.




Figure 4 Replaceable Element

8.2.4 Replaceable Unit

A Replaceable Unit represents a tangible node in SOI that plugs into a unique place in the web of buses and links, and thus produces and consumes a unique set of flows and performs a unique set of functions. A replaceable unit fits into a unique place defined by its connections to buses and links in SOI.

A replaceable unit may represent a set of interdependent attack opportunities (in terms of supplyable artifacts) (e.g. a custom software image running on a specific type of hardware and a specific type of operating system). A replaceable unit is usually pre-integrated and pre-configured, and then supplied to be integrated into the SOI.

From the risk assessment perspective, it is often preferable to consider the functions of a replaceable unit as irreducible, rather than as collaborations between subcomponents, providing a level of separation between replaceable units and any of its subcomponents in the end-to-end information pathways involving other replaceable units and channels.

A replaceable unit is involved in defining functional threads (various replaceable units are the “places” through which the thread “traverses”).

A set of replaceable units is the scope of collaboration.

Properties

- consumes:Flow [0..*] Specifies an incoming Flow
- produces:Flow [0..*] Specifies an outgoing Flow

Semantics

When stereotype ‘ReplaceableUnit’ is added to a block or part, the following claim is made about the SOI:

replaceableUnit(id, name, isInternal, note)

Derived parameters:

id- id of the connector in the SysML model

name - is derived from the SysML name of the element

note - is derived from the notes associated with the element

isInternal - if the element has stereotype “internal” then ‘true’, if the element has stereotype “external” then ‘false’, default ‘true’.

Implied Core Assertions:

```
replaceableUnit( Oid, Name, IsInternal, Note ) :- newid(=)Id, assertz(node( Id, 'ReplaceableUnit', Name)),
assertz(originalRef( Id,Oid )), assertz(internal( Id )), setBoundaryCrossing( Id ), assertz( note( newid(), Id,
Note ).
```

8.2.5 Subcomponent

Subcomponent - any block that is part of a replaceable unit (or a conveying element); a model of a SOI may choose to describes more levels of structural decomposition for certain replaceable units, with internal channels and flows and more elementary functions, collaborating to produce the functions of the entire replaceable units as emergent behaviors; and specific suppliable artifacts representing unique attack opportunities; for cyber and cyber-physical systems such collaborations may be quite complex, and the model may or may not have a high fidelity description of such behaviors; for the purposes of cyber risk assessment, subcomponents are ignored and their "boundary" flows and abstracted to the corresponding replaceable unit, their emergent functions abstracted to the replaceable unit, and all their artifacts aggregated and assigned to the replaceable unit. Since the corresponding replaceable unit is pre-integrated prior to its deployment into the SOI, this allows normalization of the information pathways and reduction in their complexities. The functions and flows of each replaceable unit are treated as axioms regardless of subcomponents. Marking an element as a subcomponent (of some replaceable unit) hides this element from information pathways.

8.2.6 Conveying Element (abstract)

Conveying Element - any connector or an association between replaceable units that allows a flow of information or other items; conveying element has at least one producer and at least one consumer; a special case is a "local link" where one replaceable unit is both the producer and the consumer; a conveying element supports a certain protocol stack that may involve multiple levels; conveying element is usually attackable, defendable and configurable. Together with replaceable units conveying elements describe the information pathways in the SOI (tangible/attackable connectors between tangible/attackable places). In a SysML model channels may be multi-segmented (multi-leg) connections through ports and parts.




Figure 5 Conveying Element

Properties

supports:Carrier Interface [0..*] specifies the Carrier Interface for this Conveying Element

Semantics

SPECTRA has a two-fold complementary perspective on the SOI: 1) a set of parts (replaceable units, processing elements), plugged into unique places within the communication fabric, and 2) a communication fabric (constituted by Conveying Elements) that defines the “sockets” for the replaceable units. Conveying Elements and Replaceable Units define the “technical surface” of the SOI. This technical surface identifies the exact set of parts under assessment, helps identify the end-to-end data flows through the system, especially those that originate outside of the SOI and thread through the parts of the SOI and those that originate inside of the SOI and thread outside of the SOI. From the CRA perspective, this information is essential to identify possible attack paths for the SOI.

A more specific meaning of a conveying element is given by one of the concrete subclasses.

8.2.7 Link

Link - a channel between exactly one producing and one consuming Replaceable Element.

Properties

endpoint1:Replaceable Element [1]	Specifies a replaceable element that is connected to this Link.
endpoint2:Replaceable Element [1]	Specifies a replaceable element that is connected to this Link.

Semantics

When stereotype 'Link' is added to a connector, the following claim is made about the SOI:

link(id, name, nid1, nid2, isInternal, key, assemblyKey, groupKey, carrierInterfaceId, note)

Derived parameters:

id- id of the connector in the SysML model

name - is derived from the SysML name of the element

note - is derived from the notes associated with the element

nid1 - if endpoint1 is provided, the id of that element is used. This element shall be a Replaceable Unit. Otherwise, the first endpoint of the connector is traced through ports and other connectors to an element with stereotype Replaceable Unit, and the id of that element is taken. Note, that nid1 is the id of some element in the SysML model.

nid2 - if endpoint2 is provided, the id of that element is used. This element shall be a Replaceable Unit. Otherwise, the second endpoint of the connector is traced through ports and other connectors to an element with stereotype Replaceable Unit, and the id of that element is taken

isInternal - if the element has stereotype "internal" then 'true', if the element has stereotype "external" then 'false', default 'true'.

key - is the key of the current element is provided, the key is used. Otherwise a new key is assigned to the owner element.

assembly key - if the assembly key is provided, it is used to identify the owner node. Otherwise, the owner node is derived from the part ownership properties in the SysML model, considering only the elements with stereotypes 'Assembly'. If the owner blocks or part has the key, the key is used. Otherwise a new key is assigned to the owner element.

group key - if the group key is provided, it is used to identify the owner node. Otherwise, the owner node is derived from the part ownership properties in the SysML model, considering only the elements with stereotype 'Independent Configuration'. If the owner blocks or part has the key, the key is used. Otherwise a new key is assigned to the owner element.

carrierInterfaceId – if the property "supports" is provided, then this property is used, otherwise at least one of port types of the connector shall have a type (e.g. an InterfaceBlock) with a stereotype Carrier Interface, and this type is used

Implied Core Assertions:

```
link( Oid, Name, Nid1, Nid2, IsInternal, Key, AssemblyKey, GroupKey, CarrierInterfaceId, Note ) :- findByOid( Nid1, N1 ), replaceableUnit( N1 ), findByOid( Nid2, N2 ), replaceableUnit( N2 ), findByOid( CarrierInterface, CI ), carrierInterface( CI ), newid( )=Id, assertz( channel( Id, 'Link', Name, Key ) ), assertz( originalRef( Id, Oid ) ), assertz( endpoint( Id, N1 ) ), assertz( endpoint( Id, N2 ) ), assertz( internal( Id ) ), setBoundaryCrossing( Id ), setInbound( Id ), assertz( note( newid( ), Id, Note ) ), FindNodeByKey( OwnerId, Key ), assertz( owner( OwnerId, Id ) ), setMemberByKey( Id, GroupKey ), Carrier( CI, Id ).
```

Constraints

connector shall have exactly two endpoints that have stereotypes 'Replaceable Unit'

8.2.8 Bus

Bus - a channel among one or more producing and/or one or more consuming Replaceable Elements. For example, a bus may have a single producer and multiple consumers, or multiple producers and a single consumer, or multiple producers and multiple consumers. One Replaceable Element can be both a producer and a consumer for the same bus.

Properties

endpoint:Replaceable Element[0..*] Specifies a replaceable element that is connected to this bus.

8.2.9 Network

A Network (as defined in NIST-800-53) is a system implemented with a collection of connected components. Such components may include routers, hubs, cabling, telecommunications controllers, key distribution centers, and technical control devices.

A Network involves a communication medium connecting one or more computing devices and involving common communication protocols over digital interconnections using telecommunications technologies based on physically wired, optical or wireless radio-frequency methods and arranged in a variety of network topologies. For example, an Ethernet local area network is a Network. One Replaceable Element can be both a producer and a consumer for the same network.

Properties

endpoint:Replaceable Element[0..*] Specifies a replaceable element that is connected to this network.

8.2.10 Flow

Flow - a representation of a type of item that flows between a single producer and a single consumer, involving an information type or some other (physical) kind of a Conveyable Element, a Conveying Element and a specific Carrier Interface supported by the Conveying Element. While cyber systems involve "information flows", in a cyber physical system one may find a broader range of "item flows" where items conveyed from the producer to the consumer may be physical. A flow is described as a combination of a specific channel (network, bus or link), a unique (logical) information type and a unique (physical) protocol. A channel may support multiple communication protocols.

The Conveyable Element of the Flow shall be marked by a specialization of the Operational Data stereotype. For a cyber-physical system, it can also be a Resource. SysML models of cyber and cyber-physical systems shall avoid using Carrier Data as Conveyable Element in Flows. The Carrier Interface for the Conveying Element (channel) shall be used instead.




Figure 6 Flow

Properties

conveys:Conveyable Element[1]	Specifies an Conveyable Element conveyed by this Flow (e.g Operational Data or a Resource)
carried by:Conveying Element[1]	Specifies a Conveying Element through which the Flow is conveyed
produced by:Replaceable Unit[1]	Specifies the producer of the Flow
consumed by:Replaceable Unit[1]	Specifies the consumer of the Flow

Semantics

From the SPECTRA profile perspective, Flow is an optional stereotype, since it represents the same concept as the UML metaclass it extends, called Information Flow. Once SPECTRA Replaceable Units are identified, SPECTRA Flows can be derived from the meta information of the SysML model, such as Information Flows, connectors and ports.

SPECTRA Flow shall convey Conveyable Element that are subclasses of Operational Data, or a Resource.

When metadata 'Flow' is added to a flow connection, or for any compliant flow connection that satisfies constraints, the following claim is made about the SOI:

flow(id, name, nid1, nid2, dataid, channelid, isInternal, note)

Derived parameters:

- id- id of the connector in the SysML model
- name - is derived from the SysML name of the element
- note - is derived from the notes associated with the element

nid1 - if endpoint1 is provided, the id of that element is used. This element shall be a Replaceable Unit. Otherwise, the first endpoint of the connector is traced through ports and other connectors to an element with stereotype Replaceable Unit, and the id of that element is taken
 nid2 - if endpoint2 is provided, the id of that element is used. This element shall be a Replaceable Unit. Otherwise, the second endpoint of the connector is traced through ports and other connectors to an element with stereotype Replaceable Unit, and the id of that element is taken
 dataid - payload from the “of” clause of the flow connection, or from the “in” or “out” clauses of the endpoint parts
 channelid -
 isInternal - if the element has stereotype “internal” then ‘true’, if the element has stereotype “external” then ‘false’, default ‘true’.

Implied Core Assertions:

```

flow( Oid, Name, FromNid, ToNid, DataId, ChannelId, IsInternal, Note ) :- findByOid( FromNid, N1 ),
replaceableUnit( N1 ), findByOid( ToNid, N2 ), replaceableUnit( N2 ), findByOid( DataId, D),
operationalDataType( D ), findByOid( ChannelId, C ), channel( C ), newid(=)Id, assertz( exchange( Id, N1, N2,
D, Name)), assertz( originalRef( Id, Oid )), assertz( internal( Id )), setBoundaryCrossing( Id ), setInbound( Id ),
setOutbound( Id ), assertz( note( newid(), Id, Note ), assertz( conveyedBy( Id, C)).
  
```

Constraints

flow connections shall have exactly two endpoints that have stereotype ‘ReplaceableUnit’
 Conveyed Item shall have stereotype ‘OperationalData’ or one of its subclasses, or ‘Resource’

8.2.11 Datastore

A Datastore is a repository for persistently storing and managing collections of data, which include not just repositories such as databases, but also simpler store types such as simple files, emails, logs, etc. As part of the Core Assertions, A Datastore represents “data at rest”.




Figure 7 Datastore

Properties

stores:Operational Data[1..*] Specifies Operational Data stored in the Datastore.

Semantics

Assembly key can be used if we consider datastore part of the indented list of equipment.

Operational Data stored in a Datastore does not include Resources, since once a Resource is transferred it always remains stored with the receiver.
 Using the “markup by proxy” mechanism, a stereotype for the Allocate relationship between operational data and replaceable elements can be used.

Constraints

SPECTRA datastore shall refer to subclasses of Operational Data in the “stores” association.

8.2.12 Carrier Interface

A Carrier Interface is a representation of the essential protocols supported by a Conveying Element. A protocol is a system of rules that allows two or more entities to transmit information via any variation of a physical quantity. There are two reference frameworks for describing network protocols: the OSI Reference Model and the TCP/IP Conceptual Layers. The Carrier Interface follows some industry best practices, and focuses at the Transport, Network and Network Interface layers of the TCP/IP stack, which are aligned with the levels 4,3 and a combination of layers 2 and 1 in the OSI Reference Model, respectively.




Figure 8 Carrier Interface

Properties

encoded as:Carrier Data[0..*]	Specifies Carrier Data involved in the Carrier (Conveying Element).
transport protocol:String	Specifies the transport protocols involved in the Carrier
network protocol:String	Specifies the network protocol involved in the Carrier
network interface:String	Specifies the network interface involved in the Carrier
isWireless:Boolean	Specifies whether the Carrier involves a wireless network interface

Semantics

SPECTRA is aligned with some industry best practices for representing protocols in models. SPECTRA does not provide a formal list of Carrier Traits (although it provides a formal list of Security and Maintenance Traits, and some generic Application Traits common to many a specific application domain where cyber and cyber-physical systems are developed).

A transport protocol can be identified as e.g. “TCP”, “UDP”,

A network protocol can be identified as e.g. “MIL-STD-188-164A”, “CANopen”, “TCP/IP”, “PWM”, “IPV4”, “IPV6”, “IPV4/IPV6”, “RTP”, “MIL-STD-1553B”, “RS-232”, “NMEA 0183”, “ARINC 429”

A network interface can be identified as e.g. “RF for SATCOM”, “CAN Bus”, “Ethernet”, “MIL-STD-1553”, “SONET/SDH”, “IEEE 1394”, “Wi-Fi”

Compliant tools shall enforce protocol identification in Carrier Interface elements.

The information conveyed by Flow elements shall be identified as Operational Data (defined as the union of Application, Maintenance and Security Domains) or a Resource. Carrier Data shall be associated with Carrier Interfaces (and through them - to Conveying Elements that support Flows), if needed.

Proper identification of the elements in a SysML model that relate to the Application Domain vs Carrier Domain (and also vs Security Domain vs Maintenance Domain) is essential for the proper interpretations of the SysML model for the purposes of a cybersecurity risk assessment of the corresponding SOI. Current industry best practices are often insufficient to make such distinction, and SysML language does not include any standard mechanisms to do so (as this is a concern that may not be important across the wide variety of the systems engineering situations). See also section on Domain Characteristics.

8.2.13 Node Configuration (abstract)

Node Configuration - an intangible "place" in the SOI. This is an abstract element; Node configuration represents any collection of replaceable units of the SOI, and possibly some related conveyable elements. For the purposes of cyber risk assessment SPECTRA distinguishes two types of node configurations: assemblies (functional configurations) and independent configurations. An assembly corresponds to a level in the "master" structural decomposition of the SOI, known as an "indented list of equipment". An independent configuration is any other arrangement of replaceable units.

8.2.14 Assembly (abstract)

An Assembly (also can be referred to as Functional Configuration) is a collection of replaceable units (and possibly some related channels) of the SOI, that collaborate to perform some system function and/or implement a capability. An assembly corresponds to a certain level in the "master" multi-level structural decomposition of the SOI, known as the BOM or the "indented list of equipment". This is an abstract element, its concrete subclasses are segment, subsystem and component. An SOI is a collection of one or more segments, each with zero or more subsystems. In a SysML model, this can be any block representing an arrangement of (functionally) related nodes that provides a common context for capabilities, functional threads, etc.

As opposed to a generic SysML block that can be used in a model to represent a multitude of systems engineering artifacts, views, etc., an assembly represents a very strong commitment for SOI that is aligned with the system integration and supply chain. Therefore, identifying SysML blocks that represent assemblies relevant to SOI is an important step to properly interpreting a given SysML model.




Figure 9 Assembly

8.2.15 System of Interest

System of Interest - block or part that represents the system of interest. Every SOI must be part of a System Context, which is usually also its owner. The System Context is a block or part with the stereotype “System Context” from SPECTRA Kernel:Boundary package.

8.2.16 Segment

Segment - next lower level of structural decomposition of the SOI, into independent or autonomous areas (possibly each under a distinct authority), e.g. spacecraft, ground station, launch vehicle. Each segment has its own subsystems. Segments often participate in distinct mission phases, and therefore in distinct mission (and/or capability) configurations. Therefore, segments are significant for the purposes of risk assessment.

8.2.17 Subsystem

Subsystem - arrangement of replaceable units that collaborate to provide related functions and/or capabilities, e.g. communications subsystems or thermal subsystems. Every subsystem is a child of a segment and is a parent of replaceable units or possibly components that each constitute a further arrangement of replaceable units. Subsystems are significant for the purposes of cyber risk assessment, because of their alignment to system functions and/or capabilities, and thus the related operational impacts.

8.2.18 Component

Component - arrangement within a subsystem that is a collection of two or more replaceable units (and possibly other components). Every component is a child of a subsystem and a parent of a replaceable unit or other component.

8.2.19 Independent Configuration (abstract)

An Independent Configuration is an arrangement of Replaceable Units in some different way in addition to the master Assembly configurations. An Independent Configuration also refers to an identifiable "place" in the digital pathways of the SOI. An Independent Configuration usually provides the scope of common organization and technical controls.

In a SysML model this is usually represented as a block with an IBD, that may own ports and connectors that constitute segments of SPECTRA conveying elements (channels). Independent configurations may overlap with functional configurations by extent. Functional configurations are considered primary/master decomposition of the system, while independent configurations provide a multitude of secondary overlapping decompositions (arrangements of the same replaceable units and channels).

Independent configuration is an abstract element, its concrete subclasses are organization, facility/building, enclave, subnet, group. "Independent configurations" help define the hierarchy of security assets and asset owners that are available to implement security, security constraints (policy, guidance, laws and regulations) and details where they are located (security enclaves).




Figure 10 Independent Configuration

8.2.20 Group

Group - generic arrangement of replaceable nodes

8.2.21 Organization

Organization - arrangement of replaceable nodes that has common organizational controls

8.2.22 Subnet

Subnet - arrangement of replaceable units around a common subnet (possibly in an enclave) that has common security policy and other constraints, common configuration, as well as common organization and technical controls, such as a firewall, etc.

8.2.23 Facility

Facility - arrangement of replaceable nodes that has common physical controls

8.2.24 Enclave

Enclave - arrangement of replaceable units that has common organizational and technical controls. An enclave is defined as a collection of information systems connected by one or more internal networks under the control of a single authority and security policy.

8.3 Boundary Package




Figure 11 Boundary

8.3.1 Boundary (abstract)

A Boundary (boundary-defining element) is an element that helps define the scope of an assessment in terms of an implied assessment “boundary”, which elements are inside and outside of the scope. A boundary can be implicitly defined by enumerating all elements that are inside the boundary, and all elements that are outside of the boundary. Such enumeration usually involves a certain context, which owns both external and internal elements.

8.3.2 System Context

Context - a block or part that represents the context for the SOI and thus owns parts that are external to the system of interest as well as the elements that are internal; and possibly an element that represents the SOI itself.

8.3.3 External

External - any block or part outside of the assessment boundary; usually owned by the system context directly or indirectly. The SPECTRA mechanism of “markup by proxy” allows a special dependency from an “assessment scope” element to such a block or part.

Semantics

When the Operational Data element has an additional stereotype “internal”, the following assertion is added (see section ReplaceableUnit, Application Data):
isInternal(Id,'true')

8.3.4 Internal

Internal - any block or part inside the assessment boundary; usually owned by the context directly or indirectly. The SPECTRA mechanism of “markup by proxy” allows a special dependency from an “assessment scope” element to such a block or part.

Semantics

When the Operational Data element has an additional stereotype “external”, the following assertion is added (see section ReplaceableUnit, ApplicationData):
isInternal(Id,'false')

8.4 Conveyable Elements Package

While the Information Pathways package describes the Core Assertions related to the information bearers of the SOI, the Conveyable Elements addresses the elements of Digital Information (as well as some physical items) involved in the missions and capabilities supported by the SOI.

This package addresses the “WHAT/To WHAT” clauses in assertions about the SOI. For example, “Failure of the Encrypted VHF radio causes exposure of the position information”. Here “position information” is the “WHAT/To WHAT” clause, the “Encrypted VHF Radio” is the “WHERE” clause, and the “Failure of...” is the “Impacting WHAT” clause. “exposure of ...” is a “consequence cause”.




Figure 12 Conveyable Element

8.4.1 Conveyable Element (abstract)

Conveyable Element - any type of thing that is conveyed between replaceable units that allows a flow of information or other items.

8.4.2 Resource

Resource - value or block or port type, activity pin; something that is consumed by attackable units as they perform their

functions (and accomplish missions as part of a system, and a system-of-systems), e.g. fuel, money, time-to-overhaul the engine, etc. Depletion of resources may be an objective of an attacker, often not well-accounted for by models. Various Physical characteristics can be applied to a resource. A resource should not be confused with cyber digital information, which is a distinct subclass of the Conveyable element, central to the descriptions of cyber systems.

8.4.3 Information Type (abstract)

Information Type – a digital information item that can flow between replaceable units and/or be processed by replaceable units and/or be stored at one or more replaceable units.




Figure 13 Information Type

8.4.4 Carrier Data

Carrier Data - information type that belongs to the Carrier Domain. Additional information related to Carrier Data is provided in the Carrier Interface element.

8.4.5 Operational Data (abstract)

Operational Data - information type that is operational. This specification uses the term Operational data to describe any information type that is specific to the SOI as opposed to some common telecommunication or network domain (the Carrier Data). Clear identification of the several key domains for SOI is essential for the purposes of performing cybersecurity risk assessments. See also section Domain Characteristics.

Operational Data allows several tags that provide an effective mechanism for model validation. For example, an element representing a SPECTRA Operational Data and be annotated as 'isInput=true'. One of the concrete subclasses of 'Operational Data' stereotype must be used, see also section "Traits and Data package" for some very specific subtypes that are commonly used in descriptions of cyber and cyber-physical systems). This is an assertion made by the author of the model that the corresponding information type is used in at least one Flow that is inbound and boundary-crossing. A compliant tool can then validate this assertion against all the facts extracted from the SysML v1 model with SPECTRA stereotypes.

Properties

isInput:Boolean	(optional) Specifies whether this item is used in the inbound, boundary-crossing flows .
isOutput:Boolean	(optional) Specifies whether this item is used in the outbound, boundary-crossing flows .
isStored:Boolean	(optional) Specifies whether this item is stored in any datastores
isProcessed:Boolean	(optional) Specifies whether this item is processed or transformed by Function Units (other than the ones performing basic send, receive, store or retrieve behavior).

Semantics

When an Operational Data element specified `isInput=true`, the extracted facts shall include at least one Flow that conveys the element, and where the Flow is defined as inbound and border-crossing.

When an Operational Data element specified `isOutput=true`, the extracted facts shall include at least one Flow that conveys the element, and where the Flow is defined as outbound and border-crossing.

When an Operational Data element specified `isStored=true`, the extracted facts shall include at least one Datastore that stores the element.

When an Operational Data element specified `isProcessed=true`, the extracted facts shall include at least one Function Unit that either consumes the element, or retrieves the element from a Datastore, and where the Function Unit is defined as implementing a processing or transforming behavior (other than an implicit send, receive, store or retrieve).

In terms of the CoreAssertions, these attributes imply on of the following additional assertions to the ones implied by the specific subclass (e.g. see section Application Data):

`isInput(Id)`
`isOutput(Id)`
`isStored(Id)`
`isProcessed(Id)`

When the Operational Data element has an additional stereotype “internal”, the following assertion is added:
`isInternal(Id,'true')`

When the Operational Data element has an additional stereotype “external”, the following assertion is added:
`isInternal(Id,'false')`

8.4.6 Application Data

Application Data - information type that belongs to the Application Domain. More specific subclasses of Application Data are defined in the Traits and Data package.

Semantics

When stereotype ‘ApplicationData’ is added to an Item, the following claim is made about the SOI:

`applicationData(id, name, isInternal, note)`

Derived parameters:

`id`- id of the connector in the SysML model

`name` - is derived from the SysML name of the element

`note` - is derived from the notes associated with the element

`isInternal` - if the element has stereotype “internal” then ‘true’, if the element has stereotype “external” then ‘false’, default ‘true’.

Implied Core Assertions:

```
applicationData( Oid, Name, IsInternal, Note ) :- newid(=)Id, assertz(dataType( Id, 'ApplicationData', Name)),  
assertz(originalRef( Id,Oid )), assertz(internal( Id )), assertz( note( newid(), Id, Note ).
```

8.4.7 Maintenance Data

Maintenance Data - an information type that belongs to the Maintenance Domain. More specific subclasses of Maintenance Data are defined in the Traits and Data package.

8.4.8 Security Data

Security Data - an information type that belongs to the Security Domain. More specific subclasses of Security Data are defined in the Traits and Data package.

8.5 Impactful Elements Package

While the Information Pathways package describes the Core Assertions related to the information bearers of the SOI, and the Conveyable Elements addresses the elements of Digital Information (as well as some physical items) conveyed by the parts of the SOI through Conveying Elements, this package addresses the Core Assertions related to missions and capabilities supported by the SOI.

This package addresses the “WHAT/Impacting WHAT” clauses in assertions about the SOI. For example, “Failure of the VHF radio causes loss of the capability to communicate”. Here “capability to communicate” is the “impacting what?” clause, the “VHF Radio” is the “WHERE” clause, and the “Failure of...” is the “WHAT/Impacting WHAT” clause. “loss of ...” is a “consequence cause”. Threat-based analytics will consider various attacks that can cause a certain “impact” situation.

8.5.1 Impactful Element (abstract)

Certain elements of the SOI may be sensitive to situations where there is a “loss” of the Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability, Privacy, or Safety cybersecurity objectives. An optional property measuring the Impact Level to the SOI’s stakeholders represents each of these objectives.




Figure 14 Impactful Element

Properties

confidentiality:Impact Level[0..1]	Represents sensitivity to the loss of confidentiality (if applicable).
integrity:Impact Level[0..1]	Represents sensitivity to the loss of integrity (if applicable).
availability:Impact Level[0..1]	Represents sensitivity to the loss of availability (if applicable).
privacy:Impact Level[0..1]	Represents sensitivity to the loss of private and personal identifiable information (if applicable).
safety:Impact Level[0..1]	Represents sensitivity to the loss of safety (if applicable).

8.5.2 Impact Level (enumeration)

The Impact Level measure is aligned with NIST SP-800-30 (Impact, Table H-3). This can be mapped to a 3-range measure {high, moderate, low} used in FIPS-199 by considering {very high, high} as FIPS high, and {very low, low} as FIPS low. The definitions below follow NIST-800-30.

Enumeration Literals

very high	The loss of confidentiality, integrity, availability, privacy, or safety could be expected to have multiple severe or catastrophic adverse effects on organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals.
high	The loss of confidentiality, integrity, availability, privacy or safety could be expected to have a severe or catastrophic adverse effect on organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals.

moderate	The loss of confidentiality, integrity, availability, privacy or safety could be expected to have a serious adverse effect on organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals.
low	The loss of confidentiality, integrity, availability, privacy or safety could be expected to have a limited adverse effect on organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals.
very low	The loss of confidentiality, integrity, availability, privacy or safety could be expected to have a negligible adverse effect on organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals.

8.5.3 Capability

A Capability is a strategic element that refers to an enterprise’s ability to achieve a desired effect realized through a combination of ways and means (e.g. capability configuration that involves a set of collaborating performers and channels) along with specified measures. In a SysML model, a capability can be represented as an activity, a block or a use case. A capability may depend on other capabilities, and usually involves collaboration and flows among multiple replaceable units

8.5.4 Mission

Mission - Strategic element that refers to an important task that people must accomplish. In a SysML model, a mission can be represented by an activity, a block, or a use case. Mission is an end-to-end "sequence" of flows usually corresponding to achieving a certain operational objective. Usually a mission involves multiple "phases", possibly involving different configurations of nodes, and with different functions enabled/disabled.




Figure 15 Mission

Properties

proceeds as:Mission Phase[1..*]	An ordered list of one or more phases comprising the mission.
---------------------------------	---

8.5.5 Mission Phase

Mission phase - Specific configuration involved in a mission. A Mission usually involves an ordered collection of "phases" with possibly different configurations of nodes involved, and different functions enabled/disabled.

MissionPhase element represents a snapshot of the SOI's architecture at a certain point in a Mission. Identification of such configuration is essential for assessing SOI with dynamically changing architecture, which is then represented as a series of static snapshots associated with various mission phases. Each MissionPhase configuration then has a static digital technical surface that can be assessed independently.

Properties

performs:Mission Task[0..*] Zero or more tasks that the mission performs.

8.6. Threads Package

While the Information Pathways package describes the Core Assertions related to the information bearers of the SOI, and the Conveyable Elements addresses the elements of Digital Information (as well as some physical items) conveyed by the parts of the SOI through Conveying Elements, this packages the relative timing of activities performed by the SOI as it supports missions and capabilities. This package identifies the Core Assertions in terms of functional threads through the system, as collections of Flows ordered by "happens before".

This package addresses the "WHEN" clause.

8.6.1 Functional Thread

Functional Thread - end-to-end ordered collection of flows usually corresponding to an emergent function or a capability.




Figure 16 Functional Thread

Properties

involves:Flow[0..*] {ordered} Zero or more ordered Flows involved in the thread

realizes:Collaborative Element[1] The Collaborative Element realized by the thread

8.6.2 Collaborative Element (abstract)

Collaborative Element represents an element that is defined through a set of dependencies to other elements.




Figure 17 Collaborative Element

Properties

- represented by:Functional Thread[0..*] Specifies zero or more threads that define the collaboration
- realized by:Node Configuration[0..1] Zero or one node configuration that includes the replaceable units involved in the collaboration
- depends on:Capability[0..*] Zero or more capabilities upon which a collaborative element depend

9 SPECTRA Artifacts package

9.1 Overview

Artifacts (together with Traits and Characteristics) provide a shared vocabulary to make assertions about the nature of the elements of SOI. Artifacts describe the common assertions related to the nature of the replaceable elements of the SOI, their role in missions and capabilities supported by the SOI, and their place in the supply chain enabling the SOI. Artifacts address assertions related to the unique technologies of the replaceable elements.




Figure 18 Artifacts

9.2 Artifacts

9.2.1 Supply Chain Element (abstract)

Supply Chain Element is an abstract class that represents artifacts in the context of the supply chain arrangements for the SOI.

Properties

supplier name:String (optional) Specifies the unique name of the supplier.

Semantics

9.2.2 Artifact (abstract)

Artifact - Artifact represents a unique attack opportunity and is defined as a combination of a characteristic and a reference to a unique suppliable artifact type called "Artifact image". Characteristics are defined as concrete subclasses of Artifact. From the supply chain perspective (BOM/SBOM), an artifact is something owned by an attackable unit (hardware, firmware, custom software, operating system, media, etc). Artifact is associated with a uniquely identified suppliable element called "artifact image". An artifact image can be associated with multiple replaceable units. An artifact image is further associated with a supplier and a CPE code. Note that several other important elements associated with a replaceable unit can be derived from the model, such as facility, operational procedures, personnel, policy, controls, etc. Specific artifact subclasses represent individual attack opportunities as well as frequently used common suppliable element categories.

Properties

cpe:String (optional) Specifies the Common Platform Enumeration code of the artifact
artifact image name:String specifies the unique name of the artifact

9.2.3 Software (abstract)

Software is an abstract element that represents computer programs that instruct the execution of a computing device. Detailed semantics relevant to cyber and cyber-physical systems are provided by the subclasses.

9.2.4 Infrastructure Element (abstract)

Infrastructure Element is an abstract element that represents computing devices, networking elements and storage media. In the context of risk and cybersecurity assessment of the SOI it is important to distinguish "native" infrastructure from "hosted" infrastructure, including "infrastructure-as-code", "hyper converged infrastructure", etc.

Properties

hosted in:Cloud Infrastructure[0..*] Specifies Cloud Infrastructure element that hosts the infrastructure element
isVirtualized:Boolean true when the infrastructure element is virtualized

9.2.5 Cloud Infrastructure

Cloud Infrastructure is an element that represents the hosting environment for virtualized infrastructures.

9.2.6 Computing Element (abstract)

Computing element is an abstract element that represents computing hardware. Detailed semantics is provided by concrete subclasses.

9.2.6 Network Element (abstract)

The nodes of a computer network can include personal computers, servers, networking hardware, or other specialized or general-purpose hosts. Computer networks may be classified by many criteria, including the transmission medium used to carry signals, bandwidth, communications protocols to organize network traffic, the network size, the topology, traffic control mechanisms, and organizational intent.

9.2.7 Storage Media

Storage Media - Computer data non-volatile secondary storage refers to a technology consisting of computer components and recording media that are used to retain digital data. Secondary storage (also known as external memory or auxiliary storage) differs from primary storage in that it is not directly accessible by the CPU. The computer usually uses its input/output channels to access secondary storage and transfer the desired data to primary storage (part of hardware). Secondary storage is non-volatile (retaining data when its power is shut off). In modern computers, hard disk drives (HDDs) or solid-state drives (SSDs), rotating optical storage devices, such as CD and DVD drives are usually used as secondary storage. Other examples of secondary storage technologies include USB flash drives, floppy disks, magnetic tape, paper tape, punched cards, and RAM disks.

9.3 Computing Elements




Figure 19 Computing Element

9.3.1 DSP

Dsp - digital signal processing unit. A digital signal processor (DSP) is a specialized microprocessor chip, with its architecture optimized for the operational needs of digital signal processing. The digital signals processed in this manner are a sequence of numbers that represent samples of a continuous variable in a domain such as time, space, or frequency.

9.3.2 Hardware

Hardware - Computer hardware includes the physical parts of a computer, such as the central processing unit (CPU), random access memory (RAM), motherboard, computer data storage, graphics card, sound card, and computer case. It includes external devices such as a monitor, mouse, keyboard, and speakers. Aligned with Cyclone DX component type “device”

9.3.3 Firmware

Firmware - firmware is software that provides low-level control of computing device hardware. For a relatively simple device, firmware may perform all control, monitoring and data manipulation functionality. For a more complex device, firmware may provide relatively low-level control as well as hardware abstraction services to higher-level software such as an operating system.

Firmware is found in a wide range of computing devices including personal computers, phones, home appliances, vehicles, computer peripherals and in many of the digital chips inside each of these larger systems.

Firmware is stored in non-volatile memory – either read-only memory (ROM) or programmable memory such as EPROM, EEPROM, or flash. Changing a device's firmware stored in ROM requires physically replacing the memory chip – although some chips are not designed to be removed after manufacture. Programmable firmware memory can be reprogrammed via a procedure sometimes called flashing. Aligned with Cyclone DX component type “firmware”

9.3.4 Mobile Device

Mobile Device (NIST-800-53) is a portable computing device that has a small form factor such that it can easily be carried by a single individual; is designed to operate without a physical connection (e.g., wirelessly transmit or receive information); possesses local, non-removable data storage; and is powered on for extended periods of time with a self-contained power source. Mobile devices may also include voice communication capabilities, on-board sensors that allow the device to capture (e.g., photograph, video, record, or determine location) information, and/or built-in features for synchronizing local data with remote locations. Examples include smartphones, tablets, and e-readers.

Mobile devices often emphasize wireless networking to both the local area networks and Internet and to other devices in their vicinity.

9.4 Software




Figure 20 Software

9.4.1 Operating System

Operating system - An operating system (OS) is system software that manages computer hardware and software resources and provides common services for custom computer programs and other system software. Aligned with Cyclone DX component type “operating-system”

9.4.2 Application

Application- application/custom software. artifact comprising only instructions for computer hardware, excluding operating system software, database and other common utility systems. Aligned with Cyclone DX component type “application”

9.4.3 Database

Database - database, SQL or no-SQL relational, key-valued, graph, etc. e.g. Oracle, Postgres, Redis, etc.

9.4.4 Network Controller

Network controller - telecommunication network technologies based on physically wired, optical, and wireless radio-frequency methods that may be arranged in a variety of network topologies. The transmission media (often referred to in the literature as the physical medium) used to link devices to form a computer network include electrical cable, optical fiber, and free space. A network interface controller (NIC) is computer hardware that connects the computer to the network media and has the ability to process low-level network information. For example, the NIC may have a connector for plugging in a cable, or an aerial for wireless transmission and reception, and the associated circuitry.

9.4.5 Framework

Framework - A software framework. Aligned with Cyclone DX component type "framework"

9.4.6 Platform

Platform - A runtime environment which interprets or executes software. This may include runtimes such as those that execute bytecode or low-code/no-code application platforms. Aligned with Cyclone DX component type "platform"

9.4.7 Hypervisor

Hypervisor element represents a type of computer software that creates and runs virtual machines.

9.4.8 Container Manager

Container manager - containerization is operating system-level virtualization or application-level virtualization over multiple network resources so that software applications can run in isolated user spaces called containers in any cloud or non-cloud environment, regardless of type or vendor. containerization technology has been widely adopted by cloud computing platforms like Amazon Web Services, Microsoft Azure, Google Cloud Platform, and IBM Cloud. Container orchestration or container management is mostly used in the context of application containers. Implementations providing such orchestration include Kubernetes and Docker swarm.

9.4.9 Library

Library – A software library. Aligned with Cyclone DX component type "library"

9.5 Network Element




Figure 21 Network Element

9.5.1 Switch

Network bridges and network switches are distinct from a hub in that they only forward frames to the ports involved in the communication whereas a hub forwards to all ports. Bridges only have two ports, but a switch can be thought of as a multi-port bridge. Switches normally have numerous ports, facilitating a star topology for devices, and for cascading additional switches.

9.5.2 Firewall

A firewall is a network device or software for controlling network security and access rules. Firewalls are inserted in connections between secure internal networks and potentially insecure external networks such as the Internet. Firewalls are typically configured to reject access requests from unrecognized sources while allowing actions from recognized ones.

9.5.3 Router

A router is an internetworking device that forwards packets between networks by processing the addressing or routing information included in the packet. The routing information is often processed in conjunction with the routing table. A router uses its routing table to determine where to forward packets and does not require broadcasting packets which is inefficient for very big networks.

9.5.4 Bridge

Network bridges and network switches are distinct from a hub in that they only forward frames to the ports involved in the communication whereas a hub forwards to all ports. Bridges only have two ports but a switch can be thought of as a

multi-port bridge. Switches normally have numerous ports, facilitating a star topology for devices, and for cascading additional switches.

9.5.5. Repeater

A repeater is an electronic device that receives a network signal, cleans it of unnecessary noise and regenerates it. The signal is retransmitted at a higher power level, or to the other side of obstruction so that the signal can cover longer distances without degradation.

9.5.6 Hub

An Ethernet repeater with multiple ports is known as an Ethernet hub. In addition to reconditioning and distributing network signals, a repeater hub assists with collision detection and fault isolation for the network. Hubs and repeaters in LANs have been largely obsoleted by modern network switches.

9.5.7 Modem

Modems (modulator-demodulator) are used to connect network nodes via wire not originally designed for digital network traffic, or for wireless. To do accomplish this, one or more carrier signals are modulated by the digital signal to produce an analog signal that can be tailored to give the required properties for transmission.

10 SPECTRA Characteristics package

10.1 Overview

Characteristics (together with Artifacts and Traits) provide a shared vocabulary to make assertions about the nature of the elements of SOI. Characteristics describe the common assertions related to the nature of various elements of the SOI.




Figure 22 Characteristics

10.2 Characteristics

10.2.1 Characteristic (abstract)

characteristics apply to nodes, channels, flows, information types, resources; The characteristics are common shared meanings that can be used to select appropriate rules and axioms in a knowledgebase and match them to specific elements of the SOI as represented by the model being ingested

10.2.2 Physical Characteristic (abstract)

Physical - "physical concerns for cyber-physical systems. "Physical" characteristics can be applied to a replaceable element, conveying element, or resource. Applying a physical characteristic to a conveying element refers to its physical communications medium and is a shortcut for describing the proper carrier interface. For the purposes of cybersecurity risk assessment, SPECTRA distinguishes several frequently used subclasses, usually the choice is straightforward. The characteristics are common shared meanings that can be used to select appropriate rules and axioms in a knowledgebase.

10.2.3 Cyber Characteristic (abstract)

Cyber - element that is involved with digital information processing. The characteristics are common shared meanings that can be used to select appropriate rules and axioms in a knowledgebase and match them to specific elements of the SOI as represented by the model being ingested. For a cyber system the elements are assumed to be cyber, however in a cyber-physical system it is important to distinguish cyber elements from physical elements.

10.2.4 Domain Characteristic (abstract)

Domain Characteristic is an abstract element that identifies the domain to which the annotated element belongs to. A domain is a specific subject area in which the SOI is involved, a field of study that defines a set of common requirements, terminology, and functionality for any system or a software program constructed to solve a problem in a given field. For the purposes of risk and cybersecurity assessments of cyber and cyber-physical systems, the following domains are important:

- Application Domain
- Security Domain
- Maintenance Domain
- Carrier Domain (or networking domain)

10.3 Domain Characteristic




Figure 23 Domain Characteristics

10.3.1 Application Domain

This stereotype identifies the element as belonging to the application domain of the SOI (without further specifying what that domain is, e.g. a medical device, an electrical substation, an avionics system, a weapons system). Marking an element as belonging to the application domain distinguishes it from other elements that are marked as belonging to other domains, relevant to SPECTRA (security, maintenance, carrier).

10.3.2 Security Domain

This stereotype identifies the element as belonging to the security domain. Cyber Security is protection of digital information, as well as the integrity of the infrastructure housing and transmitting digital information. More specifically, cyber security includes the body of technologies, processes, practices and response and mitigation measures designed to protect networks, computers, programs and data from attack, damage or unauthorized access to ensure confidentiality, integrity and availability. Security Domain is common to systems in various Application Domains.

Marking an element as belonging to the application domain distinguishes it from other elements that are marked as belonging to other domains, relevant to SPECTRA (application, maintenance, carrier).

10.3.3 Maintenance Domain

This stereotype identifies the element as belonging to the Maintenance Domain. Maintenance Domain is about the capabilities that support the evolution of the system (e.g. configuration, upgrades, hot-swap, patching). Maintenance involves functional checks, servicing, repairing or replacing of necessary devices, equipment, software, building infrastructure and supporting utilities in system installations. Maintenance domain is involves certain capabilities of SOI, such as logging, fault management, alerting and software uploads (configuration, patches, hot-swap updates or upgrades). Some data communications within SOI may be related to maintenance, such as delivering an image for a hot-swap without interrupting the regular operations of the system. Maintenance Domain is common to systems in various Application Domains.

Marking an element as belonging to the maintenance domain distinguishes it from other elements that are marked as belonging to other domains, relevant to SPECTRA (application, security, carrier).

10.3.4 Carrier Domain

This stereotype identifies the element as belonging to the Carrier (Networking) Domain. Computer networks are a key part of the infrastructure for cyber and cyber-physical systems. Computing devices use common communication protocols over digital interconnections to communicate with each other. These interconnections are made up of telecommunication network technologies based on physically wired, optical, and wireless radio-frequency methods that may be arranged in a variety of network topologies. Carrier Domain is common to systems in various Application Domains.

Marking an element as belonging to the carrier domain distinguishes it from other elements that are marked as belonging to other domains, relevant to SPECTRA (application, security, maintenance). Absence of a clear distinction between the application and carrier data is a common anti-pattern in SysML models that is a barrier for effective understanding of the core assertions made about the SOI.

10.4. Cyber Characteristic




Figure 24 Cyber Characteristics

10.4.1 Digital

Digital - An element involving automated processing of digital information (as opposed to human)

10.4.2 Cloud

Cloud - any infrastructure-as-code element that is implemented in a public or private cloud

10.4.3 Data Center

A data center is a set of computer systems, telecommunications and storage systems, often housed in a dedicated space such as a building or a group of buildings on the same site. While early data centers separated computing hardware from the remote terminal equipment, modern data centers usually host cloud-based virtualized infrastructure.

10.4.4 Encrypted

Encryption is the process of encoding information in a way that, ideally, only authorized parties can decode. This process converts the original representation of the information, known as plaintext, into an alternative form known as ciphertext.

Applies to Channel, Flow, Datastore (however encryption is achieved by the producer and consumer, not by the channel), but one of the protocols of the carrier interface may support encryption, which also entails exchange of crypto keys).

10.5 Physical Characteristic




Figure 25 Physical Characteristics

10.5.1 Electrical

Electrical - channel or node or flow or protocol or resource involving electrical current, usually involving some kind of conductors, e.g. house wiring for light fixtures, power substation, electronics, e.g. alarm triggers; flow or protocol involving electricity; DC or AC current.

10.5.2 Mechanical

Mechanical - channel or node or flow or protocol or resource involving physical forces or motion, e.g. brakes, wheel axle, antenna gimbal; not to be confused with computer hardware

10.5.3 Kinetic

While Kinetics is the branch of classical mechanics that is concerned with the relationship between the motion and its causes, specifically, forces and torques, the term Kinetic warfare is sometimes used as a term for military combat or other forms of directly-destructive warfare. In SPECTRA, kinetic characteristic is defined as producing a mechanical impact. It is somewhat overlapping with another SPECTRA characteristic “mechanical”.

10.5.4 Electromagnetic

Electromagnetic - channel or node or flow or protocol or resource involving electro-magnetic spectrum, e.g HF, VHF, etc.

10.5.5 Acoustic

Acoustic - channel or node or flow or protocol or resource involving sound, acoustic element (using sound-waves)

10.5.6 Infrared

Infrared - channel or node or flow or protocol or resource involving infrared spectrum, technically, this is also EMF, but this is very specific and also short range

10.5.7 Optical

Optical - channel or node or flow or protocol or resource involving optical element (usually involving lasers); over fiber optic channels or any other appropriate media

10.5.8 Human

Human - any element involving humans, subject to social engineering attacks

10.5.9 Document

Document - a physical document on some media, e.g. paper, optical disc, etc. This characteristic applies to resource elements.

10.5.10 Consumable

Consumable - a consumable physical resource (tangible or intangible), e.g. fuel, time-left-unit-maintenance. This characteristic applies to resource elements.

10.5.11 Financial

Financial - this characteristic applies to financial resources or information types.

10.5.12 Material

Material - a characteristic that can be applied to resources to describe a piece of equipment and supplied in a supply-chain management context.

11 SPECTRA Traits and Data package

11.1 Overview

Traits (together with Artifacts and Characteristics) provide a shared vocabulary to make assertions about the nature of the elements of SOI. Traits describe the common assertions related to the nature of the replaceable elements of the SOI and their role in the missions and capabilities supported by the SOI. The vocabulary of Traits is coordinated with the vocabulary of Operational Data (hence this package is named “Traits and Data”).




Figure 26 Traits and Data

11.2 Traits

11.2.1 Trait (abstract)

Trait describes the nature of a replaceable unit. Specific subclasses of Trait provide a vocabulary of shared meanings to describe the nature of the replaceable elements of cyber and cyber-physical systems. The vocabulary of Application Traits provides only a useful top-level vocabulary across multiple application domains (e.g. avionics, electrical substations, electrical vehicles, medical devices, etc. can have their own extensive domain ontologies, not addressed by SPECTRA). On the other hand, the vocabulary for Security Traits and Maintenance Traits is more detailed, as these domains are common across various cyber and cyber-physical systems.

11.2.2 Application Trait (abstract)

Application Trait entails Application Domain.

11.2.3 Maintenance Trait (abstract)

Maintenance Trait entails Maintenance Domain

11.2.4 Security Trait (abstract)

Security Trait entails Security Domain.

11.3 Application Traits

Application Traits entail Application Domain.




Figure 27 Application Traits

11.3.1 UI

User Interface (UI) - user interface component that is used by some human operator. Usually implemented as part of some custom software.

11.3.2 Command Control

Command control - decision making capability, usually implemented as part of some custom application software.

11.3.3 Controller

Controller (a control device) - is a component of a cyber-physical system that provides control signals to actuators or other physical devices. Usually, a controller is receiving digital information from other parts of the system.

11.3.4 Hazard

Hazard - A hazard is a potential source of harm. Substances, events, or circumstances can constitute hazards when their nature would potentially allow them to cause damage to health, life, property, or any other interest of value. In physics terms, a common theme across many forms of hazards is the presence of energy that can cause damage, as it can happen with chemical energy, mechanical energy or thermal energy.

11.3.5 Sensor

A sensor train represents the role of an element of a cyber-physical system that detects events or changes in its physical environment and sends the digital information to other elements, usually a processing element of some kind.

11.3.6 Actuator

An actuator is a component of a cyber-physical system that produces force, torque, or displacement, when a digital, electrical, pneumatic or hydraulic input is supplied to it. The effect is usually produced in a controlled way. An actuator translates such an input signal into the required form of mechanical energy. It is a special type of transducer.

Some systems make distinction between a control device and an actuator, where the control signal is physical rather than digital. Modern systems often involve digitally controlled actuators.

An actuator requires a control device (which provides control signal) and a source of energy. The control signal is usually relatively low in energy and may be voltage, electric current, pneumatic, or hydraulic fluid pressure. In the electric, hydraulic, and pneumatic sense, it is a form of automation or automatic control.

SPECTRA traits can cover various situations. Several traits can be added to the same replaceable unit or subcomponents, if needed. See other Application Traits, Command Control, Controller, Sensor, Transducer.

11.3.7 Transducer

A transducer is a device that converts energy from one form to another. Usually, a transducer converts a signal in one form of energy to a signal in another. Transducers are often employed at the boundaries of automation, measurement, and control systems, where electrical signals are converted to and from other physical quantities (energy, force, torque, light, motion, position, etc.). An example of a transducer is an antenna, which can convert radio waves (electromagnetic waves) into an electrical signal to be processed by a radio receiver or translate an electrical signal from a transmitter into radio waves. Another example is a voice coil, which is used in loudspeakers to translate an electrical audio signal into sound, and in dynamic microphones to translate sound waves into an audio signal. Sensors and Actuators can be considered as specialized transducers.

11.3.8 Processing Element

An element that processes (and possibly stored) digital information. A cyber-physical system can be described as a combination of sensors, actuators and processing elements. Some processing elements can be identified as Command Control elements or Controllers.

11.4 Application Data

Application Data entails Application Domain. Application Data is aligned with Application traits of replaceable elements of the SOI.




Figure 28 Application Data

11.4.1 Command

Command – digital information that is interpreted by the recipient as a command. Often an element of a cyber-physical system, identified as a Command Control, or a Controller sends Command data to a Controller or an Actuator. The application data going in the opposite direction is often identified as Status.

11.4.2 Status

Status – digital information that is interpreted by the receiver as a status report. Often an element of a cyber-physical system, identified as a Command Control, or a Controller sends Command data to a Controller or an Actuator and would expect a Status.

11.4.3 Request

Request – digital information that is interpreted by the recipient as a request/query. Often an element of a cyber or a cyber-physical system, identified as a Processing Element or Command Control, or a Controller sends Request data to another Processing Element, and would expect a Content (and possibly a Status) back.

11.4.4 Content

Content – digital information that is interpreted by the receiver as an application-specific content (e.g. in response to a request). Often an element of a cyber or a cyber-physical system, identified as a Processing Element or Command Control, or a Controller sends Request data to another Processing Element, and would expect a Content (and possibly a Status) back.

11.4.5 Alert

Alert – digital information that is interpreted by the receiver as a notification of an event.

11.4.6 Sensor Data

Sensor Data – digital information that is interpreted by the recipient as a digital description of the physical environment of the SOI, often produced directly by some Sensor. Often an element of a cyber-physical system, identified as a Sensor, sends Sensor data to some Processing Element, Controller or Command Control, possibly as the result of a Request.

11.5 Security Traits

Security Traits entail Security Domain. The elements in this package represent the common security mechanisms for cyber and cyber-physical systems and are aligned with NIST-800-53a “Assessing Security and Privacy Controls in Information Systems and Organizations”.




Figure 29 Security Traits

11.5.1 Account Management

A user is an Individual, or (system) process acting on behalf of an individual, authorized to access a system. A user account is the information about the user, often involving the identifier (such as a user name), the authenticator (e.g. a password), the access permissions, etc. Account management mechanism supports managing user accounts. This can be a service, a library, etc. Usually such a mechanism has a specific location within the information pathways of the SOI, in one of the replaceable units. Understanding the location of account management is important for the purposes of cybersecurity risk assessments.

11.5.2 Access Control

In physical security and information security, access control (AC) is the mechanism that provides selective restriction of access to a place, function, capability or resource. Usually such a mechanism has a specific location within the information pathways of the SOI, in one or more of the replaceable units. Understanding the location of access control mechanisms is important for the purposes of cybersecurity risk assessments.

11.5.3 Audit Mechanism

In the context of cyber and cyber physical systems, the audit (AU) mechanism is responsible for generating and managing audit records. Auditing is a formal, systematic and disciplined approach designed to evaluate and improve the effectiveness of processes and related controls. Audit often supports the non-repudiation objective of cybersecurity. Usually, auditing is governed by professional standards, completed by individuals independent of the process being audited, and normally performed by individuals with one of several acknowledged certifications. Usually, a mechanism that generates records for audit has a specific location within the information pathways of the SOI, in one or more of the replaceable units. Understanding the location of the audit mechanisms is important for the purposes of cybersecurity risk assessments.

11.5.4 Monitoring Mechanism

In the context of cyber and cyber physical systems, the monitoring (MON) mechanism is a capability to monitor access and other security-relevant events, network traffic, etc. and to generate and manage monitoring records. Monitoring mechanism is different from audit. Monitoring is an on-going process usually directed by management to ensure processes are working as intended. Monitoring is an effective control within a process. Management uses monitoring tools and processes to verify that controls it has implemented are working on a routine basis and that business risks are being identified and addressed. However, because management is checking on their own operations, an inherent conflict is evident in that reporting may reflect what management prefers to report instead of what the actual results portray. Also, in many respects, operational personnel have a better understanding of the data and therefore may create the most appropriate and effective monitoring tools. However, those tools are not necessarily tempered by objectivity or the perspectives/ knowledge of an experienced auditor. Usually, a monitoring mechanism has a specific location within the information pathways of the SOI, in one or more of the replaceable units. Understanding the location of the monitoring mechanisms is important for the purposes of cybersecurity risk assessments.

11.5.5 Crypto

Crypto – A cryptographic asset including algorithms, protocols, certificates, keys, tokens, and secrets. Aligned with Cyclone DX component type "cryptographic asset"

11.5.6 Backup Mechanism

Backup, or data backup is a copy of computer data taken and stored elsewhere so that it may be used to restore the original after a data loss event. The backup mechanism is a capability to conduct system backups (whether automatically or with the assistance of humans). Backups can be used to recover data after its loss from data deletion or corruption, or to recover data from an earlier time. Backups provide a simple form of IT disaster recovery; Backups are involved in the process of reconstituting a computer system or other complex configuration such as a computer cluster, active directory server, or database server. See also the Restore mechanism.

11.5.7 Restore Mechanism

Restore is the term used for creating original data from a backup. Backups are involved in the process of reconstituting a computer system or other complex configuration such as a computer cluster, active directory server, or database server. See also Backup mechanism.

11.5.8 Redundant Secondary Unit

Redundancy refers to the duplication of critical components or functions of a system with the intention of increasing reliability. Identifying a certain unit as a Redundant Secondary Unit is important for correct interpretations of the model of SOI.

11.5.9 Identification and Authentication

Identification and authentication (IA) of users is a mechanism involved in verifying identity of a user of SOI. Authentication (FIPS 200, NIST-800-53) is a process of verifying the identity of a user, process, or device, often as a

prerequisite to allowing access to resources in a system. The process of authentication may be used to validate personal identifier, verifying the authenticity of a website or a protocol endpoint using a digital certificate, ensuring that a product or a document is not counterfeit, etc. IA might include an explicit examination of any key-based, “password-less” login capability and potential risks inherent from any deficiency in key management, account management, system and boundary protection, physical and environmental protection, and other safeguards to prevent identification and authentication bypass by unauthorized users or processes acting on behalf of users.

A multi-factor authentication mechanism (NIST-SP-800-63-3, NIST-800-53) is an authentication system or an authenticator that requires more than one authentication factor for successful authentication. Multi-factor authentication can be performed using a single authenticator that provides more than one factor or by a combination of authenticators that provide different factors.

The three authentication factors are something you know, something you have, and something you are.

11.6 Security Data

Security Data entails Security Domain. Security Data is aligned with Security traits of replaceable elements of the SOI.




Figure 30 Security Data

11.6.1 User Identifier

Identifier (FIPS 201-2, NIST-800-53) is a unique data used to represent a person’s identity and associated attributes. A name or a card number are examples of identifiers. A unique label used by a system to indicate a specific entity, object, or group. Identifier is a form of digital identity. A digital identity is data stored on computer systems relating to an individual, organization, application, or device. For individuals, it involves the collection of personal data that is essential for facilitating automated access to digital services, confirming one's identity on the internet, and allowing digital systems to manage interactions between different parties.

11.6.2 Authenticator

Authenticator (NIST-800-53) is something that the claimant possesses and controls (typically a cryptographic module or password) that is used to authenticate the claimant's identity.

11.6.3 Credential

Credential (NIST SP 800-634-3, NIST-800-53) is an object or data structure that authoritatively binds an identity, via an identifier or identifiers, and (optionally) additional attributes, to at least one authenticator possessed and controlled by a subscriber.

11.6.3 Audit Record

Audit record is security related information generated from certain selected event types related to the SOI. Audit records are produced by the Audit mechanism. Audit records are often compiled into a system-wide audit trail that is time-correlated within organizational tolerances. Protection of the audit records may involve various cryptographic mechanisms.

11.6.4 Crypto Key

A key in cryptography is a piece of information, usually a string of numbers or letters that are stored in a file, which, when processed through a cryptographic algorithm, can encode or decode cryptographic data. Based on the used method, the key can be different sizes and varieties, but in all cases, the strength of the encryption relies on the security of the key being maintained.

The security of a key is dependent on how a key is exchanged between parties. Establishing a secured communication channel is necessary so that outsiders cannot obtain the key. A key establishment scheme (or key exchange) is used to transfer an encryption key among entities. Key agreement and key transport are the two types of a key exchange scheme that are used to be remotely exchanged between entities.

11.6.5 Certificate

In cryptography, a public key certificate, also known as a digital certificate or identity certificate, is an electronic document used to prove the validity of a public key. The certificate includes the public key and information about it, information about the identity of its owner (called the subject), and the digital signature of an entity that has verified the certificate's contents (called the issuer). If the device examining the certificate trusts the issuer and finds the signature to be a valid signature of that issuer, then it can use the included public key to communicate securely with the certificate's subject.

11.6.6 Monitoring Data

Data generated by a monitoring mechanism.

11.6.7 User Account

A user is an Individual, or (system) process acting on behalf of an individual, authorized to access a system. A user account is the information about the user, often involving the identifier (such as a user name), the authenticator (e.g. a password), the access permissions, etc.

11.6.8 Backup

Data that is generated by a backup mechanism and that is intended for a subsequent restore of the system.

11.6.9 Access Token

In computer systems, an access token contains the security credentials for a login session and identifies the user, the user's groups, the user's privileges, and, in some cases, a particular application. An access token is an object encapsulating the security identity of a process or thread. A token is used to make security decisions and to store tamper-proof information about some system entity.

An access token is usually generated by the logon service when a user logs on to the system and the credentials provided by the user are authenticated against the authentication database. The authentication database contains credential information required to construct the initial token for the logon session, including its user id, primary group id, all other groups it is part of, and other information.

11.7 Maintenance Traits

Maintenance Traits entail Maintenance Domain.




Figure 31 Maintenance Traits

11.7.1 Data Loader

Data loader is a utility program that receives data that represents an artifact image (or a patch) and updates the corresponding artifact in the SOI. For example, patches for proprietary software are typically distributed as executable files instead of source code. When executed these files load a program into memory which manages the installation of the patch code into the target program(s) on disk.

Patches for other software are typically distributed as data files containing the patch code. These are read by a patch utility program which performs the installation. This utility modifies the target program's executable file—the program's machine code—typically by overwriting its bytes with bytes representing the new patch code.

11.7.2 Test Equipment

Test and maintenance equipment is connected to the SOI (at least at some Mission Phases), therefore it is important to identify such elements in the model of the SOI.

11.7.3 Data Recorder

The Data Recorder element (sometimes referred to as a system monitor) is very similar to Monitoring Mechanism in the Security Domain. A system monitor is a hardware or software component used to monitor system resources and performance in a computer system and generate Maintenance records for the benefits of the maintenance team and their processes.

11.8 Maintenance Data

Maintenance Data entail Maintenance Domain. Maintenance Data is aligned with Maintenance traits of replaceable elements of the SOI.




Figure 32 Maintenance Data

11.8.1 Maintenance Record

The Maintenance Record element is similar to the Monitoring Data element in the Security domain. Monitoring Data is usually generated by a Data Recorder component (as the Maintenance trait).

11.8.2 Artifact Image

Artifact image is data that is intended to be used to modify an existing software resource such as a program or a file, often to fix bugs and security vulnerabilities (referred to as a patch). An artifact image may represent a hotfix (or a hot-swap image), a patch, a major or a minor release of the software or firmware.

11.8.3 Configuration

Configuration (usually a configuration file) is data used to configure the parameters and initial settings for some computer programs or applications, server processes and operating system settings. Some computer programs only read their configuration files at startup. Others periodically check the configuration files for changes. Managing, distributing and updating configurations is part of the maintenance domain for SOI.

12 SPECTRA Access package

12.1 Overview

The Access package addresses the “BY WHOM?” clauses related to SOI (in addition to “WHERE” and “To WHAT” clauses introduced in the Kernel Package). Assertions related to access are important for understanding the trust zones of the SOI, its internal attack surface as well as the external attack surface in the context of advanced persistent threats. Stereotype is the Access package that allows identifying certain blocks as the “agents” who are trusted to access some capabilities of the system. Access assertions are made in the form of agent handles data, agent accesses unit, or agent performs function. In addition, this package also identifies assertions related to the supply chain of the SOI in the form supplier supplies artifact.




Figure 33 Access

12.2 Access

12.2.1 Agent (abstract)

Agent - block or part that represents a human being (as a part in a complex information processing enterprise); e.g. an operator; a human can be vulnerable to subversion, deceit, can be clueless, careless or malicious; or can be vulnerable to some health and safety hazard.

Properties

performs:Functional Element[0..*]	Specifies the functions that the agent can perform
accesses:Replaceable Unit[0..*]	Specifies the Replaceable Units to which the agent has access

12.2.2 Operator

An operator is a human can be vulnerable to subversion, deceit, can be clueless, careless or malicious; or can be vulnerable to some a health and safety hazard

12.2.3 Maintainer

An agent performing maintenance. Maintenance operations can be performed at various mission phases, such as during the operational phases (hot patches, dynamic reconfiguration), during dedicated maintenance phases (planned patching or an upgrade), or during the major evolutionary upgrade phases.

12.2.4 Supplier

Supplier - Representation of a supplier of an artifact type (optional, can be uniquely derived in the form of "supplier of an artifact type xxx"), but if a model provides this information, it is important to annotate accordingly, so that this element is not mis-interpreted, and so that fidelity is not compromised

Properties

supplies:Supply Chain Element[0..*] Specifies artifacts that the agent supplies.

13 SPECTRA Behavior package

13.1 Overview

Information Pathways package through its emphasis on how digital information types (and some material items) are conveyed between the parts of the SOI, already implies certain “activities” performed by the replaceable units of the SOI namely:

- send an information item (or a material item)
- receive an information item (or a material item)
- store an information item
- retrieve an information item

Material items imply some kind of storage, once a material item is transferred to a replaceable unit, it remains stored in that unit.

Behavior package identifies Core Assertion related to the custom language of other “activities”, performed by the SOI (either directly by one of the replaceable units or through collaboration of several units). Such activities are usually related to processing, converting, transforming various items, producing items, disposing of items, performing computations, making decisions, etc.

The behavior viewpoint of SPECTRA is optional; attacks can be adequately predicted at the purely structural viewpoint offered by information pathways alone; SPECTRA allows identification of function units (and emergent functions) as refinement of the replaceable units. SPECTRA also allows identification of Mission Tasks (as they are introduced by the Mission Engineering language and are distinct from the Function Units and Emergent Functions of the SOI.




Figure 34 Functional Element

Behavior package does not introduce any new clauses; however the identification of Function Elements refines the “WHERE” and “WHEN” clauses, in comparison to a situation when they are defined only by Replaceable Elements.

13.2 Functional Element

13.1. Functional Element (abstract)

SysML activity, action or block that represent something that an individual replaceable unit does; function happens in a certain place (some functions are performed by an individual replaceable unit. A function unit is the most specific producer/consumer of a flow, other functions may be results of a collaboration within a larger assembly of replaceable units. Function may be denied by an attack, may fail to perform, or may perform at a wrong time, or perform incorrectly, e.g. fire a missile at a wrong target, or may be degraded.

13.1.1 Function Unit

SysML activity, action or block that represent something that an individual replaceable unit does; function happens in a certain place (some functions are performed by an individual replaceable unit. A function unit is the most specific producer/consumer of a flow, and an agent that stores/retrieves data from datastores.




Figure 35 Function Unit

Properties

involves:Function Unit[0..*]	Specifies functions into which the current function is decomposed
performed by:Replaceable Unit[1]	Specifies Replaceable Unit that performs the function
consumes:Flow[0..*]	Specifies Flows consumed by the function
produces:Flow[0..*]	Specifies Flows produced by the function
stores into:Datastore[0..*]	Specifies the datastores to which the function stores data and/or resources
retrieves from:Datastore[0..*]	Specifies the datastores from which the function retrieves data and/or resources

13.1.2 Emergent Function

Emergent Function - SysML activity, action or block that represent and emergent activity of the SOI, something that SOI does as the result of several replaceable units collaborating by performing their function units and engaging in information (an item) flows over channels.

Identification of emergent functions is important to avoid confusion between functions that are specific to a replaceable unit (allocated to a replaceable unit) and more abstract "collaborative" functions that may involve collaboration and flows between multiple replaceable units. Emergent functions are usually distinguished from capabilities, the latter being strategic/non-technical elements. Usually, a collaborative element such as an emergent function or a capability has corresponding functional threads, and/or functional configurations that define the set of replaceable units, flows, datastores, digital information types and resources involved in the collaboration.




Figure 36 Emergent Function

Properties

involves:Functional Element[0..*] Specifies function units and emergent functions into which the current emergent function is decomposed (shall not involve Mission Task)

13.1.3 Mission Task

Mission Taks is an activity or a task, defined in the context of Mission Engineering. Mission Task is involved in a Mission Thread. A Mission Task is different from the Function Units or Emergent Functions of the SOI (at least uses a different vocabulary, one of Mission Engineering), and depends on some of Capabilities of the SOI (and transitively on some Function Units, possibly through some Emergent Functions).

See section Kernel::Impactful Elements::Mission for more detail.

Properties

involves:Mission Task[0..*] Specifies Mission Tasks into which the current MIssion Task is decomposed

14 SPECTRA Model Navigation package

14.1 Overview

This package provides the framework for interpreting the SysML model of a SOI for the purposes of a cybersecurity risk assessment. It also describes an alternative mechanism called “Markup by proxy” on how SPECTRA stereotypes can be managed without the need to edit the main model.

14.2 Assessment Context

Assessment scope - block (usually on a newly created diagram) that lists dependencies to the "context" element and allows for multiple risk assessments of the same SysML model. This element is used to manage multiple scopes for the same model. It uses dependencies with stereotypes internal, external, black box, clear box.




Figure 37 Assessment Context

14.2.1 Assessment Context

Assessment Context element is part of the mechanism “Markup by proxy” allowing managing multiple viewpoints of the same SysML model and therefore configuring several assessments differently. For example, a model may describe the Spacecraft Vehicle, the Launch Vehicle, and the Ground Station (according to SPECTRA they are identified as several Segments), however assessments of each segment are done by a different authority at different times. Each segment becomes a different SOI, with a different Boundary. This is supported by having several Assessment Context elements (possibly defined in a separate package), where dependencies are added between each assessment Context element and the elements of the main model, and each dependency has a SPECTRA stereotype defined in the Markup by proxy section. The name of the context can be given to a cybersecurity risk assessment tool. This configuration also supports the need to use different control catalogs in each assessment.

Properties

name:String	Specifies the context name
control catalog:String	Specifies the name of the control catalog (e.g. NIST SP 800-53 rev 5)

Semantics

Context name is a key to associate one or more Mitigation Options with their Assessment Context. Context name is also a key to associate multiple Proxy elements with their Assessment Context. A compliant SysML model shall have at least one block with stereotype Assessment Context.

14.2.2 Proxy

Proxy element is an optional stereotype that is part of the mechanism “Markup by proxy” allowing managing SPECTRA stereotypes is a separate package without the need to edit the original SysML model. This is supported by having one or more Proxy elements, where dependencies are added between each assessment Context element and the elements of the main model, and each dependency has a SPECTRA stereotype. Without the use of a SPECTRA Proxy, stereotypes are added directly to the elements of the main SysML model.

Properties

context name:String Specifies the context name

Semantics

Proxy element shall be associated with exactly one Assessment Context element using a matching context name.

14.3 Model Navigation

This section defines several optional stereotypes that can significantly facilitate the interpretation of the input SysML model by automated tools. The most essential stereotype is “Not SOI related” that allows to exclude the parts of the model not relevant to cybersecurity risk assessment from being considered as part of the machine-consumable input.




Figure 38 Model Navigation

14.3.1 SOI related

SOI related - elements that are contributing to descriptions of the core assertions about the system of interest. This stereotype can be added to any SysML model element (usually an entire package) to emphasize the importance of this package for cybersecurity risk assessments. This stereotype is semantically redundant because the use of the specific SPECTRA stereotypes entails that the corresponding elements are SOI related. The use of this stereotype does not force the interpretation of other (e.g. unmarked) elements as “Not SOI related”.

14.3.2 Not SOI related

Not SOI - element that does not contribute to descriptions of any core assertions about the system of interest. This stereotype can be added to any SysML model element (usually an entire package, or an individual block). When a package is marked as “Not SOI related” all owned elements are excluded from the machine-consumable input. When the model organization follows good practices, it is easy to annotate entire packages as “Not SOI Related”, for example any analysis or model validation packages. See Appendix A Best practices for modeling cyber and cyber-physical systems with SPECTRA.

14.3.3 Selected Variant

Selected variant - variation selected for risk assessment. The use of this stereotype is essential to correct interpretation of a model that describes multiple variants of the SOI. When a block is marked as “Selected Variant” it shall be interpreted as part of the configuration of the SOI under assessment. This eliminates confusion between a model with multiple variants and a model with redundant secondary units.

14.3.4 Deselected Variant

Deselected variant - variation rejected from risk assessment. The use of this stereotype is essential to correct interpretation of a model that describes multiple variants of the SOI. When a block is marked as “Deselected Variant” it shall be interpreted as not being a part of the configuration of the SOI under assessment. This eliminates confusion between a model with multiple variants and a model with redundant secondary units.

14.4 Markup by proxy

Several SPECTRA stereotypes allow multiple perspectives of the same main model (see Assessment Context section). These stereotypes are placed on the dependencies between an Assessment Context element and a block or part in the System Context to indicate the role of this element in relation to the boundary and scope of the assessment.




Figure 39 Markup by Proxy

14.4.1 box in (abstract)

14.4.2 excluded in

Optional stereotype that allows excluding certain elements from a specific assessment. This stereotype is similar to “Not SOI related” stereotype.

14.4.3 14.4.3 internal white box in

White box - a block or a part in the "context" that the given risk assessment must consider as a clear box, i.e. considering any internal flows and functions defined by this block (down to attackable units); also, a special dependency from “assessment scope” to such block or part

14.4.4 internal black box in

Black box - a block or a part in the "context" that the given risk assessment must consider as a black box, i.e. aggregating any internal flows and functions; in terms of the information pathways, this block is the only "place" that is to be considered (and not constituent attackable units); also, a special dependency from the “Assessment context” to such block or part

14.4.5 external white box in

White box - a block or a part in the "context" that the given risk assessment must consider as a clear box, i.e. considering any internal flows and functions defined by this block (down to attackable units); also, a special dependency from “assessment scope” to such block or part

14.4.6 external black box in

Black box - a block or a part in the "context" that the given risk assessment must consider as a black box, i.e. aggregating any internal flows and functions; in terms of the information pathways, this block is the only "place" that is to be considered (and not constituent attackable units); also, a special dependency from the “Assessment context” to such block or part

15 SPECTRA Mitigation package

15.1 Overview

This package is optional. It provides a mechanism to annotate certain elements in the model as representations of security controls with references to a certain common security control catalog. Examples of a Security Control Catalog are NIST SP-800-53 and ITSG-33. The elements in this package entail Security Domain. Some security controls overlap with Security Traits (as Security Traits represent the security mechanisms, aligned with NIST-800-53). Allocated Control Elements can be further stereotyped with Security Traits.




Figure 40 Mitigation

15.2 Mitigation

Mitigation elements entail Security Domain.

15.2.1 Allocated Control

Allocated Control - representation of a statement, that a control type x from a certain control catalog, has been allocated to a certain node, or channel. By allocating controls to attackable units (as well as related channels, protocols and configurations) we can consider various related functional threads and understand segments of threads that are mitigated; by considering threads we can see how our protection covers other attackable targets; we can also understand control by-passes.

Some security controls overlap with Security Traits (as Security Traits represent the security mechanisms, aligned with NIST-800-53). Allocated Control Elements can be further stereotyped with Security Traits.

Properties

control name:String	Specifies the name of the control (as defined in the control catalog, identified in the Assessment Context element)
option key:String	Specifies the key of the mitigation option to which the allocated control belongs
allocated to:Mitigatable Element[1]	Specifies the Mitigatable Element to which the control is allocated (the scope of the control)

Semantics

Each Allocated Control element shall be associated with a Mitigation Option by using a matching option key string. The control name of the allocated control must match exactly one control type name for the corresponding Control Catalog. The Control Catalog is identified through the association between the Mitigation Option and its Assessment Context element, as the property control catalog of the later. SPECTRA does not enforce the identification of the control catalog by the control catalog string. Managing the identification of the control name in the corresponding control catalog shall be the responsibility of the compliant tools, and part of the SPECTRA validation capability. Each Allocated Control element shall identify a specific Mitigatable Element as its scope, thus defining the exact place of the control in the Information Pathways of the SOI.

15.2.3 Mitigation Option

Mitigation Option - also known as Security Control Traceability Matrix (SCTM) – a collection of allocated controls for the replaceable units and channels of the system under assessment, especially if more than one collection is under consideration, e.g. several desired mitigation plans, several milestones, etc. This mechanism allows managing several collections of security controls, for example, as alternatives that are subject to the evaluation during the assessment, or as “before” and “after” snapshots, or as several milestones, etc. Each Mitigation Option is associated with an Assessment Context. A Mitigation Option may describe the baseline to be used by the assessment, which the Assessment Context defines the Control Catalog as the context in which control names and baselines are interpreted.

Properties

option key:String	Specifies a unique key of the mitigation option (shared by the allocated controls that belong to this mitigation option).
baseline name:String	(optional) Specifies the name of the baseline (as defined in the control catalog, identified in the Assessment Context element)
context name:String	Specifies the name of the Assessment Context element to which this Mitigation Option belongs

Semantics

Each Mitigation Option shall be associated with an Assessment Context element by using the matching context name. If Allocated Control elements are used, the model shall have at least one block with the stereotype Mitigation Option.

15.2.3 Mitigatable Element (abstract)

Mitigatable Element is an abstract class that is defined as a union of SPECTRA elements to which allocated controls may be applied. Using a certain SPECTRA element as a Mitigatable Element to identify the placement of some security controls and their scope does not entail Security Domain for the Mitigatable Element.




Figure 41 Mitigatable Element

Annex A: Best Practices for modeling cyber and cyber-physical systems with SPECTRA

(informative)

A.1 Overview

SPECTRA does not restrict the content of a SysML model - the content is determined by the objectives of the project and the systems engineering methodology. SPECTRA is concerned with the model as an artifact from which the core assertions about the SOI must be elicited for the purposes of a cybersecurity risk assessment. Therefore, SPECTRA for SysML v1 provides a set of stereotypes to markup some elements of a SysML model of SOI to refine their meaning in the context of the Core Assertions for cyber as assertions about the SOI itself.

Multiple SysML textbooks are available. When a modeler follows [2] and [3], two models will be slightly different in their organization, will use different SysML patterns and different modeling conventions - where the conventions are not covered by the standard definitions of SysML.

SPECTRA stereotypes can be added to existing models to facilitate interpretation of some key model elements as core assertions about the SOI. SPECTRA also adds several stereotypes that can be used to express some concepts that are not defined in the standard SysML, but that are essential for cyber and cyber-physical systems (in the context of risk and cybersecurity assessment). Some of these stereotypes have been suggested in the SysML textbooks.

In the case of developing a new SysML model of a cyber or a cyber-physical system, the modeler can use these best practices as the guidance and develop SPECTRA elements and the rest of the SysML model in a coordinated effort.

SPECTRA's criteria for how to select a certain pattern is based on how well a pattern represents a certain core assertion for cyber.

A.2 Organization of the model

SysML models are organized using packages [1]. Establishment of the organization of the model in terms of the overall package structure is considered a critical step prior to initiating modeling effort. Good model organization can enhance modeling effectiveness. An effective model organization facilitates reuse of model elements, easy access, and navigability among model elements. It can also support access control to parts of the model, configuration management of the model and exchange of modeling information with other tools [1].

Textbook [1] suggest the following principles to organize a model:

- by system hierarchy (e.g. system level, element level, component level);
- by process lifecycle, where each model subpackage represent a stage in the process (e.g. requirements analysis, system design);
- by teams that are working on the model (e.g requirements team, integrated product team);
- by the kind of model elements it contains (e.g requirements, behavior, structure);
- by model elements that are likely to change together;
- by model elements organized to support reuse (e.g. model libraries);
- by other logical or cohesive groupings of model elements based on defined model-partitioning criteria;
- a combination of the preceding principles

Organizing model by process lifecycle and system hierarchy

A robust model organization is illustrated in INCOSE publication [2]. The spacecraft model consists of a top-level package with nested packages that contain model elements. The model organization includes packages to capture specification and design data for the mission, Spacecraft, other mission elements, and supporting model elements.




Figure 42 Example of a model organization by process lifecycle and system hierarchy

The top-level package is called the Spacecraft Mission Context, which contains nested packages that define the mission specification and design, including the Mission Requirements, Structure, Use cases, Behavior and Analysis. The Spacecraft package contains nested packages to define the Spacecraft specification and design, including the Black Box Specification, Physical Architecture, and Verification. The Ground Station, Launch Vehicle, and Launch Operations Facility packages contain similar model elements that describe them.

The Supporting Elements package contains supporting information in the Interface Definitions, Value Types, and Viewpoints packages. The Interface Definitions package contains model elements that can be reused throughout the system, such as flows, signals and port definitions. The Value Types package contains the library of quantities and units used in the model. The viewpoints package contains the viewpoints that identify stakeholders and their concerns.

The naming convention recommended in [2] uses number prefixes to ensure that the packages are displayed in the desired order in the Containment Tree. Note, that the Model Organization diagram is made exclusively for consumption by humans and has no formal meaning in SysML.

Here 6-Spacecraft, 6-Ground Station, 8-Launch Vehicle and 9-Launch Operating Facility are the SPECTRA “Segments”.

From the perspective of using this model to obtain the core assertion about the SOI, several packages are obviously not relevant: 5-Analysis, 6-Spacecraft::Verification. These and several other packages (not shown in the illustrations in this Appendix) must be marked with “Not SOI related” stereotype to be excluded from ingestion by automated tools.




Figure 43 Containment Tree for example model organization of the Spacecraft

The first level of the model organization is by process lifecycle. The second level is by System hierarchy: first Segments, then subsystems for each segment, then replaceable units for each subsystem.

Model organization for each Segment follows the pattern illustrated above.

MagicGrid model organization

Publication [3] recommends a similar approach based on phases of the lifecycle and system hierarchy.

This approach provides improved alignment with ISO/IEC/IEEE 15288 systems engineering life cycle processes.

The Problem domain level covers the Stakeholder Needs and Requirements Definition process. The purpose of the problem domain definition is to analyze stakeholder needs and refine them with SysML elements to get the clear and coherent description of what functions are expected from the SOI in the defined environment [3].

The problem domain analysis is performed in two phases. In the first phase, the SOI is considered as a block box. The main focus is on how it interacts with the defined environment or mission context. The packages to represent the artifacts created at this phase correspond to the packages in the Mission Level and the Spacecraft:Black Box Specification in the previous section. In the second phase the SOI is analyzed from the white-box perspective, which helps to understand the conceptual structure and the behavior of the SOI [3].




Figure 44 MagicGrid model organization

The solution domain model defines a logical architecture of the SOI to solve the problem defined in the problem domain. As the same problem definition can have several solutions, a trade-off analysis can be performed to choose the optimal solutions for implementing the system [3]. Creating the solution domain model consists of specifying requirements, structure, behavior and parameters of the SOI – see package “2 Solution Domain 3”. The rest of the model organization consists of the packages for a logical architecture of each subsystem (see package “2.1 Avionics Subsystem Solution Domain”) and the System Configuration package. Building the system configuration model is the final phase of specifying the solution domain. The goal of this phase is to build the integrated model of the SOI and validate it.




Figure 45 Containment Tree for the MagicGrid model organization

Note a mismatch between the first approach (Black-Box and Physical Architecture), and the second approach (Black Box, White-box/Conceptual architecture and Logical Architecture). An approach supporting the full systems engineering process for a complex SOI may include both Logical and Physical Architecture.

Note, that the resulting artifact defines each part of the system multiple times: first as part of the conceptual architecture, then as part of the Logical architecture for each solution (and then possibly again as part of the Physical Architecture).

SPECTRA stereotypes must be used to unambiguously identify the unique set of parts (Replaceable Units) in the SOI.

First, the packages for alternative solution domains (“2 Solution Domain 1” and “2 Solution Domain 2”) must be annotated with stereotype “Deselected Variant”. The package for the selected solution “2 Solution 3” must be annotated with the stereotype “Selected Variant”.

Second, only the leaf-level definitions of the subsystems and part must be identified with stereotypes “Subsystem” and “Replaceable Unit”. As the result, compliant tools will be able to extract the complete set of Replaceable Units avoiding ambiguity and duplication.

SPECTRA allows establishing multiple assessment contexts for the same model using the “Markup by proxy mechanism”. So the SPECTRA data can be configured to perform risk assessments on the Conceptual Architecture, and/or Logical Architecture instead of the leaf-level system configuration, if needed.

Note, the use of the string “Subsystem” in the package name does not have a recognizable standard meaning in SysML, so this alone is not sufficient to interpret a certain SysML block as a subsystem in SOI. SPECTRA addresses this by using stereotype “Subsystem”.

Organizing model by kind of model element

Some organizations recommend a model organization based on the kind of model elements. This approach can even go further and have separate structure for model elements and diagrams. An example of this model organization is illustrated below.

This approach is more light-weight compared to the two approaches above and is often used to model an as-built architecture of the SOI. This approach is less robust and may not facilitate reuse as well as the other two approaches.




Figure 46 Example of model organization by the kind of model element

As the other two approaches, placing blocks that represent subsystems in SOI into a package with the string “subsystem” in its name is a naming convention that has no standard meaning in SysML. SPECTRA addresses this by adding a stereotype “Subsystem” to each block. Adding a stereotype “Subsystem” to the entire package is not robust enough as other blocks may be placed into this package accidentally, or when the model organization involves elements of the system hierarchy.




Figure 47 Containment Tree for the model organization by model element kind

A.3 System/Mission Context

According to SPECTRA, the block definition diagram that sets the context for the SOI must be identified. The context diagram includes the SOI, as well as the elements that the SOI directly or indirectly interacts with throughout its operational environment, or its mission context. This usually includes other systems, users and the SOI’s external environment. All model organizations described in the Appendix support this approach, so adding SPECTRA stereotype “System Context” is usually quite straightforward.




Figure 48 Mission Context in Containment Tree




Figure 49 Mission Context

Note that the Spacecraft model is already using a proprietary stereotype “system of interest” to identify a block that represents the entire SOI in the System Context. SPECTRA defines a stereotype “System of Interest”. Block “Mission Context” must be marked with SPECTRA stereotype “System Context” (defined in the Boundary package). Blocks Earth, Fire Department, GPS, Spacecraft Environment and Space Environment must be marked with stereotype External (defined in the Boundary package). Blocks Launch Ops Facility, Launch Vehicle, Ground Station, Relay Satellite may be marked as External or as Internal depending on the scope of the assessment. Further, these blocks must be marked as “Segment”. Block Region is part of the block Earth, so compliant tools will interpret it as External. Block Mission Enterprise does not correspond to anything tangible in the SOI, therefore so SPECTRA stereotypes are necessary. This block correspond to the concept of an “implicit boundary of assessment”, introduces in SPECTRA Boundary package.




Figure 50 External and Internal elements in the System Context

A.4 Segments

Large cyber and cyber-physical systems often involve multiple segments (they can be called “zones”, etc.). Thus the Spacecraft model has several segments, e.g. Ground Station and Spacecraft. The INCOSE model organization described above recommends using segments as a level in model organization based on the system hierarchy.




Figure 51 Spacecraft Segments in the Containment Tree

SPECTRA identifies segments with a stereotype “Segment”.

A.5 Subsystems

Subsystem is a well-recognized level in system hierarchy. SPECTRA recommends identifying subsystems (as opposed to using a more generic stereotype Component) since a risk analyst may be interested in e.g. risk distribution per subsystems. This is usually a meaningful measurement, since subsystems provide a non-overlapping coverage of all (or most) Replaceable Units in the system. No such entailment is possible for Components, as they can be arbitrary nested. All model organization examples described above recommend using subsystems as a level in model organization based on the system hierarchy.

Note, that in a multi-level model organization, like MagicGrid, only one set of model elements, representing a subsystem must be stereotypes as Subsystem (usually at the leaf level).




Figure 52 Spacecraft Subsystems in the Containment Tree



Figure 53 Block representing a subsystem




Figure 54 Subsystem architecture (ibd) showing replaceable elements




Figure 55 All blocks representing subsystems are in the same package

A.6 Replaceable units

Proper identification of the “digital technical surface” of the SOI is the key activity in SPECTRA. Assemblies, sub-assemblies and parts are often referred to as the Indented List of Equipment for the SOI.




Figure 56 Diagram showing the Indented List of Equipment in the Containment Tree




Figure 57 Indented list of Equipment in SysML




Figure 58 Replaceable Element in the Avionics Subsystem of the Spacecraft

A.7 Conveying Elements




Figure 59 Buses and links in the Spacecraft model

A.8 Carrier Interfaces




Figure 60 Conveying Elements with Application Domain Flows and Carrier Domain interface blocks




Figure 61 Carrier Domain Interface Blocks

A.9 Artifacts: hardware and software




Figure 62 Hardware and Software Artifacts in Containment Tree




Figure 63 Subcomponents of a Replaceable Unit with Hardware and Software Artifacts

A.10 Conveying Elements




Figure 64 Conveying Elements in the Containment Tree

A.11 Functional units




Figure 65 Functional Elements in the Containment Tree

A.12 Functional threads




Figure 66 Function Threads in the Containment Tree




Figure 67 Function Thread Perform Mission represented by an Activity Diagram




Figure 68 Function Thread Launch S/C




Figure 69 Mission Level function threads (black box)




Figure 70 System level function threads (white box)




Figure 71 Subsystem level function threads

A.13 Capabilities and missions




Figure 72 Capabilities represented by use cases




Figure 73 Mission-level capabilities




Figure 74 System-level capabilities




Figure 75 Capability defined as a Collaborative Element by an activity diagram

A.14 Using SysML for mission engineering

A.15 Access

A.16 Activity diagrams

A.17 Signals

A.18 State Diagrams

A.20 Sequence Diagrams

A.21 Domains

Application

Carrier

Maintenance

Security

- the amount of detail in the security domain greatly depends on whether the model is developed in the early lifecycle phase or later phases (for example a typing systems engineering project will develop the model prior or soon after the inception of the system; however one may retrofit a model later for the purposes of risk assessment)
- Do not do anything special for spectra (at the early lifecycle phases it may be beneficial to delay certain commitments)
- If your model involves security elements - use spectra stereotypes

Annex B: SPECTRA Core Assertions

(informative)

B.1 Overview

This section provides an overview of the SPECTRA Core Assertions. Core Assertions are defined by the SPECTRA Core Assertions Metamodel. This Appendix outlines the Core Assertions, as the foundation for defining the semantics of SPECTRA metadata for SysML v2. This is not a full specification of the Core Assertions Metamodel.

Prolog-like clauses were selected as the mechanism for describing the Core Assertions because of the fact that Prolog combines assertions to a database of facts, and logical inferences, and because of the abundance of practical tools. The definitions based on Prolog can be easily transferred to a multitude of other languages (relational database schemas, json, etc.) and other formalisms. Also the choice of Prolog for describing Core Assertions emphasized the technical and pragmatic nature of these definitions, leaving a full SPECTRA Ontology as a separate specification in the SPECTRA family.

B.2 Semantic Foundation

Core Assertions define some entities and relationships. The foundation for the Core Assertions has a simple triple organization.

Meta-term	Description
entity(id,noun)	meta-term representing an assertion that a certain entity exists, and that it can be uniquely identified by an identifier <i>id</i> , and that it belongs to some class, identified by <i>noun</i> .
attribute(id, name, value)	meta-term representing an assertion that a certain entity identified by an identifier <i>id</i> , has an attribute with name <i>name</i> , and with value <i>value</i> .
relationship(verbphrase,fromid,toid)	meta-term representing an assertion that a certain entity identified by an identifier <i>fromid</i> , has a relationship to another entity identified by <i>toid</i> , and the class of the relationship is identified by <i>verbphrase</i> .

Specific Core Assertions are defined as follows:

```
node( Id,Noun,Name) :- entity( Id,'Node' ), attribute( Id,noun, Noun), attribute( Id,'name',Name).
owner( Nid1, Nid2 ) :- relationship('nodeOwnsNode',Nid1,Nid2).
```

Semantics of the SPECTRA metadata for SysML v2 defines how custom instances of core assertions for a specific SOI are constructed from a well-formed SysML v2 model with compliant SPECTRA metadata for selected elements.

Custom assertions are facts, for example:

```
node('n01','ReplaceableUnit','SATCOM Radio').
node('n02','Subsystem','Communications Subsystem').
owner( 'n02', 'n01' ).
```


The definition of the Core Assertion Schema involves the following terms:

Term	Description
schemadef(sid, name, version)	asserting existence of a Core Assertions Schema identified by <i>sid</i> and name <i>name</i> , also providing a <i>version</i> tag for this schema to manage the schema evolution.
entitydef(sid, noun)	asserting that schema identified by <i>sid</i> involves an entity class identified by <i>noun</i>
attributedef(sid, noun, name, type)	asserting that within the schema identified by <i>sid</i> an entity class identified by <i>noun</i> involves an attribute identified by <i>name</i> , with values belonging to type <i>type</i>
relationshipdef(sid, verbphrase, verb, noun1, noun2)	asserting that schema identified by <i>sid</i> involves a relationship class identified by <i>verbphrase</i> , that involves a verb <i>verb</i> , and two <i>nouns</i> . The <i>verbphrase</i> can be verbalized as “ <i>noun1 verb noun2</i> ”
typedef(sid, type)	asserting that within the schema identified by <i>sid</i> involves a primitive type identified by <i>type</i>
subclassdef(sid, noun1, noun2)	asserting that within the schema identified by <i>sid</i> the class identified as <i>noun1</i> is a subclass of the class identified by <i>noun2</i>
abstractdef(sid, noun)	asserting that within the schema identified by <i>sid</i> the involves an abstract class identified as <i>noun1</i>

Definition of the schema constitutes additional facts, for example:

```
schemadef( 's1', "SPECTRA Core Assertions", '1.0').
abstractdef( 's1', 'Node' ).
attributedef( 's1', 'Node', noun, 'String').
attributedef( 's1', 'Node', 'name', 'String').
abstractdef( sid, 'Node' ).
abstractdef( 's1', 'ReplaceableElement' ).
entitydef( 's1', 'ReplaceableUnit' ).
subclassdef( sid, 'ReplaceableUnit' , 'ReplaceableElement').
subclassdef( sid, 'ReplaceableElement' , 'Node').
typedef( 's1', 'String').
typedef( 's1', 'Boolean').
relationshipdef( 's1', nodeOwnsNode, 'owns', 'Node','Node').
```

B.3 Core Assertions

This section enumerates the Core Assertions. This section focuses on the assertions related to SPECTRA Core entities and provides only a few examples of SPECTRA Core relationships. Full specification of the SPECTRA Core Assertions is provided in the SPECTRA Core Assertions Metamodel specification. The objective of this section is to describe the key terms used in the semantic formulations in this specification, and to demonstrate the flexibility of the selected approach to describing the semantics of SPECTRA for SysML v2. This approach allows a multitude of “schemas” that can represent the facts extracted from a SysML v2 model annotated with SPECTRA metadata - ranging from a triple store format to a metamodel-driven format. This section demonstrates a hybrid format: instead of defining an individual

term for each SPECTRA entity, the list below defines a common class for a selected abstract entity, e.g. “node”, where the specific subclass of the entity is represented by its noun. The mapping of these terms is described by simple inference rules, as demonstrated in the Semantic Foundation section above.

Table 3. Specific Core Assertions

Term	Description
node(id,noun,name)	foundation for assertions that an element with certain id and name in a SysML model is one of the subclasses of metadata Node; the noun is the literal representing of the concrete subclasses of Node, e.g. ‘ReplaceableUnit’
channel(id, noun, name)	foundation for assertions that element with certain id and name in a SysML model is one of the subclasses of metadata ConveyableElement; the noun is the literal representing of the concrete subclasses of Node, e.g. ‘Link’
endpoint(nid, cid)	assertion that a node with id nid is an endpoint for the channel with id cid
owner(nid1, nid2)	assertion that node nid1 is the owner of node with id nid2
member(nid1, nid2)	assertion that node nid1 belongs to group nid2
datatype(id, noun, name)	foundation for assertions involving stereotype InformationType; the noun is the literal representing of the concrete subclasses of OperationalData, e.g. ‘ApplicationData’ or ‘Request’
exchange(id, fromid, toid, dataid)	foundation for assertions that element with id is a Flow
carrierInterface(id, name, p1, p2, p3, isWireless)	foundation for assertions that element with id is a CarrierInterface
datastore(id, name)	foundation for assertions that element with id is a Datastore
agent(id, noun, name)	foundation for assertions that element with id is one of the subclasses of Agent; the noun is the literal representing of the concrete subclasses of Agent, e.g. ‘Operator’
capability(id, name)	foundation for assertions that element with id is a Capability
mission(id, name)	foundation for assertions that element with id is a Mission
missionPhase(id, name)	foundation for assertions that element with id is a MissionPhase
function(id, noun, name)	foundation for assertions that element with id is one of the subclasses of FunctionElement; the noun is the literal representing of the concrete subclasses of Node, e.g. ‘EmergentFunction’
thread()	foundation for assertions that element with id is a Functional Thread
characteristic(ownerid, noun)	foundation for assertions that element with id is one of the subclasses of Characteristic

artifact(id, noun, ownerid)	foundation for assertions that element with id is one of the subclasses of Artifact; the noun is the literal representing of the concrete subclasses of Artifact, e.g. 'Hardware'
trait(id, noun, ownerid)	foundation for assertions that element with id is one of the subclasses of Trait; the noun is the literal representing of the concrete subclasses of Trait, e.g. 'Controller'
internal(id, value)	assertion that element with id is internal (true) or external (false)
boundaryCrossing(id)	assertion that element with id is boundary-crossing
inbound(id)	assertion that element with id is inbound
outbound(id)	assertion that element with id is outbound
input(id)	assertion that operational data with id is input
output(id)	assertion that operational data with is is output
stored(id)	assertion that operational data with id is stored
processed(id)	assertion that operational data with id is stored
impactLevel(id, objective, level)	assertion that impactful element with id has Impact Level
note(id, ownerid, text)	assertion that element with id has a comment or a note

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